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Abstrac t
This resea rch  s e t  out t o  explo re  how s t r a t e g i c  change d ec i s io n s  
were made by management of  a state-owned e n t e r p r i s e  in the  
developing country -  Lesotho. The a n c i l l i a r y  o b je c t iv e  of 
the  study was to  e s t a b l i s h  how s t r a t e g i c  changes a f fe c ted  the  
e n t e r p r i s e ' s  performance.
Given the  exp lo ra to ry  na tu re  of  the  study and the  genera l  pauc i ty  
of research  on t h i s  s u b je c t  in Afr ica  in p a r t i c u l a r ,  the  re sea rch  
approach was predominantly q u a l i t a t i v e .  I t  followed a h i s t o r i c a l  
in-depth in te rv iews in o rde r  to  ge t  th e  a c t o r s '  own i n t e r p r e t ­
a t io n s  and pe r sp ec t iv e s  of the  s t r a t e g i c  change nego t ia t io n s  
as they encountered them or  were d i r e c t l y  involved in the  p rocess .  
S t rauss  (1978) Negot ia t ion  p e r sp ec t iv e  was u t i l i s e d  to  analyse  
the  s t r a t e g i c  change p rocess .
The process of s t r a t e g i c  change as analysed in t h i s  study has 
ind ica ted  t h a t  the  SOE i s  not a monoli th ic  e n t i t y  with c r i s p  
c o n s i s t e n t  o b je c t iv e s  and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of the  corpora te  
s t r a t e g y .  Rather,  i t  r e p re se n t s  a c o a l i t i o n  of d ive rse  i n t e r n a l  
and ex te rna l  a c to r s  with s h i f t i n g  i n t e r e s t s  and d i f f e r e n t i a l  
power bases .  S t r a t e g i c  dec i s ions  emanate from a p l u r a l i t y  
of  c o n f l i c t i n g  and fragmented i n t e r e s t s  of s t a t e ' s  macro so c io ­
p o l i t i c a l  o b j e c t iv e s ,  t h e  management and o th e r  s takeholders  
micro economic o b je c t iv e s ;  d is sensus  i s  r i f e  within  t h i s  t r i a d i c  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  on th e  l i n e s  of a c t ion  t h a t  th e  corpora t ion  should 
fo l low.  Given th e  fragmenta t ion  of i n t e r e s t s  and a u th o r i ty  t o  
in f luence  s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s io n s ,  th e  fo rmula t ion  and implementation 
of s t r a t e g i c  change i s  a complex process  of  bargain ing and
n e g o t ia t io n  amongst d i f f e r e n t  a c to r s  t r y i n g  to  advance t h e i r  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of  d e s i red  changes.
Power and p o l i t i c s  were th e  mainstay of th e  s t r a t e g y  n e g o t ia t io n  
p rocess ,  and those  a c to r s  who c o n t r o l l e d  the  c r i t i c a l  resources  
and wielded power, o f ten  had t h e i r  d e f i n i t i o n  of  th e  s i t u a t i o n  
imposed on o th e r s .  P o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  dominated economic 
r a t i o n a l i t y  of  th e  s t r a t e g y  and may account p a r t l y  f o r  the  
high propens i ty  of abrupt and d iscon t inuous  changes in LNDC 
revealed  throughout th e  period  of the  s tudy .
S pec i f ic  summary conclus ions  and t h e i r  im pl ica t ions  fo r  the  
management of s t r a t e g i c  change in SOEs and resea rch  are h ig h l ig h te d .
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A morphological pe rspec t ive  of p a r a s t a t a l s  in developing c o u n t r i e s
The pos t  WWII period has been ch a rac te r iz ed  by an inc reas ing  emergence 
of p a r a s t a t a l s  as s i g n i f i c a n t  ac to r s  in the  economic growth and devel ­
opment of  most less -developed co u n t r ie s  (LDCs). These e n t e r p r i s e s  
were envisaged as ins truments  through which LDC governments would 
execute  p o l i c i e s  and programmes a f f e c t in g  a broad spectrum of indus­
t r i a l  developments. This was the  post-independence period  as well f o r  
most African co u n t r ie s  and one veh ic le  through which economic freedoms 
could be ensured was the  c r e a t io n  of public  e n t e r p r i s e s .  They have 
grown in s i z e ,  dominated some sec to r s  of the  economies in some ins tances  - 
na tu ra l  re so u rce s ,  and d i v e r s i f i e d  in a c t i v i t y .
This s e c to r  (publ ic  e n t e r p r i s e )  comprises those ‘mixed e n t e r p r i s e s '  
which are  c o n t ro l l e d  by the  s t a t e  such as public  development co rpor­
a t i o n s ,  government-controlled  e n t e r p r i s e s  (GCE) or government-owned 
companies, as well as f in a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  public  u t i l i t i e s ,  
s t r a t e g i c  e n t e r p r i s e s ,  and j o i n t  ventures  with fo re ign  s t a t e s  where 
a government has th e  c o n t r o l l i n g  share .
The motiva tion f o r  the  es tab l i shm en t  of  these  e n t e r p r i s e s  and t h e i r  
r o l e  in th e  n a t io n a l  economies i s  d iv e r s e .  Moshi (1985) in h i s  study 
of  the  e f f e c t iv e n e s s  and e f f i c i e n c y  of publ ic  e n t e r p r i s e s  in Tanzania,  
observed t h a t :
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"the  ro l e  of the  pub l ic  e n t e r p r i s e s  i s  t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  of s o c i a l i s a t i o n  
of the  means of production and of ensur ing an e f f e c t i v e  u t i l i s a t i o n  
of  the  c o u n t ry ' s  l im i ted  resources  in o rder  to  r e a l i s e  increased pro­
duction and consumption l e v e l s " .
While Hope (1983),  concerned about the  s t a t e  of management of public  
e n t e r p r i s e s  in LDCs has observed t h a t :
"The r o l e  of publ ic  e n t e r p r i s e s  in the  economy of a country  depends 
b a s i c a l l y  on i t s  economic system. Regardless of ideology and pol icy  
however, almost every developing country  has found i t  d e s i r a b l e  and 
even necessary  to  e s t a b l i s h  public  e n t e r p r i s e s  in o rde r  to  meet 
r e sp o n s ib ly ,  the  requirement  of i t s  development programme".
This leads to  another  f e a t u r e  of p a r a s t a t a l s :  t h a t  of m ul t ip le  and 
d iv e rse  i n t e r e s t s .  In p o s i t in g  the  d i f f e r e n c e s  in th e  management 
of p a r a s t a t a l s  and p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s ,  a number of  au thors  (Jones 
1982, Ramamurti 1986, El-Namaki 1984, Fubara 1984) have argued t h a t  
pub l ic  e n t e r p r i s e s  tend  to  opera te  wi th in  an unce r ta in  and changing 
environment of  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r v e n t io n s ,  d iv e rse  and fragmented d e c i ­
s ion a u t h o r i t i e s .  One e f f e c t  of t h i s  i s  t h a t  pub l ic  e n t e r p r i s e  
managers have l im i ted  s t r a t e g i c  autonomy, f l e x i b i l i t y  t o  prepare  
de s i r ed  change re sponses ,  hence the  underwhelming performance of 
th e se  e n t e r p r i s e s .  Somasundram (1984) came to  the  same observat ion  
and concluded t h a t :
" . . .  much of  th e  douleur of managers has been derived from the  f a c t  
t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  s takeho lde rs  view publ ic  e n t e r p r i s e s  from t h e i r  own 
independent s tandpo in ts  and expect performance on t h e i r  own te rms" ,  p . 59
Faced with th e  ' r e a l i t y '  of  public  e n t e r p r i s e s  as important elements 
of  i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  in LDCs and the  complexity and d i v e r s i t y  of t h e i r  
o p e ra t io n s ,  an empir ica l  study based on a publ ic  e n t e r p r i s e  corpora t ion  
in Lesotho, has been undertaken.
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This chap te r  w i l l  de sc r ibe  the  purpose of the  resea rch  and the  
evo lu t ion  of the  resea rch  i n t e r e s t ,  then po in t  a t  the  need f o r  g r e a t e r  
unders tanding of how a c to r s  in p a r a s t a t a l s  make t h e i r  s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s io n s .  
An ope ra t iona l  d e f i n i t i o n  of a p a r a s t a t a l  i s  o f fe red  and the  r a t i o n a l e  
f o r  t h i s  type of o rgan iza t ion  presen ted  in o rder  to  s i t u a t e  the  study 
and give i t  proper focus .
This study is  about s t r a t e g i c  change process  in the  p a r a s t a t a l  o rgan iz ­
a t io n  in the  developing country .  The research  explores  the  process  of 
s t r a t e g i c  decision-making by examining how management of the  p a r a s t a t a l  
i n t e r a c t  to  c r e a t e  s t r a t e g i c  changes and the  impact of  the  changes on 
the  co rpora te  performance.  The study has evolved over a period of  my 
pos tgraduate  s tudy, s t imula ted  by the  work of Dalton,  Lawrence, and 
Greiner in t h e i r  book 'O rganiza t iona l  Change and Development* (1970).
In c l a r i f y i n g  what he meant by o rgan iza t io n a l  change, Dalton pointed 
out t h a t :
"I make a po in t  of t h i s  because s tuden ts  of o rg a n iz a t io n s ,  in t h e i r  
e f f o r t s  to  c h a r a c t e r i z e  an o rgan iza t ion  as a system or  organism, too 
of ten  loose s ig h t  of the  f a c t  t h a t  the  "behaviour" of an o rgan iza t ion  
i s  made up of the  ac t io n s  and i n t e r a c t i o n s  of th e  ind iv idua ls  in i t .
We read so f r eq u en t ly  about an o rgan iza t ion  "adapting" to  market 
s h i f t s ,  economic co n d i t io n s ,  and s c i e n t i f i c  d i s co v e r ie s  t h a t  we s l i d e  
over the  in te r n a l  processes  by which an o rgan iza t ion  does t h a t  adap t ing" ,  
p . 231
I t  was t h a t  a r t i c l e  t h a t  t r i g g e r e d  th e  motivation f o r  a b e t t e r  
unders tanding of how change a c t u a l l y  occurs in o rg a n iz a t io n s .  Research 
in to  change in o rgan iza t io n s  cont inues  to  be a cha l leng ing  problem to  
p r a c t i t i o n e r s ,  academics, and governments concerned with the  economic 
hea l th  of o r g a n iz a t io n s .  In to d a y ' s  complex and changing bus iness  and 
p o l i t i c a l  c o n tex t s ,  g r e a t e r  unders tanding of  change management i s  e s s e n t i a l .
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The ques t  f o r  g r e a t e r  unders tanding
Studies  of  o rg a n iz a t io n a l  change are  by no means a new phenomenon to  
most o rg an iza t io n s  in the  developed world,  and continue  to  be an 
important i n d i c a to r  of o rg a n iz a t io n s '  compet it ive  c a p a b i l i t y  to  
a d ju s t  and adapt t o  major changes in t h e i r  environment. Reinforcing 
t h i s  viewpoint Pe t t ig rew  (1985) observed t h a t :
"Given the  s u b s t a n t i a l  changes in th e  economic, p o l i t i c a l ,  and 
bus iness  environment of la rge  fi rms over the  p a s t  two decades,  a 
c r i t i c a l  f a c t o r  a f f e c t i n g  the  r e l a t i v e  compet it ive  p o s i t i o n  of  . . .  
f irms must be th e  capac i ty  of f irms to  a d ju s t  and adapt to  major 
changes in t h e i r  environments and thereby improve t h e i r  compet i t ive  
performance.
P a r t  of the  management t a sk  i s  to  id e n t i f y  and a ssess  changing 
economic, bus iness  and p o l i t i c a l  condi t ions  and formula te  and 
implement new s t r a t e g i e s  to  improve the  f i r m ' s  compet i t ive  perform­
ance".  p . x . v i i
R e i t e r a t in g  a s im i l a r  view, H e l l r i e g a l  and Slocum (1982) warned t h a t :
"Organiza tions  must devise  means of con t inua l  s e l f - r e n e w a l .  They 
must be ab le  t o  recognise  when i t  i s  necessary  t o  change and above 
a l l ,  they  must be ab le  t o  change when i t  i s  req u i red " .
Goodman and Assoc ia tes  (1985) pointed out the  quest  f o r  unders tanding 
th e  process :
"Creating e f f e c t i v e  change in Organizat ion i s  one of  th e  most 
d i f f i c u l t  and cha l leng ing  problems faced by o rg a n iz a t io n a l  t h e o r i s t s ,  
o rg an iza t io n  development or  change s p e c i a l i s t s ,  and managers. The 
need t o  unders tand more about the  process  of change w i l l  continue  to  
in c re a s e " ,  p . v i i
While t h e r e  has been a ground swell ing app rec ia t ion  and i n t e r e s t  by 
re sea rc h e r s  t o  get  c l o s e r  to  the  foc i  of ac t ion  and in v e s t ig a t e  'how 
re a l  companies a c tu a l ly  a r r i v e  a t  t h e i r  s t r a t e g i c  changes '  Quinn (1980),
4
th e  bulk of th e  s tu d ie s  have t a ck led  the  problem predominantly from 
the  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  co u n t r ie s  p e r s p e c t iv e .  This does not mean t h a t  
th e re  has been any pauci ty  of  resea rch  on developing world.  There 
has been an inc reas ing  focus on p a r a s t a t a l s  and the  s t a t e  of management 
a r t  in the  Third World (Jones 1982, Hope 1983, El-Namaki 1977, 1984,
Gi l l  i s  and Peprah 1982, Kakabadse 1985, Jones 1986 and Shr ivas tava  
1984). Few s tu d ie s  ( i f  any) however have d e a l t  with th e  c ru c ia l  question  
of how s t r a t e g i c  changes a re  c rea ted  in a p a r a s t a t a l  o rg a n iz a t io n s .
"with few excep t ions ,  most s tu d ie s  of state-owned e n t e r p r i s e s  share  a 
cur ious  q u a l i t y :  they view such e n t e r p r i s e s  from a cons ide rab le  d i s tan ce  
. . .  The state-owned e n t e r p r i s e  r e q u i re s  a depth of a n a ly s i s  and under­
s tanding comparable to  t h a t  which s cho la rsh ip  has achieved f o r  th e  
la rge  p r iv a t e  e n t e r p r i s e " .  Vernon (1981).  p . 7
In h i s  d iscuss ion  of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  in A f r i ca ,  Blunt (1984) made a 
p e r t i n e n t  observa t ion  t h a t :
"Organiza tional change and the  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of o rg an iza t io n a l  
s t r u c t u r e s  adapted to  t h e i r  goals and environments have generated a 
v a s t  s ch o la r ly  l i t e r a t u r e  in the  West, and severa l  useful i n s ig h t s  
have emerged.
The same cannot be sa id  f o r  A f r i ca ,  however." p . 407
There,  as El-Namaki (1984),  Fubara (1984),  Kakabadse (1985) and Jones 
(1986) have c l e a r l y  argued, the  cond i t ions  d i f f e r  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  from 
those  normally assumed in the  i n d u s t r i a l i s e d  world.  Handy (1979) 
a l luded  to  the  same po in t  when he descr ibed  the  d iscon t inuous  change, 
assumptions underlying  h i s  book 'Understanding O rg a n iz a t io n s ' ,  and h is  
exper ience  in Ind ia .
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"Gradual ly ,  as I t r a v e l l e d  about the  land, I began to  r e a l i s e  t h a t  
some of  our assumptions about o rgan iza t ion  were based on the  b e l i e f  
t h a t  labour  was a s ca rce  resource  and c a p i t a l  a p l e n t i f u l  one.  In 
India  the  s i t u a t i o n  was reve rsed .  My book was w o r th le s s " ,  p . 25
Others have por t rayed  a r a t h e r  gloomy p i c tu r e  of th e  s i t u a t i o n ,  arguing 
t h a t  most managers in developing world:
"lack in t im a te  unders tanding  of the  in t e r n a l  ope ra t ions  of  t h e i r  
o rg an iza t io n s  and th e  o rg an iza t io n s  s o c i a l ,  c u l t u r a l  and p o l i t i c a l  
environments ,  and t h e r e f o r e  a re  not equipped to  choose th e  most 
a p p ro p r ia t e  change s t r a t e g i e s " .  Kiggundu (1986) p . 37
He cont inued l a t e r  t o  p o in t  out t h a t :
"The managers'  i n t e r e s t s  are  served by main ta in ing the  s t a t u s  quo" p . 347
These s u r p r i s in g  f in d in g s  a r e  -  i f  anything -  s u f f i c i e n t  case  f o r  more 
re sea rch  in o rd e r  t o  b e t t e r  understand the  process of change in such 
o rg a n iz a t i o n s .  Aharoni (1982),  r e f e r r i n g  s p e c i a l l y  to  state-owned 
e n t e r p r i s e s ,  has made a v a l i d  remark t h a t :
"we a c t u a l l y  know very l i t t l e  about the  way they are  managed", p . 47
There i s  t h e r e f o r e  a compelling need f o r  an empir ica l  study to  understand 
t h e  process  of s t r a t e g i c  change in p a r a s t a t a l  co rpo ra t ions  in th e  
developing n a t io n s .  We need t o  unders tand how managers in th e se  
c o rp o ra t io n s  de f in e  t h e i r  s i t u a t i o n ,  and how s t r a t e g i c  dec i s io n s  a re  
made. G i l l  i s  and Peprah (1982) have descr ibed  the  phenomenal growth 
o f  state-owned e n t e r p r i s e s  in developing na t ions  t o  a po in t  where 
those  in n a tu ra l  re sou rces  had become counterweights  to  m u l t in a t io n a l  
c o rp o ra t io n s ;  and commented:
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" c l e a r l y ,  g r e a t e r  unders tanding of state-owned e n t e r p r i s e s  i s  e s s e n t i a l  
i f  we a re  t o  f u l l y  assess  t h e i r  m er i t s  and l im i t a t i o n s  - f o r  the  c o u n t r i e s  
t h a t  own them, f o r  m u l t in a t io n a l  c o rp o ra t io n s ,  and f o r  the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
f i n a n c i a l  system. However a t  the  p re sen t  we lack even a widely accepted 
d e f i n i t i o n  of what i s  and i s  not a state-owned e n t e r p r i s e " ,  p . 34
S im i la r ly ,  t h i s  research  i s  in accord with McLean's (1978) c a l l  f o r  
re sea rch  p r i o r i t i e s  to :
"place  a much g r e a t e r  emphasis on s tudying ac tua l  changes in a wide 
v a r i e t y  of  d i f f e r e n t  o rgan iza t ions  and from a range of d i f f e r e n t  
p e r s p e c t iv e s .  We need to  have more "grounded" da ta  about change, in 
o rd e r  t o  develop p re c i s e  and v a l id  concep ts ,  t h a t  enable more accu ra te  
and r e l i a b l e  accounts of change to  be made", p . 74
The management of s t r a t e g i c  change i s  th u s ,  becoming an e s s e n t i a l  
requirement f o r  most state-owned e n t e r p r i s e s  as they embark on develop­
ment programmes t h a t  e n t a i l  new s k i l l s ,  new forms of compet i t ion ,  t e c h ­
nology and p o l i t i c a l  i n s t a b i l i t y  a t  a s c a le  they never encountered b e fo re .  
New genre of 'grounded'  methods needs to  be developed to  deal with  such 
changes.  Binstead (1986) s t r e s s e d  th e  same po in t  and the  demand expected 
of  th e  managers who have to :
"deal with problems they never encountered be fo re ,  in s i t u a t i o n s  in 
which p a s t  exper ience may no longer be r e l e v a n t " ,  p . 32
Lorenz (1986) took th e  po in t  f u r t h e r  when he poin ted out t h a t :
"Management o f  t h i s  w e l te r  of  ambiquity and paradox re q u i re s  not only 
th e  e x e r c i s in g  of f i r s t - r a t e  i n t e l l i g e n c e  of  every level of th e  organ­
i z a t i o n ,  but a l so  e x t ra o rd in a ry  s k i l l " .
To g e t  a measure of the  problem and cha l lenge  fac ing  p a r a s t a t a l s ,  o r  
managers of  o rgan iza t io n s  in developing world,  one only has to  jux tapose  
th e  above observa t ions  to  Kiggundu's (1986) e a r l i e r  remarks, and i t  
becomes unc lea r  whether dec is ion  makers in the se  o rgan iza t ions  have
7
the  breadth of t a l e n t  and v i s ion  to  manage change. Lorenz (1986) l a t e r  
concluded:
"Searching ques t ions  a re  now being asked in th e  academic world,  about 
whether some na t iona l  c u l tu r e s  w i l l  be l e s s  ab le  than o th e r s  to  t o l e r a t e  
a l l  t h e  complexity,  d i v e r s i t y ,  ambiquity and p ressu re  of 1986 and beyond", 
p . 9
All t o l d ,  t h e se  surveyed resea rches  r a i s e  doubts as to  whether t h e o r i s t s  
in years  p a s t  have adequate ly  addressed the  is sues  t h a t  a re  c e n t r a l  f o r  
an unders tanding of  state-owned e n t e r p r i s e s .  They r a i s e  added doubts 
as to  whether many of the  responses  so f a r  provided by theory  are  a p p l i c ­
ab le  to  state-owned e n t e r p r i s e s  as we f ind  them, Vernon (1981).
The concept of p a r a s t a t a l s
One dominant f e a t u r e  of  th e  i n d u s t r i a l  development s t r a t e g i e s  of the  
1960s was th e  rap id  growth of a new phenomenon of p a r a s t a t a l  e n t e r p r i s e s  
in developing c o u n t r i e s .  These e n t e r p r i s e s  comprise a la rge  and growing 
s e c to r  of  th e  economies of  developing na t ions  and even the  i n d u s t r i a l i s e d  
world.  They have been used in d i f f e r e n t  ways by d i f f e r e n t  cou n t r ie s  f o r  
a v a r i e t y  of  purposes.  This makes a un ive rsa l  d e f i n i t i o n  d i f f i c u l t  to  
a r r i v e  a t .  An exper t  group organized by th e  In te rn a t io n a l  Center fo r  
Public En te rp r i se s  in Developing Countr ies  has provided a formal d e f i n i t i o n :
"A publ ic  e n t e r p r i s e  i s  a product ive  o rg a n iz a t io n a l  e n t i t y  which engages 
in a c t i v i t i e s  o f  a bus iness  c h a r a c t e r  and markets any of  i t s  output and 
which i s  publicly-owned t o  th e  e x t e n t  of 50 per cen t  or  more" Nwokoye 
(1985) p . 27
According to  Hyden (1983),  p a r a s t a t a l  r e f e r s  t o :
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"any i n s t i t u t i o n  e s ta b l i s h e d  by a s t a t u t o r y  ac t  of  pa r l iam en t ,  to  
conduct commercial o r  product ive  a c t i v i t i e s ,  perform publ ic  u t i l i t y  
fu nc t ions  o r  provide s o c ia l  s e r v i c e s " .
This d e f i n i t i o n  is  al l-encompassing  as i t  does not d i s t i n g u i s h  between 
publ ic  u t i l i t i e s  and m arke t -o r ien ted  e n t e r p r i s e s .  G i l l  i s  and Peprah 
(1982) de f ine  ' s ta te -owned e n t e r p r i s e '  ( a l s o ,  known as "public  e n t e r ­
p r i s e " ,  "Government Contro lled  E n te rp r i s e s " ,  o r  " p a r a s t a t a l " )  as 
s a t i s f y i n g  th e  fo llowing:
" the  government i s  the  p r in c ip a l  s tockholder  in th e  e n t e r p r i s e ,  o r  
o therwise  has th e  a b i l i t y  o r  th e  p o t e n t i a l  to  appoint and remove e n t e r ­
p r i s e  management, and to  e x e r c i s e  con t ro l  over the  broad p o l i c i e s  
followed by th e  e n t e r p r i s e ;
- the  e n t e r p r i s e  i s  engaged in the  production of goods o r  s e rv ice s  
f o r  s a l e  to  the  pub l ic  or  to  o th e r  e n t e r p r i s e s ;  and
- As a mat te r  of  p o l ic y ,  the  revenues of the  e n t e r p r i s e  a re  supposed 
to  bear  some r e l a t i o n  t o  i t s  c o s t s . "  p . 34
S h i r ley  (1983) takes  a broader view and regards  state-owned e n t e r p r i s e s  
to  mean ' a l l  i n d u s t r i a l  and commercial f i rm s ,  mines,  u t i l i t i e s ,  t r a n s p o r t  
companies, and f i n a n c i a l  in te rm ed ia r ie s  c o n t ro l l e d  t o  some ex ten t  by 
government. According t o  t h i s  au tho r ,  th e  d i s t i n g u i s h in g  f e a tu r e s  of 
the se  e n t e r p r i s e s  a re  th e  expected r e tu rn  on th e  investment,  s e l f -  
accounting,  and sep a ra te  legal  i d e n t i t y ,  p . 2.
Taken s ep a ra te ly  th e se  d e f i n i t i o n s  a re  wanting,  and a modified d e f i n i t i o n  
of  a p a r a s t a t a l  t h a t  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  with th e  resea rch  da ta  i s  o f f e re d .
A p a r a s t a t a l  i s :
a product ive  o rgan iza t io n  e n t i t y ,  e s t a b l i s h e d  by a s t a t u t o r y  ac t  of 
pa r l iam ent ,  which engages in a c t i v i t i e s  of a bus iness  c h a r a c t e r ,  and 
markets any of  i t s  output  and which i s  publicly-owned to  the  ex ten t  
of a t  l e a s t  50-per cent  o r  more.
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In t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n ,  p a r a s t a t a l s  can e s t a b l i s h  t h e i r  own s u b s i d i a r i e s ,  
merge, buy-out,  and/or buy shares  in o th e r  companies. In some c l a s s ­
i f i c a t i o n s  t h i s  would c o n s t i t u t e  two d i f f e r e n t  types  of co rpo ra t ions  
i . e .  stock co rpo ra t ions  and s t a t e  holding companies,  Mazzolini (1979) p . 10.
State-owned e n t e r p r i s e  (SOE) and p a r a s t a t a l  w i l l  be used in te rchangeably  
in th e  con tex t  of the  adopted d e f i n i t i o n .
Why a p a r a s t a t a l ?
The es tab l i shm ent  of p a r a s t a t a l s  was motivated by managerial  con s id e ra t io n s  
of  e f f i c i e n c y  by c re a t in g  an o rgan iza t ion  t h a t  would have management 
c a p a b i l i t y  t o  conduct business  a c t i v i t i e s  e f f e c t i v e l y  and e f f i c i e n t l y .
Thus p a r a s t a t a l s  normally de r ive  t h e i r  legit imacy from the  mandate of 
t h e  enabling  Act of  pa r l iam ent .
Hope (1983) summarises th e  p r in c ip a l  c a te g o r i e s  f o r  the  emergence of 
th e se  e n t e r p r i s e s  as :
I n te r v e n t io n .  The p r iv a t e  s e c to r  and managerial  competence were on 
s h o r t  supply and t h e r e  was l i t t l e  hope of augmenting economic growth 
by r e ly in g  s o l e l y  on p r iv a t e  i n i t i a t i v e  in th e  area  of i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  
and t h a t  spurred government t o  in te rvene  d i r e c t l y  and take  a c t i v e  ro le  
in th e  economy in o rder  t o  achieve i t s  development g o a ls .
S t r u c t u r a l  changes:  These are  major changes which r e q u i r e  la rge  s ca le
investments  o f  long term n a tu re  in a reas  where p r i v a t e  in v es to r s  would 
be l e s s  w i l l i n g  to  ven tu re .  The p a r a s t a t a l  r o l e  i s  t o  p ioneer  and 
s t im u la te  development in such a re a s .
These c a te g o r ie s  are  q u i t e  f l e x i b l e  and vary widely according to  
d i f f e r e n t  ideo log ica l  persuas ions  t h a t  guided the  es tab l i shm ent  of 
p a r a s t a t a l s .  Hyden (1983),  G i l l s  and Peprah (1982) po in t  out a d d i i t i o n a l  
p e r t i n e n t  i s sue  of inadequate local  c a p i t a l i s t s  and hence investment 
sav ings .  Domestic c a p i t a l i s t s  in developing c o u n t r i e s ,  i t  i s  argued,
genera te  l i t t l e  savings f o r  investment.  Even th e  l i t t l e  t h a t  i s  a v a i l a b l e  
i s  o f ten  invested  abroad to  c a p i t a l  f in a n c i a l  markets leaving th e  domestic 
f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  barren of i n v e s t i b l e  funds .  To re d re s s  t h i s  
c a p i t a l  outf low,  many developing co u n t r ie s  had hoped t h a t  s t a t e  e n t e r ­
p r i s e s  would s t im u la te  economic development,  genera te  investment f inance ,  
and c r e a t e  conducive investment c l im a te .
Close ly  r e l a t e d  to  investment genera t ion  i s  th e  ' s a lvage  o p e ra t io n '  
o b je c t iv e  whereby the  s t a t e  takes  over ,  o r  rescues  an a i l i n g  company 
which has s u b s t a n t i a l  employment impact in the  country .  The 1979 rescue  
package of Chrys ler  Corpora tion,  i s  a po in t  in case .  Whatever d e f i n i t i o n  
and r a t i o n a l e  d i f f e r e n c e s  f o r  p a r a s t a t a l s ,  and t h e r e  are  many, i t  appears 
t h a t  th e re  p reva i led  a s t rong b e l i e f  in developing na t ions  t h a t  rap id  
and des i red  p a t t e r n s  of economic growth could not be achieved without 
r e s o r t i n g  to  th e  device  of th e  pub l ic  s e c t o r .  From t h i s  p e r sp ec t iv e  
s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  i s  d i s t in g u ish ed  prominently and impor tantly  by i t s  
management c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  as well as by i t s  economic f u n c t io n s ,  Hope (1982).
Because of t h e i r  hybr id n a tu re ,  i . e .  ' p u b l i c '  and ' e n t e r p r i s e ' ,  SOEs 
f a l l  under the  p o l i t i c a l  execu t ive  composed of  a s p e c i f i e d  m in i s t r y .  I t  
i s  th e  m in i s t e r  who would 'normal ly '  be held  re sp o n s ib le  t o  th e  l e g i s l a t u r e  
f o r  the  conduct of the  SOEs f a l l i n g  under h i s  charge .  For major dec is ions  
and /or  changes,  th e  c h ie f  execu t ive  o f f i c e r  (CEO) of SOE has t o  nav igate  
between th e  m in i s t ry  and th e  e n t e r p r i s e  and respond to  th e  values  and 
weights of a l l  th e  p a r t i e s  t h a t  a re  in p o s i t io n  to  determine th e  behaviour 
o f  the  e n t e r p r i s e .
Changes on the  horizon
There have been co n s ide rab le  r e s e rv a t io n s  about the  performance of SOEs.
They have been accused of f a i l i n g  to  l i v e  up to  the  high exp ec ta t io n s  
reposed in them. Increased budgetary burden on s t a t e s  in terms of c a p i t a l  
t r a n s f e r s ,  s u b s id ie s ,  and p ressu res  of ex te rna l  debt s e rv ic in g  a re  causing 
concern ,  and i t  i s  g radua l ly  dawning to  most governments t h a t  t h e  chemistry 
o f  s t a t e ' s  s o c i o p o l i t i c a l  g o a l s ,  and e n t e r p r i s e ' s  economic o b je c t iv e s  i s  
unworkable. Between 1975-78 e x te rn a l  debts  of developing n a t i o n s '  s t a t e  
e n t e r p r i s e s  had r i s e n  to  350 per  c en t ,  while loan commitments to  these  
e n t e r p r i s e s  were est imated  a t  $12.2 b i l l i o n .  G i l l i s ,  Peprah (1983) p . 34. 
According to  World Development Report (1986),  in Argentina ,  353 s t a t e  
e n t e r p r i s e s  lose an est imated  $2 b i l l i o n  annually  and hold about $11 b i l l i o n  
o f  the  c o u n t ry ' s  $46 b i l l i o n  fo re ign  deb t .  The r e p o r t  recommends reforms 
t o  e l im in a te  these  d e f i c i t s .
S t a t i s t i c s  i s  hard to  come by from the  African c o n t in en t  on a country  
by country bases but a cursory  a n a ly s i s  of the  South (1985) "South 600", 
South (1986) "Latin  America 400", and South (1987) "Africa  400" gives  an 
in d ic a t io n  of how the se  e n t e r p r i s e s  perform, and a l so  a d ec l in e  in s t a t e  
ownership. Pressures  are  on f o r  po l icy  reviews and r e d e f i n i t i o n  of th e  
r o l e  of p a r a s t a t a l s ,  f o r  e f f i c i e n t  management and reforms. In th e  1980s 
more than h a l f  of A f r i c a ' s  governments have a t  l a s t  begun to  l i b e r a l i s e  
t h e i r  economies, under the  s t e r n  t u i t i o n  of th e  IMF. Everywhere government 
jobs  and spending are  being trimmed, farm p r ic e s  r a i s e d ,  exchange r a t e s  
devalued, import quotas eased,  s t a t e  co rpo ra t ions  c losed  o r  p r i v a t i s e d :  
a l l  e s s e n t i a l  s teps  to  recovery ,  Economist (1986).  Those o f ten  assumed- 
away i s sues  have suddenly become problematic ,  t h r e a te n in g  th e  s t a b i l i t y  
and so c ia l  o rder  of s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s .  We th e r e f o r e  need to  understand 
how th e se  e n t e r p r i s e s  a re  managed, in p a r t i c u l a r ,  we need to  unders tand  
how a c to r s  in the se  o rg an iza t io n s  c r e a t e  s t r a t e g i c  changes.
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CONCLUSION
The resea rch  w i l l  explore  the  process  of s t r a t e g i c  change in a p a r a s t a t a l
co rp o ra t io n  based in Lesotho.
-  Despite the  d i f f e r e n c e s  of opinion about t h e i r  r o l e ,  SOEs have come
to  occupy key p o s i t io n s  in th e  economies of LDCs, and they r e q u i r e  a
depth of a n a ly s i s  and m u l t i d i s c i p l i n a r y  p e r sp ec t iv e  about how t h e i r  
s t r a t e g i c  d ec i s io n s  are  managed.
-  Because they are  owned and c o n t ro l l e d  by a bureaucracy with values
and o f ten  c o n f l i c t i n g  o b je c t iv e s ,  SOEs are  a t a r g e t  of a complex s e t  
of  p re s su re s  t h a t  co n s ta n t ly  need to  be nego t ia ted  to  accommodate the  
complex d i v e r s i t y  of i n t e r e s t s .
- These e n t e r p r i s e s  are  under p ressu re  from t h e i r  governments f o r  reforms, 
an i s sue  of p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t  t o  t h i s  r e sea rch .
The Research Format
-  A c r i t i c a l  review of  r e l e v an t  l i t e r a t u r e  i s  d iscussed  in c h ap te r  2.
-  A resea rch  methodology i s  p resen ted ;  resea rch  s tance  and design  are  
d iscussed  in chap te r  3.
-  The o p e r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  of  th e  resea rch  in terms of how i t  was admin is te red  
and analysed i s  d iscussed  in chap te r  4.
-  The da ta  on th e  management of  s t r a t e g i c  change process  in a SOE is  
descr ibed  in chap te rs  6 t o  8.
-  Chapter 9 d i scu sses  th e  change p a t t e r n s  emerging from th e  d a t a .
-  Chapter 10 demonstrates t h a t  s t r a t e g i c  change in SOE i s  a nego t ia ted  
process  amongst th e  fragmented c o a l i t i o n s  with s h i f t i n g  i n t e r e s t s  
and power d i f f e r e n t i a l .
-  The d iscuss ions  a re  conso l ida ted ,  conclus ions  drawn and re sea rch  and 
p r a c t i c a l  im p l ica t ion  o f fe red  in chap te r  11.
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Chapter 2
L i t e r a t u r e  Review
The l i t e r a t u r e  on state-owned e n t e r p r i s e s ,  as poin ted out in t h e  previous  
c h ap te r ,  provides  l i t t l e  guidance to  the  s tuden t  of  management process ;  
i t  has not evolved in a cohesive  and in te g ra te d  manner, and as such i t  
does not help o th e r  re sea rche rs  bu i ld  on i t .  Much of  the  l i t e r a t u r e  has 
tended to  analyze the  ro l e  of  the  s t a t e  as e n t rep reneu r  ( e x te n t  of  s t a t e  
ownership and c o n t r o l ,  o b je c t iv e s  and goals  and performance of SOEs), the  
legal aspec ts  - de f in ing  the  r e sp ec t iv e  powers and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  of the  
s t a t e  and th e  e n t e r p r i s e ;  the  c o n t r ib u t io n  of the  SOE to  the  macroeconomic 
o b je c t iv e s  of the  s t a t e .  The view taken is  t h a t  t h i s  i s  the  study of 
general  management process  in a spec ia l  type of o rgan iza t ion  - SOE, the  
approach followed w i l l ,  t h e r e f o r e  be m u l t i - d i s c i p l i n a r y ;  i t  r e f l e c t s  the  
' s p l i t - p e r s o n a l i t y '  of SOEs (as a public  po l icy  ins trument and as a 
bus iness  e n t e r p r i s e )  and the  d i f f e r e n t  l i t e r a t u r e  t r a d i t i o n s  from which 
i t  has evolved.
This does not n e c e s sa r i ly  imply ' s h i f t i n g  between d i f f e r e n t  paradigms, 
r a t h e r ,  looking a t  the  same paradigm from a d i f f e r e n t  p e r s p e c t iv e .  The 
review i s  s t ru c tu re d  in to  t h r e e  main sec t io n s :
( i )  S t r a t e g i c  change is  defined and reviewed using concepts and major
f in d in g s  of publ ished s tu d ie s  which have been developed from la rge
business  fi rms in the  p r i v a t e  s e c to r .
( i i )  L i t e r a t u r e  based on an empir ica l  research  on SOEs from th e  developed 
and l e s s  developed c o u n t r i e s .
( i i i )  The conceptual framework - Negotia tion p e r sp ec t iv e  which blends 
the  two streams of l i t e r a t u r e  in ( i )  and ( i i )  above and forms the
bas is  of a n a ly s i s  along which t h i s  study w i l l  be c l a s s i f i e d .
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I The S t ra tegy  Concept
In o rder  to  understand what is  meant by s t r a t e g i c  change, we f i r s t  need 
to  de f in e  th e  s t r a t e g y  concept.  Like SOEs, t h e r e  e x i s t s  no s in g l e  un ive r ­
s a l l y  accepted d e f i n i t i o n  of s t r a t e g y .  I t  i s  an e lu s i v e  concept clouded 
by a good deal of ambiguity,  as Mintzberg (1987) s u c c in t ly  put i t ,  s t r a t e g y  
' i s  one of those  words t h a t  people de f ine  in one way and o f ten  use in 
ano ther ,  without r e a l i z i n g  the  d i f f e r e n c e ' .  Drucker (1974) was among the  
f i r s t  to  address  the  s t r a t e g y  i s sues  in a bus iness  e n t e r p r i s e .  This was 
im p l i c i t  in th e  ques t ions  he urged managers to  address :  What bus iness  are  
we in ;  what should i t  be? I t  involves ' r a i s i n g  ques t ions  about the  
fundamental na tu re  of o rg a n iz a t i o n s '  t h a t  p r e c i p i t a t e  major o rg an iza t io n  
and r e o r i e n t a t i o n  - Tichy (1983).  Chandler (1962) has def ined  s t r a t e g y  as:
" the  de termina t ion  of the  basic  long-term goals  and o b je c t iv e s  of the  
e n t e r p r i s e  and the  adoption of courses  of a c t io n  and th e  a l l o c a t i o n  of 
resources  necessary  f o r  car ry ing  out the se  g o a ls " .
Since then s t r a t e g y  has been defined in a v a r i e t y  of  ways, o f ten  with a 
common theme of an e x p l i c i t  s ta tement of  i n t e n t  t h a t  c o n s t r a in s  o r  d i r e c t s  
subsequent a c t i v i t i e s ,  Pennings and Associa tes  (1985).  Some d e f i n i t i o n s  
have attempted to  e l ab o r a te  on Drucker 's  q u e s t io n s .  Others have conceived 
th e  concept in terms of  d i f f e r e n t  l ev e l s  of  o rgan iza t iona l -env i ronm enta l  
i n t e r a c t i o n ,  focussing  on the  o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s  choice of th e  environment 
in which i t  w i l l  opera te  (Child 1972) - i t s  ' d i s t i n c t i v e  su rv iva l  t e r r i t o r y ' ;  
and th e  compet i t ive  dec is ions  made wi th in  a p a r t i c u l a r  product/market scope 
o r  t a sk  environment - 'domain nav iga t ion ,  Ginsberg and Grant (1985).  The 
d e f i n i t i o n  followed in t h i s  s tudy,  one which is  much in vogue with 
o rg an iza t io n a l  r e a l i t y  - the  way in which managers a c t u a l l y  make and 
implement s t r a t e g i c  changes in p r a c t i c e ,  views s t r a t e g y  as 'a  p a t t e r n  in an
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ongoing stream of o rgan iza t io n a l  dec is ions  t h a t  reveal  management’s 
goals  f o r  th e  o rgan iza t ion  and the  means they choose to  achieve them. 
Mintzberg (1978, 1982), Miles and Snow (1978),  Quinn (1980),  Pe t t igrew 
(1985),  Donaldson and Lorsch (1983).  According to  t h i s  p e r sp ec t iv e ,  
s t r a t e g i c  dec i s ions  and changes w i l l  be viewed as streams of a c t i v i t y  
involving  in d iv id u a ls  and groups which occur mainly but not s o le ly  as 
a consequence of environmental change, and which can lead to  a l t e r a t i o n s  
in the  core  purpose . . .  of  the  host  o rg a n iz a t io n .  S t r a t e g i c  marks j u s t  
a d e s c r ip t i o n  of magnitude of a l t e r a t i o n  in . . .  s t r u c t u r e  and organ iza ­
t i o n a l  c u l t u r e  recogniz ing the  second-order e f f e c t s  or  m u l t ip le  e f f e c t s  
of  any such ch anges ' ,  Pe t t ig rew (1986).  Thus, s t r a t e g i e s  are  a continuous 
process  t h a t  "shape the  t r u e  goals of the  e n t e r p r i s e .  They help d e l in e a t e  
th e  broad l im i t s  with in  which the  e n t e r p r i s e  o p e ra te s .  They d i c t a t e  both 
th e  resources  the  e n t e r p r i s e  w i l l  have a cc e ss ib le  fo r  i t s  ta sks  and the  
p r in c ip a l  p a t t e r n s  in which these  resources  w i l l  be a l l o c a t e d " ,  Quinn 
(1980) p . 8.  The an a ly s i s  of these  d ive rse  d e f i n i t i o n s  revea ls  t h a t  
s t r a t e g i c  change c l u s t e r s  in to  th r e e  d i s t i n c t  p e r s p e c t iv e s .
The Rat ional-Planned Perspec t ive
For some decades now the  l i t e r a t u r e  on s t r a t e g i c  change has been guided 
by the  normative model with the  focus on th e  r a t i o n a l  formula t ion of 
s t r a t e g i e s .  According to  t h i s  approach, s t r a t e g y  comprises of in te g ra te d  
d e c i s io n s ,  p lans  and f o r e s i g h t f u l  ac t ion  autonomously cons t ruc ted  to  
achieve v iab le  need f u l f i l l i n g  o rgan iza t io n a l  goals  (Chaffee 1985,
Benson 1977). Adopting a p roac t ive  and systemic approach, the  model:
"descr ibes  and p re s c r ib e s  techniques  f o r  i d e n t i fy in g  cu r ren t  s t r a t e g y ,  
ca r ry  out s t r a t e g i c  a n a ly s i s ,  resources  and gaps,  revea l ing  and a ssess ing  
s t r a t e g i c  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  and choosing and implementing c a r e f u l ly  analyzed
16
and wel l - though t- th rough  outcomes" Pet t igrew (1985) p . 19.
Change i s  t h e r e f o r e  seen as a ' r a t i o n a l ,  planned element of  management' 
P f e f f e r  (1978),  Johnson (1985). Im p l ic i t  in t h i s  l i n e a r  th ink ing  i s  the  
concept ion of  the  o rgan iza t ion  as a monoli th ic  and u n i t a ry  agent which is  
th e  d ec id e r  and a c t o r .  Top management i s  assumed to  wield complete powers 
and c ap a c i ty  t o  change the  o rgan iza t ion  given t h a t :
" th e re  i s  one co rpo ra te  p a t t e r n  of behaviour  which i s  d i r e c t e d  by one 
o v e ra l l  plan and t h a t  the  company in i t s  e n t i t y  i s  committed to  t h i s  
p lan ;  . . .  t h a t  a l l  co rpora te  resources  are  c e n t r a l l y  co -o rd ina ted  and 
mobilized in a c o n s i s t e n t  fa sh ion  throughout the  o rgan iza t ion  to  implement 
th e  plan as e f f i c i e n t l y  as poss ib le"  Mazzolini (1981) p . 7.
Pe t t ig rew  (1985) r e j e c t s  t h i s  o r d e r l i n e s s  about change and r e i f i c a t i o n  
of o r g a n iz a t i o n s .  He warns:
"One has to.be doubtful  about th e  simple determinism of s tages  about 
implied a c t io n s  of p rogress ive  l i n e a r  development t o  h igher  l ev e l s  of 
growth . . .  and the  r e i f i c a t i o n  e x p l i c i t  in s ta tements  about the  firm 
behaving r a t h e r  than in d iv id u a ls  or  groups producing an e f f e c t  which 
could be l a b e l l e d  as the  f irm behaving".
The u t i l i t y  and appropr ia teness  of t h i s  orthodox s tance  t o  o rgan iza t io n a l  
change and SOE in p a r t i c u l a r ,  has been challenged by a number of develop­
ments and i s  f a s t  loosing ground to  the  paradigms t h a t  a re  concerned with 
th e  grounding of  o rg an iza t io n a l  phenomena -  techno log ica l  changes,  o b j e c t iv e s ,  
s t r u c t u r e s  in th e  ac t ions  and p r a c t i c e s  of th e  a c t o r s .  The depersona l ised  
and i d y l l i c  harmony of o rg a n iz a t io n a l  l i f e  por t rayed  by th e  r a t i o n a l i t y  
model i s  an o v e r t l y  simple guide f o r  a c t i o n .  Modern e n t e r p r i s e s  a re  not 
only complex o rgan iza t ions  with i n t e rn a l  dynamics of t h e i r  own, they are  
a l so  embedded in an i n t r i c a t e  web of s o c i a l ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  and economic 
in t e r l i n k a g e s  of ind iv id u a ls  and groups (Rothman, 1979, Suarez 1984).
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These l inkages  fo rce  us to  a t tend  to  th e  processes  through which p a r t i c u l a r  
" o rg an iza t io n a l  p a t t e rn s  have been generated  and are  s u s ta in ed ,  . . .  to  
a t t en d  t o  h i s t o r y ,  t o  the  sequence of events  and con tex ts  through which 
th e  p re sen t  r e a l i t i e s  have been manufactured,  and . . .  t o  analyze the  
on-going day-to-day i n t e r a c t i o n s ,  through which a produced r e a l i t y  i s  
su s ta ined"  Benson, (1977).
The Process Perspec t ive
The r a t i o n a l i t y  approach paid l i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n  to  the  ' i n s i d e '  of th e  
f i rm ,  i t s  soc ia l  s t r u c t u r e  and in te rn a l  processes  through which change 
dec i s io n s  are  made. The semi-autonomous u n i t s  wi th in  the  firm o f ten  
p re sen t  m u l t ip l e  demands incongruent with the  shared conception of 
o rg a n iz a t io n a l  g o a l s .  As P f e f f e r  (1982) pointed out:
"because p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in o rg an iza t io n a l  dec is ions  i s  both segmented 
and d iscon t inuous ,  because p re fe rences  develop and change over t ime, and 
because the  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of the  r e s u l t s  of a c t io n s  -  i s  o f ten  problem­
a t i c ,  behaviour cannot be p red ic ted  a p r i o r i  e i t h e r  by the  in te n t io n  
of  ind iv idua l  ac to r s  or by the  cond i t ions  of the  environment.  Rather ,  
o rg an iza t io n s  are  viewed as con tex ts  in which people ,  problems, and 
so lu t io n s  come to g e th e r ,  with the  r e s u l t s  determined importantly  by th e  
process and c o n s t r a i n t s  on t h a t  p rocess" ,  p . 9.
The work of Bower (1970) on the  resource  a l l o c a t i o n  process in la rge  
d i v e r s i f i e d  bus iness  e n t e r p r i s e  i s  equa l ly  p e r t i n e n t  to  t h i s  p e r s p e c t iv e .
He found t h a t  as p r o j e c t  proposals  emerged from the  sub -un i t s  managers 
through to  top  management r a t i f i c a t i o n ,  t h e re  was . . .  a period of 
n e g o t i a t io n  while  the  ideas of th e  area manager and h i s  subord ina tes  
were t r a n s l a t e d  in to  a s e t  of "words" t h a t  a re  accep tab le  to  the  d iv i s io n  
general  manager. Thus, Bower's model has ind ica ted  t h a t  t h e re  are  various  
segments wi th in  the  firm t h a t  deal  with the  ' . . .  func t ions  ( t e c h n i c a l ,  
r a t i o n a l ,  economic) t h a t  cause the  need f o r  the  s t r a t e g i c  change to  be
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f e l t ,  the  i n t e g r a t i n g  func t ions  - t h a t  a c t i v a t e  and promote th e  change, 
and th e  co rpo ra te  fu n c t io n s .
Research on change continue  to  r e j e c t  the  programmed phased models and 
reveal  t h a t  change does not obey the  l i n e a r ,  phased plan t h a t  e a r ly  
t h e o r i s t s  had sugges ted .  Change does not occur in s in g le  ep isodes  o r  
i n t e r v e n t io n s '  Beer and Walton (1987).  Research conducted a t  McGill 
Un ivers i ty  by Mintzberg,  Rais inghani,  Theoret ,  1976, Mintzberg,  1978,
1987, Mintzberg and Waters, 1982 have s i g n i f i c a n t l y  c on t r ibu ted  to  the  
d e s c r i p t i v e  unders tanding of s t r a t e g i c  change p roce sses .  S t r a t e g i e s  can 
now be viewed as r e c o n s t r u c t io n s  t h a t  impute order  and r a t i o n a l i t y  to  ac t s  
and dec i s io n s  a f t e r  they have taken p lace  r a t h e r  than systematic  intended 
p lans ;  as r e s u l t a n t  of  involvement, " t a c i t "  knowledge and sharp mind in 
touch with the  s i t u a t i o n  - Mintzberg (1987).  Such dec is ions  are  d i s t i n ­
guished by
"novel ty ,  complexity,  and openendedness, by the  f a c t  t h a t  th e  o rgan iza t ion  
u sua l ly  begins with l i t t l e  unders tanding of the  dec is ion  s i t u a t i o n  i t  f aces  
o r  th e  rou te  t o  i t s  so lu t io n  might be and how i t  w i l l  be evalua ted  when i t  
i s  developed. Only by groping through a r e c u r s i v e ,  d iscont inuous  process  
involving many d i f f i c u l t  s teps  and a host  of dynamic f a c t o r s  over a 
cons iderab le  per iod  of t ime i s  a f i n a l  choice made". Mintzberg (1976).
Mintzberg has f u r t h e r  e x p l ic a ted  the  v a r i a t i o n  of a s t r a t e g i c  dec is ion  by 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  between ' in tended  s t r a t e g y '  - those  d e l i b e r a t e  formal 
plans made ahead of s p e c i f i c  a c t io n s  to  which they ap p l ied .  A ' r e a l i z e d '  
s t r a t e g y  r e s u l t s  from a sequence of dec is ions  which e x h ib i t  a c o n s i s t e n t  
p a t t e r n  overt ime.  Therefore  a s t r a t e g y  can be imputed o r  in fe r r ed  from 
the se  p a t t e r n s .  The b i f u r c a t io n  of s t r a t e g y  in to  two s t rands  - intended 
and emerging f u r t h e r  helps  to  dismiss  the  'commander view' of a CEO who 
i s  located somewhere a t  th e  p innacle  of  an o rgan iza t io n  with appos i te  
information and making a l l  the  s t r a t e g i c  dec i s ions  a lone .  This is
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p a r t i c u l a r l y  p e r t i n e n t  to  SOEs where decision-making process  is  
fragmented around i n t e r e s t  groups arranged around the  s p e c i f i c  i ssues  
and s o lu t io n s  of the  d e c i s io n s .
S t r a t e g i c  Change as Incremental Process
In a study of  la rge  success fu l  companies, Quinn (1980, 1982) has argued 
t h a t  o rg an iza t io n s  do not tend t o  make major one -o f f  s h i f t s  in s t r a t e g y .  
S t r a t e g i c  changes are  usua l ly  made in a d d i t i v e ,  small r e v e r s i b l e  blocks 
of an incremental  c h a r a c t e r .  Given t h a t  t h e r e  are  too many unknowns to  
spec i fy  a cohesive s e t  of  new d i r e c t i o n s  f o r  the  e n t e r p r i s e ,  Quinn (1980),  
th e re  is  ' t e s t i n g  ou t '  of the  small changes to  be g radua l ly  developed as 
more information becomes a v a i l a b le  f o r  d e c i s io n s .  Such a process the  
in c re m en ta l i s t s  regard as log ica l  and incrementa l .  I t  i s  not 'muddling 
th ro u g h ' ,  as Quinn pointed out:
"The most e f f e c t i v e  s t r a t e g i e s  of major e n t e r p r i s e s  tend t o  emerge s tep  
by s tep  from an i t e r a t i v e  process in which th e  o rgan iza t ion  probes the  
f u t u r e ,  experiments ,  and learns  from a s e r i e s  of p a r t i a l  ( incrementa l )  
commitments r a t h e r  than through global formula t ions  of t o t a l  s t r a t e g i e s .  
Good managers a re  aware of t h i s  p rocess ,  and they consc ious ly  in te rvene  
in i t " ,  p . 58.
Quinn argues t h a t  s ince  the  sub -u n i t s  a re  in a cons tan t  i n t e r a c t i o n s ,  
t h e  var ious  dec is ions  from th e se  sub-systems are  not n e c e s sa r i ly  s ep a ra te .  
The fu n c t io n a l  managers should know what o the rs  a re  doing and should 
i n t e r p r e t  each o the rs  a c t i o n s ,  Johnson and Scholes (1984).
Dona Ison and Lorsh (1983) embarked on a study s im i l a r  to  Quinn 's ,  to  
study the  f i n a n c i a l  and psychologica l  fo rces  t h a t  shaped top managers'  
s t r a t e g i c  cho ices .  Their  f i n d i n g s ,  l ikewise ,  revealed  the  i n t u i t i v e  
c h a r a c te r  of dec is ion  process  and the  l i m i t a t i o n s  placed on CEO powers; 
and t h a t  change did not come about in one grand f e l l  swoop.
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"Major s h i f t s  in s t r a t e g y  do not occur suddenly or  r a p id ly .  On the 
c o n t r a ry ,  th e  process  of s t r a t e g i c  change is  . . .  an incremental one, 
and each s tep  is  r e l a t i v e l y  smal l ,  . . .  i t  takes  many years  fo r  the  
management of a company to  achieve major s t r a t e g i c  changes,  . . .
S t r a t e g i c  dec is ions  are  not the  product of simple economic logic  
a lone .  Because these  dec is ions  o f ten  depend on f o r e c a s t s  of fu tu re  
ev en ts ,  they involve cons ide rab le  u n c e r ta in ty  and ambiguity .  To 
analyze th e se  complexit ies  top managers draw upon t h e i r  exper ience 
and judgement . . .  to  some e x ten t  t h e i r  dec is ions  always r e f l e c t  non- 
r a t i o n a l  co n s id e ra t io n s  because they have been f i l t e r e d  through 
b e l i e f  system".
They concluded ( in  conformity with Mintzberg) t h a t  s t r a t e g i c  dec is ions  
emerged from a p a t t e rn  - 'a  long s e r i e s  of choices  and dec is ions  t h a t  
overtime may add up to  a s i g n i f i c a n t  change in s t r a t e g i c  d i r e c t i o n 1.
Incremental  ism has a l so  been applied  in the  public  po l icy  format ion.  
Analysts a re  cau t ious  not to  hammer out comprehensive so lu t io n s  and 
s t r a t e g i e s  in deal ing  with changes.  They concen t ra te  on incremental  
a l t e r a t i o n s  of  the  e x i s t i n g  p o l icy ,  making i t  p o s s ib le  to  bargain out 
and a d ju s t  competing i n t e r e s t s  a t  the  margin as more information 
becomes a v a i l a b l e ,  Braybrooke and Lindbloom (1963).  As Yates (1985) 
poin ted out th e  d i s jo in t e d  incrementa ls  obvia te  the  'b ig  bang' brought 
about by s t r a t e g i c  s h i f t ,  and make i t  more f e a s i b l e  to  move ' p r o f e s s io n ­
a l l y  stubborn b u reaucra t ic  mules a few f e e t  than to  ge t  them charging 
in unison down the  r o a d ' .
Mintzberg (1978) concurs t h a t  g e n e ra l ly  th e re  are  d i s ce rn ab le  incremental  
p a t t e r n s  of  s t r a t e g i c  change. In o rde r  to  su rv ive ,  o rgan iza t ions  have 
to  adapt t o  changing environments around them as defined and in te rp re te d  
by the  a c t o r s .  I t  is  through t h i s  process  of con t inua l  readjustment  
t h a t  incremental  changes come about.  The f in e - tu n i n g  of s t r u c t u r e s ,  
b e h av io u r -p a t te rn s ,  and the  bui ld ing  of cumulative momentum. However, 
he d i sag ree s  with Quinn's an u n in te r rup ted  incremental  ism, poin ting
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out t h a t  s t r a t e g i c  change may be ' g l o b a l '  in n a tu re ,  r e s u l t i n g  in a 
fundamental paradigm s h i f t  in d i r e c t i o n ,  Sheldon (1980).  When t h a t  
happens th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s
" s c r i p t  i s  not simply modified,  the  ro l e  not merely e labo ra ted  and 
developed. The s c r i p t  i s  to rn  up: new p a r t s  are  c a s t  and performed".  
Mangham (1979).
The 'paradigm' t h a t  used to  be taken fo r  granted as the  guiding 
framework of purposes,  means, s t r a t e g i e s ,  and s t r u c t u r e s  with which 
o rg an iza t io n a l  a c t io n  was d i r e c t e d ,  i s  s u b s t i t u t e d  by a new one - 
Imershein (1977).  There i s  frame-breaking change t h a t  involves  a 
sharp s h i f t  in the  d i r e c t i o n  of the  e n t e r p r i s e  and the  d i s ru p t io n  of 
the  e s t a b l i s h e d  p a t t e r n s ,  b e l i e f s  and va lues .  Pe t t ig rew (1985) a l so  
d isag rees  and po in ts  t o  s p e c i f i c  omissions in Quinn's model:
"Quinn's log ica l  in c re m en ta l i s t  approach overemphasizes th e  continuous 
incremental na tu re  of  change and thereby conceals  the  major r o l e  t h a t  
environmental d i s tu rb an ce  and c r i s i s  can play as an enab le r  and a 
t r i g g e r  fo r  s i g n i f i c a n t  change".
Mintzberg views have been complemented by useful empir ica l  work of 
M i l le r  and Fr iesen  (1984) by what they c a l l  'quantum' change or  
s t r a t e g i c  rev o lu t io n  which occurs when suddenly th e  o rgan isa t ions  
s t r a t e g i c  o r i e n t a t i o n  moves out of  sync with i t s  environment,  causing 
th a t
"long period of  ev o lu t iona ry  change i s  suddenly punctuated by a b r i e f  
bout of  rev o lu t io n a ry  tu rm oil  in which the  o rgan iza t ion  quickly  a l t e r s  
many of i t s  e s t a b l i s h e d  p a t t e r n s .  Mintzberg (1987).  p . 72.
In a study of a Swedish company, Berg (1979) found t h a t  change tended 
to  fo llow a ' d i s t i n c t '  p a t t e r n  with periods  of r e l a t i v e  s t a b i l i t y
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i n t e r s p e r s e d  by p e r io d s  o f  rapid and profound change .  He observed  t h a t :
" the  t r a n s i t i o n  from one s t a b l e  period to  another can be seen as a 
s h i f t  in the  bas ic  paradigm out of which the  so c ia l  organism o p e ra te s .
I t  i s  as i f  in o rder  f o r  a soc ia l  organism to  develop beyond a c e r t a i n  
level  i t  i s  necessary to  change the  bas ic  assumption out of which i t  
i s  working",  p . 259.
Quinn's  approach i s  recognized and supported ,  however, h i s  emphasis 
on con t inua l  log ica l  incremental ism is  in sharp disagreement with the 
fo rce  of the se  arguments which po in t  a t  the  i n t e r r u p t io n s  of 'bou ts  and 
s p u r t s '  of d i s c o n t i n u i t y .  Sudden s t r a t e g i c  j o l t s  and d i s c o n t in u i ty  
from the  above c i t e d  s tu d ie s  c lo se ly  mir ror  the  s i t u a t i o n  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
of th e  SOE s tu d ie d .
In h i s  study of B r i t i s h  r e t a i l e r s  in the  1970s, Johnson (1985) shows 
how th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s  i n b u i l t  b e l i e f s  - s t r a t e g i c  formulae,  w i l l  
always r e f i n e  ideas  and ensure t h a t  change is  c a r r i e d  out in ways 
congruent '  with these  b e l i e f s .  To br ing about s t r a t e g i c  changes,  
t h e r e  w i l l  have to  be a success fu l  a s s a u l t  to  the  company c u l t u r e ,  
poss ib ly  through a new power con f igu ra t ion  - a compatible new CEO, or  
ex te rn a l  e x p e r t i s e .  Johnson deduced t h a t :
"There i s  a need in a l l  o rgan iza t ions  f o r  some homogeneity of b e l i e f s  
and expec ta t ions  about the  compet it ive  environment and models of 
o p e ra t io n .  Without i t  t h e re  would be no o rg a n iz a t io n a l  a c t i o n ,  merely 
as many responses  as t h e r e  are  i n d iv id u a l s .  However, i f  homogeneity 
around the  rec ip e  i s  e s s e n t i a l  f o r  th e  p re se rv a t io n  of o rde r ,  so is  
he te rogene i ty  f o r  the  a b i l i t y  to  change".
The in s ig h t f u l  i s sues  r a i s ed  by Johnson about how homogeneity and 
he te rogene i ty  of models of opera t ion  a re  reconc i led  and order  preserved* 
are  e s p e c i a l l y  v i t a l  f o r  SOEs because of th e  g e n e ra l ly  ambiguous na ture  
of t h e i r  o b j e c t iv e s ,  cons tan t  p o s s i b i l i t y  of in te rv e n t io n  by the  govern-
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ment, and the  complex i n t e r a c t io n  process between te ch n o c ra t i c  managers 
and p o l i t i c a l  managers who tend to  hold d i f f e r e n t  va lues  and language 
and o f ten  t a c k l e  i s sues  from d i f f e r e n t  p e r sp e c t iv e s .  Added to  t h i s  
a re  o th e r  powerful ex te rna l  a c to r s  with vested i n t e r e s t s  in th e  SOEs.
P o l i t i c a l  Process Perspect ives
In a comprehensive study of  Imperial Chemical I n d u s t r i e s  -  ICI, 
Pe t t ig rew  (1985) has provided an in s ig h t fu l  account of how one of 
B r i t a i n ' s  l a r g e s t  manufacturing company changed i t s  s t r a t e g y ,  s t r u c t u r e ,  
technology and o rgan iza t iona l  c u l t u r e .  His approach s t rong ly  advocates 
a p o l i t i c a l  and c u l t u r a l  pe rspec t ive  on o rgan iza t ions  t h a t  embrace 
t h e i r  h i s t o r y ,  t h e i r  soc ia l  con tex t  and the  processual c h a r a c te r  of 
s t r a t e g i c  change. In t h i s  approach s t r a t e g i c  change involves:
“the  continuous in t e rp la y  between ideas  about the  con tex t  of change, 
the  process  of change, and the  con ten t  of change, to g e th e r  with the  
s k i l l  in re g u la t in g  the  r e l a t i o n s  between th e  t h r e e " ,  p . 19.
Every o rgan iza t ion  has a h i s to r y  t h a t  provides th e  b a s i s  f o r  under­
s tanding how i t s  pas t  shaped th e  c o n s t i t u t e d  p r e s e n t .  As Hall (1987) 
has so ap t ly  put i t :
" i t  al lows sepa ra t ion  of th e  i n v a r i a n t  . . .  from the  changed o r  changing. 
I f  something remains s t a b l e ,  one can learn  how, why, and with what 
consequences.  Change can be examined, compared, and accounted fo r  
in the  same fashion . . .  a l so  he lps  to  d e re i fy  th e  s t a t u s  quo. Things 
taken f o r  granted now may not always have e x i s t e d  o r  even be what 
they seem. When c u r r e n t  ci rcumstances  are  sa id  to  be s im i l a r  to  
previous  ones,  h i s t o r i c a l  analyses  can demonstrate the  prevalence of 
d i f f e r e n t  co n d i t io n s " .
Berg (1985) agrees but f o r  a d i f f e r e n t  reason:
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"The way the  company was c r e a te d ,  the  p e r s o n a l i t y  of the  founder,  and 
legends about "big b a t t l e s "  or o th e r  c r i s i s  s i t u a t i o n s  in the  co rpora te  
h i s t o r y  are  a l l  examples of  c o l l e c t i v e l y  s to red  h i s t o r i c a l  exper iences" .
There are  t h e r e f o r e  e s t a b l i s h e d  ideo log ies  and c u l tu r e s  which change 
i s  l i k e l y  to  d i s r u p t ,  arousing ' p o l i t i c a l '  storm amongst various  ac to r s  
th rea ten ed  by changes:
"This r ecogn i t ion  t h a t  in te rven ing  in an o rgan iza t ion  to  c r e a te  
s t r a t e g i c  change is  l i k e ly  to  be a challenge to  the  dominating 
ideology,  c u l t u r e ,  and systems of meaning and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  as 
well as the  s t r u c t u r e s ,  p r i o r i t i e s ,  and power r e l a t i o n s h i p s  of the  
o rg a n iz a t io n ,  making i t  c l e a r e r  why and how the  processes  of sensing,  
j u s t i f y i n g ,  c r e a t in g  and s t a b i l i z i n g  s t r a t e g i c  change can be so 
to r tu o u s  and long" (1985) p . 443.
P e t t i g r e w ' s  work, no doubt confirms Quinn's incremental  approach, 
with a d i f f e r e n c e .  He express ly  recognizes t h a t  environmental  
d i s tu rbances  could p r e c i p i t a t e  change by c re a t in g  wider awareness or 
g iv ing  impetus t o  s t r a t e g i c  changes,  fo r  example, economic and business  
downturn o r  r e c e s s io n .  No determinism is  implied here ,  as these  
environmental f a c to r s  are  p red ica ted  upon managerial pe rcep t ion ,  
systems of meaning and t h e i r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  People do not merely 
respond, they  a c t  and r e a c t  in terms of how they i n t e r p r e t  t h e i r  
environments,  th ings  do not j u s t  happen. But as Pe t t ig rew  c o r r e c t ly  
po in ts  o u t ,  an adequate a n a ly s i s  of s t r a t e g i c  change must embrace not 
only th e  o b je c t iv e  economic f a c t o r s ,  but a l so ,
" the  r o l e  of  execut ive  l eade rsh ip  and managerial  a c t io n  in in te rvening  
in th e  e x i s t i n g  concepts of co rpora te  s t r a t e g y  in th e  f i rm,  and using 
and changing the  s t r u c t u r e s ,  c u l t u r e s ,  and p o l i t i c a l  processes  in the  
firm to  draw a t t e n t i o n  to  performance gaps r e s u l t i n g  from environmental 
change, and lead th e  o rgan iza t ion  to  sense and c r e a t e  a d i f f e r e n t  
p a t t e r n  of  alignment between in te rn a l  c h a r a c t e r ,  s t r a t e g y ,  and s t r u c tu r e  
and i t s  emerging concept of i t s  opera t ing  environment",  p . 453.
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His c o n t e x t u a l i s t  approach of lodging s t r a t e g i c  change process in the  
micro and macro con tex ts  of ICI -  i t s  underpinnings ,  the  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
of  th e  key p la y e r s ,  t h e i r  ro le s  in the  change p rocess ,  and t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  
manoeuvres and the  on-going in t e r a c t i o n s  t h a t  continuously  reproduce 
the  o rg an iza t io n  provides an i n s t r u c t i v e  springboard from which we 
can look a t  the  s im i l a r  process in SOE, through d i f f e r e n t  l e n se s .  A f te r  
reading t h i s  d e t a i l e d  volume, one is  l e f t  with a nagging f e e l i n g  t h a t  
P e t t i g r e w ' s  unique opportun i ty  and exposure to  the  ' i n s i g h t s '  of  ICI,  
no tw i ths tand ing  h is  c a l l  f o r  s o p h i s t i c a te d  and complex long i tu d in a l  
t h e o r i e s  of o rgan iza t io n a l  change, may not be a cc e s s ib le  to  most o th e r  
r e s e a r c h e r s .
Murray's  (1978) c o n t r ib u t io n  to  the  p o l i t i c a l  process  of s t r a t e g i c  
choice  b r ings  a p e r t i n e n t  dimension missing in the  reviewed s tu d ie s  
so f a r .  In a study of an e l e c t r i c  u t i l i t y . -  company he found t h a t  
execu t ives  power and range of opt ions  from which they could formula te  
s t r a t e g i e s ,  were cons t ra ined  by a number of  soc ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  
p r e s su re s .  He found t h a t  s t r a t e g i c  dec is ions  a re  a m u l t i - l e v e l  and 
fragmented process :  " r a r e ly  does one execu t ive  have power t o  make 
major dec i s io n s  t o t a l l y  independent of o th e r s .  'The company manage­
ment had t o  deal with severa l  fed e ra l  and s t a t e  agenc ies ,  each one 
i n t e r e s t e d  in i t s  own agenda, o f ten  a t  var iance  with o th e r s .  Each 
sought t o  p ress  on i t s  p a r t i c u l a r  pe rspec t ive  and c h a r t e r  t o  bear 
on the  s i t u a t i o n ' ,  p . 96.
Murray, concluded t h a t  co rpora te  s t r a t e g i e s  in th e  midst  of such 
d i v e r s i t y  of  dec is ion  models, could not only be formulated w i th in  the  
fi rm but a l so  had to  be 'n e g o t i a t e d '  with ex te rna l  i n t e r e s t  c a b a l s .
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Mintzberg,  Quinn, James (1986) have cautioned t h a t  when the  process  
g e t s  so p o l i t i c i s e d ,  managers should cease to  th ink  in terms of  c l e a r ,  
c r i s p  s t r a t e g i e s  and begin to  look ins tead  fo r  an outpourings  of 
d e c i s io n  compromises . . .  they have to  learn  to  manage in t h i s  kind of 
'negot ia ted*  p o l i t i c a l  atmosphere.  The conception of  o rg an iza t io n s  as 
u n i t a r y  n a t io n a l  systems once again f a l t e r s ,  in s tead  they can be seen 
as th e  'outcomes of j o i n t  involvement in c e r t a i n  t a sk s  of a m u l t i p l i c i t y  
of  in d iv id u a l s  and groups with a v a r i e ty  of goals  and values  and in 
i n t e r a c t i o n  of i n e q u a l i t y ' ,  Watson (1982).
Taking a m ic r o - p o l i t i c a l  p e r s p ec t iv e ,  Watson (1982) descr ibed  how a 
major o rg an iza t io n a l  change was thwarted because d e f i n i t i o n s  of the  
s i t u a t i o n  and ideology held by work fo rce  d i f f e r e d  from the  management.
A change ' s c r i p t  s in g u la r ly  w r i t t e n  by management, laying out d e t a i l s  
of  the  move to  a new p l a n t ,  had to  be compromised and r e d e f i n e d . '
As Quinn (1980) pointed out such major s t r a t e g i c  changes,  o f ten  
t r i g g e r  ove r t  p o l i t i c a l  behaviour and requ i re  p o l i t i c a l  savvy by 
management to  deal with i t .  Consequently,  the  ' n e g o t i a t i o n  and 
r e n e g o t i a t i o n  of r e a l i t i e s  informed ac t ions  and th e  r e s u l t i n g  
p a t t e r n  of change ' .  Watson concluded t h a t  o rg a n iz a t io n a l  change 
should be seen in t h i s  con tex t  as:
"Modificat ions  made to  o rg an iza t io n a l  arrangements which a re  the  
outcomes of i n t e r a c t i o n s ,  c o n f l i c t s  and c o n f ro n ta t io n s  between 
groups" ,  p . 224.
\
Thus, th e  pervas ive  presence of group id ea log ies  sugges ts  t h a t  p o l i t i c s  
undergird s t r a t e g i c  changes.  Far from being harmonious e n t i t i e s  with 
consensus conception of  g o a l s ,  o rgan iza t ions  comprise of in d iv idua ls
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and groups with d i f f e r e n t  agendas,  percep t ions  and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  
of o rg a n iz a t io n a l  g o a l s .  Ind iv idua ls  who may a lso  have some personal  
goals  and ambitions which have l i t t l e  to  do with the  good of the  
o rgan iza t io n  -  Jones (1987). S t r a t e g i c  changes from t h i s  p e r s p e c t iv e ,  
r e s u l t  from barga in ing ,  compromises, th e  g ive -and- take  among dec is ion  
makers with d i f f e r i n g  i n t e r e s t s  and values  and d i f f e r e n t i a l  power,
Gray and Ariss  (1985).
Using a s t r a t e g i c  ' r o p e '  metaphor, Tichy (1983) argues t h a t  management 
of change re q u i re s  making t e c h n i c a l ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  and c u l tu r a l  d ec is ions  
a l l  of which re q u i re  d i f f e r e n t  managerial approaches.  The ta sk  of 
management i s  to  keep the  th r e e  s t rands  in a lignment .  Tichy gives  
d e t a i l e d  p r e s c r i p t i o n s  of the  dimensions of each s t r a n d s ,  the  most 
p e r t i n e n t  to  th e  p re sen t  study being - c u l t u r e ,  p o l i t i c s ,  and changing 
people as a s t r a t e g i c  change.
The s t r a t e g i c  rope approach o f f e r s  managers an o ppor tun i ty ,  a 'h and le '  
t o  s t a r t  working on one dimension(s) with and then t o  in f luence  the  
o the rs  from t h i s  s t a r t i n g  p o in t .  However, SOEs have a d i f f e r e n t  
audience and var ied  a c t o r s ,  T ichy 's  p r e s c r i p t i v e  s c r i p t  may have to  
be modified t o  r e f l e c t  v a r i a t i o n s  in the  processes  followed by d i f f e r e n t  
o rg a n iz a t io n s .
II  Empirical  Experience on SOEs
This sec t ion  reviews the  resea rch  t h a t  focused on SOEs as a realm of 
in qu i ry .  Most of  the  l i t e r a t u r e  dea ls  with the  i n t e r a c t i o n  between 
the  s t a t e  and SOEs. At the  hub of these  s tu d ie s  are  concerns regard ing  
managerial  autonomy, c o n t r o l ,  and performance of SOEs; s t a t e  i n t e r ­
vention in management of SOE and s t r a t e g i c  dec is ion  p rocesses .
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Research c l o s e r  to  t h i s  study i s  spar se ,  the  most s i g n i f i c a n t  being 
Mazzolini (1979) study of th e  s t r a t e g i c  dec is ions  by European SOEs 
to  launch fo re ign  d i r e c t  investment.  Drawing ex ten s iv e ly  from A l l ison  
(1970) framework, Mazzolini l i k e  Murray (1978), po in t s  out t h a t  SOEs 
have m u l t ip l e  and of ten  c o n f l i c t i n g  o b je c t iv e s  t h a t  can only be 
re so lved  by arguing and bargain ing  among a c to r s .
"Players  do not a l l  a c t  according to  one s e t  of o b j e c t i v e s .  Rather,  
each p layer  has h is  own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of th e  o v e ra l l  o rgan iza t iona l  
o b j e c t i v e s ,  the  o b je c t iv e s  of h is  own su b -o rgan iza t ion ;  and h i s  own 
o b j e c t i v e s .  Decisions a re  not made as r a t i o n a l  choices  in view of 
common aims but by the  'p u l l i n g  and h au l ing '  t h a t  is  p o l i t i c s " .
He po in ts  out t h a t  s t r a t e g i c  dec is ions  are  not i s o l a t e d  snapshots ,  
divorced from continua l implementation p rocess .
"The conception t h a t  dec is ions  a re  made by leaders  once and f o r  a l l  
and then handed over to  the  opera t ing  people f o r  implementation is  
naive . . .  A f i r m ' s  s t r a t e g i c  behaviour i s  not decided upon and
taken in success ive  s teps  a t  d i f f e r e n t  po in ts  in t ime by leaders  who,
between one s tep  and another ,  need t o  worry about o th e r  problems.
This does not guarantee c o n t in u i ty .  In s tead ,  dec i s ions  and ac t ions  
take  the  form of  co l lages  . . .  t o  exp la in  why a p a r t i c u l a r  formal 
[ o r g a n iz a t io n a l ]  dec is ion  was made, o r  why one p a t t e r n  of  o rgan iza ­
t i o n a l  behaviour emerged, i t  i s  necessary  to  i d e n t i f y  the  games and 
p la y e r s ,  t o  d i sp lay  the  c o a l i t i o n s ,  bargains  and compromises and to
convey some f e e l  fo r  the  confus ion" ,  p . 252.
I t  i s  through t h i s  process of  bargain ing  among p layer s  p ro te c t in g  
t h e i r  coveted s t a k e s , t h e  i n t r i c a c i e s  of  procedures ,  power plays 
and compromises t h a t  s t r a t e g i c  change is  o f ten  p r o t r a c t e d ,  Mazzolini ,  
observed:
"When a company follows a p a r t i c u l a r  course ,  a change in the  
environment . . .  w i l l  tend to  cause a change in s t r a t e g y  only much
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l a t e r  than the  environmental  change* . . .
I f  a proposed change in s t r a t e g y  has to  be approved by many o rgan iz ­
a t io n a l  u n i t s ,  [as i s  th e  case in most SOEs]} then the  process  of 
change w i l l  be more cumbersome.
A s h i f t  in s t r a t e g y  e n t a i l i n g  th e  d iscon t inuance  of a p a r t i c u l a r  
course  of a c t io n s  w i l l  be a l l  t h e  more d i f f i c u l t  to  accomplish 
when i t  e n t a i l s  upse t t in g  the  expec ta t ions  of severa l  suborgan iza t ions  
which were s a t i s f i e d  up to  t h a t  p o in t " ,  p . 135.
The r e s u l t a n t  compromise o r  ' n eg o t i a t e d  change ' ,  o f ten  does not 
correspond t o  th e  o r ig i n a l  change p roposa l ,  i t  i s  redef ined  and f i n e -  
tuned to  r e f l e c t  the  view of  th e  c o n s t e l l a t i o n  of loosely  k n i t  u n i t s .
I t  i s  the  theme of t h i s  study t h a t  s t r a t e g i c  change in SOEs is  a 
' n e g o t i a t e d  p rocess '  and M azzo l in i ' s  f in d in g s  c lo se ly  p a r a l l e l  t h i s  
conception .  His study was about European SOEs and the  r e s u l t s  i t  
y i e l d s  cannot be taken in d i s c r im in a te ly ;  they may not apply to  o the r  
c o u n t r i e s .  For in s tance ,  t h i s  study in d ic a te s  t h a t  r e l i a n c e  on 
government f inances  i s  a complex process involving a l o t  of is sues  
than j u s t  f in a n c e ,  and a v a r i e ty  of ex te rna l  p layers  very i n f l u e n t i a l  
on how SOE should ope ra te .  Depending on the  is sues  a t  s tak e ,  these  
groups could p res su re  th e  government to  y i e ld  to  t h e i r  views. So 
M azzo l in i ' s  conclus ions  have to  be i n t e r p r e t e d  with cau t ion .
H afs i ,  Kiggundu and Jorgensen (1985) examined the  s t r u c t u r a l  con f ig ­
u ra t io n s  in the  s t r a t e g i c  apex of SOEs based on t h e i r  p ropos i t ion  
t h a t  'some key func t ions  o f  the  s t r a t e g i c  apex were performed ou ts id e
* Presupposes r e l e v an t  environment as defined by th e  a c t o r s ,  and 
perce ive  the  need to  change.
} Comment supplied
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th e  SOEs - wi th in  the  government bureaucracy1. They descr ibed  the  
apex as composed of c o a l i t i o n s  of two groups of ex ecu t iv e s .  'Commissars'  
and ' e n g i n e e r s ' ,  or  p o l i t i c a l  and t e c h n o c r a t i c '  managers to  use Bower's 
(1983) conception ,  ' s p e c i a l i z e d  and g en e ra l '  execu t ives  according to  
Barnard (1938).  The 'Commissars' a re  conduits  f o r  d i r e c t  government 
c o n t r o l ,  they id e n t i fy  with the  i n t e r e s t s  of the  e x te rn a l  s takeho lde r  - 
the  government, the  c i v i l  s e rv ice  where they a re  mainly drawn from, 
th e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r ty ,  o r  an e thn ic  group. The ' e n g in e e r s '  by c o n t r a s t  
a re  bus iness  o r ien ted  and more concerned with the  t e ch n ica l  economic 
performance and the  f i r m ' s  in te r n a l  management. S t r a t e g i c  dec is ions  
then became n e g o t i a t iv e  along th e se  two o r i e n t a t i o n s ,  or the  mix of 





o Career pa ths  r e l a t e d  to  a b i l i t y  
t o  r e p re se n t  ex te rna l  i n t e r e s t s .
o SOE is  a means towards o the r  
g o a l s .
o Responsive to  demands of t h e i r  
p o l i t i c a l  p r i n c i p a l s .
o Their  'sandwich'  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between ex te rna l  and in te rn a l  
c o a l i t i o n s  i s  c o n f l i c t f u l .
Engineers
o Careers l inked to  t e c h n i c a l -  
economic performance of the  
SOE.
o Iden t i fy  c lo se ly  with managers 
in p r iv a t e  s e c to r .
o They shoulder  the  economic 
legit imacy of the  SOE.
The study f u r t h e r  revealed f i v e  s t r u c t u r a l  p a t t e rn s  in the  s t r a t e g i c  
apex as the  SOE d i v e r s i f i e s ,  develops e x p e r t i s e  and f in a n c ia l  autonomy 
t h a t  reduce i t s  dependence on s t a t e  funding, and i n i t i a t e  changes t h a t  
a re  ' e n g in e e r s '  dominated. The l i f e - c y c l e  path develops from the  
s i t u a t i o n  of infancy to  the  s i t u a t i o n  of autonomy, even though the  
path v a r ie s  from organ iza t ion  to  o rg a n iz a t io n .  [These are  shown in 
Table 2 . 2 ] .  Hafsi e t  a l ,  pointed out t h a t  development of s t r a t e g y  
i s  a c ru c ia l  func t ion  of the  s t r a t e g i c  apex.
" S t r a t e g ic  fo rmula t ion involves  th e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  the  o rg a n iz a t io n -  
environment in t e r f a c e  and the  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of p o t e n t i a l  o p p o r tu n i t i e s  
and t h r e a t s  r e l e v a n t  to  the  o rg a n iz a t io n .  Based on t h i s  a n a ly s i s ,  the  
s t r a t e g i c  apex makes a stream of dec is ions  which . . .  enables the  
o rg an iza t io n  to  f u l f i l  i t s  miss ion ,  and to  meet the  needs of i t s  
s takeho lders  . . .
When th e  o rg an iza t io n  is  su b jec t  to  powerful ou ts id e  c o n t r o l ,  as i s  
o f ten  the  case  with SOEs, th e  s t r a t e g i c  apex is  requ ired  to  respond 
to  performance contro l  systems e s ta b l i s h e d  by these  ou ts ide  i n t e r e s t s " ,
p . 6.
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I t  i s  the  ta sk  of s t r a t e g i c  apex to  r e co n c i le  these  fo rces  to ge the r  
with t h e i r  - SOE management - i n t e r e s t s ,  in to  a dec is ion  t h a t  w il l  
be accep tab le  t o  a l l  p a r t i e s .  The SOE execu t ives  must have s k i l l s  
to  recognize  where t h e i r  p a r t i c u l a r  e n t e r p r i s e  s tands among the  
c o n f ig u ra t io n s  [not an easy th ing  to  do] and take  ap p rop r ia te  a c t io n .
Table 2 .2  DIMENSIONS OF THE STRATEGIC APEX CONFIGURATIONS
C onfigura t ion :  Composition of Functions of Accountab i l i ty
S t r a t e g i c  Apex S t r a t e g i c  Apex
1. INFANT o Top managers
are  commiss­
ars  se lec ted  
and t r u s t e d  
by government
2. AUTONOMOUS o Top managers
are  engineers
3. WAFER o Top managers
are  commiss­
a rs  and eng­
ineers
4.  FLOWER POT o Top managers
are  engineers  
and/o r  commi­
s sa rs
o S e t t in g  s t r a t -  o Organic 
egy i s  toward 
s o c i o - p o l i t i ­
cal  goals 
o In te rn a l  man­
agement is  
not a major 
func t ion
o In te rn a l  man­
agement i s  
key func t ion  
o S t ra tegy  mak­
ing process 
i s  d i r e c te d  
toward e f f i c ­
iency
o Key func t ion  
i s
- in t e rn a l  
management 
o C o n f l ic t  man­
agement i s  ke)
o Boundary mana- o Oriented tow- 
gement i s  key ard m u l t ip le
func t ion  ex te rna l  con-
o Risk of negle-  s t i t u e n c i e s
c t in g  s t r a t e g y  which overlap





e f f i c i e n c y
- publ ic  r e l ­
a t io n s
o Balancing t e c h ­
nical/economic 
vs soc ia l  c r i t ­
e r i a
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5. ASPARAGUS o Top managers o Boundary man- o I d e n t i f i c a t i o n
are  fo rced to  agement i s  key with m u l t ip l e
become comm- fu n c t io n ,  but c o n s t i tu e n c ie s
i s s a r s ,  to  i s  segregated
choose s ides  r a t h e r  than
in ex te rna l  s p ec ia l i z ed
c o n f l i c t s  o S t ra tegy
o S t r a t e g i c  apex making and
is  v e r t i c a l l y  i n te rn a l  man-
div ided along agement are
p o l i t i c a l  unimportant
l in e s
Source: Hafsi e t  al (1985),  S t r u c tu ra l  Configura tions  in the  S t r a t e g i c  
Apex of  SOEs.
Escobar (1982) s tudied  the  decis ion-making processes  of two SOEs in 
Lat in America: the  Corporation Venezolana de Guayana - CVG, and the  
Compantia Vale de Rio Doce - CVRD. Following the  'Commissars-Engineers ' 
typo logy, she pointed out t h a t  a t  any given time a given SOE w i l l  be 
d i r e c t e d  by some mixture of the  c o a l i t i o n .  She proposed th a t  th e re  
are  fo rce s  which motivate  the  behaviour of the  c o a l i t i o n s  with in  the  
con tex t  of c e r t a i n  dec is ion  a reas :  Table 2.3  shows the  dimensions 
of the  model and dec is ion  areas  t h a t  would req u i re  readjus tment of 
c o a l i t i o n  s tan ce .  According to  Escobar, Commissars are  not a 
r i g i d l y  government-oriented group, they may re p re se n t  a non-governmental 
i n t e r e s t ,  in which case they 





P r o f i t
Maximization
Social
Subs id i ­
za t ion
Policy  Issues
o D i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  
o Employment Policy  
o Marketing Policy 
o Finance & Tax
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w il l  a l l y  with ' en g in e e r s '  on most i s su e s .
"Engineers placed by the  ou ts id e  p a r tn e r  develop two l o y a l t i e s " :  one 
to  th e  SOE i t s e l f  and one to  th e  s t ro n g e r ,  mother company, which 
r e a l l y  determines t h e i r  long-term c a r e e r  chances.  In cases  of c o n f l i c t  
of  i n t e r e s t  between p r iv a t e  shareho lder  and SOE, they a re  l i k e  the  
commissars f o r  the  p r iv a te  owners.
She a p t ly  concluded t h a t :
" the  o v e ra l l  behaviour of the  . . .  SOE in developing mixed economies . . .
t ends  to  be a melange, varying according to  p o l icy ,  power s h i f t s ,  and
th e  bus iness  and economic environment.
A dynamic view of change in the  SOE would have t o  incorpora te  some 
theory  of change, in which . . .  the  government - SOE bargain ing
process  i t s e l f  i s  the  motor of ev o lu t io n " ,  p . 125.
Escobar 's  model was not c l e a r l y  focused and consequently  has produced 
in format ive  but t e n t a t i v e  r e s u l t s .
From an exp lo ra to ry  survey of 50 execu t ives  of SOEs in Lat in America, 
Asia and A f r i ca ,  Zif  (1981) pos i ted  t h a t  managerial s t r a t e g i c  behaviour 
in SOEs was a mix of  two v a r i a b l e s :  p o l i t i c a l  and bus iness  o r i e n t a t i o n s .  
The fol lowing p ro p o s i t io n s  formula t ing the  expected behaviour t endenc ies  
were developed and t e s t e d .
1. The s t ro n g e r  the  p o l i t i c a l  o r i e n t a t i o n  of an SOE, the  g r e a t e r  the  
l ik e l ih o o d  t h a t  i t s  s t r a t e g y  w i l l  be c h a rac te r i z ed  by r e l a t i v e l y  
low p r i c e s .  This tendency in c reases  with an inc rease  in the  
e x te rn a l  o r i e n t a t i o n  of management.
2.  The s t ro n g e r  th e  p o l i t i c a l  o r i e n t a t i o n  of an SOE, the  g r e a t e r  
th e  l ik e l ihood  of i n s t a b i l i t y  in i t s  g o a l s ,  and f requen t  s h i f t s  
in p r i o r i t i e s  fol lowing the  p o l i t i c a l  mood.
35
3. The s t ro n g e r  the  p o l i t i c a l  o r i e n t a t i o n  the  g r e a t e r  the  l ik e l ihood  
t h a t  management w i l l  ask f o r  support  before  a c t in g  on a new plan .  
Management tends to  c u l t i v a t e  pub l ic  support  p r i o r  to  a c t i o n .
4.  The s t ro n g e r  the  p o l i t i c a l  o r i e n t a t i o n  of an SOE, the  g r e a t e r  the  
l ik e l ih o o d  t h a t  i t s  top  managers w i l l  come from publ ic  r a t h e r  
than p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s .
Zif  noted t h a t  h is  p ropos i t ions  were s t rong ly  supported ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
2 ,3 ,4  above. He concluded t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  o r i e n t a t i o n  had s i g n i f i c a n t  
explana tory  power on the  s t r a t e g i c  behaviour of managers of SOEs. 
Rai ffa  (1981) argued t h a t  because of t h i s  p o l i t i c a l  p ressu re :
"Marginal changes in the  p o l i c i e s  of the  firm are  . . .  p o s s ib le ,  
but s u b s t a n t i a l  s h i f t s  in the  scope and s t r u c t u r e  of the  fi rm are  
impossible  without a major c o n f ro n ta t io n .  Major dec is ions  are  
t y p i c a l l y  made a t  a p o l i t i c a l  l e v e l ,  beyond the  board* of the  
state-owned e n t e r p r i s e ,  and re q u i re  var ious  pay-offs  to  p a r t i e s  
involved" .
S im i la r  conclusions  were echoed by Grass ini  (1981),  and M ar t in e l l i  
(1981).  Ramamurti (1986) adds h is  weight to  those  ques t ion ing  the  
p r e s c r i p t i v e  value of the  r a t i o n a l  c a lcu lus  of planning in SOEs.
'How f r e e  are  the se  o rgan iza t ions  . . .  to  r e a l l y  choose o b je c t iv e s  
and s t r a t e g i e s ,  to  d i v e r s i f y  in to  new bus inesses ,  or  to  d iv e s t  
e x i s t i n g  bus inesses  because they are  no longer a t t r a c t i v e ' .
He argues t h a t  SOEs face  s e r i e s  of con tex tual  c o n s t r a i n t s  in t h e i r  
s t r a t e g i c  a c t io n s :
* emphasis supp l ied .  This observat ion  from R a i f f a ' s  hypo the t ica l  
case  was repeated severa l  t imes in t h i s  study.
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1. Loss of s t r a t e g i c  autonomy;
2. Ambiguous and c o n f l i c t i n g  goa ls ;
3. P o l i t i c i z a t i o n  of s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s io n s ;
4.  Shor t- te rm o r i e n t a t i o n .
Under the se  c i rcumstances ,  SOE managers ' n e g o t i a t e '  s t r a t e g i c  changes 
r a t h e r  than ' fo rm u la te '  them - Murray (1978),  and ba lance shor t - te rm  
incremental  changes with immediate pay-offs  t o  meet the  i n t e r e s t s  of 
p o l i t i c i a n s ,  and the  fundamental s t r a t e g i c  changes t h a t  have long-term 
payback but secures  managerial  i n t e r e s t s  and p r o f i t a b i l i t y  of the  
o rg a n iz a t i o n .  Smith (1981) agrees  but f a l l s  sh o r t  of recogniz ing the  
neg o t ia ted  p rocess .  He observed t h a t  SOEs have t o  take  cognizance of 
the  macro con tex tua l  f a c t o r s  - soc ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  i s su e s .
" ' t h e  n a t io n a l i z e d  i n d u s t r i e s '  po in t  of view is  t h a t  while they are  
the  b e s t  judges of what i s  b e s t  f o r  t h e i r  own in d u s t ry ,  the  government 
i s  . . .  r e spons ib le  f o r  a sse ss in g  any c o n f l i c t i n g  impact on the  economy".
I t  could be added t h a t  through th e  process of n e g o t ia t io n  a compromise 
o r  agreeab le  s t r a t e g i c  plan w i l l  be drawn.
Using a marketing s t r a t e g y  approach, Capon (1981) specu la ted  about the  
d i f f e r e n c e s  t h a t  e x i s t  between SOEs and p r iv a t e  fi rms in the  development 
and execution of  t h e i r  marketing s t r a t e g i e s .  He focused on s t r a t e g i c  
dec is ions  about:
- the  bus iness  t o  e n t e r ;
- market segmentation and t a r g e t i n g ;
- th e  marketing mix s t r a t e g i e s  - i e ,  p roduct ,  p r i c e ,  promotion and 
d i s t r i b u t i o n .
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Using th e  Boston Consult ing Group - BGC p o r t f o l i o  framework, he developed 
the  fo l lowing  p ro p o s i t io n s :
- SOEs are  l e s s  d i v e r s i f i e d  in the  markets they serve ,  the  techno log ies  
they employ, and the  products and se rv ices  they produce than are  
p r i v a t e  c o rp o ra t io n s .
- SOEs tend to  use market segmentation l e s s ,  and seek broader  customer 
bases than p r i v a t e  c o rp o ra t io n s .
- SOEs are  o f ten  d i r e c te d  by t h e i r  governments to  provide  c e r t a i n  
products  and se rv ice s  and to  u t i l i s e  c e r t a i n  inputs  in t h e i r  
production p rocess ,  much more than are  p r iv a t e  co rp o ra t io n s .
- SOEs with lower market shares  adopt more aggress ive  p r ic in g  s t r a t e g i e s  
than p r i v a t e  c o rp o ra t io n s .
- There are  minimal d i f f e r e n c e s  in the  c h a r a c te r  of  th e  promotional 
s t r a t e g i e s  between SOE and p r iv a t e  co rp o ra t io n s .
Capon's underlying assumption in the  fo rmula t ion of th e se  p ro p o s i t io n s  
was t h a t  the  marketing s t r a t e g i c  dec is ion  flowed from the  o b je c t iv e s  
s ince  'a  c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  s t r a t e g y  i s  enexorably t i e d  to  i t s  o b j e c t i v e s ' .
But, as Ramamurti (1987) concluded from h is  study of  I n d i a ' s  SOEs, 
' t h e o r y - i n - u s e '  tends  t o  d ev ia te  from the  'espoused '  theory  and 
assuming away t h a t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  can d i s t o r t  the  r e a l i t y  of  the  
s i t u a t i o n .
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Nwokoye (1984),  used a 'market-performance m a tr ix '  model to  look a t  
the  SOEs in terms of t h e i r  market compet it iveness  and the  p r in c ip a l  
performance c r i t e r i o n  fo r  a sse ss ing  r e s u l t s  as shown in Figure 2 .1 ,  
a l so  t o  c l a s s i f y  the  broad management s t y l e s  to  be adopted whenever 








Performance C r i t e r io n  
Non-Profit  P r o f i t




' Business Manage- 
' ment
Nwokoye's model p re sc r ib e s  adoption of con t ingen t  management s t y l e s :  
the  p r i v a t e  s e c to r  management s t y l e ,  the  pub l ic  s e c to r  s t y l e ,  o r  the  
mix th e r e o f  depending on the  na tu re  of  the  market and performance 
c r i t e r i o n .
"The c i v i l  s e r v ice  management s t y l e  i s  suggested f o r  an e n t e r p r i s e  
t h a t  ope ra te s  in a non-competit ive  market and whose performance 
c r i t e r i o n  i s  n o n - p r o f i t ,  because th e se  cond i t ions  p a r a l l e l  what 
o b ta in s  in the  c i v i l  s e r v ic e " .
The converse  i s  the  case  when SOE opera tes  in th e  compet i t ive  market 
and i s  eva lua ted  on p r o f i t  performance.  While th e  r e s u l t s  are  
p l a u s i b l e ,  th e  s tepwise changes assumed by th e  model, may tu rn  out 
to  be a f a r  cry from r e a l i t y .
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The Amorphous P r inc ipa l
The underly ing problem in SOEs is  one of p l u r a l i t y  of p r i n c i p a l s  with 
panoply of  o b j e c t i v e s .  Aharoni (1982) argues t h a t  one way to  look 
a t  SOE managers - government, s t ak e h o ld e r s ,  r e l a t i o n s h i p  is  in terms 
of  a g e n t - p r i n c i p a l . I t  i s  o f ten  unc lea r  who the  "boss" or  the  " rea l  
p r in c ip a l "  i s ,  Ramamurti (1987).  The government i s  not a monolith 
t h a t  speaks with one voice .  I t  ac t s  through a v a r i e ty  of m i n i s t e r s ,  
l e g i s l a t o r s ,  c a b in e t ,  and c i v i l  s e r v an t s .
I t  i s  a m u l t i - c u l t u r a l  con tex t  of ind iv idua ls  with t h r e e  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  
" cu l tu re s"  t h a t  are  forced to  work to g e th e r :  p ro fes s iona l  managers, 
bu reau c ra t s ,  and p o l i t i c i a n s .  The t h r e e  c o a l i t i o n s  tend to  d i f f e r  
on t h e i r  pe rcep t ions  of  SOEs - Ramamurti (1987).  These agents of  the  
s t a t e ,  " inc luding  the  managers of the  e n t e r p r i s e  and t h e i r  c o n t r o l l e r s  
as well as o th e r  c o n s t i t u e n t s ,  look f o r  ways to  reach some q u a s i - r e s o lu t i o n  
of c o n f l i c t s ,  o f ten  by nebulously defined o b je c t iv e s  of the  e n t e r p r i s e  
o r  by o f f i c i a l  requirements  t o  achieve m u l t ip l e  and c o n f l i c t i n g  goals"  - 
Aharoni (1981).  To re so lve  th e  c o n f l i c t  he sugges ts  t h a t  as t h e r e  is  
no i d e n t i f i a b l e  p r in c ip a l  but m u l t ip l e  t i e r s  of agen ts ,  the se  agents  
should be forced  to  argue on choices  to  be made and th e  goals  t o  be 
pursued. But, s ince  goals  are  formulated through i n t e r a c t i v e  process  
wi th in  a c o a l i t i o n ,  d i f f e r e n t  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  designs  may change 
membership in th e  c o a l i t i o n ,  (see  Bhatt  1982) and th e  r e l a t i v e  power 
of d i f f e r e n t  c o a l i t i o n  members. For Austin (1985) the  so lu t io n  l i e s  
in ' c o l l a b o r a t i v e '  management and ' i n t e r a c t i o n  d i v e r s i t y ' .  A u s t in ' s  
p o s i t i v i s t  pe rspec t ive  sees  c o l l a b o ra t io n  through j o i n t  goal s e t t i n g  
as th e  c ru c ia l  l inkage between the  s t r a t e g i c  mission of the  SOE and 
the  na t iona l  development p o l i c i e s .  The two p a r t i e s :  SOE and s t a t e ,  
must demonstrate a w i l l in g n ess  to  accept t h a t  d i v e r s i t y  in t h e i r
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i n t e r a c t i o n  i s  d e s i r a b l e .
S h i r ley  (1983) recommends negot ia ted  formal c o n t r a c t s  with SOEs to  
e s t a b l i s h  an ope ra t ing  framework, as in France and Senegal.  Under 
t h i s  arrangement,  the  SOE and the  government e n t e r  in to  a nego t ia ted  
unders tanding whereby the  government pledges not t o  in te rvene  in th e  
o pe ra t ions  of SOE, while the  SOE accepts  n eg o t ia ted  performance g o a ls .  
S h i r ley  b e l iev es  t h a t  the  nego t ia ted  understanding inc reases  the  a c to r s  
commitment and w i l l in g n ess  to  comply with the  terms of the  agreement.
Bhatt  (1982) s tud ied  the  development of indigenous technology, a case 
of SwarajX Trac tor  in Ind ia ,  and the  dec is ion  making s t r u c t u r e  and 
behaviour in which government was involved. He found th a t  the  process  
was segmented in to  ' p l u r a l i t y  of dec is ion  cen te rs  with d i f f e r e n t  agendas'  
and s h i f t i n g  a l l i a n c e s ,  which he in fe r r e d ,  was the  stumbling block 
f o r  th e  indus t ry  in acqu ir ing  and developing the new technology.
B h a t t ' s  study f u r t h e r  in d ic a te s  the  importance of a s k i l l f u l  change 
provocateur and the  need to  harness broader h igh - leve l  support  fo r  
a change p rocess .  He observed:
"Immediately a f t e r  th e  work of Swaraj s t a r t e d ,  the  prime m in i s t e r  
[who had supported the  p r o j e c t ]  was changed as well as the  members 
of the  planning commission. A new d i r e c t o r  general  with a d i f f e r e n t  
agenda was appointed;  the  new d i r e c to r - g e n e r a l  emphasized research  
but without l inks  with the  ind u s t ry " ,  p . 134.
Jorgensen e t  al  (1986) summed t h i s  exper ience  when he sa id :
"A c r u c ia l  v a r i a b l e  in th e  e f f e c t iv e n e s s  of an SOE i s  the  s t a b i l i t y  
of i t s  board of d i r e c t o r s  . . .  and top management. Too of ten  these  
change every year  or  two, leaving l i t t l e  oppor tun i ty  fo r  conso l ida t ing  
change".
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Thus the  goals  and s t r a t e g i e s  of SOE change as government p r i o r i t i e s  
s h i f t .
At th e  c e n t r e  of debate  on SOE-government r e l a t i o n s h i p  is  the  clamour 
of  autonomy and managerial  d i s c r e t i o n .  While broad g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  
about the  d i s c r e t i o n  of SOE managers could be mis lead ing ,  Aharoni (1981)
has proposed t h a t  th e  degree of managerial d e sc re t io n  was a f f e c t e d  by
th e  fo llowing f a c t o r s :
- The e x te n t  of dependence on government f inance .
- The degree of product d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n .
- The e x te n t  of government equ i ty  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .
- Complexity and fragmenta tion of the  e n t e r p r i s e  goa ls .
- Degree of  e x p e r t i s e  and knowledge by c o n t r o l l i n g  agen ts .
- Cost of r ep lac ing  a manager.
-  The s t r u c t u r e  of th e  market.
- The i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  of an e n t e r p r i s e .
He recommended var ious  techniques  f o r  inc reas ing  d i s c r e t i o n  - based
mainly on P f e f f e r  and Salancik  (1978):
1. Obviate c o n t ro l s  through sequen t ia l  a t t e n t i o n  to  the  c o n f l i c t i n g  
demands.
- C on t ro l l ing  access t o  in format ion .
- Giving assurances  t h a t  demands are  being a t tended  t o .
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2. Reduction of dependence on the  s t a t e .
-  Develop d i s c r e t i o n a r y  f inance  f o r  investment.
-  D i v e r s i f i c a t i o n .
3. C on tro l l ing  the  con tex t  of the  SOE c o n t ro l s  through
-  Involvement in formula t ing con t ro l  r u l e s .
-  Foreign investment.
-  C o-op ta t ion .
There i s  however, a p o l i t i c a l  dimension t h a t  we should not lose  s ig h t  
o f .  Governments are  prone to  in te rvene  and want t o  be seen as i n s t r u ­
mental in management of success fu l  SOEs in o rder  to  score  p o l i t i c a l  
advantage.  Thus, the  s t r a t e g i c  management of SOEs is  a t  bes t  f r a g i l e .
F in a l ly ,  Ramamurti (1987) contends,  t h a t  what r e a l l y  m at te rs  i s  not 
to  s t r i k e  the  o f ten  tou ted  balance between autonomy and a c c o u n ta b i l i t y .  
Governments need to  r a i s e  the  ' q u a l i t y  of c o n t r o l '  and q u a n t i ty  of 
con t ro l  by which he means ' e x t e n t  to  which SOEs are  c o n t ro l l e d  by 
r e s u l t s ,  and ' e x t e n t  to  which in te rn a l  processes  of SOEs are  c o n t r o l l e d ,  
r e s p e c t i v e l y .  He proposes t h a t  what governments need but f ind  d i f f i c u l t  
t o  implement i s  a change away from 'high  s t r a t e g i c  autonomy with low 
o p e ra t io n a l  autonomy', to  'low s t r a t e g i c  autonomy with high o p e ra t iona l  
autonomy' .
S t r a t e g i c  Planning in LDCs: Government-SOE i n t e r a c t i o n
The purpose of s t r a t e g i c  planning in most LDCs i s  to  provide a macro 
' b l u e - p r i n t '  of  government p r i o r i t i e s  and economic changes,  and SOEs 
are  accordingly  expected t o  develop t h e i r  plans  wi th in  t h i s  framework.
In p r a c t i c e  co rpo ra te  planning seems to  be viewed as a 'poor cousin '  
of na t io n a l  planning to  be accepted by the  SOEs whether i t  w i l l  or 
no t .  This o b je c t iv e  has eluded the  LDCs f o r  reasons  o f ten  a t t r i b u t e d  
to  lack of managerial  know-how, ambiguous and c o n f l i c t i n g  g o a ls .  The 
' r e a l  problem would seem p a r t l y  to  be in r a t i o n a l  assumptions t h a t  
undergrid  s t r a t e g i c  planning,  t h a t  have proven t o  be incompatible with 
the  dynamic and a t  t imes t u r b u l e n t  environment of SOEs. "Environment 
tu rbu lence  i s  inheren t  in the  very process of  development and the  f a s t  
pace of environmental  change a sso c ia ted  with" - El-Namaki (1984).  In 
exp la in ing  empir ica l  s tu d ie s  on LDCs c l o s e r  to  t h i s  research  the  
fo llowing works were found p e r t i n e n t .
El-Namaki (1977) examined the  na ture  of bus iness  planning in major 
government-owned e n t e r p r i s e s  in Tanzania; National Development 
Corporation-NDC, S ta t e  Trading Corpora tion,  and Board of In te rn a l  
Trade. The s tudy shows t h a t  th e  process  of macro planning i s  u sua l ly  
shared by t h r e e  s e t s  of power cab le s :
1. Pol icy  planning apparatus  -  involved in po l icy  planning . They 
inc lude  (a) Par liament,  (b) Pa r ty ,  (c) Economic Committee of 
Cabinet .
2. Designing, implementation s t r a t e g i e s  - r e spons ib le  f o r  drawing 
s p e c i f i c  g u id e l i n e s .
3. Implementation Apparatus -  p u t t in g  plans in to  a c t i o n .  This i s  
the  category  of SOEs.
El-Namaki po in t s  out t h a t  the  d r a f t i n g  of  plans is  a c o n s u l t a t i v e  
process whereby SOEs draw up the  f e a s i b i l i t y  s tu d ie s  and fu tu r e
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plans  and submit them to  the  coord ina t ing  m i n i s t r y ' s  endorsement* en 
rou te  to  the  planning commission f o r  conso l id a t io n  with n a t io n a l  p la n s .
I t  then goes t o  the  pa r ty  and ev en tu a l ly  the  pa r l iam ent .  This i s  the  
kind of  f ragmenta tion  r e f e r r e d  to  by Murray 1978, Bhatt  1981, Aharoni 
1982 and Ramamurti 1986. He concluded t h a t  planning in Tanzania was 
flawed and f a r  from optimum; a r e s u l t a n t  of weak conceptual and oper­
a t i o n a l  assumptions t h a t  could not stand the  t e s t  of contextual  r e a l i t i e s .
"Some dec i s io n s  taken by the  government of Tanzania are  n e i t h e r  the  
outcome of sudden change of one aspec t  or the  o the r  of the  environment 
or  motivated by i n v i s i b l e  undercurren ts  t h a t  cannot be r e a d i ly  de tec ted  
by the  observer .  The r e s u l t  is  a sudden s h i f t  in bus iness  p o l i c i e s  
t h a t  sometimes reaches dramatic p ro p o r t io n s .  Both the  speed and the  
s ig n i f i c a n c e  of the  change leaves many e n t e r p r i s e s  almost para lysed  
as n e i t h e r  t h e i r  o p e ra t iona l  system not re sources  allow them to  
s w i f t l y  accommodate the se  p o l i c i e s .  Plans are  then thrown in to  havoc 
and, given the  i n f l e x i b i l i t y  of the  adjustment p rocess ,  i n t e r e s t  in 
planning is  sometimes abandoned a l t o g e t h e r " ,  p . 60.
In a subsequent r e s ea rc h ,  El-Namaki (1984) proposed a s t r a t e g i c  
planning model f o r  SOEs in LDCs. He hypothesized t h a t :
1. SOEs opera ted  in a t u r b u le n t  environment t h a t  c r e a te s  change and 
the  r e s u l t a n t  impetus to  s t r a t e g i c  behaviour.
2. Elements of s t r a t e g i c  behaviour were d i s ce rn ab le  and could be 
t r a c ed  in th e  contemporary h i s t o r i e s  of a number of SOEs in most 
LDCs.
3. Formulation of a s t r a t e g y  f o r  SOE in LDCs could fo llow a conceptual  
model t h a t  incorpora ted  macro as well as micro o rg an iza t io n a l  
c o n tex t s .
* The process  i s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  descr ibed  by Bower whereby sub -un i t s  
managers'  channel t h e i r  p r o j e c t  proposals  to  d iv i s io n a l  general  
manager fo r  endorsement.
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He concluded t h a t  environmental  tu rbu lance  in SOEs was c rea ted  by 
o rg a n iz a t i o n a l  changes,  market f o r c e s ,  government a c t i o n ,  or a l l  
t h r e e  combined. S t r a t e g i c  changes could be t raced  to  what he c a l l s  
government 'p e r su a s iv e  a c t i o n '  t h a t  spurs SOEs to  d i v e r s i f y ,  expand 
o r  d i v e s t .  The model assumes t h a t  management of SOE i s  re cep t iv e  
t o  environmental  change and o rg a n iz a t io n a l  response to  t h a t  change.
C lea r ly  El-Namaki regards  the  var ious  a c to r s  in the  SOEs, the  govern­
ment, and o th e r s  with s take  in th e  SOEs, as pass ive  observers  
r e a c t in g  r a t i o n a l l y  to  the  d i c t a t e s  of the  environment,  but unable 
t o  make i n t e l l i g e n t  d e c i s io n s .  This study c o n te s t s  t h a t  view. Decision 
makers in SOEs adapt and formula te  changes based on t h e i r  sense 
making and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of the  environment. They are  th e r e f o r e  the  
a r c h i t e c t s  of t h e i r  environment and not r e a c t o r s .
Suarez (1984) takes  th e  view t h a t  SOEs can be conceptua l ized  as a 
system of in t e r l i n k a g e s  "connected by a network of r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  
i n t e r a c t i n g  with one another  and exchanging informat ion . . .  and 
seeking a p o s i t io n  (of power) in the  h ie ra rchy  of  th e  web t h a t  would 
ensure  each o n e ' s  s u r v i v a l " .  I t  i s  from t h i s  p e r sp ec t iv e  t h a t  
o rg a n iz a t io n a l  changes come about as SOEs grow, expand, i n t e r a c t  in 
more unce r ta in  and t u r b u l e n t  environments,  and r e a l ig n  t h e i r  i n t e r ­
l inkages .  As the  in t e r l i n k a g e s  inc rease  in complexity,  the  need f o r  
s t r a t e g i c  planning and management becomes even g r e a t e r .
"The g r e a t e r  th e  degree of  change the  g r e a t e r  the  need f o r  p lanning, 
o therwise  the  precedents  of the  pas t  could guide the  f u t u r e ;  . . .  bu t,  
the  planning a c t i v i t y  of modern o rgan iza t ions  has to  be a f l e x i b l e  
and ongoing process ,  always searching f o r  new d i r e c t i o n s  under cond­
i t i o n s  t h a t  co n s ta n t ly  produce novelty  and s u rp r i s e s  in the  process 
of  managing the  web of i n t e r l i n k a g e s " ,  p . 36.
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More s i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  Suarez,  p o in t s  out  t h a t  the  i n t e r l i n k a g e s  i n t e r ­
a c t io n  bear  a human component of  power, i . e .  th e  c a p a c i ty  t o  a c t  and 
make d e c i s i o n s .  The r e l a t i o n s h i p  between th e  s t a t e  and SOEs i s  marked 
in the  main by th e  d i r e c t i o n  of  th e  power pendulum. The more i t  i s  in 
the  s t a t e  favour ,  th e  more top-down d ec i s io n  making tends  to  be.  El- 
Namaki (1977) Tanzanian case  would f a l l  under t h i s  c a t e g o ry ,  whereby 
goals  a re  t r a n s m i t t e d  to  th e  SOE, which in t u r n  i s  expec ted  to  accomplish 
them. The more th e  pendulum swings th e  SOE way, th e  more th e  e n t e r ­
p r i s e s  ' a b i l i t y  t o  n e g o t i a t e  changes with th e  s t a t e ,  e x e r c i s e  p e r su a ­
s io n s ,  and i n f l u e n c e ' .  This r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  shown in F igure  2 .2 .
The i n t e r l i n k a g e s  model gives  th e  a c t o r s  a le ad ing  r o l e  in the  a f f a i r s  
of  SOEs. They are  not  pas s ive  r e a c t o r s  of env ironmenta l  changes 
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Somasundram (1984) has i l lum inated  Suarez model and sugges ts  t h a t  the  
a n a ly s i s  of  SOEs could be drawn from in s ig h t s  provided by p o l i t i c a l  
s c ien ces .  He r e j e c t s  the  view t h a t  co rpora te  plans (state-SOE plans)  
are  b e au t i f u l  symmetries and harmonies, drawn with a concern fo r  
in t e r n a l  c o n s i s ten cy ,b o rd e r  balances  and the  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  which 
combine p e r f e c t l y .  S t r a t e g i c  planning in SOEs he argues ,  has two 
components t h a t  de r ive  t h e i r  ethos  from d i f f e r e n t  t i e r s  of management 
o r i e n t a t i o n s .  They a re :
1. f o r e c a s t i n g  - which is  the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of s t a t e  p lanners .
2.  s t r a t e g i c  formula t ion and development,  which is  an area of SOE 
management.
The two t i e r s  co n s ta n t ly  meet to  n e g o t i a t e  co rpora te  p lans ,  review 
them, modify,  or  change them as s i t u a t i o n s  change. A d i f f e r e n t  
pe r spec t ive  of s t r a t e g i c  planning could be considered?
"A t a p e s t r y  of compromises, an adjustment to  p re s su re s ,  a give and 
t ak e ,  an absorp t ion  of d i s c o n t i n u i t y  and in e q u a l i t y ,  a documentation 
of bargains  s t ruck  and mini-concordants  e s t a b l i s h e d ,  a l l  of them 
concluded a t  every po in t  t o  bu i ld  commitments".
From a survey of  negat ive  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  performance in 44 Nigerian 
SOEs, Fubara (1984) hypothesized t h a t  SOEs leaders  make s t r a t e g i c  
choices  t h a t  d i r e c t  the  e n t e r p r i s e ' s  a c t i v i t i e s  and are  c r i t i c a l  
f o r  i t s  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  and s u r v i v a l .  He found t h a t  p o l i t i c i a n s  made 
up 62 per cen t  of th e  boards of d i r e c t o r s ,  while p ro fes s iona l  groups 
equal led  38%. The Boards of SOEs were not the  u l t im a te  dec is ion  
makers on s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s io n s .
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"Board r e s o lu t io n s  on major e n t e r p r i s e  i ssues  . . .  [were] recommendations 
t o  the  c o n t r o l l i n g  m in i s t ry ,  e s p e c i a l l y  when they concerned expansion 
and investment of more c a p i t a l  . . .  the  m in i s t e r  of a c o n t r o l l i n g  m in i s t r y ,  
t h e  s e c r e t a r y  to  Government and the  Board of D irec to rs  could a l l  give  
d i r e c t  i n s t r u c t i o n  to  the  Chief Executive of SOE f o r  a c t i o n .
. . .  i t  was i n t r i g u in g  to  f ind  so many in f luences  on the  Chief Executive - 
t o  th e  ex ten t  t h a t  a Chief Executive and h is  team spend more t ime 
managing power brokers than the  business  of t h e i r  e n t e r p r i s e s " ,  p . 69.
Fubara concluded t h a t  the  management apparatus  of SOEs in Nigeria  
i . e .  d i r e c t o r s ,  c h ie f  execu t ives  and top management, lacked the  
co rp o ra te  and p ro fes s io n a l  competence-stake which m i l i t a t e d  a g a in s t  
good performance of the  e n t e r p r i s e s .
This i s  confirmed by S h i r ley  (1983) who found t h a t  in most LDCs th e re  
were acu te  shor tages  of managerial s k i l l s ,  and execu t ives  of SOEs were 
drawn from the  ranks of th e  c i v i l  se rv ice  and the  m i l i t a r y .  The pos­
i t i o n s  of top management are  e i t h e r  not f i l l e d ,  l i k e  in Tanzania where 
h a l f  of ten  la rge  a g r i c u l t u r a l  SOEs had no f i n a n c i a l  managers in 1980, 
and Nigeria where t h i r t y - f i v e  of  management pos ts  in E l e c t r i c a l  Power 
Author i ty  were vacant in 1981; or  they are  f i l l e d  by management con­
t r a c t s  with e x p a t r i a t e s  f i rm s .  The problem is  compounded by th e  
high tu rnover  of managers of  SOEs [as w i l l  become ev iden t  from t h i s  
s tudy] due mainly to  p o l i t i c a l  changes t h a t  usher  in new ac to r s  with 
d i f f e r e n t  agendas and t h e i r  c o t e r i e  of p o l i t i c a l  managers.  Donaldson 
and Lorsch under lined  th e  key r o l e  played by CEO in managing s t r a t e g i c  
change when they  sa id :
"The CEO must be ab le  t o  s tep  back, both from th e  p res su res  of  day- 
to -day  a c t i v i t y  and from o t h e r s '  inc reas ing  concern about s u r v iv a l ,  
to  unders tand the  sources of the  company's c u r r e n t  d i f f i c u l t i e s  and
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assess  i t s  c u r r e n t  and f u t u r e  s t r e n g t h s .  To do t h i s  an execut ive  must 
have confidence  in h is  v i s io n  . . .  he must t r u s t  h i s  own judgement . . .  
he must be capable  of making c r i t i c a l  assessments . . .  he must be able  
to  draw on wel1-developed in te rpe rsona l  s k i l l s " ,  p . 152.
F in a l ly ,  Boneo (1985) argued t h a t  the  des igners  of con t ro l  systems 
should not overlook the  p o l i t i c s  of con tro l  in SOEs. In a study of 
Latin American SOEs, he proposed a model t h a t  mapped out the  power 
d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  i d e n t i f i e d  th e  a c to r s  and t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s .  This is  
summarised in Table 2 .5 .
Actors Roles
a Managers of SOEs
b In f luencers
c Performance Evaluators  
d Feedback users
- Implementation goals  and comply with 
ru le s  and r e g u la t i o n s .
- Negotia te  r u l e s ,  resources  and goals,
- Set the  t a r g e t s ,  goal and perform­
ance s tanda rds .
- A l locate  c r i t i c a l  re sou rces .
- Monitor the  ru le s  and performance.
- Change g o a ls ,  r u l e s .
- Change re source  a l l o c a t i o n .
- Change management d e c i s io n s .
Boneo has suggested t h a t  "eva lua to rs "  can l ink  in cen t ives  and sanc t ions  
t o  performance which would induce "feedback-users"  to  comply with the  
des i red  changes.  He t h e r e f o r e  advocates c lo se  t i e s  between eva lua to rs  
(who are  not the  same people or  o rgan iza t io n s  as th e  in f lu en c e r s )  and 
the  feed-back users  in o rd e r  to  ensure  t h a t  feedback information is  
acted upon by re le v an t  people .  In p r a c t i c e  however, Boneo found t h a t  
contro l  designs are  t a i l o r e d  to  the  i n t e r e s t s  of in f lu en ce rs  - i . e .  
Prime M in is te r ,  M in is t e r s ,  Army O ff ice rs  who pay no a t t e n t i o n  to  
performance app ra isa l  r e p o r t s  and in troduce  changes based on p o l i t i c a l  
c r i t e r i a .
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Boneo's conclus ions  are  based on l im i ted  exper ience ,  however, they 
a re  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  r e l e v a n t  to  t h i s  study. Contrary to  the  dyadic 
approach t h a t  looks a t  th e  s t a t e  as the  main i n f lu en c e r  around which 
th e  SOE o r b i t s  and n e g o t i a t e s  s t r a t e g i e s  f o r  autonomy, he po in ts  out 
(be i t  im p l i c i t l y )  t h a t  t h e re  are  o th e r  ac to r s  equa l ly  i n f l u e n t i a l ,  
t o  th e  ex ten t  of  chal leng ing  the  s t a t e  on the  s t r a t e g i c  d i r e c t io n  of 
th e  SOE, and we need t o  recognize  t h e i r  power. These ' o t h e r  a c t o r s '  
con t ro l  resources  - f in a n c e ,  e x p e r t i s e ,  t h a t  they monitor and p re s c r ib e  
how SOEs in LDCs should deploy.  We can no longer ignore  t h e i r  in f luence  
on s t r a t e g i c  dec is ions  of SOEs and assume t h a t  the  s t a t e  is  th e  main 
problematic  a c t o r .
All t h i s  l i t e r a t u r e  provides  i n s ig h t f u l  unders tanding of how SOEs 
o p e ra te ,  but they need t o  be in t e r p r e t e d  with care  and should not be 
g e n e ra l i s e d  across  the  board as some were based on specu la t ion  from 
p r i v a t e  s e c to r  exper iences ,  and o the rs  had narrow empir ica l  suppor t .  
Thus, while  th e  f ind ings  may r e f l e c t  the  exper ienced r e a l i t y ,  but 
because of  th e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  many t h a t  can go amiss,  as t h i s  research  
would in d i c a t e ,  they are  of l im i ted  use,  mainly as p o in te r s  f o r  f u r t h e r  
r e s ea rc h .  As Vernon (1984) c o r r e c t l y  pointed out " th e re  is  no optimum 
a p p l i c ab le  to  a l l  c o u n t r i e s ;  each arrangement must . . .  r e f l e c t  the  
values  of th e  country  concerned".
I l l  Conceptual Framework
The foregoing survey of l i t e r a t u r e ,  a l b e i t  of unfocused n a tu re ,  has 
c l e a r l y  ind ica ted  t h a t  t h e r e  is  a spo t ty  r ecogn i t ion  t h a t  s t r a t e g i c  
change is  a n eg o t ia ted  p rocess .  However, t h i s  r e a l i z a t i o n  has been 
ins inua ted  in most c ases ,  and where e x p l i c i t ,  i t  has o f ten  been f l e e t -
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ingly  app l ied  to  some s p e c i f i c  change ep isodes  o r  d ec i s io n  making 
p rocess .  Thus th e re  a re  few empir ica l  s tu d ie s  where 'n eg o t i a t e d  o rd e r '  
has been app l ied  in the  a n a ly s i s  of change process  in l a rge  soc ia l  
o r g a n iz a t i o n s .
This resea rch  does not focus d i r e c t l y  on n e g o t i a t io n s  as an aspec t  of 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  As poin ted  out in chap te r  4, i t  needs to  be emphasized 
t h a t  th e  a c to r s  were not a c tu a l ly  observed in the  process  of n e g o t i a t in g  
s t r a t e g i c  changes,  but through the  use of extended in te rv iews  with the  
a c t o r s ,  most of whom were d i r e c t l y  involved in the  change p rocess ,  we 
were able  to  ge t  t h e i r  p e r sp ec t iv e s  of n e g o t i a t i o n s .  I t  does however 
apply Negot ia t ion  p e r sp ec t iv e  as a framework of a n a ly s i s  by id e n t i fy in g  
a number of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l ,  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  and s t r a t e g i c  change 
processes  which can and do give r i s e  to  n e g o t i a t io n s  in a SOE.
The Negotia ted Order Pe rspec t ive
The concept of n eg o t ia ted  o rde r  acquired  i t s  o r ig i n s  from St rauss  e t  al 
(1963) in a study of two p s y c h ia t r i c  h o s p i t a l s ,  as a way of concept­
u a l i z in g  how o rde r  and change could be understood in terms of an 
o v e ra l l  p roce ss .  They argued t h a t  i t  i s  through processes  of negot­
i a t i o n  t h a t  th e  o rg an iza t io n  s t r u c t u r e  i s  able  t o  ope ra te  and order  
main ta ined . Negotia ted o rde r  recognizes  and takes  in to  account:
" the  importance of unders tanding i n t e r a c t i o n  processes  as well as the  
s t r u c t u r a l  f e a t u r e s  of o rg a n iz a t io n a l  l i f e .  I t  s t r e s s e s  the  po in t  
of  view t h a t  one of  the  p r in c ip a l  ways t h a t  th ings  g e t  accomplished 
in o rg a n iz a t io n s  i s  through people n e g o t i a t in g  with one another ,  
and i t  t akes  th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  p o s i t io n  t h a t  both ind iv idua l  ac t ion  
and o rg a n iz a t io n a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  can be comprehended by unders tanding 
the  na tu re  and con tex ts  of those  n e g o t i a t i o n s " .  Maines and Charlton 
(1985).
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Strauss  (1978) argues t h a t  nego t ia ted  order  p e rspec t ive  could be 
"conceived of as the  sum t o t a l  of the  o r g a n iz a t i o n s ' s  ru le s  and 
p o l i c i e s ,  along with whatever agreements,  unders tandings ,  p ac t s ,  
c o n t r a c t s ,  and o th e r  working arrangements c u r r e n t ly  ob ta ined .  These 
inc lude  agreements a t  every level of o rg a n iz a t io n ,  of every c l ique  
and c o a l i t i o n ,  and inc lude  i m p l i c i t  as well as e x p l i c i t  agreement*.
Any envisaged changes t o  th e se  pacts  o r  t a c i t  agreements cause d i s r u p ­
t i o n ,  in f r in g e  on i n t e r e s t s  of  some a c t o r s ,  and c r e a t e  a need fo r  
r e s to r in g  o rd e r .
"Negotia tions  occur when ru le s  and p o l i c i e s  are  not in c lu s iv e ,  when 
th e re  are  d isagreements ,  when th e re  is  u n c e r t a in ty ,  and when changes 
are  int roduced . . .  n e g o t i a t io n s  can breed f u r t h e r  n e g o t i a t i o n s .
When new unders tandings  a re  reached, they in e v i t a b ly  a f f e c t  previous  
t a n g e n t i a l  agreements".  Maines and Charlton (1985).
S t rauss  p o in t s  out t h a t  th e  paradigm does not imply a l l  m at te rs  in 
o rg an iza t io n s  a re  n e g o t ia b le ;  r a t h e r  i t  i s  the  unders tanding of the  
n e g o t i a t io n  processes  t h a t  might inform the  an a ly s t  on how s t r a t e g i c  
d ec i s io n s  a re  made, how they are  changed, and how s t r u c t u r a l  l im i t a t i o n s  
i n t e r a c t  with the  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  a b i l i t y  to  i n t e r p r e t  h i s  s i t u a t i o n  and 
c r e a t e  th e  changes.
He uses t h r e e  key concepts  to  p re sen t  h is  paradigm;
- Negotia t ion which r e f e r s  to  th e  ac tua l  i n t e r a c t i o n  engaged in by 
i n t e r a c t a n t s ,  t h e i r  s t r a t e g i e s  and n eg o t i a t io n  subprocesses .
* This c lo se ly  p a r a l l e l s  s i t u a t i o n s  in SOEs as conta ined in legal 
ins t ruments ,  C har te r ,  Memorandas o f  Operations d e t a i l i n g  what 
bus iness  they are  in ,  who they a re  accountable  t o ,  and how debt 
f inanc ing  i s  t o  be r a i s e d ,  r u l e s  and procedures of f in a n c ia l  
r e p o r t in g .
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- Negotia t ion  context which d e sc r ib e s  the  r e l e v a n t  f e a tu re s  of the  
s i t u a t i o n  which d i r e c t l y  e n t e r  in to  n e g o t ia t io n s  and a f f e c t  the  
course .  The n eg o t ia t io n s  con tex t  have p ro p e r t i e s  t h a t  may be com­
bined in d i f f e r e n t  forms to  s u i t  the  c i rcumstances .  They inc lude: 
th e  number of  n e g o t ia to r s  and who they r e p r e s e n t ,  whether n e g o t i a ­
t i o n s  are  o n e -o f f ,  sequen t ia l  or  m u l t ip l e ,  the  power balance amongst 
n e g o t i a t o r s ,  i s sues  a t  s takes  and t h e i r  complexity,  and the  options  
open to  n e g o t i a to r s .
- S t r u c t u r a l  context r e f e r s  to  the  broader parameters wi th in  which 
n e g o t i a t io n s  take p lace .
He po in t s  out t h a t  the  l ines  of in f luence  are  not undimens ional, they 
can go e i t h e r  way, in which case  changes in the  s t r u c t u r a l  con tex t  may 
in f luence  the n e g o t i a t io n .  Context or  the  r e s u l t s  of n e g o t ia t io n s  
[as w i l l  be shown in t h i s  s tudy] can bring changes in the  n e g o t ia t io n  
con tex t  and s e t  the  tone fo r  f u tu r e  n e g o t i a t io n s .
S t rauss  is  ca re fu l  to  note t h a t  s t r u c t u r e s  and con tex ts  do not determine 
the  behaviour of the  i n d iv id u a l s ,  but merely provide  a general  frame­
work in which so c ia l  l i f e  is  acted  o u t .  The ind iv idua l  plays  a c e n t r a l  
ro l e  in forming and changing th e  framework.
Empirical  Studies
From i t s  e a r ly  development with a focus on small groups in h o s p i t a l s ,  
nego t ia ted  o rder  p e rspec t ive  has g radua l ly  demonstrated i t s  wider 
a p p l i c a b i l i t y  in the  a n a ly s i s  of o rgan iza t ions  as th e  following 
case  s tu d ie s  i l l u s t r a t e .
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In a resea rch  on pub l ic ly  supported a g r i c u l t u r a l  r e s ea rc h ,  Busch 
(1982) shows how a g r i c u l t u r a l  resea rch  evolved out of and has been 
modified by n e g o t ia t io n s  between urban a g ra r i a n s ,  farmers and s c i e n t i s t s .  
In response to  the  demands of th e  p o p u l i s t  fa rmers ,  enabling l e g i s l a ­
t i o n  was c rea ted  which led to  e s t a b l i s h i n g  of s t a t e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
experiments s t a t i o n s .  But as Busch po in ts  ou t ,  the  meaning of research  
was su b jec t  to  n e g o t ia t io n s  as i t  was in t e r p r e t e d  d i f f e r e n t l y  by 
s c i e n t i s t s  who were in t e r e s t e d  in ' o r i g i n a l  r e s ea rc h '  and those  who 
des i red  ' p r a c t i c a l  in fo rm a t io n ' .
Busch concluded t h a t :
1. Once an o rgan iza t ion  has sedimented i t s  s t r u c t u r e ,  t h a t  may s e t  
th e  l im i t s  f o r  the  context  and d i r e c t i o n  of n e g o t i a t i v e  a c t i v i t y .
2.  Creating formal o rgan iza t ion  [from n e g o t i a t i o n s ]  may s h i f t  the  
lo ca t io n  of n e g o t i a t io n s ,  and i n t e r n a l i z e  them away from the  
pu b l i c .
3.  Powerful p a r t i e s  in the  n e g o t ia t io n  process  may dominate and 
con t ro l  th e  agenda by r e s t r i c t i n g  n ego t iab le  i s s u e s .
Thus, Busch's study c l e a r l y  shows t h a t  the  " an a ly s i s  of  n e g o t i a t iv e  
a c t i v i t y  i s  markedly processual  and dynamic, y e t  grounded in the  
p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t i e s  of  soc ia l  l i f e "  -  Hall (1987).
Denzin (1976) study of  the  American l iquo r  indus t ry  focused on the  
ex ten t  to  which the  e s ta b l i s h e d  economic s t r u c t u r e s  evolved through 
the  process of n e g o t i a t io n s ,  and how the  n e g o t i a t io n  processes served 
to  maintain soc ia l  o rde r  in the  in dus t ry .  He i d e n t i f i e d  the m u l t ip le
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t i e r s  t h a t  c o n s t i t u t e d  what he descr ibed  as ‘complex of i n d u s t r i e s ' .
The f i v e  t i e r s  system comprised of d i s t i l l e r s ,  w ho lesa le rs ,  d i s t r i b u t o r s ,  
r e t a i l  owners, the  consumers (d r in k e r s )  and law enforcement agencies .  
Denzin examined the  n e g o t i a t i v e  process  through which the  indus t ry  was 
maintained - the  s t r u c t u r a l  con tex t  of the  indus t ry  and the  ac t ions  
of humans who c o n s t i t u t e d  i t  and the  i n t e r  and i n t r a  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
among the  t i e r s .
A p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n t e r e s t i n g  observa t ion  from h is  s tudy, which gave 
support  to  S t rauss  e t  al (1963) was t h a t  the  laws, procedures had a 
f i c t i o n a l  c h a r a c t e r ,  were bare ly  followed and above a l l  not c l e a r l y  
understood by those who were supposed to  enforce  them. Maines (1977) 
observed t h a t  the  f i v e - t i e r  system shows t h a t  n eg o t i a t io n  permeate, 
and is  p resen t  throughout  the  various  p a r t s  of the  system. Maines 
and Charlton (1985) were much more a n a ly t i c a l  about i t :
"The ' f i v e - t i e r '  system and the  t y p ic a l  ways t h a t  people wi th in  the  
t i e r s  i n t e r a c t  among themselves con ta in  the  p r in c ip a l  f e a tu r e s  of 
the  n e g o t ia t io n s  among the  p a r t i c i p a n t s  of the  in d u s t ry .  Except fo r  
d i s t i l l e r s ,  no one t i e r  emerges as a dominating fo rce  in so f a r  as 
each can modify the  ac t io n s  of th e  o th e r .  But th e  n e g o t ia t io n s  
t a c t i c s  and s t r a t e g i e s  and the  r e l a t i v e  balance of power a re  not 
evenly d i s t r i b u t e d  throughout the  indus t ry .
The contex t  and t h e i r  n e g o t i a t io n s  p a t t e rn  the  exper iences  of  the  
p a r t i c i p a n t s " .
Pe te r  Hall and Ann Spencer-Hall  (1982) undertook a comparative study 
of two publ ic  schools - Cooley Corners and Meadmont, in order  to  
in v e s t ig a t e  the  cond i t ions  under which n e g o t i a t iv e  a c t i v i t y  would 
expla in  the  o rgan iza t ion  of the  schools .  They d esc r ib e  in d e t a i l  the  
d i f f e r en c es  in the  system of o rg an iza t io n ,  s t y l e  of  leadersh ip  and
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o rg a n iz a t io n a l  arrangements t h a t  f a c i l i t a t e d  n e g o t i a t i o n s .
Their  observa t ions  revealed t h a t  t h e r e  were d i f f e r e n c e s  between the  
two schools  in the  ex ten t  and circumstances  of n e g o t i a t i v e  a c t i v i t y ,  
s t r u c t u r a l ,  and in te rpe rsona l  l im i t s  on n e g o t i a t io n s  between and 
wi th in  the  schools .  Based on th e se  f ind ings  they proposed the  cond i t ions  
t h a t  lead or hamper n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  the  most p e r t i n e n t  to  t h i s  study 
being the  fo llowing:
1. The occurrence of n e g o t i a t io n s  w i l l  be high in s i t u a t i o n s  t h a t  are  
c h a r a c te r i z e d  by change, u n c e r t a in ty  and ambiguity ,  d isagreement , 
ideo log ica l  d i v e r s i t y ,  newness and inexper ience ,  and problematic  
coo rd in a t io n .
2.  The more complex the  o rg a n iz a t io n ,  the  g r e a t e r  the  degree of 
n e g o t i a t i v e  a c t i v i t y .
3.  Adm in is t ra t ive  success ion ,  e s p e c i a l l y  an e x te rn a l  exper t  or  CEO, 
can c r e a t e  a conducive environment fo r  n e g o t i a t i o n .
4.  An o rgan iza t io n  with p ro f e s s io n a l s  i s  more l i k e l y  to  engage in 
n e g o t i a t io n  than no n -p ro fes s io n a l s .
5.  The broader the  d i spe r s ion  of power with in  an o rgan iza t ion  the  
h igher  the  incidence of n e g o t ia t io n  becomes.
Unlike S t rauss  (1978),  they concluded t h a t  o rg a n iz a t i o n a l  context 
and not n e g o t ia t io n  context c o n s t i t u t e d  overa rching co n tex t .  In the
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study of occupational r o l e s ,  Rothman (1979) agrees t h a t  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
of  power ( in  the  form of re sou rces )  s t rong ly  in f luences  the  success 
of n e g o t i a t io n s  and soc ia l  c o n t r o l .
S t rauss  (1982) ap p l ie s  "Negotia tion"  as an a n a ly t i c a l  p e r spec t ive  
t o  examine i f  i n t e r  and i n t r a  o rgan iza t io n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  could be 
i n s t i t u t e d  and maintained without n e g o t i a t io n s .  He p resen ts  a model 
t h a t  lo ca te s  n e g o t ia t io n s  in th e  an a ly s i s  of such r e l a t i o n s h i p s  by 
examining the  s e t  of dimensions c o n s t i t u t i n g  the  s t ruc t i ra l  co n tex t .
- Lines of work t h a t  comprise i n t e ro rg a n iz a t io n a l  l inkages .
- Overall  o rgan iza t io n a l  m a t r ix .
- Arenas in which o rgan iza t ions  p a r t i c i p a t e .
- I n t e r s e c t io n a l  dimensions.
St rauss  applied  t h i s  model to  s tudy the  n e g o t ia t io n s  amongst agencies 
of f ed e ra l  government, d iv i s io n s  of those  agencies ,  the  US sena te ,  and 
National Labora tory .  A no tab le  f e a t u r e  of t h i s  study is  the  ex tens ion  
and re in forcement of O'Toole and O'Toole (1981),  and c l a r i f i c a t i o n  of 
' s t r u c t u r a l  c o n tex t '  which S t rauss  provided.
Any o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  a r e ,  . . .  l inked in very complex 
ways with i t s  loca t ion  in a matr ix  of  soc ia l  worlds or  subworlds,  . . .  
with i n t e r s e c t i o n s  between i t  and s a l i e n t  o the r  o rgan iza t ions  in 
the se  and r e l a t e d  wor lds" ,  p . 361.
Negotia t ion con tex t  and s t r u c t u r a l  co n tex t s ,  he observed, a re  c ru c ia l  
to  understand the  n e g o t i a t io n s :
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"Without looking a t  those c o n tex t s ,  the  n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  t h e i r  consequences,  
and an a n a l y t i c a l  unders tanding of th e  i n t e r o r g a n iz a t io n a l  (and i n t r a -  
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l ) r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i l l  be most d e f i c i e n t " ,  p . 364.
F in a l ly ,  fo llowing S t r au s s '  (1978) sugges tion t h a t  a c to r s  " im p l i c i t  
conceptions  of n eg o t ia t io n  profoundly a f f e c t  how a c to r s  would a c t " ,  
Kleinman (1982) examined n e g o t i a t io n s  of board members of a hea l th  
co rp o ra t io n .  She found t h a t  th e  board held c o n t r a d i c t o r y  notions  of 
n e g o t ia t io n s  t h a t  were a m an i fe s t a t ion  of the  d i f f e r e n t  concept ions  
of the  kind of  o rgan iza t ion  they were. This ambiguity had an e f f e c t  
on who should n e g o t i a t e ,  on what i s sues  and how. I t  f u r t h e r  a f fe c ted  
the  very s t r u c t u r e  of n e g o t i a t i o n s .
Kleinman's study i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of the  dilemma t h a t  SOEs face on 
mat te rs  of  autonomy. Management de f ines  i t  as a bus iness  e n t e r p r i s e  
l e g a l ly  c o n s t i t u t e d  to  t r a n s a c t  i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  (say n e g o t i a t e  debt 
f in a n c e ) ,  but the  s t a t e ,  o f ten  ope ra tes  with a d i f f e r e n t  conception 
and sees th e  e n t e r p r i s e  as an ex tens ion  of Min is t ry  of  Trade,  conse­
quent ly  i t  is  th e  s t a t e  t h a t  must n eg o t ia te  on i t s  b eh a l f .
Limits of  Negotia t ion
Negotiated o rder  has been c r i t i c i s e d  f o r  being vague on c e n t r a l  i ssues  
of power, p o l i t i c s ,  h i s to ry  and m a c ro -s t ru c tu re s ,  Day and Day (1977), 
and t h a t  i t  ignores  the  hard r e a l i t i e s  of the  l i m i t s  of  n e g o t i a t io n s ,  
Benson (1977).  From the  c i t e d  empir ica l  s t u d i e s ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  most 
of  th e se  c r i t i c i s m s  no longer hold .  Busch (1982),  Denzin (1979) and 
Hall and Hall (1982) h igh l igh ted  th e  c e n t r a l i t y  of h i s t o r i c a l ,  procesual
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and p o l i t i c a l  a n a ly s i s  of the  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  Power c o n s t r a in s  the  
occurrence as well as the  r e s u l t s  of n e g o t ia t io n s  noted Hall and Hall .  
For S t rauss  (1978) th e re  are  no u l t im a te  l i m i t s ,  agreements are  open 
t o  r e n e g o t i a t io n  under c e r t a i n  co nd i t ions :
"The change can be the  product of  c o n d i t io n s .  The change can be the  
product of mutual agreement i f  i t  i s  not coerced, manipulated . . .  
but r e q u i re s  working through v ia  n e g o t i a t io n .  Both th e  l im i t s  and 
the  agreements a re  p o t e n t i a l l y  con t in g en t" .
No agreements a re  c a s t  in stone and cannot change, the  p o te n t i a l  f o r  
change, through n e g o t i a t io n ,  i s  always t h e r e .  There is  te n s io n ,  
observed Maines and Charlton among p a r t s  of  an o rg a n iz a t io n a l  s t r u c t u r e  
which might lead to  marginal m o d i f ica t io n s ,  such as a po l icy  change.
"This process of s t r u c t u r a l  t rans fo rm a t ion  is  a temporal p rocess .  
Sometimes those  t rans fo rm a t ions  occur very slowly and change can be 
de tec ted  only in terms of very long periods  of t ime ,  o r  th e re  may be 
rapid  and r a d ic a l  change which may th re a te n  to  des t roy  the  o rg a n iz a t io n " ,  
p . 302.
Maines and Charlton continue and po in t  out t h a t  one process t h a t  can 
account f o r  t h i s  incremental  and paradigm changes i s  ' n e g o t i a t i o n " .
"This process fo rce s  us to  recognize  the  s ig n i f i c a n c e  of  indiv idua l  
ac to r s  who are  in a s s o c ia t i o n  with one ano ther .  These ac to r s  are  
faced with work and o rg a n iz a t io n a l  con t ingencies  . . .  They, th e r e f o r e  
have to  t a l k  about the se  problems and con t ingencies  in an attempt to  
f ind  ways of doing t h e i r  work b e t t e r ,  g e t t i n g  more power and advantage 
. . .  And, in t h a t  t a l k ,  . . .  they end up working through those  problems 
and issues  . . .  they end up having to  n e g o t i a t e  . . .  the  r e s u l t  of 
these  n e g o t ia t io n s  may range [ i n ]  . . .  main ta in ing th in g s  as they a re  
o r  a l t e r  . . .  the  c u r r e n t  arrangement" ,  p . 302.
These observa t ions  are  very in format ive  and desc r ibe  well the  p a t t e rn s  
ana lys ts  of SOEs would expec t.  They d i r e c t  our a t t e n t i o n  to  the
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confluence  and p lura l ism  of p r i n c i p a l s  t h a t  own SOEs, the  s t r u c t u r a l  
c o n s t r a i n t s ,  the  ambiguity of goals  and d i v e r s i t y  of views (p rev a len t  
in SOEs); to  the  change process - gradual and d iscon t inuous ,  and to  
power and p o l i t i c a l  games t h a t  a c to r s  play - a l l  of which would 
f a c i l i t a t e  n e g o t ia t io n  and maintenance of o rde r .  S t r a t e g i c  change 
is  not a snapshot even t ,  but a markedly dynamic process  embedded in 
a h i s t o r y  of a soc ia l  o rgan iza t ion  t h a t  opera te  w i th in  the  micro 
and macro con tex ts  of an environment and i t  i s  through n e g o t ia t io n  
t h a t  changes in SOEs are  c r e a te d .
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Chapter 3
Methodological  Approach and Research Design
D i f f e re n t  S ea t s ,  D if fe ren t  Viewpoints
How one sees th e  problem of ten  depends on where 
one i s  s i t t i n g .  J .E .  Austin (1985)
The purpose of  t h i s  chapter  is  t o  desc r ibe  the  aims and o b je c t iv e s  
t h a t  guided t h i s  re sea rch ;  develop assumptions and epis temologica l  
s tan d p o in t ,  and show how the  resea rch  was designed.
The venerable  axiom of s c i e n t i f i c  research  d i c t a t e  t h a t  the  methodology 
should be determined by the  na tu re  of the  phenomenon under in v e s t ig a t i o n .  
The re sea rch  o b je c t iv e s  are  f i r s t  addressed to  i l lu m in a te  the  research 
phenomenon.
The primary o b je c t iv e  of t h i s  re sea rch  was, f i r s t l y ,  to  explore  how 
s t r a t e g i c  change dec is ions  were made by the  management of the  SOE in 
th e  developing country  - Lesotho. The a n c i l l a r y  purpose was to  
e s t a b l i s h  how th e  s t r a t e g i c  changes a f fec ted  the  c o r p o r a t io n ' s  
performance.
I wanted to  study and learn  how s t r a t e g i c  d ec is ions  were c rea ted  by 
the  var ious  a c to r s  t h a t  c o n s t i t u t e  management of a SOE. The s t a t e  
of th e  l i t e r a t u r e  on s t r a t e g i c  change in SOE i s  spo t ty  and does not 
provide c l e a r  t h e o r e t i c a l  p e r sp ec t iv e  t h a t  might a s s i s t  us to  
organ ize  our th ink ing  on change. Most of the  arguments and research  
f in d in g s  t h a t  t h e o r i s t s  use,  were developed from a d i f f e r e n t  perspec­
t i v e  of the  i n d u s t r i a l i s e d  c o u n t r i e s .  The r e s u l t s  of  Western re search  
may o r  may not be r e a d i ly  ap p l ic ab le  to  a LDC co n tex t .  Cummings,
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Mohrman, Mohrman J r . ,  and Ledford J r . ,  (1985) have dismissed the  
approbated change resea rch  methods because they:
"be l ieve  t h a t  many t r a d i t i o n a l  re search  methods are  unsuited to  
studying o rgan iza t iona l  change, mainly because they are  based on 
assumptions t h a t  do not hold in change s i t u a t i o n s " ,  p . 280.
I t h e r e f o r e  faced a s i t u a t i o n  whereby I was moving in to  a novel 
resea rch  area with l im i ted  precedent upon which to  proceed, wherein 
the  bas ic  parameters were de fined and o p e ra t io n a l i z e d .  To my know­
ledge,  no prev ious ly  repor ted  resea rch  from LDC has addressed i t s e l f  
t o  t h i s  s u b je c t .  I t  was th e r e f o r e  e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  the  research  should 
be exp lo ra to ry  and as pure ly  induc t ive  as p o s s ib l e .  I use 'explora tory*  
in the  sense r e f e r r e d  to  by Harre and Secord (1972):
"In exp lo ra to ry  s tu d ie s ,  a s c i e n t i s t  has no very c l e a r  idea of what 
w il l  happen, and aims to  f in d  o u t .  He has a f e e l i n g  fo r  the  ' d i r e c t i o n '  
in which to  go to  . . .  but no c l e a r  expec ta t ions  of  what to  expec t.
He is  not confirming or r e f u t in g  hypotheses".
i
A s im i l a r  view is  held by Berg (1979) who noted t h a t :
"An exp lo ra to ry  study of a complex so c ia l  phenomenon such as the  
process  of  change in o rg a n iz a t io n s ,  requ i re s  a study in depth" ,  p . 17.
Secondly, the  research  would a lso  r e ly  heavi ly  on empir ica l  da ta ,  
grounded in th e  soc ia l  con s t ru c t io n  of  r e a l i t y  as de fined by the  
i n t e r a c t a n t s  most knowledgeable with th e  change s i t u a t i o n s  o r  d i r e c t l y  
involved in s t r a t e g i c  changes.  The c o n s t ru c t io n s  and explana tions  
t h a t  a c to r s  of the  s t a t e  co rpo ra t ion  used to  d e sc r ib e  t h e i r  r e a l i t y
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and ac t io n s  as s i t u a t i o n s  changed were c ru c ia l  aspec ts  of the  research  
in developing our unders tanding of s t r a t e g i c  change in a SOE.
Third ly ,  the  resea rch  would c o n t r ib u te  to  the  fund of knowledge t h a t  
would improve th e  p r a c t i t i o n e r ' s  managerial  e f f e c t iv e n e s s  in managing 
change and a l so  advance s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge and unders tanding of 
change in SOEs.
In sum, th e  resea rch  has sought to :
-  explo re  the  process of s t r a t e g i c  change in a SOE, and the impact 
of s t r a t e g i c  changes on the  performance of the  e n t e r p r i s e .
- To develop in depth unders tanding of change grounded in the  
s u b jec t iv e  meanings of changing s i t u a t i o n s  as defined and 
experienced by i n t e r a c t a n t s  involved in s u s ta in in g  order within 
the  SOE.
- Contr ibu te  to  the  advancement of s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge th a t  
would be useful t o  in f luence  p r a c t i c e .
Given th e se  o b je c t iv e s  we sh a l l  now consider  th e  r e l e v a n t  research  
designs employed to  c a r ry  out the  s tudy.
The Research Design: Choice of Organizat ion
Having desc r ibed  the  aims and o b je c t iv e s  of  the  s tudy, my next task  
was to  i d e n t i f y  s u i t a b l e  o rg an iza t io n a l  s e t t i n g  where the  research
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could be conducted.  This w i l l  focus on the choice of the  host  
o r g a n iz a t i o n ( s )  and how resea rch  access was ob ta ined .
The Choice of SOE: LNDC
The choice  of Lesotho National Development Corporation (LNDC) was 
an important co ns ide ra t ion  in th e  development of t h i s  study as i t  
a f f e c t e d  not only the  c h a r a c te r  of  the  da ta  (and i t s  c o l l e c t i o n  and 
t r ea tm en t )  but a l so  the  theory  generated  from t h a t  da ta  (Berg, 1979).
I was equa l ly  aware of d i v e r s i t y  of opinions on the  choice of s e t t i n g .  
Taylor and Bogdan (1975) have cautioned:
"we would recommend t h a t  r e s ea rch e r s  choose s e t t i n g s  in which the  
su b jec t s  are  s t r a n g e r s  to  them and in which they have no p a r t i c u l a r  
p ro fe s s io n a l  knowledge or  e x p e r t i s e " ,  p . 28.
Implied in t h i s  warning is  the  notion of b ia s  and o b j e c t i v i t y  which 
might r e s u l t  as r e sea rch e r  ' e v a l u a t e s '  f r i e n d s  r a t h e r  than 'd e sc r ib e  
them o r  t h e i r  a c t i v i t y .  I d i sag ree  with t h i s  viewpoint and inc l ined  
to  favour  L of land 's  (1976) appeal f o r  in t im ate  f a m i l i a r i t y  with th e  
phenomenon of inqu i ry .
"The s o c i a l  sc ience  e s tab l ishm ent  i s  populated with "exper ts"  on 
medical i n s t i t u t i o n s  who have spent v i r t u a l l y  no t ime in medical 
s e t t i n g s ,  e x p e r t s  on crime and law enforcement who are  s im i la r ly  
u n fa m i l ia r  with c r iminal o r  law enforcement s e t t i n g s ,  exper ts  on 
r e l i g i o n  who have had very l i t t l e  a s s o c ia t i o n  with r e l i g i o n i s t s  
and t h e i r  o r g a n iz a t io n s ,  exper t s  on f a m i l i e s  who have had almost 
no co n tac t  with f a m i l i e s ,  and so on through o th e r  a reas  of soc ia l  
l i f e " .
LNDC has o f ten  been the  sub jec t  of  c r i t i c i s m s  from both the  govern­
ment and th e  academics. The former accuses i t  o f  investment s t r a t e g y
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biased  in favour  of fo re ign  companies, while the  l a t t e r  a t t a ck  i t  on 
i n e f f e c t i v e  i n d u s t r i a l  s t r a t e g i e s .  This t r i g g e r e d  my i n t e r e s t  to  
g e t  c l o s e r  t o  the  action  and inqu i re  from the  a c to r s  involved.
LNDC is  th e  leading development finance  co rpo ra t ion  in Lesotho, and 
th e  second b ig g es t  employer a f t e r  government, and f e a tu r e s  prominantly  
in government " f ive  year  development plans"* as i n d u s t r i a l  p ioneer  and 
employment g e n e ra to r .
Since e s tab l i shm ent  in 1967, th e  Corporation has been managed by 
fo re ig n  ex p e r t s  on shor t  term c o n t r a c t s .  Major l o c a l i s a t i o n  programme 
was launched in 1978, however i t  would seem the  execu t ive  core has 
been d i f f i c u l t  to  rep lace  as they are  s t i l l  v i s i b l e  in most key 
p o s i t i o n s  ( i . e .  f inance ,  o p e ra t io n s ,  investment) .
I developed in t im ate  f a m i l i a r i t y  - to  use Lofland express ion ,  with 
t h i s  co rp o ra t io n  through p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in t h e i r  in-house executive  
development programmes and seminars and was a board member of one of 
th e  su b s id ia ry  companies from 1984-85. These a c t i v i t i e s  provided 
i n s i g h t f u l  glimpses of what was going on wi th in  LNDC and insp i red  
t h i s  s tudy.  A concurrent f a c t o r ,  which in fluenced t h i s  choice was 
s a n c t io n s .  As the  t h r e a t  of sanc t ions  a g a in s t  Republic of South 
Afr ica  (RSA) loomed high, the  focus  was on LNDC, as to  whether i t  
would be ab le  t o  provide employment o p p o r tu n i t i e s  f o r  th e  150,000 
migrant workers in RSA, should they  be re t renched .
* Five Year Development Plans a re  long term economic plans  t h a t  s e t  
out th e  government p r i o r i t i e s  and t a r g e t s  in var ious  s ec to r s  of the  
economy.
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As my focus of inquiry  was on s t r a t e g i c  change th e re  were some 
" v i s i b l e  in c id en ts"  of change within  th e  co rpora t ion  l ik e  d i s i n v e s t ­
ment in hote l  bus inesses ,  changes of chairman and managing d i r e c t o r s .  
Moreover former members of the  board,  managing d i r e c t o r s  and chairmen 
were s t i l l  a v a i l a b l e ,  most of whom were founder board members. That 
was important f o r  my study was over 19 years  pe r iod ,  from 1967 to  1986, 
i t  would provide a h i s t o r i c  pe rspec t ive  e s s e n t i a l  to  a p p rec ia te  the  
p re sen t  s i t u a t i o n  of the  co rp o ra t io n .  That meant I would need to  
have f u l l  access  t o  a l l  p e r t i n e n t  information wi th in  the  c o rp o ra t io n .
Las t ly ,  the  incorpora t ion  of LNDC's wholly-owned o r  m ajo r i ty  equ i ty  
s u b s id i a r i e s  would provide a f a i r l y  balanced view of d i f f e r e n t  
indus t ry  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s :  f o r  example, motor indus t ry ,  process ing ,  
brewery, f i n a n c i a l ,  and t e x t i l e  i n d u s t r i e s .  The s u b s id i a r i e s  included 
were those where LNDC d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y  in fluenced and/o r  d e t e r ­
mined the  s t r a t e g i c  change d e c i s io n s .  I t h e r e f o r e  concluded t h a t  a 
r e sea rchab le  s i t e  had been i d e n t i f i e d ,  what remained was to  n e g o t i a t e  
e n t ry .
Gaining Access
Obtaining access  can be a problematic  i s s u e .  Organizat ions  are  
noto r ious  f o r  t h e i r  r e lu c tan ce  t o  allow re sea rch e r s  t o  probe in to  how 
top dec is ions  a re  made. My s t r a t e g y  was based on Taylor and Bogdan 
(1984) advice:
"Getting in to  a s e t t i n g  involves  a process  of managing i d e n t i t y ;  
p ro jec t in g  an image of  y o u r s e l f  t h a t  w i l l  maximize your chances of 
gaining  access" .
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This was c r u c i a l  because a t  t h a t  t ime of my a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  permission 
t o  do r e s ea rc h ,  th e  co rpo ra t ion  had j u s t  had a major change a t  th e  top ,  
i . e .  managing d i r e c t o r  and chairman. I t h e r e f o r e  appl ied  to  the  ac t ing  
managing d i r e c t o r *  using the  Univers ity-headed notepaper  and a support  
l e t t e r  from my su p e r v i so r .  My experience of t h i s  approach i s  t h a t  i t  
confe rs  a high s t a t u s  of  a u th o r i ty  on the  a p p l i c a t i o n  to  the  level of 
i n s t i t u t i o n  to  i n s t i t u t i o n ,  which s t reng thens  t h e  chances of success 
much more than i t  would i f  seen a t  a personal l e v e l .  I def ined  the  
purpose of  my s tudy in genera l  but s u f f i c i e n t l y  in format ive  d e t a i l s  
i n d ic a t in g  I was i n t e r e s t e d  in people involved -  e i t h e r  d i r e c t l y  or  
i n d i r e c t l y  with change(s ) or f a m i l i a r  with the  change process  in the  
c o rp o ra t io n .  That my resea rch  would l a s t  f o r  a per iod  of f i v e  to  
s ix  months, r e q u i r in g  1-2 hour per in te rv iew.  That gave me a 
wide band p e r sp ec t iv e  w i th in  which to  explore  d i f f e r e n t  views a t  
d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  of management.
The a p p l i c a t i o n  was success fu l  and I was to  r e p o r t  t o  the  Personnel 
Manager who would in t roduce  me around the  c o rp o ra t io n .
Gaining access  t o  LNDC was only the  f i r s t  so lu t io n  t o  a mul t i -phase  
p rocess .  Being a p a r a s t a t a l  o rg a n iz a t io n ,  I s t i l l  had to  n e g o t i a t e  
access to  government m in i s t e r s  and subs id ia ry  managers. This proved 
t o  be a complex process  in s p i t e  of the  support ing in t roduc to ry  l e t t e r  
from LNDC. Subsequently ,  two m in i s t e r s  were dropped from my t h e o r e t i c a l  
sampling, i t  was not j u s t  p o l i t i c a l l y  f e a s i b l e  t o  see them.
* While the  a c t in g  managing d i r e c t o r  (MD) approved my a p p l i c a t io n  
u n c o n d i t io n a l ly ,  t h e  su b s ta n t iv e  MD when to ld  of  my a r r i v a l  remarked 
t h a t  I had come to  a wrong o rgan iza t ion  f o r  my re sea rch  on s t r a t e g i c  
change; I should have gone t o  th e  Cabinet o f f i c e  where major changes 
had taken p lace .  He was r e f e r r i n g  to  the  changes r e s u l t i n g  from the  
coup d ' e t a t  t h a t  took p lace  in January 20, 1986. Ind ica t ions  were 
t h a t  i t  would have been d i f f i c u l t  to  get  access from him.
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The Methodological Considera tions
The choice  of  resea rch  methodology in so c ia l  s c ien ces  has become an 
important and ye t  problematic  i s su e .  Hardy (1985) quotes  Watkins in 
i l l u s t r a t i n g  th e  o r i g i n s  of  th e  problem:
"The hope which o r i g i n a l l y  in sp i red  methodology was th e  hope of f ind ing  
a method of  enquiry  which would be both necessary  and s u f f i c i e n t  to  
guide the  s c i e n t i s t  une r r ing ly  t o  the  t r u t h .  This hope has died a 
na tu ra l  d ea th" .
There is  no such c l i n i c a l  method. Morgan and Smircich (1980) have 
s u c c in t ly  emphasised th e  same po in t :
"The choice  and adequacy of  a method embodies a v a r i e t y  of assumptions 
regard ing  th e  n a tu re  o f  the  knowledge and th e  methods through which 
t h a t  knowledge can be ob ta ined ,  as well as a s e t  o f  r o o t  assumptions 
about the  na tu re  of  th e  phenomena to  be i n v e s t i g a t e d " ,  p . 491.
I t  i s  the se  ro o t  assumptions which provide th e  systems of meaning t h a t  
inform the  kinds of  ind iv idua l  judgements we make in th e  re search  
p rocess" .  Pe t t ig rew  (1985).
B urre l l  and Morgan (1979) in d iscuss ing  f u t u r e  d i r e c t i o n s  f o r  theory  
and resea rch  s t r e s s  th e  re levancy of th e  method and concluded t h a t :
" th e re  i s  a need f o r  o rg a n iz a t io n a l  t h e o r i s t s  t o  adopt methods of 
study which are  t r u e  t o  th e  na tu re  of th e  phenomena which they are  
a ttempting to  i n v e s t i g a t e .  Our review of  th e  dominant orthodoxy 
w i th in  the  o rg an iza t io n  theory  has shown t h a t  a l a rg e  p ropor t ion  of 
empir ica l  resea rch  i s  based upon o b j e c t i v i s t  assumptions .  The 
wholesale  inco rpo ra t ion  of  methods and techn iques  taken  d i r e c t l y  
from na tu ra l  sc iences  needs t o  be severe ly  q u e s t io n ed " .
Ed. Lawler I I I  (1985) has extended the  c r i t i c i s m  on th e  use of 
q u a n t i t a t i v e  methods and t h e i r  re levancy in cap tu r in g  th e  su b t le  and 
i n t u i t i v e  in s ig h t s  about o rg a n iz a t io n s .  He observed:
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"To many, the  path toward f u r t h e r  knowledge about o rgan iza t iona l  
behaviour i s  c l e a r .  I t  leads  t o  more s o p h i s t i c a t e d  s t a t i s t i c a l  
a n a l y s i s .  But i s  t h i s  indeed th e  bes t  rou te  to  lead us toward 
b e t t e r  unders tanding  of o r g a n iz a t io n s " ,  p .1 .
The concerns thus  f a r  r a i s e d  by d i f f e r e n t  au thors  on resea rch  methods, 
c l e a r l y  in d ic a te  t h a t  in th e  p a s t  - t o  a l im i ted  ex ten t  even today,  
o rg a n iz a t io n a l  t h e o r i s t s  used t o  base t h e i r  work upon analogies  which 
t r e a t e d  o rg an iza t io n s  e i t h e r  as mechanical o r  organismic systems, a 
view which has aroused d i s c o n te n t  p a r t i c u l a r l y  amongst o rgan iza t io n a l  
change s ch o la r s .
Relevance of T r ad i t io n a l  Methods to  Study of Change
O rganiza t ions ,  we a re  t o l d ,  are  complex, multidimensiona l soc ia l  
e n t i t i e s  t h a t  make d i f f i c u l t  su b jec t s  to  s tudy. The complexity is  
compounded when the  o rgan iza t io n s  are  fac ing  rap id  and uncer ta in  
change. As Ed. Lawler I I I  (1985) observed:
"Assessing o rg an iza t io n a l  change is  d i f f i c u l t  and o f ten  c r e a te s  con­
d i t i o n s  t h a t  v i o l a t e  t r a d i t i o n a l  views of what c o n s t i t u t e s  good 
s c i e n t i f i c  r e s e a r c h . I t  t y p i c a l l y  r e q u i re s  a long-term involvement 
with an o rg a n iz a t io n ,  an adap t ive  research  design in which methods 
and quest ions  change over t ime" ,  p . 12. (emphasis su p p l ied ) .
These dynamic cond i t ions  of  ' s h i f t i n g  g o a l s ,  d i s c o n t i n u i t i e s  in 
a c t i v i t y ,  s u rp r i s in g  even ts ,  and unexpected i n t e r v e n t i o n s '  t y p ic a l  
of  SOEs, are  o f ten  not compatible with the  procedural  canons of 
t i g h t l y  c o n t r o l l e d  f i e l d  experiments t h a t  c o n s t i t u t e  'good r e s e a r c h ' .  
Daft (1983) endorses  t h i s  view and po in ts  out t h a t  o rgan iza t ions  
cannot be s tud ied  e f f e c t i v e l y  with the  same techniques  t h a t  are  
used to  study physica l  o r  b io lo g ic a l  systems.
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MacLean (1978) has noted the  swell ing disenchantment among s tudents  
of  o rgan iza t ion  change about t r a d i t i o n a l  re sea rch  methods t h a t  tend 
to  take  a ' snapsho t '  view and concentra ted  on unders tanding ,  desc r ib ing  
and exp la in ing  the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f e a t u r e  of th e  o rgan iza t io n  a t  t h a t  
po in t  in t im e.  F r ied lander  and Brown (1974) agree and po in t  out t h a t :
"Current resea rch  methods are  based on th e  t r a d i t i o n  t h a t  knowledge 
g e t t i n g  and knowledge g iv ing  are  s ep a ra te ;  th e  e v a lu a t io n  and v a l i d ­
a t io n  of  change lead t o  unders tanding development p rocess ,  t h a t  
ex te rn a l  r i g o u r ,  con t ro l  and s t an d a rd iz a t io n  a re  ideal  methodological  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  t h a t  knowledge n e c e s s a r i l y  produces change".
Beer and Walton (1987) reviewed th e  recen t  00 resea rch  and eva lua t ion  
and concluded:
" i n v e s t i g a t o r s  have f e l t  th e  need f o r ,  and have begun to  use,  
q u a n t i t a t i v e  d a ta ,  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  resea rch  des igns ,  and s t a t i s t i c a l  
procedures aimed a t  accu ra te  measurement of change",  p . 343.
Despite  t h i s  bent towards q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  and p r e c i s io n ,  Beer and 
Walton (1987) argue t h a t  0D re sea rch  r e s u l t s  a re  ' s t i l l  i n c o n c l u s iv e ' .  
F i r s t l y ,  th e  reasons a re  t h a t  t r a d i t i o n a l  normal sc ience  re sea rch ,  
they argue,  i s  " f l a t " ;  i t  i s  high on methodological  d e t a i l s  but 
lacking in substance:
" i t  i s  o f ten  impressive in depth and d e sc r ip t i o n  of th e  in te rv e n t io n  
and s i t u a t i o n  . . .  t h e  environment con tex t  i s  overlooked . . .  Q uan t i t ­
a t i v e  d e sc r ip t i o n  may not be th e  bes t  method f o r  unders tanding a 
m u l t i - cau sa l  phenomenon".
Secondly,  i t  may mask a more complex s e t  of d i r e c t  and i n d i r e c t  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  There i s  t h e r e f o r e  a tendency f o r  methodology to
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dominate ac tua l  phenomena being s tud ied  and subordina te  them to  the  
re sea rch  ins trument per s e ,  the  demand c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of re search  
ins truments  demanding th e  kind of behaviour you wish to  prove e x i s t s .  
Force a t i g h t  coupling between th e  word and the  deed . . .  by our view, 
of  what sc ience  should be . . .  But every s tep  of th e  way conta ins  s e l f -  
imposed decep t ion .  (Perrow, 1982).
T h i rd ly ,  the  resea rch  aims to  i s o l a t e  c au s a t io n .  I t  t r i e d  to  i d e n t i fy  
s in g le  cause even ts ,  making change process a ' s c a t t e r b o a r d '  of
i d e n t i f i a b l e  v a r i a b le s  t h a t  can be e a s i l y  separa ted  and c o n t r o l l e d .
Beer and Walton observa t ions  are v a l id :
" t r a d i t i o n a l  resea rch  methods make assumptions t h a t  may be e n t i r e l y  
in ap p ro p r ia te  fo r  f i e l d  r e sea rch .  For example, th e  concept of 
con t ro l  groups or  uniformed sub jec ts  may diminish th e  value of th e  
informat ion . . .  Events may be m u l t ic a su a l ,  th e  c o n s t e l l a t i o n  of 
causes being a s i g n i f i c a n c e .  Thus, i t  would be impossible  to  
i d e n t i f y  the  p re c i se  e f f e c t  of a given a c t i o n " ,  p . 343.
Beer and Walton have warned OD re sea rch e r s  t h a t  as long as they emulate
t r a d i t i o n a l  sc ience  methodology, they w i l l  conf ine  themselves to  
i s o l a t e d  ep isodes  of change.
For Norman (1973),  h is  s t rong  disagreement with t r a d i t i o n a l  soc ia l  
sc ience  re sea rch  i s  due t o  what he c a l l s  ' r e l a t i o n s h i p - s e a r c h e r '  
who proceeds by picking a number of  " re lev an t"  v a r i a b l e s  and 
subsequently  determines  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between them - always according 
t o  th e  premise t h a t  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  r e a l l y  e x i s t  in an o b je c t iv e  
r e a l i t y  and t h a t  "knowledge" or  "sc ience"  i s  only  a m a t te r  of measuring 
them with inst ruments  as re f in e d  as p o s s ib l e .  Hall (1983) develops 
t h i s  po in t  f u r t h e r  and d i s t i n g u i s h e s  th e  two modes of s c i e n t i f i c  
e xp lana t ion .
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"One kind of sc ience  seeks r e l a t i o n s h i p s  among v a r i a b l e s  under c e r t a i n  
s p e c i f i e d  cond i t ions  whi le  another  seeks a th ic k  d e s c r ip t i o n  and 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the  con tex t  and the  
behaviour(s)  in q u e s t io n .  I t  might be sa id  t h a t  the  former model has 
dominated not only s o c i a l  sc ience  but the  planning apparatus  as 
well  . . .  On a much more benign l e v e l ,  the  recen t  p o p u la r i ty  of 
q u a l i t a t i v e  methods i s  probably due to  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  to  provide 
v iv id  con tex tual  c o n to u rs " ,  p . 87.
Close ly  accompanying th e  above i s  what Benson (1977) c a l l s  a f a i r l y  
simple form of ' p o s i t i v i s m ' .
"Organizational f e a t u r e s  have been measured without much concern 
about the  process  through which those  f e a tu r e s  have been produced 
and reproduced by p a r t i c i p a n t s .  And, the  involvement of the  
observer  in r e a l i t y  production  has been s im i l a r ly  d i s regarded .  
Organizational r e a l i t y  has been taken as e s s e n t i a l l y  non-problematic ,  
i . e .  taken f o r  g ran ted ,  by the  a n a ly s t " .
This conception of o rg a n iz a t io n s  a ttempts  to  f r ee ze  the  soc ia l  world 
in to  r i g i d  s t r u c t u r e s  and to  reduce th e  r o l e  of human beings to  
elements amenable t o  in f luence  of a more or  l e ss  d e t e r m in i s t i c  s e t  
of fo rces  (Morgan and Smircich,  1980). I t  has proved inadequate in 
unders tanding complex, i n t a n g ib l e ,  emotional dimensions of o rg an iza t io n s  
(Daft ,  1980); and i s  remotely r e l a t e d  to  th e  r ea l  world of the  
p r a c t i s i n g  managers (Susman and Evered,  1978).
P r a c t i c e  and Research: Poles Apart
There is  nothing so p r a c t i c a l  as a good th eo ry ,  d ec la re s  Kurt Lewin, 
y e t  much resea rch  s t i l l  concerns i t s e l f  with producing s e t s  of law­
l i k e ,  s o p h i s t i c a te d  p ro p o s i t io n s  t h a t  a re  o f ten  one s tep  removed from 
th e  imperfec tions  and encumbrances o f  th e  ever-changing world of 
o r g a n iz a t i o n s .  Ed. Lawler I I I  (1985) has developed t h i s  po in t  f u r t h e r :
73
" I t  cannot simply be taken as a m a t te r  of f a i t h  t h a t  adher ing to  
c e r t a i n  s c i e n t i f i c  re sea rch  p r in c ip l e s  w i l l  lead to  j o i n t l y  useful 
re sea rch  . . .  People in o rg an iza t io n s  do not become su b jec t s  in the  
same sense t h a t  an im als ,  neu trons ,  and chemical substances  become 
s u b j e c t s .  They a re  an a c t i v e  p a r t  of the  resea rch  process  . . . ,  
they in f luence  i t  d i r e c t l y .  Given t h i s  d i f f e r e n c e ,  i t  seems q u i t e  
p o s s ib le  t h a t  what i s  a good resea rch  approach f o r  c o n t r ib u t in g  
to  theory  and s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge in t r a d i t i o n a l  f i e l d s  of sc ience  
may not be a good re sea rch  approach in dealing  with o r g a n iz a t io n s" ,  
p . 3.
MacLean (1978) has recommended t h a t  fu tu r e  re sea rch  should narrow the  
gap between theory  and p r a c t i c e  of change management. Sayles (1977) 
i s  concerned about th e  p re fe rence  to  ' r i g o r '  as a g a in s t  ' r e l e v a n c e ' :
"Laboratory exper imenta t ion  or  l i b r a r y  specu la t ions  a re  chosen in 
p re fe rence  to  f i e l d  immersion. And when fie ldwork is  engaged in a 
h i t - an d - ru n  q u e s t io n n a i r e  or  t e s t  t h a t  produces q u a n t i t a t i v e ,  r e a d i l y  
ana lyzab le ,  and guaranteed r e s u l t s  i s  most l i k e l y  employed r a t h e r  
than sys temat ic  and extended f i e l d  s tudy" .
Many f ind ings  of  th e  re sea rch  t h a t  have been c a r r i e d  out by the  most 
r igorous  methods of  th e  p re v a i l i n g  conception of s c ien ce ,  a re  only 
remotely r e l a t e d  t o  th e  r e a l i t y  of p r a c t i t i o n e r s .  This conception 
sep a ra te s  theory  from p r a c t i c e ,  subsequently p r a c t i t i o n e r s  and t h e i r  
c l i e n t s  complain more and more about th e  lack of  re levance  of publi shed  
resea rch  f o r  th e  problems they face  (Susman and Evered 1978). Beer 
and Walton (1987) agree and in t h e i r  review of OD r e s ea rc h ,  c r i t i c i z e d  
i t  f o r  not f i t t i n g  th e  needs of i t s  u se r s ;  they observed:
"More complex s t a t i s t i c a l  techniques  and more complex quas i -exper imenta l  
des igns ,  in a t tempts  to  achieve more p re c i s io n  and t i g h t e r  s c i e n t i f i c  
"proof" ,  n e g lec t  th e  " so c ia l  co n s t ru c t io n "  of knowledge in the  so c ia l  
s c ie n c es .  The complexity of th e  su b jec t  m a te r ia l  and th e  ex i s t ence  
o f  n o n - ra t io n a l  responses  to  da ta  w i l l  i n h i b i t  acceptance of even th e  
most t i g h t l y  c o n t r o l l e d  experiments . . .  OD might do b e t t e r  to  aim 
resea rch  a t  needs i d e n t i f i e d  by managers and u t i l i z e  language managers 
can unders tand" ,  p . 344.
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Otherwise,  research  and p r a c t i c e  w i l l  remain in Babel, shouting 
loudly a t  each o the r  and s ig n i fy in g  nothing" (Mangham, 1986).
M it ro f f  (1985) r e j e c t s  the  focus on p rec i s io n  because:
"fundamentally what the  applied  soc ia l  sc iences  a re  up to  i s  how 
people make sense of a very fuzzy, l a rg e ,  complex and loosely  coupled 
whole system. P rec is ion  i s  not how people make sense of t h e i r  world,  
no m a t te r  how much they would l i k e  p re c i s io n  to  r e s u l t " .
D i f f e r e n t  approaches and methods are  t h e r e f o r e  r equ i red  t h a t  would 
bu i ld  a d i f f e r e n t  model of knowledge t h a t  focuses  on q u a l i t a t i v e  r a t h e r  
than q u a n t i t a t i v e  f e a tu re s  of the  change s tudy. This dichotomy has 
t r i g g e r e d  a debate over which methodology is  a p p ro p r ia te  to  a p a r t i ­
c u l a r  r e s ea rc h ,  an is sue  seen by some as a c r i s i s  of ep is tenology 
(Susman and Evered, 1978):
"This c r i s e s  has r i s e n ,  . . .  because o rg a n iz a t io n a l  re sea rch e r s  have 
taken th e  p o s i t i v i s t  model of sc ience  which has had g r e a t e r  h e u r i s t i c  
va lue  f o r  th e  phys ical  and b io lo g ic a l  sc iences  and some f i e l d s  of 
s o c ia l  sc iences  and have adopted i t  as the  u l t im a te  model of what is  
b e s t  f o r  o rg an iza t io n a l  s c ien ces " .
'Hard'  and ' S o f t '  Methodological Debate
One o f  th e  foca l  t h e o r e t i c a l  problems inheren t  in th e  use of na tu ra l  
sc iences  methods i s  t h a t  t h i s  approach assumes epis tomologica l  s tance  
t h a t  i s  widely d isputed as being an inadequate  conception of the  human 
organism and b a s i s  fo r  s o c ia l  r e s ea rc h .  Two broad p e r spec t ives  of 
so c ia l  sc iences  have emerged. Some see i t  as a branch of  pure sc ience ,  
which t r e a t s  the  soc ia l  world as i f  i t  were a hard ,  r e a l ,  e x t e r n a l ,  
o b je c t iv e  r e a l i t y .  Others emphasise th e  id io sy n c rac ie s  of  the  soc ia l  
world arguing t h a t  to  understand them, soc ia l  s c ience  w i l l  have to
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be more s u b je c t iv e ,  s o f t e r ,  m u l t i - v a r i a t e ,  and based on exper ience  
and in s ig h t s  of  a unique and e s s e n t i a l l y  personal  na tu re  (B u r re l l  and 
Morgan, 1979).
The p ro ta g o n i s t s  o f  th e  n a tu ra l  sc ience  ( q u a n t i t a t i v e  re sea rch)  look 
f o r  un ive rsa l  laws, r e g u l a r i t i e s  and r e l a t i o n s h i p s  t h a t  govern and 
exp la in  th e  s o c ia l  phenomena being observed. Thus, t h i s  p e r sp ec t iv e  
assumes t h a t :
" soc ia l  r e a l i t y  i s  a c o n c r e te ,  measurable phenomenon . . .  s t r e s s  
th e  importance of  r e l i a b i l i t y ,  v a l i d i t y ,  and accu ra te  measurement 
before  research  outcomes can c o n t r ib u te  to  knowledge". Daft (1983).
The re sea rc h e r  adopts a d is tan ced  inquiry  s t y l e  to  study phenomena 
from 'w i t h o u t ' ,  the  r e s u l t  of  which is  to  impose a d e f i n i t i o n  on the  
su b jec t  of in q u i ry ,  (Jones 1983). S c i e n t i f i c  knowledge, i t  i s  argued, 
o r i g i n a t e s  in th e  s c i e n t i f i c  r e s e a r c h e r ' s  obse rva t ions  of f a c t .  
P o s i t i v i s t s  hold t h a t  such observa t ions  a re  pure and d i s t o r t i o n - f r e e  
. . .  s ince  they a re  t o  p rovide  the  o b je c t iv e  b a s i s  on which th e  sub­
sequent induction  of  th e  theory  i s  to  be secured (Lee 1985).
These assumptions have f a l l e n  in to  d i s r e p u te  amongst s o c ia l  s c i e n t i s t s ,  
t h e r e  i s  growing c a l l  t o  r e j e c t  them:
"By l im i t in g  i t s  methods t o  what i t  claims i s  v a l u e - f r e e ,  l o g i c a l ,  
and em p i r ic a l ,  t h e  p o s i t i v i s t  model of sc ience  when app l ied  to  
o rgan iza t ions  produces a knowledge t h a t  may only in a d v e r ten t ly  
serve and sometimes undetermine th e  values  of  o rg a n iz a t io n a l  
members (Susman, Evered,  1978) (emphasis s u p p l i e d ) .
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There is  a growing r e a l i z a t i o n  t h a t  resea rch  is  a s o c ia l  p rocess ,  s e t  
w i th in  a s o c ia l  c o n te x t .  Human beings are  c e n t r a l  t o  the  study of 
s o c ia l  phenomenon and as such th e  methods by which we study people 
of  n e ce s s i t y  cannot be n eu t ra l  ins truments  because they de f ine  how 
we view them and how the  r e sea rc h e r  w i l l  adopt to  a p a r t i c u l a r  
d e f i n i t i o n  of s e l f  v i s - a - v i s  the  d a ta ,  Silverman (1985).  Fineman 
and Mangham (1983) r e j e c t  as f a l s e  th e  ' s o f t '  and ' h a r d '  sc ience  
d i s t i n c t i o n :
"Much q u a n t i t a t i v e  s o c ia l  sc ience  might be considered decidedly  s o f t  
in terms of th e  misuse of s t a t i s t i c a l  methods . . .  To the  q u a l i t a t i v e  
r e s e a rc h e r ,  n e i t h e r  the  da ta  nor the  method are  ' s o f t ' ;  they are  
' r i c h ' .  Richness has something to  do with ' v a r i e t y ' ,  ' d e p t h ' ,  
' r e a l n e s s '  and ' c o l o u r ' ,  a t t r i b u t e s  which q u a l i t a t i v e  re sea rchers  
f r eq u e n t ly  deny to  number c runchers" .
The notion of  an o b je c t iv e  soc ia l  world,  even ts ,  th ings  t h a t  are  
'o u t  t h e r e ' ,  a t t r a c t s  s trong c r i t i c i s m  from phenomenologists who 
r e j e c t  the  idea of a pass ive  observer  not in f luenc ing  the  ob jec t  
under s tudy,  and argue t h a t  people are  a c t i v e  and r e f l e c t i v e  authors  
of  t h e i r  exper iences  and of the  r e a l i t i e s  they in h a b i t  (Hewitt 1984) 
they impose on t h e i r  world through in te n t io n a l  a c t i o n .
" I t  i s  through such ac t ion  t h a t  human ac to r s  c o n s t r u c t  and give 
meaning to  t h e i r  ex te rn a l  world and a lso  give form t o  t h e i r  evolving 
na tu re  as human be ings .  Human a c to r s  do not know or  perceive  the  
world,  but know and perce ive  t h e i r  world" .  (Smirc ich,  1983).
Pe t t ig rew  (1985) eschews h y p o th e t ic a l -d ed u c t iv e  assumptions t h a t  
impose concepts of meaning on th e  a c t o r s ,  and develops a con tex t -  
u a l i s t  approach which:
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"does not begin with a u n i l a t e r a l  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s tance  dominated 
by values  of o b j e c t i v i t y ,  c o n t r o l ,  and d is tan ce  under the  assumption 
t h a t  s c i e n t i f i c  t r u t h  is  out t h e r e  to  be d iscovered by a process of 
knowing, l i k e  some plum to  be picked from a t r e e .  Rather ,  a c o n te x t ­
ual i s t  begins with a more mutual s tance  . . .  s t e e r  a middle course  . . .  
recognizes  th e  r e l a t i v e  m u l t i f a c e ted  na ture  of t r u t h  among people 
involved in the  research  p rocess .  Concepts and meanings are  shared 
. . .  as accep tab le  d e f i n i t i o n s  of  ac t s  in con tex ts  emerge, they are  
not so much discovered by a process  of detached knowing as they are  
c rea ted  by a process of making", p . 227.
R ea l i ty  is  t h e r e f o r e  not something t h a t  is  e x te rn a l  to  a c to r s ,  t h a t  
can be apprehended c o r r e c t l y  o r  i n c o r r e c t l y .  Rather,  i t  i s  cons t ruc ted  
through the  process  of soc ia l  in te rchange  in which pe rcep t ions  are  
a f f i rm ed ,  modified ,  or  abandoned according to  t h e i r  apparen t congruence 
with o t h e r s '  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  (Chaffee,  1985, Ford and Baucus, 1987).
Discontent with the  q u a n t i t a t i v e  paradigm has swung the  pendulum in 
favour of q u a l i t a t i v e  approach which i s  concerned with meaning and 
not measurement. I t  allows the  r e sea rc h e r  to  ge t  ' c l o s e  to  the  d a t a ' ,  
thereby  developing the  a n a l y t i c a l ,  concep tua l ,  and c a te g o r i c a l  compon­
e n ts  of  exp lana t ion  from the  da ta  i t s e l f  - r a t h e r  than from prede f ined ,  
s t r u c tu re d  q u a n t i t a t i v e  techniques  t h a t  pigeonhole th e  empir ica l  
so c ia l  world th e  r e sea rch e r  has c rea ted  (Brenner,  1984).
Taylor and Bogdan (1984) poin t  out t h a t  t h i s  approach is  more than 
j u s t  a s e t  o f  da ta  ga ther ing  techn iques ,  i t  i s  a way of approaching 
the  empir ica l  world.  Das (1983),  in a review paper ,  had t h i s  to  say:
" q u a l i t a t i v e  da ta  c o n s i s t s  of d e t a i l e d  d e s c r ip t i o n s  of even ts ,  
s i t u a t i o n s  and i n t e r a c t io n s  between people and th in g s  providing depth 
and d e t a i l " .
Such a r e s ea rch ,  observes Bulmer (1979):
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"proceeds from a somewhat d i f f e r e n t  s t a r t i n g - p o i n t  t o  t h a t  of 
experiment l o g ic .  I t  emphasises not so much a model of so c ie ty  
in terms of causal  v a r i a b l e s ,  as a resea rch  commitment t o  come to  
g r ip s  with th e  n a tu ra l  soc ia l  worlds in which people i n t e r a c t .
To render those  worlds i n t e l l i g i b l e  from the  po in t  of view of a 
theory  grounded in th e  a t t i t u d e s  and behaviours  of those  s tu d ie d ,  
i t s  focus i s  upon th e  soc ia l  c o n s t r u c t io n  of r e a l i t y  and the  ways 
in which so c ia l  i n t e r a c t i o n  r e f l e c t s  a c t o r s '  unfolding d e f i n i t i o n s  
o f  t h e i r  s i t u a t i o n .  Man i s  su b jec t  as well as o b je c t  in t h i s  type 
of r e s ea rc h " ,  p . 12.
S im i la r  focus on th e  c e n t r a l i t y  of  human beings was emphasised by 
Argyris (1985):
"The domain of focus is  on human beings as they are  i n t e r a c t in g  in 
o rde r  to  achieve t h e i r  intended g oa ls .  I take  i t  as a given t h a t  
i t  i s  i nd iv idua ls  who w i l l  do the  ac tua l  implementing, a c t i n g ,  even 
though they may be serv ing  as agents  fo r  an o rgan iza t io n  or  group".
From t h i s  p e r s p e c t iv e ,  knowledge is  grounded in the  understanding of 
how, what and not only why people c o n s t r u c t ,  modify or i n t e r p r e t  t h e i r  
world.  Knowledge and unders tanding are  con tex t  bound, and the  th e o r i e s  
advanced to  account f o r  the  form of the  soc ia l  world and na ture  of 
human ac t ion  a re  c lo s e ly  r e l a t e d  to  the  ques t ions  being r a i s e d ,  to  
the  h i s t o r i c a l  and s o c ia l  s i t u a t i o n  in which they are  asked. I n t e r ­
p r e t i v e  resea rch  a t tempts  to  comprehend such ques t ions  from "within"  
so c ia l  phenomena by focusing on th e  e s s e n t i a l  dimensions of a soc ia l  
process  or con tex t  (Jones ,  1983, Denzin, 1983).
In a s im i l a r  ve in ,  Blumer (1956) has noted t h a t :
"We can, and I th in k  must,  look upon human l i f e  as c h i e f l y  a vas t  
i n t e r p r e t a t i v e  process  in which people s in g ly  and c o l l e c t i v e l y  guide 
themselves by de f in ing  the  o b j e c t s ,  events  and s i t u a t i o n s  to  analyse  
human group l i f e  in i t s  general  c h a r a c t e r  has t o  f i t  t h i s  process 
of  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " .
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The d iscuss ion  thus  f a r  has looked a t  methodological  i s su e s ,  questioned 
the  re levance  of n a tu ra l  sc ience  methods to  the  study and unders tanding 
of o rg an iza t io n a l  change and addressed the  epis temologica l  i s sues  as 
a background to  th e  method s tance  upon which t h i s  study is  roo ted .
The Method S tance :
There is  no method t h a t  i s  equa l ly  su i ted  fo r  a l l  purposes.  The choice  
of  re sea rch  method should be determined by the  resea rch  i n t e r e s t ,  the  
c ircumstances  of th e  s e t t i n g  o r  people to  be s tud ied ,  and p r a c t i c a l  
c o n s t r a i n t s  faced by th e  r e sea rc h e r  (Taylor and Bogdan, 1984). Having 
c a r e f u l l y  considered th e  methodological  i s sues  wi th in  so c ia l  s c ien ces ,  
i t  became c l e a r  t h a t ,  no twiths tanding  the  c o n t r ib u t io n s  of na tu ra l  
sc ience  methods, which s t i l l  form a good deal of management received  
wisdom, the  p o s i t i v i s t  approach was inapprop r ia te  to  th e  c u r r e n t  
r e s ea rc h .  The s c i e n t i f i c  methods t h a t  underpin p o s i t i v i s t  t r a d i t i o n  
es t ranged th e  very phenomena I wanted to  study and unders tand by 
emphasizing p r e c i s io n ,  accuracy and r e l i a b i l i t y .
"To know i s  to  be c e r t a i n  about something . . .  knowledge i s  synonymous 
with p r e c i s io n ,  accuracy and r e l i a b i l i t y .  Any endeavour t h a t  cannot 
be sub jec ted  to  t h i s  formula o r  l i n e  of  reasoning i s  e i t h e r  suppressed ,  
devalued or  s e t  a s ide  as not worth knowing or  capable  of  being known". 
Reason (1982).
My study on s t r a t e g i c  change, a d i s o r d e r ly  and h ighly  dynamic p rocess ,  
requ i red  unders tanding of  how human beings defined and c rea ted  change 
in t h e i r  world.  The t h i c k  d e s c r ip t i o n s  car ry ing  layer s  of  meaning, 
nuances,  substance ,  and emotions would not make sense w i th in  the
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p re c i s io n  cannons of p o s i t iv i sm .  The domain of focus in t h i s  study 
was human beings as they i n t e r a c t  and n e g o t i a t e  t h e i r  r e a l i t y .  I t  
was t h e r e f o r e  e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  t h i s  study be rooted in the  q u a l i t a t i v i s t  
t r a d i t i o n .  Why? Heiss (1981) quoting Blumer, unde r l ines  my guiding  
conv ic t io n .
"To understand human behaviour one must unders tand a c t o r ' s  d e f i n i t i o n s ,  
and in o rder  t o  do t h i s  th e  i n v e s t i g a t o r  must ge t  in s id e  the  a c t o r ' s  
world and must see the  world as the  a c to r  sees i t .  A c to r ' s  d e f i n i t i o n s ,  
cannot be obta ined from q u e s t io n n a i r e s ;  no q u a n t i t a t i v e  measures can 
adequate ly  rep re sen t  meanings; and no s t a t i s t i c a l  a n a ly s i s  can exp la in  
them", p . 20.
S im i la r  observa t ions  have been made by Agar (1985) who takes  e thnographic  
approach.
"When a so c ia l  r e sea rch e r  assumes a learn ing  r o l e  - th e  ques t ions  
(what is  your hypothesis?) do not work. When you s tand on th e  edge 
of a v i l l a g e  and watch the  n o ise ,  and motion, you wonder . . .  Hypothesis,  
measurement, samples,  and ins truments  are  the  wrong g u id e l in e s .
In s tead  you need to  learn about a world you do not understand by en­
counter ing  i t  f i r s t  hand and making some sense out of i t " .
Thus, f a r  from being a d is tanced  bys tander ,  d i s t i l l i n g  t r u t h  from th e  
s u b je c t s ,  I would have to  i n t e r a c t  with the  a c to r s  as I learn  and 
t r y  t o  understand t h e i r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of t h e i r  world.  In t h i s  regard  
th e  da ta  cannot be divorced from the  a c to r s  who c o n s t i t u t e d  i t .  I t  
i s  as much p a r t  of the  s i t u a t i o n  and r e a l i t y  desc r ibed  to  me as of 
my own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of th e  s i t u a t i o n  and r e a l i t y  descr ibed  t o  me 
as of my own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of th e  s i t u a t i o n  as I encountered i t  and 
made sense of i t .  Ind iv idua ls  i n t e r p r e t  and respond to  s i t u a t i o n s  
through i n t e r a c t i o n .  Their  r e a c t io n s  are  not made d i r e c t l y  to  the  
ac t io n s  of one another  but through the  meanings which they a t t a c h  
t o  such a c t i o n s .  As Schwartz and Jacobs (1979) noted:
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"We want to  know what the  a c to r s  know, see what they see ,  understand 
what they unders tand. As a r e s u l t  our da ta  a ttempt t o  desc r ibe  t h e i r  
v o cab u la r ie s ,  t h e i r  ways of looking,  t h e i r  sense of th e  important and 
unimportant" .
Advocates of t h i s  s u b jec t iv e  view argue f o r  th e  c e n t r a l i t y  of the  
researched a c to r s :
" to  make th e  lay person th e  exper t  about h is  world.  He l iv e s  t h e r e ;  
he knows b e t t e r  than we do what i t  i s  l i k e  and how b es t  to  desc r ibe  
i t  . . .  (Schwartz and Jacobs,  1979).
I found g r e a t  appeal in th e  q u a l i t a t i v e  approach, f o r  i f  we are  to  
gain in s ig h t s  in to  how ac to r s  in LDCs manage change, they need to  be 
heard and involved as human beings who exper ienced t h e i r  l ived world 
and made sense of i t .  This corresponds to  Mangham's (1979) metaphor 
o f  man:
"my metaphor f o r  man i s  man; I am proposing t h a t  in o rde r  to  understand 
organ iza t ions  and in o rder  t o  develop ideas f o r  a c t io n  people should 
be t r e a t e d  as i f  they were human beings as we know and understand them 
in everyday l i f e .  I submit t h a t  we do not know and understand people 
as machines, as p la n t s  or  as systems, r a t h e r  we know and understand 
them as unique e n t i t i e s ,  as s p e c i f i c a l l y  human be ings" .
I t  has a l ready  been pointed out t h a t  th e  re sea rch  was exp lo ra to ry  and 
I had to  go out in the  f i e l d  and f in d  o u t .  Martin and Turner (1986) 
sugges t ,  an appos i te  method t h a t  would produce such a discovery  would 
be grounded theo ry ;  i t  would:
"produce t h e o r e t i c a l  accounts which unders tandable  to  those  in the  
area s tud ied  and which are  usefu l  in g iv ing them a su p e r io r  under­
s tanding of  th e  na ture  of  t h e i r  own s i t u a t i o n  . . .
Such unders tanding can a lso  help employees and managers id e n t i f y  and 
i n s t i t u t e  changes to  bring about o rg an iza t io n a l  improvements".
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Such a d iscovery  would meet the  u l t im a te  aim of t h i s  re sea rch ;  to  
produce theory  t h a t  w i l l  inform and in f luence  p r a c t i c e .  That i s  what 
Glaser and S trauss  (1967) aimed a t  in t h e i r  "discovery  of theory  from 
d a t a " .
"Our bas ic  p o s i t io n  i s  t h a t  genera t ing  grounded theory  is  a way of 
a r r i v i n g  a t  theory  s u i t e d  t o  i t s  supposed uses . . .  t o  be usab le  in 
p r a c t i c a l  a p p l i c a t i o n s  . . .  be ab le  to  give th e  p r a c t io n e r  unders tanding 
and some con t ro l  of s i t u a t i o n s " .
Glaser  and S t rauss  (1967) r e j e c t  a p r i o r i  preconceptions  of o b j e c t i v e  
r e a l i t y ,  or  imposing the  d e f i n i t i o n  of a phenomena under s tudy. Theory 
is  generated  from d a t a .
"We encourage the  i n v e s t i g a t o r  to  commence by co n cen t ra t ing  on a 
d e t a i l e d  d e sc r ip t i o n  of th e  f e a tu re s  of  da ta  c o l l e c t e d  before  a ttempting  
to  produce more general  t h e o r e t i c a l  s ta t em en ts " .  (Martin and Turner ,  
1986).
Through the  process of d e s c r i p t i o n ,  d e f i n i t i o n ,  immersion in d a t a ,  
and s p e c i f i c a t i o n  of r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  'grounded th e o ry '  demands high 
degree of r i g o r  in th e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of d a t a .  Those who dub i t  s o f t ,  
vague, p o e t i c ,  r i s k  foregoing ' r e a l n e s s '  and ' r i c h n e s s '  of da ta  without 
which th e o r i e s  of so c ia l  behaviour are  l i k e l y  t o  prove j u s t  t h e o r i e s .  
I t ' s  a d a p t a b i l i t y  to  d a t a ,  was an a s s e t :
"Our approach, al lowing s u b s ta n t iv e  concepts  and hypothesis  to  emerge 
f i r s t ,  on t h e i r  own, enables  th e  a n a ly s t  t o  a s c e r t a i n  which, i f  any, 
e x i s t i n g  formal theory  may help him genera te  h i s  su b s ta n t iv e  t h e o r i e s .  
He can then be more f a i t h f u l  t o  h is  d a ta ,  r a t h e r  than fo rc ing  i t  t o  
f i t  a th e o ry " .  (Glaser  and S t r au s s ,  1967)
On t h i s  b a s i s  I concluded t h a t  i t  was e s s e n t i a l  t o  use grounded theo ry ,  
cognizant of the  shortcomings of t h i s  approach as expressed by (Miles,
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1979, Bulmer, 1979, Jones ,  1984, Turner,  1983).
Figure  3.1 shows the  flow c h a r t  of the  ^ 'overall  re sea rch  des ign .
Who Should Benef i t  from t h i s  Study?
Theore t ica l  c o n t r ib u t io n s :
The primary o b je c t iv e  of t h i s  study i s  to  c o n t r ib u t e  to  more unders tanding 
of  th e  na tu re  and process  of s t r a t e g i c  change in a State-owned e n t e r p r i s e  
from the  developing world.  I t  a l so  c o n t r ib u te s  to  the  'Negotia ted Order'  
theo ry  as i t  accords with S t r a u s s ' s  t h e s i s  t h a t  one of the  p r in c ip a l  
ways t h a t  th in g s  ge t  done in o rg a n iz a t io n  is  through people n eg o t ia t in g  
with  one ano ther .  From t h i s  p e r s p e c t iv e ,  i t  broadens t h i s  t h e s i s  to  
State-owned e n t e r p r i s e s .
P r a c t i t i o n e r  c o n t r ib u t io n s :
The immediate t a r g e t  users  a re  LNDC management and po l icy  makers in 
Lesotho concerned with State-owned e n t e r p r i s e s .  I t  i s  hoped t h a t  
ap p re c ia t io n  and unders tanding of s t r a t e g i c  change as a nego t ia ted  
process  w i l l  improve t h e i r  f u t u r e  dec i s ion  making and the  i n t e r a c t i o n  
between SOE and government.
The resea rch  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  in t h a t  i t  i s  th e  f i r s t  study of t h i s  
na tu re  -  t h a t  I am aware of -  t h a t  looks a t  s t r a t e g i c  change of  a 
SOE in a developing world.  I t  t h e r e f o r e  provides  a base f o r  empir ica l  
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Data Co l lec t ion  and Method of Analysis
This chap te r  desc r ibes  the  data  c o l l e c t i o n  s t r a t e g y  and a n a ly s i s  by 
which the  research  o b je c t iv e s  formulated in chap te r  1 were implemented 
w i th in  the  resea rch  design and s tance  developed in chap te r  3. As 
a l ready  ind ica ted  t h a t  grounded theory  approach w i l l  be fo llowed,  the  
f i r s t  p a r t  of t h i s  chap te r  looks a t  the  problems posed by t h a t  approach 
and the  m odif ica t ions  t h a t  were made in o rde r  to  re so lv e  them. The 
r e s t  of the  chap te r  provides  the  d e t a i l s  of how th e  study was conducted,  
processed and eva lua ted .
Grounded Theory Perspect ive-Modified
One problem t h a t  has o f ten  been l e v e l l ed  a t  Glaser and Strauss? (1967) 
theory  was t h e i r  sugges tion t h a t  in genera t ing  th e o ry ,  th e  r e sea rc h e r  
should e n t e r  the  f i e l d  without a f i rm preconception d i c t a t i n g  re levances  
in concepts and hypothesis ;  what Huber (1973) has c a l l e d  'a  blank mind ' .  
Glaser and S t rauss  (1967) advised:
"An e f f e c t i v e  s t r a t e g y  i s ,  a t  f i r s t ,  l i t e r a l l y  t o  ignore the  l i t e r a t u r e  
of theory  and f a c t  on the  area under s tudy, in o rde r  t o  assure  t h a t  
the  emergency of c a teg o r ie s  w i l l  not be contaminated by concepts more 
su i t e d  t o  d i f f e r e n t  a re a s .  S i m i l a r i t i e s  and convergences with the  
l i t e r a t u r e  can be e s t a b l i s h e d  a f t e r  the  a n a ly t i c  core  of c a te g o r ie s  
has emerged".
That advice was r e i t e r a t e d  l a t e r  by Bogdan and Taylor (1975):
"To e n t e r  a s e t t i n g  with a s e t  of s p e c i f i c  hypothesis  i s  to  impose 
p recond i t ions  and perhaps misconceptions on th e  s e t t i n g " .
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While the  broad t h e o r e t i c a l  premises of t h a t  s t r a t e g y  were sound and 
a necessary  p recau t ion  t o  re sea rch e r s  to  guard ag a in s t  a s i t u a t i o n  
where "fixed log ics  and formal systems of any s o r t  could become s t r a i t -  
j a c k e t s  ins tead  of t o o l s  on in qu i ry" ,  Shalin  (1986); th e re  were however, 
some o p e ra t iona l  problems t h a t  would have been de ter imenta l  t o  the  
a c c e p t a b i l i t y  of t h i s  re sea rch  from the  sponsors '  po in t  of view as 
well as the  academic i n s t i t u t i o n s .  Most re sea rch  f i n a n c i e r s ,  sponsors ,  
and academic i n s t i t u t i o n s  of h igher  learn ing  r e q u i r e ,  to  a varying 
degree,  comprehensive resea rch  proposal in d ic a t in g  t h a t  the  r e sea rc h e r  
has done l i t e r a t u r e  search and is  f a m i l i a r  with the  s t a t e - o f - t h e - a r t  
on the proposal of i n t e r e s t .  A co l league  of mine missed a resea rch  
g ran t  because the  sponsor f e l t  t h a t  the  proposal did not c l e a r l y  
de f ine  the  re search  v a r i a b l e s .  Moreover, ignoring  l i t e r a t u r e  review 
could r e s u l t  in an unnecessary d u p l i c a t io n  of well e s t a b l i s h e d  
re sea rch .
Contrary to  Glaser and S t rauss  (1967) advice ,  the  l i t e r a t u r e  review 
was undertaken, fundamentally  as an o r i e n t i n g  pe rspec t ive  t h a t  would 
allow me to  focus on th e  general  su b jec t  whi le  open-minded to  the  local  
id io syncrac ie s  t h a t  would emerge from the  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s .  This view 
is  c o n s i s t e n t  with Blumer's  (1954) c o n t r a s t  of s e n s i t i z i n g  concepts 
from d e f i n i t i v e  concepts .
"A s e n s i t i z i n g  concept lacks  such s p e c i f i c a t i o n  of a t t r i b u t e s  or 
bench marks and consequently  i t  does not enable  the  use r  to  move 
d i r e c t l y  to  the  in s ta n ce  and i t s  r e l e v a n t  c o n ten t .  Ins tead ,  i t  
g ives  the  user  a general  sense o f  r e fe ren ce  and guidance in 
approaching empir ica l  in s t a n ce s .  Whereas d e f i n i t i v e  concepts 
provide p r e s c r i p t i o n s  of  what t o  see ,  s e n s i t i z i n g  concepts  merely 
suggest  d i r e c t i o n s  along which to  look",  p . 7.
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Glaser (1978) l a t e r  recognized t h a t  view in h is  work on t h e o r e t i c a l  
s e n s i t i v i t y  when he wrote:
"The f i r s t  s t ep  in ga in ing t h e o r e t i c a l  s e n s i t i v i t y  i s  to  e n t e r  the  
resea rch  s e t t i n g  with as few predetermined ideas as p o s s ib le  - 
e s p e c i a l l y  l o g i c a l l y  deducted,  a p r i o r  hypothes is ,  . . .  the  an a ly s t  
i s  ab le  to  remain s e n s i t i v e  to  th e  data  by being ab le  to  record 
events  and d e t e c t  happenings without  f i r s t  having them f i l t e r e d  
through and squared with p r e - e x i s t i n g  hypotheses and b i a s .  His 
mandate is  t o  remain open t o  what i s  a c tu a l ly  happening",  p . 3. 
(emphasis su p p l i e d ) .
Thus the  notion of approaching a research  with a 'wholly naive or 
v i rg i n  mind ' ,  had to  be modified.  As Pett ig rew (1985) approvingly 
observed:
"No observer  of  l i f e  or  form begins with h is  mind a blank, to  be 
g radua l ly  f i l l e d  by evidence" ,  p .1 .
Schmitt  (1974) argued t h a t  the  " le ss -b lank"  the  i n v e s t i g a t o r ' s  mind, 
t h e  b e t t e r ,  in t h a t  the  more "savvy" he has of soc ia l  systems, 
in d iv idua ls  and t h e i r  i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  the  more a l t e r n a t i v e s  he 
w i l l  have to  draw on in h i s  cons ide ra t ion  of soc ia l  s e t t i n g s .  But 
the  emergent t h e o r i s t  does have a "blank mind . . .  "open mind" in t h a t  
he does not have a predetermined s e t  of hypo thes i s" ,  p . 454.
Huber (1973) would l i k e  to  see a p r i o r i  l o g i c a l ly  r e l a t e d  p ro p o s i t io n s :
"A t h e o r e t i c a l  fo rmula t ion  fo rces  researches  to  be t  on a p a r t i c u l a r  
outcome and to  exp la in  why they bet th e  way they do. In the  absence 
of  such a fo rm ula t ion ,  the  r e sea rch e r  always wins, f o r  any outcome 
i s  pe rm is s ib le" .
This view t h a t  t h e re  is  abso lu te  t r u t h  and o b j e c t i v i t y  t h a t  e x i s t  
somewhere a g a in s t  which a l l  e l s e  has to  conform, was r e j e c t e d .
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Miles (1979) has h ig h l ig h ted  another  p e r t i n e n t  problem r e l a t e d  to  
being open to  the  emergent t h e o r e t i c a l  accounts without an ap p rop r ia te  
p e r sp ec t iv e .  He poin ted  out t h a t :
“The need to  develop grounded theory  usua l ly  e x i s t  in tens ion  with 
the  need f o r  c l a r i t y  and focus ;  research  p r o j e c t s  t h a t  pretend  to  
come to  the  study with no assumptions u sua l ly  encounter much d i f f i c u l t y .  
We be l ieve  . . .  t h a t  a rough working frame needs to  be in p lace  near  the  
beginning of f ie ldw ork .  Of course i t  w i l l  change. The r i s k  i s  not 
t h a t  of "imposing" a s e l f -b in d in g  framework, but t h a t  an incoherent ,  
bulky, i r r e l e v a n t ,  meaningless s e t  of observat ions  may be produced, 
which no one can make sense of ".  p . 119.
In the  s im i la r  ve in ,  Whyte advocated the  use of
"general  conceptual scheme . . .  t o  guide in the  c o l l e c t i n g  of da ta  and 
the  s e l e c t io n  of p a r t i c u l a r  i s sues  f o r  a n a ly s i s " .
Glaser  and Strauss  (1967) had a l so  advised preplanning of f u r t h e r  
c o l l e c t i o n  of da ta  d e s p i t e  the  concomit tent  o p e ra t iona l  problems t h a t  
they c l e a r l y  acknowledged.
"Because the  s o c i o l o g i s t  who wishes to  genera te  theory  cannot s t a t e  
beforehand how many groups he w i l l  study and to  what degree he w i l l  
study each one,  he cannot say how much time h is  p r o j e c t  w i l l  t a k e .
But he can s t a t e  the  type of th e o ry ,  su b s tan t iv e  o r  formal ,  t h a t  he 
wishes to  genera te ,  and give the  . . .  a reas  where he w i l l  study c e r t a i n  
kinds of groups" ,  p . 74.
They went f u r t h e r  to  s t a t e  t h a t :
"Deta iled  breakdowns of  th e  t iming of  research  . . .  a re  a l so  d i f f i c u l t  
to  give in a resea rch  proposal designed f o r  d iscover ing  theo ry ,  s ince  
they depend on the  d i r e c t i o n s  th e  emerging theory  t a k e s ,  and on the  
temporal open-endedness of  the  t h e o r e t i c a l  sampling".
The problem with t h i s ,  i f  taken l i t e r a l l y ,  i s  t h a t  in gaining access ,  
the  r e sea rcher  has to  i n d ic a te  which group(s) he in tends to  study, the
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d ura t ion  of the  study,  and the  t ime l ik e ly  to  be spent with each group. 
Glaser and S t r au s s ,  have t r i e d  to  assume away t h i s  problem by merely 
acknowledging i t  without providing any s p e c i f i c s  of how i t  could be 
overcome. Organizations  are  o f ten  anxious to  know in advance how the  
resea rch  i s  l i k e ly  t o  a f f e c t  t h e i r  workflow. As mentioned in the  
previous  ch ap te r ,  t h i s  can be a t ime consuming process in a S ta t e -  
owned e n t e r p r i s e  where a p a r t  from the  focal resea rch  o rgan iza t ion  
en t ry  has to  be nego t ia ted  s ep a ra te ly  with a host  of o th e r  ac to r s  t h a t  
i n t e r a c t  with the  State-owned e n t e r p r i s e ,  SOE. Thus, Glaser and 
St rauss  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  the  r e sea rc h e r  would choose any groups t h a t  
would help gen e ra te ,  t o  th e  f u l l e s t  e x t e n t ,  as many p ro p e r t i e s  of 
th e  ca teg o r ie s  as p o s s i b l e ,  and t h a t  w i l l  help r e l a t e  c a teg o r ie s  to  
each o th e r  and to  t h e i r  p ro p e r t i e s  (1967 p . 49) ,  assumes in s ta n t  access  
and cooperation to  p a r t i c i p a t e  in the  re search  from such groups - 
which may not be the  case .
As Berg (1979) c o r r e c t l y  s t a t e d ,  " the  study could be expected to  address 
i t s e l f  t o  i s sues  t h a t  contained a high p o l i t i c a l  as well as emotional 
charge" ,  making i t  more d i f f i c u l t  to  s e l l  and gain en t ry  in some 
q u a r te r s  - p a r t i c u l a r l y  government m i n i s t r i e s .  I had id e n t i f i e d  my 
groups as being those  people most knowledgeable and f a m i l i a r  with the  
s t r a t e g i c  changes of  the  SOE, o r  involved d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y  in 
s t r a t e g i c  change p rocess .  That provided the  o rg an iza t io n  with a 
broad but c l e a r e r  t e r r a c e  of my inquiry  while a f fo rd in g  me f l e x i b i l i t y  
t o  follow up ' l e a d s '  t o  t h e o r e t i c a l  c a te g o r ie s  w i th in  and ou ts ide  
th e  broadly descr ibed  group. The d e sc r ip t i o n  lacked f ixed  bench marks, 
but formed g u id e l in e s  and re fe rence  po in ts  which the  re sea rch e r  could 
use to  deduct ive ly  formula te  ques t ions  which may then e l i c i t  data
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t h a t  l eads  t o  i n d u c t iv e  c o ncepts  being formulated  l a t e r ,  Glaser  ( 1 9 7 8 ) .
L a s t ly ,  while  Shalin  (1986) advises  t h a t  i n t e r a c t i o n i s t s  should avoid 
th e  premature c losu re  of genera t ing  theory ,  remaining on the  lookout 
f o r  th e  unforeseen and s e r en d ip i to u s ,  ready to  'd i s c o v e r '  new c a teg o r ie s "  
. . .  Glaser  and S trauss  (1967) in the  same ve in ,  g loss  over the  t ime 
c o n s t r a i n t  to  re sea rche rs  who o f ten  opera te  under t i g h t  schedules.
"The systematic  formula t ion of the  core  s t r u c t u r e  of h is  theory may 
take  cons iderab le  t ime, though i t  need not.  In e i t h e r  even t ,  the  
s o c i o l o g i s t  should . . .  not be a f r a id  t o  th e ,  l i t e r a l l y ,  months o f f  
h is  da ta  c o l l e c t i o n ,  i f  necessary  (and i f  p o s s i b l e ) ,  t o  th ink  through 
h i s  emergent theory  before  r e tu rn in g  to  the  f i e l d " ,  p . 73.
Theore t ica l  s a tu r a t i o n  had t o  take  cognizant of the  t ime and resource  
c o n s t r a i n t s  imposed on the  r e sea rc h e r .  This genera l  abandon of t ime 
c o n s t r a i n t  had unleashed a c r i t i c i s m  from Bulmer (1984):
"problem i s  when to  s top process  of category  development.  Grounded 
theory  has . . .  uncontro l led  a i r  about proceedings ,  wherein the  
cons tan t  comparative a n a ly s t  i s  rushing h i t h e r  and t h i t h e r  gaining 
new i n s i g h t s ,  while t r y i n g  t o  bu i ld  up from data  to  c a te g o r ie s  and 
t h e i r  p r o p e r t i e s  to  s u b s ta n t iv e  theory  and then formal theory .
When are  h is  c a te g o r ie s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  formed to  s top the  process?"
To conclude,  t h e r e  were some aspec ts  of grounded theory  which I f e l t  
needed to  be ad jus ted  and redef ined  within  the  con tex t  of the  
re sea rch  s i t u a t i o n  I encounte red.  With these  problems and modif ica­
t i o n s  h ig h l ig h te d ,  a d m in is t r a t io n  of da ta  c o l l e c t i o n  w i l l  be descr ibed  
and d iscussed .
Data Co l lec t ion  S tra tegy
I have argued in the  previous  chap te r  fo r  a research  approach th a t
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r e l a t e s  d i r e c t l y  to  a c t o r s '  r e a l - l i f e  experiences  and t h e i r  shared 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of the  meaning of th e se  exper iences .  For i f  we 
a re  t o  understand why people a c t  as they do, we need to  give them 
'a  day in c o u r t '  - l e t  them be heard and express t h e i r  views on how 
they perce ive  t h e i r  own r e a l i t y .
"To unders tand o th e r  persons '  co n s t ru c t io n s  of  r e a l i t y  we would do 
well t o  ask them . . .  and to  ask them in such a way t h a t  they can t e l l  
us in t h e i r  te rms" .  Jones ,  (1985).
Fineman (1983) s im i la r ly  acknowledges the  importance of unders tanding 
s o c ia l  phenomena from the  a c t o r s '  pe r sp ec t iv e .
"A p l a u s i b l e  research  o r i e n t a t i o n  of those who wish to  study th e  
meaning of soc ia l  phenomena is  to  conduct i n v e s t ig a t io n s  amongst 
in d iv id u a ls  who are  d i r e c t l y  exper iencing  such phenomena".
In-depth personal in terv iewing seemed e sp e c i a l l y  well su i ted  f o r  such 
s i t u a t i o n s .  I t  provided the  oppor tun i ty  to  probe broadly and deeply ,  
to  uncover new c lu e s ,  to  adapt to  s i t u a t i o n s  and pursue new l in e s  of 
in qu i ry ,  and to  secure  v iv id ,  accurac t  d e t a i l e d  accounts from respon­
dents  t h a t  a re  based on personal exper ience ,  Burgess (1982).  In-depth 
in te rv iewing  was in consonance with grounded theory  and produced data 
t h a t  was t r u t h f u l  to  the  o b je c t iv e  indeterminancy of  the  s i t u a t i o n .  
Thus, an in te rv iew in depth was more than a s in g l e  c o l l e c t i o n  of 
da ta ;  " i t  i s  a l so  th e  simultaneous i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  and v a l id a t io n  of 
t h i s  da ta  w i th in  the  r e s e a r c h e r ' s  frame of re fe rence"  Berg, (1979).
I t  could be argued q u i t e  convincingly ,  t h a t  p a r t i c i p a n t  observat ion  
was the  bes t  instrument f o r  t h i s  study s ince  I would study the  process
92
of change overt ime, and observe people in s i t u ,  in t h e i r  na tu ra l  
h a b i t a t .
"Since ac t ion  is  forged by the  a c to r  out of what he p e r c e i v e s , i n t e r ­
p r e t s ,  and judges ,  one would have to  see th e  opera t ing  s i t u a t i o n  as 
the  a c to r  sees i t ,  pe rce ive  o b je c t s  as the  a c to r  pe rce ives  them, 
a s c e r t a in  t h e i r  meaning in terms of th e  meaning they have f o r  the  
a c to r ,  and follow th e  a c t o r ’s l i n e  of  conduct as th e  a c to r  organizes  
i t  . . .  and see h i s  world from h i s  s t a n d p o in t" .  Schwartz and Jacobs,  
(1979).
That opt ion  was however, d iscounted  on p r a c t i c a l  c o n s id e ra t io n s .  The 
time-consuming na tu re  of t h i s  method and th e  resource  l im i t a t i o n s  on 
the  study made i t  i n f e a s i b l e .  As Mintzberg,  Raisinghani and Theoret  
(1978) have noted in a s im i l a r  s i t u a t i o n :
"Observation i s  c e r t a i n l y  a powerful and r e l i a b l e  method, but extremely 
demanding of re sea rch  resources  because s t r a t e g i c  dec is ion  processes  
t y p i c a l l y  span per iods  of y e a r s ;  . . .  t h e r e f o r e  the  r e sea rc h e r  i s  
obliged to  r e ly  heav i ly  on in te rv iew ing ,  p . 248.
Depth in te rv iewing  not only made e f f i c i e n t  use of th e  t ime,  but a l so  
ensured t h a t  a p r a c t i c a l  degree of in t im a te  f a m i l i a r i t y  was achieved 
through an in t e n s iv e ,  d i v e r s e ,  open-ended, semi s t r u c tu r e d  d iscuss ions  
with people who were p a r t i c i p a n t s  in a s i t u a t i o n  under inquiry  - 
Lofland, (1976).
The c o l l e c t i o n  of da ta  on nego t ia ted  s t r a t e g i c  changes through i n t e r ­
view was, however, p roblematic  in t h a t  the  p a r t i c i p a n t s  were not 
a c tu a l ly  observed during th e  change n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  we have had t o  rep ly  
predominantly on the  extended in te rv iews supported by secondary 
documentation,  t o  ge t  th e  n e g o t i a t io n  pe rspec t ive s  of the  a c to r s  who 
were d i r e c t l y  and i n d i r e c t l y  involved in th e  change process .
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The Col lec t ion  of In terview Data
This study r e s t s  predominantly on 50 in te rv iews c a r r i e d  out in 10 
o rg an iza t io n s  i . e .  the  holding SOE and i t s  nine su b s id ia ry  companies; 
covering a f i v e  month per iod ,  beginning in August to  December, 1986. 
In r e t r o s p e c t ,  a three-phased  approach was fo llowed. The f i r s t  en t ry  
level  was a t  the  c o r p o r a t io n ' s  headquar te rs ,  as per access c o n t r a c t ,  
where the  personnel manager in troduced me to  the  managing d i r e c t o r  - 
MD, and f i v e  d iv i s io n a l  d i r e c t o r s .  In each case ,  t h e  study was 
descr ibed  and in te rv iew da te  a rranged.  I t  was from such subsequent 
in te rv iews  with those key a c to r s  - those  people involved in one form 
or  another  with change d e c i s io n s ,  t h a t  recommendations of o th e r  
respondents  well vested in the  inqu iry ,  both with in  the  co rpo ra t ion  
and o u t s id e ,  were genera ted .  That included those people who though 
not d i r e c t l y  in a decision-making p o s i t io n  as f a r  as s t r a t e g i c  and 
po l icy  dec is ions  are  concerned, but who are  in a p o s i t io n  not only 
to  have an i n d i r e c t  bear ing on what dec is ions  are  in f a c t  taken ,  but 
a l so  to  observe the  ac t ions  of the  actual  dec iders  - Mazzolini 1979. 
These were mainly s t a f f  people in the  d iv i s io n a l  l e v e l s .  Thus the  
f i r s t  phase had focused on top and middle management a t  the  head­
q u a r te r s  where 25 people were in terviewed.
The second phase involved in te rv iews with the  top management of  
su b s id ia ry  companies where 13 people were interviewed in 8 companies. 
The s u b s i d i a r i e s  were those  companies where LNDC had 100% equ i ty  
or  held c o n t r o l l i n g  shares  - a t  l e a s t  51%, and d i r e c t l y  in f luenced  
t h e i r  s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s io n s .  In most cases  the  key a c to r s  were th e  
general  managers, and in a few o the rs  the  company accountants  had a
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b e t t e r  pe rspec t ive  of the  s t r a t e g i c  changes.  Asked who e l s e  would 
be involved or  f a m i l i a r  with th e  company s t r a t e g i c  changes,  the  
managers had recommended th e  accountants  and board members.
The t h i r d  phase took me o u ts id e  the  co rp o ra t io n ,  as i t  were,  to  the  
government m in i s t e r s  who were board members of th e  co rpo ra t ion  and 
involved in quest ions  a f f e c t i n g  SOE as well as s t r a t e g i c  change 
d e c i s io n s .  They included th e  Minis t ry  of Trade which super in tend 
over the  LNDC, Minis t ry  of Finance and Minis t ry  of Planning. They 
tu rned out t o  be gene ra l ly  l e s s  informed about the  co rp o ra t io n ,  and 
keen on s p e c i f i c  i ssues  only .  Included in t h i s  phase were in d iv idua ls  
from o th e r  o rg a n iz a t io n s ,  some were former MDs, Chairmen, Chairman of 
Commerce, and p resen t  and former members of the  board.  Some of these  
people had been with the  Corporation s ince  i t  was e s t a b l i s h e d  in 
1967, and provided va luable  h i s t o r i c a l  pe rspec t ive s  on th e  s t r a t e g i c  
evo lu t ions  and revo lu t ions  of  th e  SOE.
The in te rv iew design had no preplanned sample s i z e ,  th e  50 people 
in terviewed were included on t h e o r e t i c a l  re levance  of  each indiv idual 
o r  group in f a c i l i t a t i n g  development of  f u r t h e r  in s ig h t s  in to  the  
s t r a t e g i c  change p rocess .  The d i v e r s i t y  of  respondents  meant t h a t  
more t ime had to  be spent on n e g o t i a t in g  en t ry  in the  second and 
t h i r d  phases of the  in te rv iew s .  Table 4.1 gives  the  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  
of the  people t h a t  were in te rv iewed while t a b l e  4 .2  l i s t s  the  companies.  
A t ten t ion  i s  now d i r e c te d  t o  how the  in te rv iews were admin is tered  
throughout the  d i f f e r e n t  phases .
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Adminis tra tion of Interviews
In my f i r s t  in te rv iew s,  th e  respondents  were fa m i l i a r i z e d  with what 
the  study was about,  how I intended to  conduct i t ,  and an assurance  
of n o n - a t t r i b u t a b i l i t y  and c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y .  Respondents were then 
to ld  t h a t  the  in te rv iews would be tape- reco rded ;  and any informat ion 
which they regarded as an a s ide  would be excluded from the  tape  and 
the  t r a n s c r i p t s ,  or  i f  they  f e l t  in h ib i te d  by i t ,  I would not use i t .  
All respondents  agreed to  t ap e- reco rd ing  the  in te rv iew s .  I had c a r e ­
f u l l y  considered the  advantage and drawbacks of using tape  reco rd e r ,  
and concluded t h a t  with th e  tape  I would have a f u l l e r  record ing of 
the  in te rv iew t h a t  could reveal  new, s u b t le  angles  to  exp lo re .  I t  
would give me an oppor tun i ty  to  be a t t e n t i v e ,  r e f l e c t i v e ,  and engage 
the  respondent on a f a c e - t o - f a c e  con tac t  to  observe the  nuances of 
the  body language which I recorded in my ' in t e rv ie w  j o u r n a l '  as soon 
as I l e f t  the  in te rv iew p lace .  Whyte (1982) lends support  t o  t h i s  
observa t ion :
"Physical  movements, g e s tu r e s ,  and f a c i a l  experiments give c lues  not 
to  be found in the  words themselves ,  and some of th e se  f l e e t i n g  non­
verbal cues w i l l  be missed while  the  in te rv iew er  i s  w r i t i n g " .
He continued:
"The in te rv iew er  who is  busy tak ing  notes cannot be as a l e r t  a t  
picking up product ive  leads  as the  in te rv iew er  who i s  paying f u l l  
a t t e n t i o n  to  the  informant" .
While not tak ing  no tes ,  I j o t t e d  down the  key concepts  t h a t  emerged 
from the  in te rv iew .  They were he lpfu l  f o r  r e f l e c t i n g  and summarising 
the  in te rv iew  d iscuss ion  which were e s s e n t i a l  f o r  f l a s h in g  out some
96
missing informat ion and e s t a b l i s h in g  ra p p o r t .  I t  a l so  meant I had 
a r e se rve  of  ques t ions  I could r a i s e  on th e  concep ts ,  and juxtapose  
in c o n s i s t e n c ie s  t h a t  c o n t ra d ic t ed  what was sa id  e a r l i e r .
The f i r s t  in te rv iews were e s s e n t i a l l y  uns t ruc tu red  and approached 
more as exp lo ra to ry  d iscuss ions  with various  managers a t  d i f f e r e n t  
h i e r a r c h i c a l  l e v e l s .  The respondents  were asked to  desc r ibe  th e  
a c t i v i t i e s  of the  co rpora t ion  o r  companies and what they thought were 
th e  important s t r a t e g i c  changes the  co rpo ra t ion  or  company had gone 
through dur ing the  period  under inqu iry  - 1967-1986. While t h e r e  
was a tendency f o r  respondents  to  d iscuss  the  changes t h a t  they 
exper ienced and were f a m i l i a r  wi th ,  a wealth of o th e r  informat ion 
about who e l s e  would f i l l  up th e  gaps they were not f a m i l i a r  w i th ,  
was recommended. The in te rv iew s t r a t e g y  was t o  meet respondents a t  
t h e i r  work p la ce ,  and much as t h e r e  were some d i s r u p t i o n s ,  i t  was 
important  f o r  me to  in te rv iew th e  respondents  and observe as w e l l ,  
t h e  r e l e v a n t  aspec ts  of soc ia l  i n t e r a c t i o n  w i th in  the  context  of t h e i r  
a c tua l  work s i t u a t i o n .  I t  provided informat ion t h a t  could not e a s i l y  
be obta ined from in te rv iew s .  For example, one d iv i s io n  was reorganised  
and changed from Investment Promotion to  New In d u s t r i e s  t h r e e  years  
ago, and y e t  only th e  d iv i s io n  d i r e c t o r ' s  door had th e  new name, the  
r e s t  of th e  d iv i s io n a l  sec t ions  s t i l l  had the  old  name. These 
o bserva t ions  were recorded in my in te rv iew jou rna l  where I kept  a l l  
my personal comments, f e e l i n g s ,  o b se rv a t io n s ,  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  and 
general  r e f l e c t i o n s  about a l l  th e  in te rv iew s .  This da ta  was usefu l  
t o  e s t a b l i s h  p a t t e r n s  and composite unders tanding of th e  resea rch  
t o p i c .  The f i r s t  in te rv iews tended to  l a s t  longer ,  2-3 hours ,  as the  
respondents f r e e l y  covered a broad t e r r i t o r y  o f  th e  study.
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The in te rv iews were o f ten  c losed  by asking the  respondent i f  th e re  
was something he f e l t  was important and was not d iscussed  in the  i n t e r ­
view. That encouraged them to  play an a c t iv e  r o l e  in the  genera t ion  
o f  th e  theory  and not be pass ive  resea rch  s u b je c t s .  I t  was the  
percep t ion  of  t h e i r  l ived  exper ience of s t r a t e g i c  changes and t h e i r  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of i t  t h a t  I wanted t o  unders tand, hence t h e i r  importance.
At the  end of  th e  in te rv iew  se s s io n s ,  I spent 2-3 hours l i s t e n i n g  t o  
th e  tapes  and t r a n s c r i b i n g  them, noting the  emerging general  themes 
new concepts and r e l a t i n g  them where r e l e v a n t ,  to  those  j o t t e d  down 
dur ing in te rv iew s .  From t h i s  ' c o n s ta n t  comparative approach ' ,  new 
avenues of inquiry  were formulated to  be followed in-depth  in subsequent 
in te rv iew s .
In-Depth In te rv ie w s :
The second and subsequent in te rv iews were much more re c u r s iv e ,  focused 
on key t h e o r e t i c a l  concepts  t h a t  emerged from the  e a r l i e r  in te rv iew s ,  
c l a r i f y i n g  new ideas ,  i d e n t i f y in g  d i s c rep an c ie s  in pe rcep t ions  among 
managers where they do e x i s t .  Following up v a r i a t i o n s  in i n t e r p r e t ­
a t io n s  emerging from in te rv iew s ,  and p u l l in g  to g e th e r  various  emerging 
themes to  develop p a t t e r n s .  The ques t ions  were f a c i l i t a t i v e ,  probing 
f o r  d e t a i l s ,  s p e c i f i c  d e s c r ip t i o n s  of  processes  and people .  They 
were meant to  p ie r c e  th e  v e i l  of any w e l l - rehea rsed  s c r i p t  o r  'p lay in g  
o u t '  t h a t  the  respondents  might have s taged .
"Human beings p re sen t  d i f f e r e n t  personae in d i f f e r e n t  s i t u a t i o n s ,  t o  
d i f f e r e n t  audiences .  In th e  g iv ing of accounts to  o th e r s ,  they a re  
concerned not only with ' i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y '  -  making t h e i r  ac t ions  
comprehensible - but a l so  . . .  th e  l e g i t im a t io n  of ac t ion  and the  
p re sen ta t io n  of  a c r e d ib l e  and l e g i t im a te  s e l f " .  Jones (1985).
98
I had a l so  gained confidence  from the  rapport  maintained with the  
respondents  who were beginning t o  ‘thaw1 and f o r t h r i g h t l y  delve 
in to  some s e n s i t i v e  i s sues  they had e a r l i e r  h e s i t a t e d  to  d i s c u s s .
By adopting th e  respondents '  ve rnacu la r  and seeking to  empathize with 
t h e i r  circumstances  c rea ted  a re laxed  atmosphere and was useful in 
c o l l e c t i n g  da ta  and achieving  a deep understanding of th e  s tudy.
This was p a r t i c u l a r l y  th e  case  with Permanent S e c r e t a r i e s  in the  
Min is t ry  of Planning, Finance and Commerce. They a re  not members of 
the  LNDC board,  but a t tend  board meetings as adv isors  to  t h e i r  r e s p e c t ­
ive m i n i s t e r s .  C o n f id e n t i a l i t y  and n o n - a t t r i b u t a b i l i t y  of information 
were emphasized and support ing document requested  where necessary .
The in te rv iew s t y l e  and ques t ions  were var ied  amongst respondents as 
a func t ion  of t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  and of the  s i t u a t i o n  in which the  re l e v a n t  
o rgan iza t ions  were.  The in -depth  in te rv iews were not s tandard ized  
across  a l l  th e  companies, d i v i s i o n s ,  m i n i s t r i e s  and o th e r s .
Two of  th e  most s en io r  d iv i s io n a l  d i r e c t o r s  who had been with the  
co rpora t ion  f o r  the  p a s t  14 y e a r s ,  had res igned and were due to  leave 
within  a month of  th e  resea rch  s t a r t .  They were very frank and open 
and provided d e t a i l e d  accounts  of the  changes,  who were ins trumenta l  
a c to r s  in b r inging  them about,  and the  s p e c i f i c  consultancy s tu d ie s  
t h a t  were commissioned. Six in te rv iews were undertaken between them.
I was very cau t ious  about t h e i r  accounts f o r  one th i n g ,  t h e re  might 
be an in c l i n a t i o n  as Berg (1979) observed, t o  l e g i t im iz e  t h e i r  dec i s io n s  
in th e  o rg a n iz a t io n ,  by thoroughly exp la in ing  the  c o n s id e ra t io n s  behind 
t h e i r  a c t ions  - poss ib ly  th e  p o s i t i v e  aspec ts  on ly .  A l t e r n a t iv e ly ,  
t h e i r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of  accounts could be regarded,  as I d id ,  as 
the  genuine d e sc r ip t i o n  of  the  r e a l i t y  they exper ienced,  t h e i r  emotional
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s u b j e c t i v i t y  were an e s s e n t i a l  p a r t  of the  da ta  en r ich ing  our under­
s tanding of t h e i r  exper ience .
The in -depth  in te rv iews were g radua l ly  tak ing  s h o r t e r  t ime,  an average 
of one hour,  as i ssues  were becoming focused ,  the  cons tan t  v e r i f i c a t i o n s  
g radua l ly  decreas ing ,  and summaries of t r a n s c r i p t s  were c l a r i f i e d  and 
c lea red  with respondents  to  ensure  t h a t  t h e re  were no incongruencies 
between what they meant and how I in t e r p r e t e d  t h e i r  meanings.  The 
v e r i f i c a t i o n  and approval of the  t r a n s c r i p t s  by the  inte rv iewed managers,  
m i n i s t e r s ,  permanent s e c r e t a r i e s ,  and o the rs  was usefu l  in g enera t ing  
a r i c h  and r e l i a b l e  data  t h a t  w i l l  be c i t e d  in th e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of 
the  d a ta .
Documented Information
While depth in te rv iews were the  p r in c ip a l  method of da ta  c o l l e c t i o n  
sources were d i v e r s i f i e d  and a d d i t io n a l  data were c o l l e c t e d  by s tudying 
the  re l e v a n t  o rgan iza t iona l  memoranda, f i l e s ,  correspondence,  video 
p r e s e n ta t i o n s ,  n e w s le t t e r s ,  annual r e p o r t s ,  consul tancy  s tu d ie s  and 
d iv i s io n a l  and subs id ia ry  p roposa ls .  Most o f  t h e se  da ta  was suggested 
by th e  respondents  to  gain supplemental informat ion on s p e c i f i c  i s sues  
and was not sought as an undercu t t ing  of what was sa id  o r  happening 
in another s e t t i n g ,  Si lverman(1985). I t  a l so  e lu c id a te d  the  meanings 
of some of th e  themes t h a t  emerged from the  in te rv iews  l ik e  f i n a n c i a l  
performance,  change proposals  to  the  board,  and most im por tan t ly ,  some 
touchy p o l i t i c a l  i s sues  t h a t  would never have f u l l y  surfaced without 
access to  t h a t  d a ta .  I was t h e r e f o r e  s e n s i t i z e d  in my probing f o r  
emergents and sought a l t e r n a t i v e  channels of o b ta in ing  the  same 
informat ion.  For example, m in i s t e r s ,  co rpo ra te  s e c r e t a r y ,  and perm-
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anent s e c r e t a r i e s  were r a t h e r  h e s i t a n t  to  give me access  to  co rpora te  
correspondence with the  Cabinet.  I e a s i l y  got the  information from 
d iv i s io n a l  d i r e c t o r s  who had d i r e c t  access  to  the  f i l e s .
Another source of information came from government budget speeches 
and f i v e  year  development plans and World Bank review r e p o r t s .  
Personal in te rv iews  were by f a r  the  most rewarding and informat ive  
mode of da ta  c o l l e c t i o n .  Like Neustadt,
" I f  I were fo rced  to  choose between the  documents on the  one-hand, 
and l a t e ,  l im i t ed ,  p a r t i a l  in te rv iews with some of the  p r in c ip a l  
p a r t i c i p a n t s  on the  o th e r ,  I would be forced to  d isca rd  the  
document". Mazzolini (1979).
A l l ison  (1971) concurs but considers  sample s i z e  to  be important.
"Documents do not cap ture  t h i s  kind of information [ f i e l d  in te rv iew s] .  
What the  documents do preserve  tends  to  obscure,  as much as to  e n l ig h te n .  
Thus, the  source of such information must be the  p a r t i c i p a n t s  them­
se lves  . . .  each p a r t i c i p a n t  knows one small p iece  of the  s to ry  . . .  
what i s  requ i red  i s  access . . .  to  a la rge  number of the  p a r t i c i p a n t s  
. . .  such access is  uncommon. But without t h i s  informat ion,  how can 
th e  an a ly s i s  proceed".
The a d d i t io n a l  informat ion was t h e r e f o r e  p a r t i a l  and supplemental 
t o  d i f f e r e n t  p e rc ep t io n s ,  views and in s ig h t s  t h a t  were received 
from respondents .  I t  was devoid of the  mot iva t iona l  context and 
p a t t e r n  of d ec i s io n s  and reasoning t h a t  engendered i t .
The Method o f  Data Analysis
This s ec t ion  considers  the  procedure by which th e  massive q u a l i t a t i v e  
da ta  c o l l e c te d  was evalua ted  and analysed.  To have a separa te  sec t ion
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on da ta  a n a ly s i s  does not imply t h a t  the  c o l l e c t i o n  and a n a ly s i s  were 
two detached p rocesses .  The two were concur ren t ly  c a r r i e d  out and 
in e x t r i c a b ly  l inked .  The very process  of choosing which data  chunks 
t o  code, what to  pu l l  ou t ,  which p a t t e rn s  summarize a number of chunks, 
what th e  evolving theme i s ,  are  a l l  a n a ly t i c  cho ices ,  Miles and Huberman 
(1984).  The da ta  t h e r e f o r e  had two s tages  of  a n a ly s i s :  during the  
c o l l e c t i o n  process  and a f t e r  the  da ta  c o l l e c t i o n .
Reference has a l ready  been made to  the  checking of accounts with r e s ­
pondents t o  ensure  t h a t  they were congruent with t h e i r  i n t e r p r e t a t i v e  
schemes. My next move was to  immerse myself  in the  data  by reading 
the  t r a n s c r i p t s  t h a t  were w r i t t e n  in the  evenings a f t e r  the  in te rv iew 
s e s s io n s .  Twelve f i l e s  were opened f o r  each of th e  o rgan iza t ions  and 
groups of ind iv idua l  in te rv iews:  nine s u b s id ia ry  companies, LNDC 
h eadquar te rs ,  government m i n i s t r i e s  and o th e r s .  I began the  a n a ly s i s  
with - broad c a te g o r i e s  of d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  of g e n e r a l i t y ,  ass ign ing  
them, along th e  margins of the  t r a n s c r i p t s  with d i s t i n c t i v e  coloured 
codes,  and r e t a i n i n g ,  as much as p o s s ib le ,  the  respondents  local  
concep ts .  During t h i s  process I a l so  made no tes  ( t h e o r e t i c a l  memoranda) 
behind the  t r a n s c r i p t  shee ts  with corresponding a s t e r i s k  o r  number 
in d ic a t in g  where i t  came from. These notes b r i e f l y  descr ibed  th e  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  why c e r t a i n  c a te g o r ie s  were deemed s i g n i f i c a n t  o r  why 
they captu red  my a t t e n t i o n  as I pondered over  th e  d a t a .  In the  e a r ly  
s tages  of  th e  in te rv iew s ,  overlapping concept c a te g o r i e s  were generated  
t h a t  embraced th e  d i v e r s i t y  of d e f i n i t i o n s  emerging a t  d i f f e r e n t  l ev e l s  
of  the  o rg an iza t io n s  of  the  research  sample.
By c a r e f u l l y  reviewing each in te rv iew and l i s t e n i n g  again to  the  tapes  
t o  get  the  " n o n - l i n g u i s t i c  data . . .  emphasis mood, in ton a t io n  . . .  t h a t
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c r u c i a l l y  e l a b o r a te  meaning", Jones (1985); c a te g o r ie s  were compared 
c o n t r a s t e d ,  and combined to g e th e r  in to  a h o l i s t i c  view t h a t  r e f l e c t e d  
th e  c o n s t r u c t s  t h a t  emerged from the  da ta  within  the  o rg a n iz a t io n s .  
Through th e  process  of 'weaving back and f o r t h '  among in te rv iew s ,  I 
was ab le  to  e s t a b l i s h  l inkages  among d i f f e r e n t  conceptual c a te g o r ie s  
which were subsequently used as bu i ld ing  blocks of th e  growing 
t h e o r e t i c a l  unders tanding of th e  resea rch  t o p i c .  As the  process  
of cons tan t  comparison continued,  new concepts were genera ted ,  some 
immediately disappeared as they could not f i t  nor be supported by 
d a ta ,  and those  t r u e  to  the  da ta  remained. At t h i s  s tage  I r e f e r r e d  
to  my ' i n t e rv ie w  jo u r n a l '  where I had entered a l l  the  impressions 
about th e  in te rv iew s ,  how they a f f e c t ed  me or how I might have 
in fluenced them, and the  general  cursory  observa t ions  made during the  
in te rv iew s .  These data was useful in providing the  s i t u a t i o n a l  
pe r sp ec t iv e  and a c r i t e r i a  fo r  eva lua t ing  the  usefu lness  of the  
c a te g o r i e s  t h a t  emerged.
S p ec i f ic  p ropos i t ions  about r e l a t i o n s h i p s  of the  f i r s t - o r d e r  da ta  
were teased  o u t ,  assessed a g a in s t  the  da ta  and where necessary modified 
to  allow f o r  th e  b e t t e r  p o r t r ay a l  of the  i n t e r p r e t i v e  schemes as 
const rued  by th e  respondents ,  but a l so  my own unders tanding and 
concep tu a l i s in g  of t h e i r  c o n s t r u c t s .
The a b s t r a c te d  processes and p a t t e r n s  derived from the  da ta  were then 
used t o  formula te  t h e o r e t i c a l  g e n e ra t io n s .  The e lab o ra t io n  of t h e o r ­
e t i c a l  p ropos i t ions  cont inued even a f t e r  da ta  c o l l e c t i o n  in o rde r  to  
take  account of c ro s s - l in k ag e s  to  o th e r  d iscuss ions  of the  same to p ic  
a rea ,  or  . . .  comments from those  s tu d ied ,  Turner (1983).
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C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  of Documented Data
Documented data  formed an in te g ra l  p a r t  of the  o v e ra l l  a n a ly s i s ;  i t  
provided among o th e r  th ings  chronologies  of  events  and records  of 
' s i g n i f i c a n t  a c t o r s ' .  They were coded and re ferenced  ag a in s t  th e  
corresponding t r a n s c r i p t  codes even though they had a s ep a ra te  f i l e ,  
Most of the  da ta  a n a ly s i s  was c l a s s i f i e d  according t o  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  
o r  a c t i v i t i e s ,  f o r  example, f i n a n c i a l  records  of th e  pas t  ten  y e a r s ,  
consultancy s t u d i e s ,  review r e p o r t s ,  proposals  t o  Cabinet f o r  s p e c i f i c  
changes.
The documents t h a t  did not conform t o  s p e c i f i c  emerging p a t t e r n s ,  but 
were deemed re l e v a n t  to  understanding the  broad p i c t u r e ,  were r e t a i n e d .  
Through th e  process  of cons tan t  comparison of evolving concepts  le ss  
usefu l documents were excluded.
V a l id i ty  of Q u a l i t a t i v e  Data
The grounded q u a l i t a t i v e  approach has o f ten  been sub jec ted  to  c r i t i c i s m s  
c en t r in g  on whether th e  da ta  provide a t ru s tw or thy  account f o r  drawing 
i n t e r f e r e n c e s ,  and on issues  of  r e l i a b i l i t y  and r e p l i c a t i o n .  " C r i t i c s  
quest ion  whether th e  information so derived c o n s t i t u t e s  exp lana t ion  
and a n a ly s i s ,  r a t h e r  than mere d e s c r i p t i o n " ,  Hardy (1985).  The notion  
of  r e l i a b i l i t y  looks f o r  a da ta  l e s s  contaminated by the  in f luences  of 
the  r e s e a rc h e r .  But as Jones (1985) pointed ou t :
" the  notion of some kind of impersonal,  machine-l ike  i n v e s t i g a t o r  is  
recognised as a chimera.  An in te rv iew is  complicated,  s h i f t i n g ,  soc ia l  
process occur r ing  between two indiv idua l  human be ings ,  which can never 
be exac t ly  r e p l i c a t e d " ,  p . 48.
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I have a lso  re j e c t e d  t h i s  research  b ias  (see  chap te r  3) and argued 
t h a t  I could not stand a loof  and take  an unambiguous s tance  in o rder  
to  understand how people cons t ruc ted  t h e i r  soc ia l  r e a l i t y ;  to  do o t h e r ­
wise would mean sepa ra t ing  the  knower from th e  known.
Shalin  (1986) has dismissed the  r e l i a b i l i t y  concern as being ' f a c t o r i n g  
o u t '  and f r eez in g  a l l  the  indete rminate  o th e r  f a c t o r s  t h a t  immediately 
crowd in the  moment we move from the  experimental  s e t t i n g  to  th e  r ea l  
sound s i t u a t i o n .
" R e l i a b i l i t y  . . .  is  t y p i c a l l y  secured by the  n e u t r a l i z a t i o n  of the  
m u l t ip l e  de termina t ions  of th in g s :  the  more thoroughly  the  th ing  is  
s t r ip p e d  of i t s  m u l t ip le  i d e n t i t i e s ,  the  more r e l i a b l y  the  measuring 
device  y ie ld s  the  same r e s u l t  on success ive  occas ions .  But the  more 
r e l i a b l e  the  d a ta ,  the  le ss  va l id  i t  i s " ,  p . 20.
I t  has been shown t h a t  data was t r i a n g u la t e d  in o rder  to  draw d i f f e r e n t  
pe r sp ec t iv e s  to  the  sub jec t  under inquiry  (Halfpenny, 1979, Denzin, 1970). 
However, as Silverman (1985) observed, t r i a n g u l a t i o n  should not be 
used to  j u s t i f y  q u a l i t a t i v e  da ta  in to  p o s i t i v i s t  c r i t e r i o n ;  by gener­
a t in g  a d d i t io n a l  information from d i f f e r e n t  sources in o rder  t o  v e r i f y  
o r  undercut da ta  obta ined from elsewhere.  He argued:
"Action makes sense in con tex t .  We should unders tand how t h a t  sense 
i s  accomplished r a t h e r  than appeal to  our o th e r  knowledge to  d iscount  
i t  . . .  have to  be c a re fu l  about i n f e r r in g  master r e a l i t y  in terms of 
which a l l  accounts  and ac t ions  a re  to  be judged" ,  p . 21.
He concluded:
"What goes on in one s e t t i n g  is  not a simple c o r r e c t i v e  to  what happens 
elsewhere - each must be understood in i t s  own te rms .  Each has to  be 
understood in c o n tex t " .
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For Jones (1983),  th e  "adequacy or  v a l i d i t y  of a theory  can only be 
judged in r e l a t i o n  to  the  f a c t s  of i t s  realm of d iscourse"  while  Blumer 
(1956) agrees t h a t  exper iences  s h i f t  and change, he observed:
" the c r i t e r i a  of t r u t h  here  is  the  grasping o b je c t iv e ly  of the se  l ived 
exper iences" .
These observa t ions  underscore th e  ten s io n  inheren t  between v a l i d i t y  
and r e l i a b i l i t y ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  on resea rch  t h a t  takes  a h i s t o r i c a l  
p e r s p e c t iv e .  Can th e  two be maximized concur ren t ly  o r  i s  t h e r e  a 
t r a d e - o f f ?  Miles (1979) be l iev es  r e l i a b i l i t y  must be breached in te n ­
t i o n a l l y  in o rder  to  gain a depth of  unders tanding .
I t  has been argued t h a t  analys ing change and process  on the  b a s i s  of 
in te rv iew  da ta  c r e a t e s  problems because respondents  are  vu lnerab le  
t o  memory lapse  or  subconscious b i a s .  Becker and Geer (1978) have 
poin ted out t h a t  respondents a re  l e a s t  l i k e l y  t o  render  an accura te  
account of events  due to  th e  changes in th e  s o c ia l  environment and 
in the  t rans fo rm a t ions  of p e r s p ec t iv e .  But as Berg (1979) has 
c o r r e c t l y  poin ted out the  r e sea rc h e r  i s  not j u s t  i n t e r e s t e d  in f a c tu a l  
p e r s p e c t iv e ,  but understanding the  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  in d iv id u a l s '  
p e r s p e c t iv e s .  I t  i s  the  'meaning'  of change r a t h e r  than th e  fa c tu a l  
chronology of change episodes t h a t  has been emphasized.  I agree 
with Brinberg and McGrath (1985) view t h a t  v a l i d i t y  i s  not a commodity 
t h a t  can be bought with techn iques .
"The d iscourse  of our f i e l d  . . .  seem to  imply t h a t  v a l i d i t y  i s  a 
t a n g ib l e  ' r e s o u r c e ' ,  and t h a t  i f  one can acqu ire  a s u f f i c i e n t  amount,
. . .  one has somehow 'won' the  game c a l l e d  resea rch  . . .  V a l id i ty  is  
l i k e  i n t e g r i t y ,  c h a r a c t e r ,  o r  q u a l i t y ,  t o  be assessed  r e l a t i v e  to  
purposes and c i rcumstances" ,  p . 13.
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The theory  t h a t  unfolds  from th e se  depth in te rv iews and a n a l y s i s ,  " i s  
in one sense e q u iv a len t  to  what [ th e  re sea rc h e r ]  knows s y s te m a t ic a l ly  
about h i s  own data  . . .  he h imself  knows what he knows about what he 
has s tud ied  and l ived  through.  They are  h is  p e rc ep t io n s ,  h is  personal  
exper iences ,  and h i s  own hard-won a n a ly s i s " ,  Taylor and Bogdan (1975).
Summary
The da ta  c o l l e c t i o n  and an a ly s i s  of  t h i s  study were based on th e  
grounded theory  approach. Caveats and m odif ica t ions  were undertaken 
in order  to  f i t  the  theory  in to  the  context  of the  s tudy.
Following Glaser and Strauss  (1967) ' co n s ta n t  comparative approach ' ,  
the  c o l l e c t i o n ,  coding, and a n a ly s i s  of da ta  were a l l  i n e x t r i c a b ly  
bound up to g e th e r  throughout the  period of i n v e s t ig a t i o n  and a f t e r .
As concepts were generated from the  in te rv iew s ,  they were reviewed 
and reformula ted  to  c r e a t e  t h e o r e t i c a l  a b s t r a c t i o n s .  Depth in te rv iews 
were the  p r in c ip a l  method of in qu i ry .  The data  was tape - reco rded ,  
and so respondents  were in terviewed from var ious  o rg a n iz a t i o n s .
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Table 4.1
CORPORATE, SUBSIDIARY, GOVERNMENT, AND OTHERS INTERVIEWED
Level of Management R es p o n s ib i l i t i e s
Top Corporate Management Chairman
Managing D irec to r  




Div is ional Executive 
Management
Operations Divis ion 
New In d u s t r ie s  
Adminis t ra t ive  Services  
Legal Divis ion 
Finance
Subsid ia ry  Management General Manager 8
Accountant 3
Sec t iona l  Head 2
Government Min is t ry  of Trade 4
Min is t ry  of Finance 1
Min is t ry  of  Planning 3
Other Former -  managing d i r e c t o r ,  4
chairman, board members
T O T A L  50
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Limefford Trading Ltd 
Loti Brick [P ty] Ltd 
Maseru Motors [P ty] Ltd 
Pioneer Motors [P ty] 
S e c u r i ta s  Lesotho Ltd 
Peacock Garments Ltd 
Investment Holding Ltd
Pr in c ip a l  
Business A c t iv i ty
Canning-- asparagus,  
baked beans
Brewing beer ,  canning 
s o f t  d r inks
Hardware Merchant
Brickmakers
Motor t r a d e
Motor t rade
Secu r i ty  Services















Lesotho: P o l i t i c a l  and Economic Development
In t h i s  c h ap te r ,  an h i s t o r i c a l ,  p o l i t i c a l  and economic development 
of  Lesotho i s  o f f e r e d .  This background d e sc r ip t i o n  is  meant to  
provide  e s s e n t i a l  in format ion which w i l l  s i t u a t e  the  subsequent
d iscuss ion  of the  a n a ly s i s  of the  empir ica l  da ta  and t o  provide an
informing con tex tual  p e r sp ec t iv e  of the  world th e  reader  may not be 
f a m i l i a r  wi th .  I t  p laces  Lesotho 's  p o l i t i c a l ,  bus iness  and economic 
s t r a t e g i e s  wi th in  th e  Southern African macro environment,  and i d e n t i f i e s  
the  key i n t e r a c t a n t ,  t h e i r  a c t ions  and f a c to r s  t h a t  in f luence  and/o r  
a re  in fluenced by events  in Lesotho.
Lesotho is  an enclave kingdom, engulfed t o t a l l y  by South Afr ica  -  SA, 
with Natal to  the  e a s t ,  Cape Province to  th e  south and the  Orange
Free S ta te  to  the  north  and west .  I t  occupies an area of 30,355 sq.  km.,
and has a t o t a l  popula t ion  es t imated  a t  1.8 m i l l i o n .  See f ig u r e  5.1 
f o r  the  map of the  country .
Recent H is to ry  in Brie f
Formerly the  B r i t i s h  P r o t e c to r a t e  of Basutoland, the  Basotho na t ion  
was welded to g e th e r ,  by i t s  founding f a t h e r  Moshoeshoe I ,  from o th e r  
African t r i b e s  in tu rmoil  and s c a t t e r e d  in wars with th e  Zulus and 
Matebele in th e  e a r ly  n ine teen th  cen tury .  As th e  scramble fo r  
Afr ica  div ided th e  c o n t in en t  in to  spheres of  in f luence  f o r  the  
European powers a t  the  tu rn  of  the  century -  Jones (1986),  Basutoland 
was under p re ssu re  from the  s e t t l e r s  in Orange Free S ta t e  who wanted 
t o  annex the  country in to  Union of South A f r i c a .  A f te r  a prolonged
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period of indete rminate  f i g h t i n g ,  Moshoeshoe I p e t i t i o n e d  the  B r i t i s h  
High Commissioner in South Afr ica  f o r  p r o t e c t i o n .
In 1986, the  B r i t i s h  High Commissioner issued a proclamat ion d e c la r in g  
th e  t e r r i t o r y  t o  be B r i t i s h  p r o t e c to r a t e  and th e  Basotho people to  be 
B r i t i s h  s u b je c t s .  The B r i t i s h  Act o f  Parliament  which e s t a b l i s h e d  
th e  Union of South Afr ica  in 1910, had envisaged eventual inc lu s ion  
in South Afr ica  of the  High Commission t e r r i t o r i e s  which included 
Basutoland, and success ive  South African governments continued t o  press  
f o r  the  t r a n s f e r  of the  t e r r i t o r i e s  t o  be amalgamated in to  SA. Against  
a s trong r e s i s t a n c e  from Basotho c h i e f s ,  Basutoland became a detached 
B r i t i s h  colony adminis tered d i r e c t l y  by the  High Commissioner.
The p resen t  boundaries of Lesotho were demarcated by the  Treaty of 
Aliwal North of 1869 between B r i t a in  and SA, in which Basotho were 
forced to  cede much of  t h e i r  l a r g e r  f e r t i l e  land they had p rev ious ly  
occupied and ex p lo i ted  f o r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  purposes .  The Basotho were 
then compelled t o  s e t t l e  on the  rugged and bar red  f o o t h i l l s  and 
mountainous landscape with a narrow b e l t  of lowlands.  Thus, t h i s  
land is sue  i s  a t  th e  hub of th e  v o l a t i l e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the  
plucky l i t t l e  Lesotho and SA G ol ia th .
Developments were a l so  tak ing  p lace  with in  Basutoland , and t h e r e  was 
mounting p re s su re  from groups a g i t a t i n g  f o r  s e l f -g o v e rn in g .  In 1955, 
Basutoland Counci l ,  a group of n a t i o n a l i s t  t h a t  spearheaded the  
self -government and forerunners  of  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  in Lesotho, 
were granted l e g i s l a t i v e  powers t o  deal with i n t e r n a l  m a t te r s .  In 
1959 the  new c o n s t i t u t i o n  g ran t ing  some l im i ted  powers of  s e l f -gove rn ing
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to  the  Council was adopted.  Thus, the  new a d m in i s t r a t iv e  s t r u c t u r e  
had the  B r i t i s h  Resident Commissioner a t  th e  top a s s i s t e d  by the  
Council members who d e a l t  mainly with in te rn a l  l e g i s l a t i v e  i s sues  and 
t h a t  was the  modus operandi u n t i l  1965 when the  e l e c t i o n s  were held 
and the  country  was granted independence by B r i t a i n .
P o l i t i c a l  and Economic mil ieu
Lesotho 's  f i r s t  e l e c t i o n s  were held in 1965, as a pre lude  to  independ­
ence in October,  1966. Three main p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  con tes ted  the  
e l e c t i o n s ;  Basotho Congress Party  - BCP, Basotho National Party  - 
BNP, and Marema-Tlou Freedom Party  - MFP. They were won by BNP, a 
t r a d i t i o n a l i s t  and conserva t ive  group t h a t  had a p l i a n t  pos tu re  and 
c lo se  cooperation with SA. I t  was widely acknowledged in Lesotho t h a t  
Chief Jonathan - then prime m in i s t e r ,  was helped in to  power by the  
South A fr icans .  He was the  f i r s t  leader  of an independent black 
African country  to  confer  with a South African prime m in i s t e r ,  and 
in h is  e a r ly  days was suspected widely of being l i t t l e  more than 
P r e t o r i a ' s  puppet.
The po l icy  s tance  of a m ic ab i l i ty  between SA and Lesotho came under 
severe c r i t i c i s m  from oppos i t ion  p a r t i e s  and has caused some se r ious  
dilemmas f o r  Lesotho government from both i n t e r n a l  and ex te rna l  sources .  
I n t e r n a l l y ,  Jona than 's  government wanted t o  demonstrate the  immediate 
b e n e f i t s  of  c lo se  coopera t ion  with SA, and e s t a b l i s h  c r e d i b i l i t y  and 
acceptance from a na t ion  t h a t  was s t i l l  see th ing  from 'we were robbed'  
border d i spu te s  and was susp ic ious  of c lo se  l in k s  with SA. From t h i s  
viewpoint Lesotho had hoped t h a t  a pro-SA pos tu re  would be followed
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by v i s i b l e  f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  from t h e i r  economically powerful 
neighbour t h a t  ensnares  he r .  Lesotho gained no such favours ,  in s tead  
i l l - q u a l i f i e d  personnel was sent by SA to  help  with ad m in is t r a t io n  
(see  Hirschman, 1979 f o r  d e t a i l s ) .
E x te rn a l ly ,  Lesotho had to  s t r i v e  f o r  i n t e r n a t io n a l  re c o g n i t io n ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  th e  African acceptance who frown a t  P r e t o r i a ' s  r a c i a l  
p o l i c i e s .  Accordingly,  Lesotho had to  cease embracing SA as before  
and adopted a more independent approach. The s t r a t e g y  of d i s tan c in g  
i t s e l f  more openly from SA paid o f f  as Lesotho became a more a c t iv e  
a id  t a r g e t  f o r  those  Western c o u n t r i e s  wishing to  make a g e s tu re  to  
counter  th e  adverse impression of continuing  c lo se  economic t i e s  with 
SA. I t  was able  to  draw i n t e r n a t io n a l  a t t e n t i o n  to  i t s  open antagonism 
t o  P r e t o r i a ' s  p o l i c y ,  to  i t s  (Leso tho 's )  own v u l n e r a b i l i t y ,  and i t s  
courage in th e  c ircumstances  -  Hirschman (1979).
This ba lanc ing a c t  has dogged Lesotho 's  r e l a t i o n s  with SA with the  
r e s u l t  t h a t  coopera t ion  in o th e r  a reas  - p a r t i c u l a r l y  economic i s su e s ,  
i s  heav i ly  in f luenced  by th e  s t a t e  of the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the  
two c o u n t r i e s  a t  any t im e,  i . e .  whether i t s  co rd ia l  o r  f r o s t y .
Af te r  independence,  a W estmins te r -s ty le  c o n s t i t u t i o n  was fol lowed, 
which was l a t e r  suspended in 1970 when the  second general  e l e c t i o n s  
were held and BCP appeared t o  have won the  m a jo r i ty  s e a t s .  The 
Prime M in is t e r ,  Jonathan, annulled  the  e l e c t i o n s ,  dec la red  the  s t a t e  
of  emergency, suspended the  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  and de ta ined  th e  oppos i t ion
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le ad e r s .  P o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s  were a l so  suspended, and s ince  then 
th e r e  has never been e l e c t i o n s .  The country  has been under one-man 
ru l e  with cons tan t  ou tb u rs t s  of v io lence  a p t ly  desc r ibed  by the  new 
m i l i t a r y  r u l e r  Major General Lekhanya, in h i s  s ta tement  a f t e r  the  
Coup in January 1986:
"For a long t ime the  Lesotho na t ion  has been l i v in g  in a cons tan t  
uns tab le  p o l i t i c a l  c l im ate  because of  the  a c t i o n s  of  p o l i t i c i a n s  
whose i n t e r e s t s  were not on a par with the  d e s i r e s  of the  r e s t  of  
th e  na t ion  . . .  Relations  with our neighbours (SA) were a l so  soured 
in an alarming manner and the  s t a t e  of our economy was adverse ly  
a f f e c t e d " .
The soured r e l a t i o n s  were arguably a c r i t i c a l  f a c t o r  in th e  January 
1986 Coup t h a t  ousted the  twenty years  re ign  of  Jonathan.  Disappointed 
with lack of v i s i b l e  pay o f f s  from re l i a n c e  on, and c lo se  t i e s  with 
SA, Jonathan pursued a po l icy  of s t ro n g e r  l in k s  with s o c i a l i s t  s t a t e s  
and African National Congress - ANC which SA regarded  as a communist 
menace in i t s  own backyard.  The SA response was t o  impose r ig o rous  
border r e s t r i c t i o n s  around Lesotho, p r e c i p i t a t i n g  an economic and 
p o l i t i c a l  c r i s i s .  Lesotho, wi th in  a m at te r  of  weeks, choked and went 
in to  a p o l i t i c a l  convulsion which even tu a l ly  changed i t s  government. 
Cognizant of th e  importance of remaining in SA's 'good books ' ,  t h e  
new m i l i t a r y  l eader  pointed out in h is  publ ic  s ta tem ent  a f t e r  th e  
Coup, t h a t :
" I t  i s  our i n t e n t io n  and bounded duty to  put r i g h t  r e l a t i o n s  with 
South Afr ica  and we sh a l l  do a l l  in our power t o  achieve  t h i s " .
I t  is  a g a in s t  t h i s  backdrop of geographical  c laus t ro p h o b ia  t h a t  
Lesotho 's  p o l i t i c s  needs to  be understood.  I t ' s  p o l i t i c s  t h a t  has 
been (and continue  to  be) dominated by the  maintenance of o rder  and 
management of t h a t  o rder  as d i c t a t e d  by SA, and has overbear ing
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c o n s t r a i n t s  on L e so th o 's  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  and domest ic  p o l i c y  o p t i o n s .
The Economy
At independence Lesotho in h e r i t e d  an economy c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by v i r t u a l l y  
no i n d u s t r i a l  framework, s c a r c i t y  of na tu ra l  re so u rce s ,  the  small s iz e  
of  the  domestic market, dear th  of local  e n t re p re n eu rs ,  shor tage  of 
Basotho managerial  s t a f f  and s k i l l e d  workers to  formula te  and implement 
i n d u s t r i a l  p o l i c i e s ,  outflows of migrant workers to  SA i n d u s t r i e s ,  
and complete i n t e g ra t io n  with th e  economy of SA. The B r i t i s h  Colonial  
po l icy  was c h a r a c te r i s e d  by parsimony and benign neg lec t  in terms of 
economic and in d u s t r i a l  development. As a l ready poin ted ou t ,  the  most 
no tab le  f e a tu r e  of the  co lon ia l  ru l e  was the  assumption t h a t  the  country 
would u l t im a te ly  be absorbed in to  SA, and as such i t  did not f e a tu r e  
in th e  development zones which were concentra ted  in few ta rg e te d  
cen t r e s  in SA to  e x p lo i t  minera ls  and o the r  r e sou rce s .  The r e s u l t a n t  
of t h a t  po l icy  was t h a t  Lesotho and surrounding s t a t e s  became v i t a l  
pe r iphe ra l  labour r e s e r v o i r  of the  i n d u s t r i e s  in SA. This was c l e a r l y  
enunciated in th e  r e p o r t  of th e  Resident Commissioner fo r  1898/99:
"Though f o r  i t s  s i z e  and popula t ion  Basutoland produces a comparative ly  
enormous amount of g r a in ,  i t  has an indus t ry  of g r e a t  economic value  
t o  South A fr i ca ,  v i z . ,  the  output of na t ive  labour .  I t  supp l ie s  th e  
sinews of a g r i c u l t u r e  in th e  Orange Free S t a t e ;  t o  an ex ten t  i t  keeps 
going ra ilway works, coal mining, the  diamond mines . . .  the  gold mines 
of Transvaal ;  and f u r n i s h e s ,  in a d d i t io n ,  a la rge  amount of domestic 
se rv ice s  in th e  surrounding t e r r i t o r i e s " .
This ' expor t  of labour '  t o  SA has become one of Leso tho 's  major revenue 
g en e ra to r s ,  accounting f o r  s u b s t a n t i a l  p a r t  of government budget.  I t
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i s  es timated  t h a t  140,000 people from Lesotho work in SA. The country 
de r iv e s  50% of  i t s  gross na t iona l  product (6NP) from r e p a t r i a t e d  
earn ings  of migrant workers:
"Migrant workers '  remit tances  c o n s t i t u t e  th e  l a r g e s t  source of r e c e ip t s  
in Lesotho 's  balance of payments and cont inued to  f inance  the  bulk of 
th e  imports (79.0  per cent  of imports,  c . i . f . ) .  They a l so  c o n t r ib u te d  
to  gross  domestic investment in Lesotho. I t  i s  e s t imated  to  have 
grown from M507.0 m i l l ion  in 1984 to  M600.0 m i l l i o n  in 1985 as a 
r e s u l t  of an average inc rease  of 18.3 per cen t  in miners '  wages in 
t h a t  y ea r .  I t s  share of GNP was 50.0 per c e n t " .  Central  Bank of 
Lesotho, (1985).
Table 5.2 under cu r ren t  accounts ,  i l l u s t r a t e s  th e  c o u n t ry ' s  adverse 
t r a d e  d e f i c i t ,  mainly consumer goods and c a p i t a l  goods and the  s i g n i f i ­
can t  c o n t r ib u t io n  of remit tances  in o f f s e t t i n g  i t .  Tables 5.3  and 
5.4 in d ic a te  the  degree to  which Lesotho is  dependent on labour supply 
t o  SA compared to  o the r  c o u n t r i e s  in the  reg ion .
Lesotho is  f u l l y  aware of th e  d i r e  consequences of  t h i s  dependence as 
noted in the  second f iv e  year  development plan (1975-80),  under 
p r i o r i t y  i s sues :
"The g ro ss ly  inadequate domestic productive  base ,  which i n t e r  a l i a  
i s  the  reason f o r  low incomes and f o r  our dependency on employment 
o u ts id e  our borders ,  i s  one of  th e  fundamental problems fac ing  t h i s  
n a t io n .  I t  causes us deep concern t h a t  up t o  now we have not been 
ab le  t o  f ind  a so lu t io n  to  our chronic  migrant  labour  problem".
Unti l  Lesotho can conceive a s t r a t e g y  able  t o  o f f e r  domestic employment 
and sustenance ins ide  th e  country ,  th e  consequences t o  Lesotho 's  
economy are  in c a lcu la b le  should SA decide to  r e p a t r i a t e  the  workers in 
response to  in te rn a t io n a l  p re s su re  f o r  the  imposit ion of sanc t ions  
ag a in s t  South A fr ica .  Added to  t h i s ,  i s  the  r ecen t  expansion of 
rec ru i tment  from the  South Afr ican homelands.
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Table 5 .2
Summary of Balance of Payments 
Maloti Mil l ion:  End of Period
1981 1982 1983 1984* 1985*
Current Account -42.9 -40.2 -9 .0 37.5 30.0
a .  Goods and Services -115.4 -90.8 -90.7 -92 .3 -104.0
Exports,  f . o . b . 44.6 40.6 34.6 41.8 47.0
Imports,  c . i . f . -415.2 -505.1 -561.7 -639.8 -756.0
Workers' remit tances 225.0 378.0 441.0 507.0 600.0
Investments Income -0 .2 -2.1 -2 .6 0.6 7.0
Dividends & p r o f i t s  
(d e b i t ) ( -4 .6 ) ( -5 .3 ) ( -9 .8 ) (-16 .5 ) (-20 .8 )
I n t e r e s t  payments 
(ne t ) (4 .4) (3.2) (7 .2 ) (17.1) (27.8)
Other Se rv ices ,  net -0 .4 -2 .2 -2 .0 -1 .9 -2 .0
* Provis iona l
* Preliminary  e s t im ates
Source: Central  Bank of Lesotho: Annual Report f o r  1985.
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Table 5 .3
Estimates  of Deferred Pay and Remittances Accruing to  Neighbouring S ta te s  
From Employment of Their  Nationals  in South Africa  1980 and 1983
Country 1980 1983












1. I t  was assumed t h a t  tw o - th i rd s  of  the  cash earn ings  in mining and 
manufacturing was r em i t ted ,  and o n e - th i rd  of th e  cash earnings
in o th e r  s e c to r s .
2 .  Inc luding SWA/Namibia.
Source: Afr ica  I n s t i t u t e  of  South A fr i ca ,  Vol. 26 (4) 1986.
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Table 5 .4
D is t r ib u t io n  of  Foreign Migrant Workers in South Afr ica  According to  
Countries  of Qrigi'n
Country
of
o r ig in
1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Angola 623 304 09 120 v88 48
Botswana 37 016 29 528 29 169 26 262 25 963 26 433
Lesotho 152 188 136 395 150 422 140 719 145 797 138 443
Malawi 39 308 31 772 30 602 27 558 29 612 29 268
Mozamb­
ique
150 738 60 490 59 391 59 323 61 218 60 407
Swaziland 16 390 11 981 13 418 13 659 16 773 16 823
Zambia 914 914 727 787 743 1 274
Zimbabwe 8 897 20 540 16 965 11 332 7 742 7 492
Other 8 512 3 102 995 2 512 70 1051 71 0721





+2,3% -6,5% +26,8% + 1,9%
Notes:
1. Including SWA/Namibia
2. Excluding fo re ign  workers i l l e g a l l y  in the  RSA 
Sources:
Africa I n s t i t u t e  of South A f r i c a ,  Vol. 26 (4) 1986.
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Economic Cooperation
Lesotho, with Botswana, South Afr ica ,  and Swaziland, i s  a member of 
th e  Southern A fr ica  Customs Union - SACU, which is  admin is te red  by 
SA. Within th e  con tex t  of t h i s  Union, customs, exc ise  and sa le s  
taxes  a re  c o l l e c t e d  in to  a revenue pool to  be shared by members pro 
r a t a  with th e  value  of t h e i r  imports and domestic produc t ion .  There 
i s  a compensation f a c t o r  which is  added on to :
"compensate . . .  f o r  th e  disadvantages  of belonging to  a Customs Union 
with a more developed p a r tn e r  (South A f r i c a ) .  These disadvantages  
inc lude  the  r a i s i n g  e f f e c t  of p r o t e c t iv e  t a r i f f s ,  th e  " p o la r i s a t i o n  
of development" e f f e c t  and the  " loss  of f i s c a l  d i s c r e t i o n " .  (Plan 
2 1975-80).
The f r e e  movement of  goods within  the  Customs Union means t h a t  most 
new a c t i v i t i e s  in Lesotho must compete with l a rg e r  and long -e s tab l i sh ed  
e n t e r p r i s e s  in SA. The developed in d u s t r i a l  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  wi th in  SA 
e x e r t s  a s t rong  economic pull  on new investment in th e  reg ion .
SA remains Leso tho 's  p r in c ip a l  expor t  market,  about 80%, o thers  t r a n s i t  
through SA's p o r t s  t o  th e  r e s t  of the  world,  while about 95% of imports 
o r i g i n a t e  from SA. The t r a d e  imbalance between the  two co u n t r ie s  (see 
t a b l e  5.2  f o r  imports and exports )  p a r t l y  exp la ins  one major source 
of  Lesotho 's  revenue -  customs revenue. Table 5.5 shows t h a t  r e l i a n c e  
on Customs Union has been growing in both abso lu te  and r e l a t i v e  terms 




( in  m i l l i o n s  of rands ,  c u r r e n t  p r ic e s )
Total Total % of
Revenue Customs Revenue Total  Revenue
1974/75 29 17 59
1975/76 29 15 53
1976/77 30 17 55
1977/78 53 33 61
1978/79 78 56 72
1979/80 97 72 74
Source: Lesotho Third Five Year Development Plan: 1980-1985.
Once again  t h i s  economic f r a g i l i t y  and pe rm eab i l i ty ,  po in t  to  th e  
l im i t ed ,  i f  any, op t ions  fac ing  Lesotho i f  th e  p o l icy  makers 
should seek t o  d i v e r s i f y  th e  economy. I t  f u r t h e r  exp la ins  why th e  
c o u n t ry ' s  economy has been descr ibed  as a d i s t r i b u t i o n  economy.
As Baffoe (1986) a p t ly  observed:
"Lesotho . . .  can be c h a r a c t e r i s e d  not as a production economy, but 
as a d i s t r i b u t i o n  economy. The bulk of na t iona l  income is  received 
from o u t s id e  sources ;  and the  major p a r t  of funds a v a i l a b l e  fo r  
publ ic  and p r i v a t e  consumption and investments i s  spent on imported 
goods".
The customs, revenues d i sp lay  a degree of v o l a t i l i t y  in l in e  with 
f l u c t u a t i o n s  in economic and p o l i t i c a l  cond i t ions  in SA over which 
Lesotho has no c o n t r o l ,  f o r  in s tan ce ,  a f a l l  in imports by SA in 
response t o  economic r e c e s s io n .
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" I t  has been r e a l i s e d  over t ime t h a t  r e l i a n c e  on customs revenue puts  
th e  government in a very vu lnerab le  p o s i t io n  and hence new and 
r e l i a b l e  domestic sources have to  be found within  the  medium term" 
(Lesotho Centra l  Bank, 1985).
The p o in t  in case  was a l so  the  non-payment by SA of the  customs dues 
es t imated  around R110 m i l l i o n ,  in 1984 due to  f r o s t y  r e l a t i o n s  between 
the  two c o u n t r i e s .  In h i s  budget speech (1985/86 e s t im a te s )  th e  
m in i s t e r  of  Finance emphasised t h i s  p o s i t io n :
"The main revenue i tems, th e  Customs Union revenue, and s a le s  t a x ,  
y ie lded  M187 m i l l i o n  o r  86% of t o t a l  revenue of  government . . .  we 
have very l i t t l e  d i s c r e t i o n  with the  Customs Union revenue item 
which i s  of  course  th e  dominant item in our revenue budget,  accounting 
f o r  as much as 75% of  the  t o t a l  in 1984/85".
Thus, SA can fo rce  compliance on the  neighbours by merely p u l l in g  the  
economic s t r i n g s .  SA's con t ro l  of the  Union has ensured t h a t  i t s  
i n t e r e s t s  a re  p ro te c ted  and no competing investments are  located  in 
Lesotho. See f o r  in s t a n ce ,  Hirschman (1979).
Monetary and f i s c a l  p o l i c i e s
As SA i s  th e  dominant and e a s i l y  a c c e s s ib le  s u p p l i e r  of imports,  th e  
p re v a i l in g  i n t e r e s t s  r a t e s  and i n f l a t i o n  in t h a t  country  are  l a rg e ly  
mir rored in th e  r a t e s  p re v a i l in g  in Lesotho. Since la rge  d i f f e r e n c e s  
could t r i g g e r  movements of  funds which would a f f e c t  th e  s t a b i l i t y  of 
Lesotho banking, th e  government i s  usua l ly  forced to  fo llow s u i t .  
Lesotho, with South Afr ica  and Swaziland, i s  a member of  the  Rand 
Monetary Area - RMA. Under t h i s  agreement,  Lesotho would rece iv e  
compensation in th e  form of i n t e r e s t  paid on the  c i r c u l a t i o n  of  SA
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Rand* within  i t s  borders .  Lesotho f u r t h e r  has access  to  the  SA re se rve  
bank, c a p i t a l  markets,  and i s  guaranteed the  prov is ion  of fo re ign  
currency by SA. Lesotho 's  currency - Maloti*,  in troduced in 1980, 
i s  pegged to  SA rand (which had h i t h e r t o  been the  currency of Lesotho 
and continues  to  c i r c u l a t e  a longside  the  malo t i )  and while the  
government is  r e spons ib le  f o r  i t s  own monetary po l icy  and contro l  of 
f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  th e  management of the  rand currency remains 
the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of the  SA government. While Lesotho enjoys the  
f r e e  access to  SA's abundant fo re ign  exchange, a perennia l  problem 
of  many African s t a t e s ,  the  country  b a s i c a l ly  has no f i s c a l  and 
monetary autonomy over i t s  own economy. Devaluation of the  rand 
t r i g g e r s  simultaneous e f f e c t  on m a lo t i .  The cont inued weakness of 
the  SA rand aga ins t  the  US d o l l a r  is  a l so  r e f l e c t e d  in the  d ec l ine  
in Lesotho 's  economy. Central  Bank of Lesotho has observed:
"The progress ive  d ec l ine  of the  exchange r a t e  value of the  rand 
hence the  l o t i ,  which plummeted to  an a l l - t im e  low in August (1986) 
as a r e s u l t  of in t e rn a t io n a l  r e a c t io n  to  p o l i t i c a l  developments in 
South Afr ica ,  had ser ious  im pl ica t ions  not only f o r  i n f l a t i o n  in 
Lesotho but a l so  f o r  the  c o u n t ry ' s  ex te rna l  debt o b l ig a t io n s " .
The membership in the  RMA makes the  country l a rg e ly  dependent upon 
monetary and c r e d i t  p o l i c i e s  s e t  by South African Reserve Bank.
Thus, t h i s  b r i e f  s e l e c t i v e  overview of Lesotho 's  economy, in d ica te s  
the  ex ten t  of the  c o u n t ry ' s  i n t e g ra t io n  in to  SA's economy and i t s  
dependence on two major ex te rna l  sources of  revenue:
* Rand is  South African currency
* Maloti i s  Lesotho currency,  Loti f o r  s in g u la r  R1 = 1 l o t i
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- the  customs revenue from SACU.
- migrant labour rem i t tances  from SA.
In t h i s  con tex t ,  the  pervas ive  impact of p o l i c i e s  implemented in SA 
on p o l i c i e s  and d i r e c t i o n  of development in Lesotho to  break out of 
t h i s  economic c l u t c h ,  cannot be over-emphasised.
I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n :  Object ives  and S t r a t e g i e s
I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  has long been a key is sue  fo r  post-independence 
Lesotho. The grim per iphery  s t a t u s  thus  f a r  desc r ibed ,  underlined 
the  need fo r  economic d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  to  a l l e v i a t e  'expor ted unem­
ployment'  and overcome economic and technolog ica l  dependency. Manu­
f a c tu r in g  i n d u s t r i e s ,  promised rapid  economic growth and Lesotho, 
l i k e  most developing c o u n t r i e s ,  has attempted to  a cc e le r a t e  t h a t  
growth through na t io n a l  economic planning.  Lesotho 's  second develop­
ment plan 1975-80 i d e n t i f i e d  major na t iona l  o b je c t iv e s  as:
- Economic growth through improvement of a g r i c u l t u r e  and indus t ry .
- Maximum domestic employment through expansion of o p p o r tu n i t i e s  
within Lesotho, and l o c a l i s a t i o n  programme.
- Economic independence through d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  of r e l a t i o n s  with 
o the r  c o u n t r i e s  and o r g a n i z a t i o n s .
- Encouragement of p r i v a t e  investment in indus t ry  and the  development 
of mineral  and water r e so u rce s .
- Increase of 46% in t o t a l  output (GDP a t  f a c t o r  c o s t ) .
To accomplish th e se  o b j e c t i v e s ,  the  i n d u s t r i a l  s e c t o r ' s  ro le  was to  
transform the  country  in to  a domest ica l ly  v iab le  productive  system 
through:
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"an expansion of n o n -a g r ic u l tu ra l  output as rap id ly  as p o s s ib le  with 
sp ec ia l  emphasis on the  development of indigenous i n d u s t r i e s  and 
commerce". (Plan 2 1975-80)
The Third and Fourth Plan o b je c t iv e s  were much more s p e c i f i c  and 
p r i o r i t i z e d ,  r e f l e c t i n g  the  government major economic concerns .
- t o  reduce v u l n e r a b i l i t y  t o  ex te rna l  economic and p o l i t i c a l  p ressu res  
through su s ta in a b le  economic growth (emphasis su p p l ied ) .
- s t im u la te  domestic employment to  reduce the  outflow of migrant 
workers to  South A fr ica .
The plan had est imated  the  c r e a t io n  of 1500 and 750 jobs  annually  in 
manufacturing and commerce r e s p e c t iv e ly .  I t  goes f u r t h e r  and modified 
the  Second Plan by s e t t i n g  out s p e c i f i c  o b je c t iv e s  f o r  in d u s t ry ,  and 
th e se  included the  promotion of  fo re ign  investment from d i v e r s i f i e d  
sources ,  the  development of  small s ca le  local  e n t re p re n eu rs ,  t h e  
promotion of import s u b s t i t u t i o n ,  export  and agro i n d u s t r i e s ,  the  
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  of expor t  markets and maximum u t i l i z a t i o n  of local  
raw m a te r i a l s .  According to  th e  Third Plan,  i n d u s t r i a l  s e c to r  
o f f e r e d :
" the b e s t  hope f o r  achieving  cons iderab le  growth f o r  helping to  
e f f e c t  optimum e f f i c i e n c y  in severa l  s e c to r s ,  c o n t r ib u t in g  to  
na t iona l  income, c r e a t in g  domestic employment and help ing to  reduce 
dependence on migrant labor" .
Thus, s ince  independence i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  has acquired  a p r i o r i t y  
pos i t ion  fo r  economic growth, maximum domestic employment gen e ra t io n ,  
in d ig en isa t io n  of commerce, and reduction  of the  c o u n t ry ' s  ex te rn a l  
economic dependence.  The a t ta inment  of these  o b je c t iv e s  poses a
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herculean ta sk  fo r  Lesotho. There is  shortage  of indigenous p r iv a te  
s e c to r  which has i n v e s t i t u r e  c a p i t a l ,  t e ch n ica l  and managerial s k i l l s ,  
rudimentary i n d u s t r i a l  framework, and most s e r io u s ly ,  r e l i a n c e  on the  
customs and migrant revenue to  fund th e se  p lans .  For in s tance ,  Fourth 
Plan es timated  th a t  75% of Lesotho National Development Corporation 
f inanc ing  requirements w i l l  come from overseas  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  The 
whole r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to  a c c e l e r a t e  i n d u s t r i a l  growth under the  
c ircumstances ,  tends  to  f a l l  on the  government p a r t i c u l a r l y  where 
c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e  investments are  involved.
S ta te  as In d u s t r i a l  C a ta lys t
Lesotho 's  i n d u s t r i a l  s t r a t e g y  is  based on the  f r ee  e n t e r p r i s e  system, 
and makes c l e a r  what ro le  the  government w i l l  ac t  out in t h i s  p a r tn e r ­
sh ip .
"We look to  the  p r iv a te  e n t e r p r i s e  f o r  i n i t i a t i v e ,  t e chn ica l  know­
how, i n d u s t r i a l  t r a in in g  . . .  the  ro le  of government in the  investment 
f i e l d  wi l l  be p r im ar i ly  t h a t  of a promoter,  a c a t a l y s t ,  and a leade r .  
There w i l l ,  of course,  be c e r t a i n  areas  where government investment 
through i t s  co rpora t ions  w i l l  be c a l l e d  f o r .  Government sh a l l  play 
i t s  ro le  in i n d u s t r i e s  of s t r a t e g i c  importance and in those  in d u s t r i e s  
which . . .  are  not s u f f i c i e n t l y  a t t r a c t i v e  f o r  p r iv a t e  s e c to r " .
(Plan 2 1975-80)
In d u s t r i a l  development co rpora t ion  was u rgen t ly  needed t o  spearhead 
the  government's  e f f o r t s  in the  c r e a t io n  of  commercial and in d u s t r i a l  
s e c to r .  Lesotho government requ ired  an o rgan iza t io n a l  form to  engage 
in la rge ly  e n t re p re n eu r i a l  a c t i v i t i e s  without  the  personnel and 
budgetary c o n s t r a in t s  of th e  government and bu reau c ra t ic  machinery.
The p r in c ip a l  instrument f o r  t h i s  s t r a t e g y  was Lesotho National 
Development Corporation (LNDC), e s t a b l i s h e d  in 1967 as a s t a t u to r y
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p a r a s t a t a l  o rgan iza t ion  charged with the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to  " i n i t i a t e ,  
promote and f a c i l i t a t e  the  development of manufacturing and process ing 
i n d u s t r i e s ,  mining and commerce in a manner c a lc u la t e d  to  r a i s e  the  
level of  income and employment in Lesotho". (LNDC Act 1967). LNDC 
is  p r im ar i ly  concerned with the  promotion of fo re ign  investment and 
l a r g e - s c a l e  e n t e r p r i s e s .
The e s tab l i shm en t  of LNDC a l so ,  had as im p l ic i t  t a r g e t s  t h a t  ownership 
and management in commercial and i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t i e s  in the  economy 
should u l t im a te ly  be l o c a l i s e d .  I t  t h e r e f o r e  purchased equ i ty  in the  
commercial i n d u s t r i a l  s e c to r  which has been dominated by SA companies, 
and holds the se  in t r u s t  f o r  the  na t ion  to  be sold back to  the  public  
in the  f u t u r e .
The primary po l icy  inst ruments remains a s e t  of f i s c a l  incen t ives  which 
inc lude:
- Loan and /equ i ty  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .
- Loan guarantees  with the  commercial banks.
-  Ten years  tax  holiday ( inc reased  from 6 years  in o rder  t o  compete 
with SA 'homelands'  o f f e r i n g  super io r  i n c e n t iv e s ) .
-  N on-na t io n a l i s a t io n  po l icy  on fo re ign  companies.
The government of  Lesotho provides  c a p i t a l  subventions  to  LNDC, and 
a s u b s t a n t i a l  p a r t  comes from fo re ign  sources such as World Bank, EEC, 
European Investment Bank and German KFW. During the  Third Plan period 
1980-85, government subventions amounted to  M6.3 m i l l i o n ,  while the  
t o t a l  c a p i t a l  investment was approximately M16 m i l l io n  of which 80% 
went to  manufacturing and th e  balance of 20% to  commercial e n t e r p r i s e s .
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As p a r t  of the  l o c a l i s a t i o n  d r ive  ( the  t r a n s f e r  of e f f e c t i v e  control  
o f  economic a c t i v i t y  in to  the  hands of n a t io n a l s )  government e s ta b l i sh e d  
Basotho E n te rp r i se s  Development Corporation (BEDCO) in 1980 to  promote 
sm a l l - s ca le  indigenous manufacturing and commercial e n t e r p r i s e s .  Like 
LNDC, BEDCO o f f e r s  a s e r i e s  of inducements aimed a t  a t t r a c t i n g  in v e s to r s ;
- Financing of v iab le  e n t e r p r i s e s .
- A ss is tance  in t r a i n i n g  and marketing a c t i v i t i e s .
-  Offer ing  techn ica l  and managerial s e r v ic e s .
- P repara t ion  of f e a s i b i l i t y  s tu d i e s .
While government funded BEDCO through annual c a p i t a l  subventions,  the  
primary source and te chn ica l  a s s i s t a n c e  has been Canadian Development 
Agency (ClDA).
Thus, Lesotho had adopted a two-pronged t rans fo rm a t ion  approach: a 
m a cro - in d u s t r ia l  s t r a t e g y ,  involving la rge  s ca le  fo re ign  investments ,  
pioneered  by LNDC. And, a m ic ro - s t r a teg y  t h a t  focused a t  the  small 
su b -se c to ra l  indigenous e n t e r p r i s e s  t h a t  are  d ea r ly  needed to  play 
a leading  ro le  in the  con t ro l  of the  na t iona l  economy.
The Emerging Economic S t ru c tu re
Leso tho 's  economy has grown s t e a d i l y  p a r t l y  in response  to  the  above 
s t r a t e g i e s .  Gross domestic product has grown in ab so lu te  terms 
during th e  Third Plan pe r iod ,  an inc rease  of 7.43 per cent over the  
base -year  1979-80. During the  same Plan period  the  i n d u s t r i a l  s ec to r  
r e g i s t e r e d  an abso lu te  increase  of M7.65 m i l l i o n ,  a 36 per  cent above
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the  base -year ,  see t a b l e  5 .6 .  Manufacturing,  as a share of GDP now 
s tands  a t  7.4 per cent compared to  4 .6  per cent in 1983. Value 
added has grown from M29 m i l l ion  in 1983 to  M40 m i l l io n  in 1985. 
There i s  however a s t r i k i n g  f e a tu r e  about the  Lesotho product ion 
p rocess ,  as Central  Bank of Lesotho observed:
"Out of  a t o t a l  tu rnover  of M256, as much as M216 m i l l io n  (84.3%) 
co n s i s ted  of inputs  from o the r  s e c to r s  . . .  these  local  inputs  a re ,  
. . .  be lieved  to  c o n s t i t u t e  only a small p a r t  of  t o t a l  inpu ts ,  . . .  
The r e s t  being made up of la rge  amounts of imported goods and 
s e r v i c e s " .
Table 5.6
GDP and In d u s t r i a l  Sector a t  1984/85 P r ices  ( in  Mil l ion Maluti)
Year GDP Annual % 
Growth r a t e
Ind. Sector Annual % 
Growth r a t e
1979/80 478.9 - 21.333 -
1980/81 518.6 8.28 23.725 11.2
1981/82 510.8 (- )1-51 26.282 10.77
1982/83 496.9 ( - )2 .7 3 31.715 12.06
1983/84 512.3 (+ )3 .09 28.731 ( - J9 .14
1984/85 514.5 0.004 28.979 (+)0.008
5 Years 
d i f f e r e n t i a l (+)35.6 7.43% (+)7.646 35.84%
Source: CPDO/Bureau of  S t a t i s t i c s
Despite  th e  growth, the  s t r u c t u r e  of the  economy has changed l i t t l e .  
There were about 80 firms involved in medium and la rge  s ca le  manufac­
t u r i n g  in 1982, most of which were sponsored by fo r e ig n ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y
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South Afr ican ,  in v e s to r s  who have e s ta b l i s h e d  in Lesotho, s p e c i f i c a l l y  
t o  take  advantage of  th e  c o u n t ry ' s  p r e f e r e n t i a l  access  to  the  EEC and 
o th e r  African markets .  As t a b l e  5.7 shows, out of a t o t a l  of 22 
manufacturing e n t e r p r i s e s ,  only two e n t e r p r i s e s  were wholly owned by 
l o c a l s ,  17 were 100 per  cent foreign-owned, mostly by South A fr icans .  
These companies were tak ing  advantage of Lesotho 's  generous f i s c a l  
in c e n t iv e s .  There i s  d u ty - f r e e  access to  th e  Southern and Eastern 
African P r e f e r e n t i a l  Trade Area (PTA), and a d u ty - f r e e  access  (on 
s p e c i f i c  products )  to  th e  l a rg e r  markets of USA, Canada, A u s t ra l i a  
and Japan. Thus, Lesotho has become economic conduit  of SA to  many 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  marke ts .  With SA expor te rs  being persona non g ra ta  in 
most fo re ign  markets ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  th e  African markets ,  Lesotho has 
become a convenient  circumvention p o in t .
"The LNDC w i l l  f a c i l i t a t e  in te rn a t io n a l  marketing f o r  the  new 
i n d u s t r i a l i s t  through p r e f e r e n t i a l  and d u ty - f r e e  access  to  Lesotho- 
manufactured goods t o  l u c r a t i v e  world markets" .  (The S t a r ,  1986).
The irony of Leso tho 's  i n d u s t r i a l  s t r a t e g i e s  aimed a t  economic 
independence is  t h a t :
"a t tempts  a t  c u r t a i l i n g ,  or  a t  l e a s t  d imin ish ing ,  t h i s  dependence 
have in some r e s p e c t s  s t rengthened i t s  economic t i e s  with South 
African bus iness  and c a p i t a l ,  l i k e  th e  (R37 m i l l i o n )  De Beers- 
opera ted diamond mine (opened in 1977 and c losed in 1982) and 
( th e  R4 b i l l i o n )  Highlands Water P ro jec t  . . .  The main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
of Leso tho 's  economy i s  i t s  pe rm eab i l i ty :  . . .  every Rand spent in 
Lesotho i s  worth 80 cen ts  to  South Afr ica"  (Baynham and M il l s ,  1987).
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Table 5 . 7
L is t  of Major Manufacturing E n te rp r i se s  March 1986
Name of Company Sector % Foreign Ownership
Loti Brick Brick Manufacture 0
Lesotho Brewery Co (E) Brewery 49
Parthenon Pa in ts Pa in t  Manufacture 50
Lesotho Foods Mill ing 60
Bastho Tanning Leather  Manufacture 0
Libtex Linen Manufacture 100
Shoe Company Shoe Manufacture 100
Pal Products Manufacture 100
Focus Clothing Manufacture 100
Tranal Quip. Manufacture 100
Gallant Clothing Manufacture 100
Lesotho Bag Manufacture 100
Mustang Shoes Manufacture 100
Steel  Quip. Manufacture 100
Lesotho Knitwear Manufacture 100
Tsi toe  Clothing Manufacture 100
LKM Manufacture 100
Natural  Shoes Manufacture 100
Tronic Ventures Manufacture 100
Golden T e x t i l e s Manufacture 100
Glennit  T e x t i l e s Manufacture 100
Source: Central  Planning O f f i ce ,  1986
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Conclusions
The ana lys i s  has demonstrated t h a t  the  p o l i t i c a l  economy of Lesotho, 
due p a r t l y  to  geographical  l o c a t io n ,  has been dominated by, and i n t e ­
gra ted in to  the  highly  advanced South African economy. Lesotho emerged 
from the  co lon ia l  ru l e  with p r a c t i c a l l y  l i t t l e  or  no i n d u s t r i a l  frame­
work. I t  has l im i ted  resources  based on a su f fo ca t in g  migratory labour 
system which provides  the  major source of purchasing power in the  
economy.
The pos t-independence economic p o l i c i e s  focused on d iv e r s i f y in g  the  
economy and break the  dependence on one su p p l i e r ,  employer,  and 
inves to r  which is  SA. Comprehensive medium term development plans 
were formulated to  d i r e c t  and encourage the  development of the  economy.
In o rder  to  s t im u la te  p r i v a t e  s e c to r  i n i t i a t i v e  and p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  
f i s c a l  incen t ives  were o f fe red  and th e  government took th e  lead through 
the  es tab l ishment  of the  p a r a s t a t a l  -  LNDC to  implement the  development 
p lans .  Thus the  r a t i o n a l  f o r  th e  e s tab l ishm ent  of  t h i s  p a r a s t a t a l  and
the  expec ta t ions  of i t s  r o l e  by the  government are  of p a r t i c u l a r
s ig n i f i c a n ce  to  t h i s  study as we examine i t s  i n d u s t r i a l  s t r a t e g i e s  
and the  ac t ions  of the  a c to r s  determining i t s  d i r e c t i o n .  As a c o r o l l a r y ,  
i t  i s  worth noting t h a t  while  th e  Lesotho economy, of the  1980's has
grown, in GNP, GDP te rms, and th e  bas ic  i n d u s t r i a l  framework is
emerging, th e  intended i n d u s t r i a l  s t r a t e g i e s  of a l l e v i a t i n g  economic 
p o la r i s a t i o n  as emphasised in a l l  th e  development p la n s ,  does not 
accord with the  emergent/ac tual  s t r a t e g i e s  which are  f o s t e r in g  the  
economic in t e g r a t i o n .
132
The Third Plan h ig h l ig h ted  the  government uneas iness  about t h i s  
‘economic hos tage '  s t a t u s ,  and the  worrying environmental  f a c t o r s :
"The u n c e r t a in t y  surrounding f u tu r e  economic and p o l i t i c a l  developments 
in Southern Afr ica  makes i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  s e t  q u a l i f i e d  t a r g e t s  f o r  th e  
economy up to  1985. The c r i t i c a l  e lements are  migrant labour,  Customs 
Union revenue, a id  flows and i n f l a t i o n " .
There i s ,  however, a descending view of informed sources in Lesotho 
who argue t h a t  i f  government in t e rv e n t io n  as i n d u s t r i a l  c a t a l y s t  i s  
t o  be e f f e c t i v e ,  "macro-economic s t r a t e g i e s  and p o l i c i e s  must be c l e a r  
t o  make i t  easy . . .  f o r  both domestic and fo re ign  i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  to  
plan and e s t a b l i s h  p r o j e c t s  with g r e a t e r  c e r t a i n t y "  (Baffoe,  1986).
An ov e r r id in g  need, i t  i s  argued, is  f o r  th e  formulat ion of a 
comprehensive s t r a t e g y  with o b je c t iv e s  . . .  p r i o r i t i e s ,  t a r g e t s  and 
implementation measures c l e a r l y  def ined  a t  the  g lo b a l ,  s e c t o r a l ,  and 
e n t e r p r i s e  l e v e l s  (UNIDO 1984). While I do not n e c e s sa r i ly  support  
th e se  arguments, they  are  brought in here  to  h ig h l ig h t  some of the  
underlying assumptions ,  debates and expec ta t io n s  l e v e l led  a t  
p a r a s t a t a l s  when n a t io n a l  economies f lo u n d e r .  They are  important 
in unders tanding some of th e  h e u r i s t i c  dec i s ions  of both the  
government and management of the  p a r a s t a t a l s  given t h a t  the  l a t t e r  
a re  t r u s t e d  with th e  charge of provid ing th e  country with employment 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s .  They a re  the  shapers  of government economic p o l i c i e s .
I t  i s  a g a in s t  t h i s  background of  economic development where the  
impetus fo rce  f o r  po l i t ico -econom ic  changes has g e n e ra l ly  emanated 
from SA economy t h a t  we need to  cons ide r  when we judge Lesotho 's
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economic p o l i c y .  I t  in d ica te s  t h a t  th e re  are  powerful a c to r s  with in  
the  macro-context of Lesotho, who, though not d i r e c t l y  involved in 
s t r a t e g i c  dec is ions  of LNDC, and hence Lesotho government, t h e i r  
inf luence  and i n t e r e s t s  cannot be ignored.
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Table 5.1
Source: Third World Encyclopaedia, Volume 2, 1985.
Chapter 6 
The Data
The Pioneer ing Period - LNDC in Formation: 1967-76 
Descr ip t ive  Account
This Chapter provides a th ick  d e sc r ip t i o n  of th e  more important a c t i v i t i e s  
and dec is ions  t h a t  took p lace  in Lesotho National Development Corporation - 
LNDC, from th e  period of i t s  es tab l ishment  in 1967. I t  is  not the  study 
about the  h i s t o r y  of LNDC, but because th e  r e c en t  changes are  i n e x t r i ­
cably l inked with the  development of the  c o rp o ra t io n ,  i t  i s  important 
to  provide a h i s t o r i c a l  pe rspec t ive  in o rder  t h a t  the  reader  may draw 
h i s /h e r  conc lus ions .  I t  focuses a t  what th e  co rpo ra t ion  was s e t  up to  
do, the  pioneer ing a c to r s  and t h e i r  ro le  in s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s io n s ,  the 
in t e r a c t io n  process  with in  LNDC and between the  government, and the  
change process  as in t e rp re te d  by those a c to r s  involved in th e  p rocess .
The Origin
For the  sake of  c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y  and n o n - a t t r i b u t a b i l i t y  c o n t r a c t ,  some 
names of the  respondents  have been d i sg u ised .  All th e  quotes ,  unless  
otherwise in d ic a ted ,  were taken d i r e c t l y  from th e  resea rch  d a ta .
The e s tab l ishm ent  of LNDC da tes  back to  1967, when through the  co rd ia l  
r e l a t i o n s h ip  between Lesotho and South A fr i ca ,  the  l a t t e r  seconded a 
team of economic advisors  from one of SA's tobacco magnates, the  
Rembrandt group, to  a s s i s t  Lesotho to  draw development programmes.
I t  was through the se  advisors  t h a t  the  idea of a development corpora t ion  
wholly owned by the  s t a t e ,  t h a t  would s t im u la te  and o r i e n t  Lesotho 's  
nodern n o n -a g r ic u l tu ra l  s ec to r  was conceived and passed through
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par l iam ent .  The LNDC a c t ,  as i t  was to  be c a l l e d ,  spe l led  out the  
purpose of the  co rpo ra t ion .
' t o  i n i t i a t e ,  promote and f a c i l i t a t e  the  development of manufacturing 
and process ing  i n d u s t r i e s ,  mining and commerce in a manner c a lc u la te d  
to  r a i s e  the  level  of  income and employment in Leso tho ' .
In car ry ing  out t h i s  a l l  embracing mandate, the  enabling ac t  s t i p u l a t e d  
t h a t  the  government may, a f t e r  c o n su l t a t io n  with the  co rpo ra t ion ,  give 
t o  the  co rpora t ion  general  d i r e c t io n s  as to  th e  pol icy  to  be applied  
in car ry ing  out the  purposes of the  co rpo ra t ion ,  and the  corpora t ion  
sha l l  give e f f e c t  to  those  d i r e c t i o n s .  Every dec is ion  of LNDC made 
in accordance with those d i r e c t io n s  is  deemed fo r  a l l  purposes to  be 
a decis ion  of the  c o rpo ra t ion .
The h ig h l ig h t s  of r e lev an t  aspec ts  of the  ac t  a re  adumbrated in 
appendix 1. These h ighly  summarised o b je c t iv e s  and goals are  c ru c ia l  
to  unders tanding the  complexity of views, c o n f l i c t i n g  o b je c t iv e s ,  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of the  r a ison  d ' e t r e  of the  co rpo ra t ion ,  and the 
p a t t e rn  of changes t h a t  took p lace .  They were s e l e c te d ,  p r im ar i ly  on 
th e  bas is  of n e g o t i a t iv e  c l im ate  and cond i t ions  t h a t  they fo s te red  
between the  government and LNDC and with in  the  u n i t s  of these  two 
main a c to r s .
Van Gen, the  head of the  economic a d v iso r s ,  became the  f i r s t  ch ie f  
execut ive o f f i c e r  - CEO, of  LNDC. He was seen as the  dominant and
1 LNDC Act, 1967.
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shrewd t a c t i c i a n  - f o r c e f u l ,  b r i l l i a n t  and possessed vas t  managerial 
exper ience  developed over the  years  in Rembrandt group. He understood 
th e  problems fac ing  Lesotho and was f a m i l i a r  with the  s i t u a t i o n ;  so 
he knew exac t ly  what ta sk  he faced and he had the  r e q u i s i t e  re sources  
to  do i t .  As one former Chairman of the  co rpora t ion  pointed out:
"Van Gen enjoyed the  confidence of th e  government. We were new in 
t h a t  f i e l d  ( i n d u s t r i a l  development) and he was looked upon as somebody 
who was kind of our s av iour .  He knew almost everyth ing about indus­
t r i a l i z a t i o n .  He enjoyed access  to  th e  prime m in i s t e r ,  to  m i n i s t e r s ,  
and could t a l k  or  put h is  reques ts  and ideas d i r e c t l y  to  the  head 
of  th e  government. He seemed to  be accomplishing h i s  o b je c t iv e s  and 
was an e f f i c i e n t  CEO. His impact on issues  and progress  were v i s i b l e  
because he had the  r i g h t  forum." ( in te rv iew)
Because of h i s  e x p e r t i s e  and s k i l l  to  i n s t i l  confidence ,  the  prime 
m in i s t e r  had extended Van Gen's sphere of in f luence  by giv ing him a 
f r e e  hand to  advise  the  government in o the r  f i e l d s  regard ing p o s s i b i l ­
i t i e s  of e s t a b l i s h i n g  s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s . 1
The governance of the  co rpo ra t ion  was highly  c e n t r a l i z e d  during t h i s  
embryonic pe r iod ,  with th e  CEO i n i t i a t i n g  and decid ing on most important 
i s s u e s .  The co rpora t ion  has one of the  high powered and p o l i t i c a l l y  
o r ie n te d  board of d i r e c t o r s  a SOE could have. I t  i s  composed of the  
prime m in i s t e r  who was the  Chairman, the  M in is te r  of Trade and Industry  
(who i s  an a l t e r n a t i v e  Chairman), Minis ters  of Finance and Planning,
CEO, and th r e e  o u t s id e r s  in v i te d  by PM on the  bas is  of t h e i r  e x p e r t i s e .  
Almost a l l  th e  ex te rna l  members had been appointed by th e  CEO with the  
support  of  th e  PM. They included one of  SA's top  academic and l a t e r  
to  be SA's M in is te r  of Finance,  Senator Horwood. They formed an
1 LNDC Board Minutes, 1970.
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i n f l u e n t i a l  a l l i a n c e  t h a t  the  CEO could r e ly  on, p a r t i c u l a r l y  amongst 
SA i n d u s t r i a l i s t s .  In a ttendance  are  a l so  permanent s e c r e t a r i e s  of 
th e  above m i n i s t r i e s  who a t tend  as adv iso rs  to  t h e i r  r e sp ec t iv e  
m i n i s t e r s ,  al though they do not vote .  The government wanted to  
demonstrate t h e i r  commitment to  the  process  of i n d u s t r i a l  development 
and to  g ive  LNDC th e  kind of legit imacy t h a t  would p o s i t io n  i t  favourably  
t o  launch i t s  a c t i v i t i e s .  I t  was a l so  a per iod  of learn ing  by the  
dec i s ion  makers bend on t ransforming th e  economic mis fortunes  of the  
coun t ry .  Van Gen's conception of a p o l i t i c a l  board was meant to  
obv ia te  b u re a u c ra t ic  i n e r t i a  and make the  dec is ion  making and s t r a t e g y  
formula t ion  more e f f i c i e n t  and e f f e c t i v e  by co-opting  the foci  of 
power, i . e .  cab in e t  m in i s t e r s  who had d i r e c t  i n t e r a c t io n  with LNDC 
and c o n t ro l l e d  key dec i s ions  regard ing i t s  a c t i v i t i e s .  For in s tance ,  
th e  investment d ec i s io n s  - expans ions ,  mergers ,  buy-outs,  or  new 
p r o j e c t s  r e q u i r e  th e  M in is te r  of Finance to  i n d ic a te  how much is 
a v a i l a b l e  in the  c o f f e r s  of th e  s t a t e ,  what the  commitments a re ,  and 
how much can be expended, f o r  how long. I n d u s t r i a l  development 
s t r a t e g i e s  c a l l  f o r  M in is te r  of  Trade to  i n d ic a te  government i n v e s t ­
ment p r i o r i t i e s ,  t o  persuade and d i r e c t  the  p r iv a t e  sec to r  and SOEs 
t o  channel t h e i r  re sou rces  in to  these  t a r g e t s .  The Central  Planning 
c o -o rd in a te s  these  programs and formula tes  government f iv e  year 
development p lans .  This c rea ted  a conducive and n e g o t i a t iv e  atmos­
phere in which i s sues  could be d iscussed  and dec is ions  taken without  
d e fe r r in g  them because a l l  the  key a c to r s  were t h e r e ,  and the  board 
tended t o  accept l i t e r a l l y  the  agenda cons t ruc ted  by the  CEO. The 
former Chairman of LNDC emphasized t h i s  po in t  when he explained the  
government 's  eagerness  t o  cooperate  in the  formula t ion  of s t r a t e g i c  
d e c i s io n s :  'He (Van Gen) was equipped with th e  necessary  t o o l s  to
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car ry  out the  mandate of LNDC and we (m in i s t e r s )  were keen to  learn  
and f a c i l i t a t e  h is  e f f o r t s .  He was a l so  the  PM's economic advisor  
and had tremendous in f l u e n c e 1. I t  would appear t h a t  Van Gen owned 
the  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  supplied the  le ad e rsh ip ,  and was the  dominant 
p e r s o n a l i t y  in pioneer ing the  i n d u s t r i a l  s t r a t e g y  process .
The En t rep reneur ia l  S t ra tegy
Abraham Maslow, the  American p sycho log is t ,  once sa id  t h a t  i f  requested  
to  help  a country in s t r a i t s ,  he would send them n e i t h e r  100 s o ld i e r s  
nor 100 t e a c h e r s ,  but 100 en t rep ren eu rs ,  Kubr and Wal l is ,  (1983).  
Because of  lack of e n t r e p re n eu r i a l  t r a d i t i o n  and exper ience ,  and 
l im i ted  sources of indigenous e n t r e p re n eu r i a l  t a l e n t ,  the  predominant 
i n d u s t r i a l  s t r a t e g y  p re v a i l in g  during the  p ioneer ing period could be 
descr ibed  as e n t r e p re n e u r i a l  and e x p lo ra to ry .  The t h r u s t  of  t h i s  
s t r a t e g y  was to  e s t a b l i s h  small s ca le  e x p o r t -o r i e n t a t e d  h a n d ic ra f t  
i n d u s t r i e s  t h a t  u t i l i s e d  local  raw m a te r i a l s  -  wool and mohair,  in 
o rder  to  in troduce  i n d u s t r i a l  base and o r i e n t  people to  i n d u s t r i a l  
d i s c i p l i n e .  R isk - tak ing ,  i t  was argued, was unavoidable in e s t a b l i s h ­
ing an i n d u s t r i a l  base,  e s p e c i a l l y  in a developing n a t io n .  Van Gen 
perceived himself  as a change provaca teur ,  an in te rp re n e u r  who had 
t o  take  r i s k s ,  t o  i n i t i a t e  bankable ideas and o p p o r t u n i t i e s .  LNDC 
had to  be an i n d u s t r i a l  c a t a l y s t  and ge t  in to  investment d i r e c t l y  
and own bus inesses  f o r  two major reasons :
1. Create  job  o p p o r tu n i t i e s .
2.  Most importantly  to  c r e a t e  a conducive investment environment 
through a f o r t f o l i o  of success fu l  LNDC companies t h a t  would 
prove to  p o t e n t i a l  in v es to r s  t h a t  Lesotho was a v iab le  investment 
a rea .
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Through h i s  c l o s e - k n i t  c o t e r i e  of commercial and p o l i t i c a l  a s so c ia te s  
in SA, and th e  support  of Rembrandt Corpora tion,  Van Gen was able  to  
r e c r u i t  t a l e n t e d  managers from SA to  manage the  h a n d ic r a f t  companies. 
With th e  board e f f e c t i v e l y  under h is  c o n t r o l ,  th e re  was l i t t l e  p o l i t i c a l  
ou tc ry  from t h i s  dec is ion  as the  companies were p r o f i t a b l e  and generated 
employment, a f a c t o r  which symbolised the  g en e ra l i s ed  mandate of  the  
c o rp o ra t io n .  Moreover, the  SA managers, i t  was argued, would t r a i n  
and t r a n s f e r  t h e i r  managerial  know-how to  loca l s  who were not v i s i b l e  
anywhere w i th in  LNDC managerial cadre .
In 1969, Van Gen n eg o t ia ted  levy and roya l ty  agreements with SA's 
companies t h a t  included h a l f  a m i l l io n  rand per annum from SA Sugar 
Assoc ia t ion  f o r  t h e i r  monopoly of  Lesotho market as the  so le  supp l ie r s  
of  sugar ,  and from mining companies fo r  prospect ing  diamonds in Lesotho. 
These s lack  re sou rces  s t rengthened Van Gen's leade rsh ip  p o s i t io n  and 
autonomy as he could no longer r e ly  exc lus ive ly  on the  government 
meagre annual subvent ions  to  implement h is  i n d u s t r i a l  s t r a t e g i e s .  
Circumstances were now p ro p i t io u s  fo r  the  expansion and d iv e r s i fy in g  
small s ca le  h a n d ic r a f t  c en t r e s  t h a t  mushroomed throughout the  country .  
Taking advantage of SA's laws t h a t  p r o h ib i t  gambling, a j o i n t  venture 
agreement was reached between LNDC and Holiday Inns to  e s t a b l i s h  a 
hote l  with cas ino  f a c i l i t i e s ,  in Lesotho in 1970. The venture  was 
an i n s t a n t  success  y ie ld in g  huge div idends as wealthy South Africans 
flocked in to  Lesotho f o r  gambling, and the  number of t o u r i s t s  increased 
from l e s s  than 5000 a year  in 1969, to  an es timated  150,000 in 1973J  
The ho te l  f u r t h e r  marked what one former board member described as 
"perhaps the  r e a l  beginning of th e  development which to o k -o f f " .
1 World Bank Review Report,  1980.
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The s p in - o f f s  of t h i s  pragmatic muddling-through approach were the  
emergence of a booming t o u r i s t  indus t ry  t h a t  f u e l l e d  the  demand fo r  
h a n d ic r a f t  i n d u s t r i e s ,  ie  ceramics,  t a p e s t r y ,  and rugs ,  subsequently 
a r e t a i l  s t o r e  was opened in Johannesburg - SA, t h a t  would be an 
o u t l e t  f o r  th e  products  of the  c o r p o r a t io n ' s  s u b s i d i a r i e s  as well as 
provide informat ion s e rv ice  about Lesotho t o  SA t o u r i s t s .
In 1970, th e  country  was having i t s  f i r s t  e l e c t i o n  a f t e r  independence, 
and normally p o l i t i c i a n s  would l i k e  to  po in t  a t  s i g n i f i c a n t  economic 
developments and job  o p p o r tu n i t i e s  c rea ted  under t h e i r  le ad e rsh ip .
As expla ined  elsewhere (see Chapter 5 ) ,  the  e l e c t i o n s  were abor ted ,  
the  c o n s t i t u t i o n  suspended and the  s t a t e  of emergency dec la red .  This 
p o l i t i c a l  development did not go down well in Lesotho 's  b igges t  and 
a c c e s s ib l e  market - SA. The wide p u b l i c i t y  of p o l i t i c a l  un res t  by 
th e  SA's media, adverse ly  a f f e c t ed  th e  t o u r i s t  indus t ry  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
gambling which was th e  money sp inner .  A two-pronged s t r a t e g y  from 
th e  government a t  t h e  d ip lomatic  l e v e l ,  and from LNDC, emerged to  
r e i n s t a t e  th e  image of the  co rpora t ion  and general  confidence in the  
coun try .  The Board of  LNDC had agreed t h a t  a p o s i t i v e  image was 
important f o r  t h e  co rpo ra t ion  and the  country in o rder  t o  bu i ld  th e  
t o u r i s t  i n d u s t ry .  Legit imation of the  s e iz u re  o f  power was on th e  
grounds of  f o r e s t a l l i n g  a r a d ic a l  communist pa r ty  ru l i n g  the  country .  
This j u s t i f i c a t i o n  immediately obta ined SA's sea l  of approval,  and 
g radua l ly  Van Gen was ab le  t o  r e s t o r e  the  confidence  and image of 
LNDC as 100,000 t o u r i s t s  from SA were recorded in 1972.1
I t  needs t o  be s t r e s s e d  t h a t  while the  CEO had s e n io r  cab ine t  m in i s t e r s  
on board of  th e  c o rp o ra t io n ,  the  CEO was not super in tended by any
 ^ LNDC Annual Report ,  1973.
141
p a r t i c u l a r  m i n i s t r y ,  he was d i r e c t l y  answerable to the  chairman and 
th e  board .  A d iag ram at ic  s t r u c t u r e  of  LNDC in 1967-70 looked l i k e  
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Van Gen's approach was l e s s  o f t e n  th e  r e s u l t  of a planned comprehensive 
n a t io n a l  s t r a t e g i e s  as Lesotho by then lacked the  s k i l l s .  His s t r a t e g i e s  
r e f l e c t e d  and emerged from a complexity of  development problems, of  
p ro p in q u i ty  th an  of  any g r e a t e r  r a t i o n a l e ,  th e  ambiguity and vagueness 
about th e  purpose of  th e  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  the  nove l ty  of  i n d u s t r i a l  process  
and inexper ience  of  Lesotho bu re a u c ra t s  and lack of a v a i l a b l e  a l t e r n -
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a t i v e  approaches among which to choose.  One former CEO of  the co rpora t ion  
desc r ibed  t h i s  approach when he sa id :
"I d o n ' t  th ink  the re  was a d e l i b e r a t e  planned p o l ic y  t h a t  a c t u a l l y  sa id  t h i s  
[ s p e c i f y in g  th a t  e n t re p re n eu r i a l  s t r a t e g y ] ,  I never saw i t ,  bu t t h a t ' s  what 
Ven Gen was doing and t h a t ' s  what we fo llowed",  ( in t e rv iew )
Thus g rad u a l ly ,  in an o p p o r t u n i t s t i c  manner, an incremental  approach has 
p rev a i led  as the corpora t ion  groped through with  a purpose,  sequential ly-  
a t t en d in g  to  development problems and sensing  the  environment,  and as i t  
became aware of  new needs and perceived t h a t  i t  was ready to a c t  (Kubr and 
W al l is ,  1983). A confluence o f  o p p o r tu n i t i e s  and f a c t o r s  f a c i l i t a t e d  the 
s t r a t e g i c  dec is ions  of  t h i s  pe r iod ,  among them was c l e a r l y  the competent 
management o f  the CEO, the s lack  investment r e sou rces  he c o n t ro l l e d ,  d i r e c t  
a c c e s s i b i l i t y  to the s ea t  o f  power, and above a l l  the  powerful support  of  the 
SA government and the Rembrandt group. When the secondment expired in 1973, 
Van Gen had s u cc e ss fu l ly  e s t a b l i s h e d  f i f t e e n  p r o f i t a b l e  companies and had s e t  
up good in te rn a l  opera t iona l  procedures .  Figure 6 .2  below shows the f in a n c ia l  
performance o f  LNDC from 1968 to  1973.
Figure 6.2
LNDC Financ ia l  Performance 1968-73 ( '000  Rand)










Source: LNDC Financia l  Records
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Management I n s t a b i l i t y :  1973-76
When the  Rembrandt group withdrew t h e i r  s t a f f  in 1973, no s u i t a b l e  
replacement could be found f o r  some time.  While the  'head hunt '  
con tinued,  B e tch te l ,  a German e x p e r t ,  who had come to  s e t  up Lesotho 
Bank, a wholly-owned s t a t e  commercial bank, was ass igned the  dual 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of managing LNDC while con tinuing to  serve  as th e  
general  manager of Lesotho Bank. Around t h i s  period th e r e  was a l so  
a world recess ion  on h a n d i c r a f t s ,  t h e i r  market was dec l in ing  and 
p r ice s  f a l l i n g .  Most of the  h a n d ic r a f t  companies were beginning 
to  lose money as f ig u re  6.2  in d ic a te s  th e re  was a s i g n i f i c a n t  drop 
in the  opera t ing  p r o f i t s .
B e t c h t e l ' s  s t r a t eg y  was to  s h i f t  away from the  h a n d ic r a f t s  and develop 
the  growing hote l  and t o u r i s t  indus t ry  through j o i n t  ventures  between 
his  two empires:  Lesotho bank and LNDC. From only one cas ino  hote l  
in the  whole country,  he e s t a b l i s h e d  and acquired a l t o g e th e r  f i v e  
more h o t e l s .  Lesotho bank f inanced the  investments while LNDC 
provided the  guarantee .  This culminated in the  a c q u i s i t i o n  of SA 
motor veh ic le  f r an ch ises  such as Pioneer Motors, and Maseru Motors 
(see Chapter 4 t a b le  4 . 2 ) .  The o b je c t iv e  of  th e se  buy-outs of mainly 
SA companies was to  l o c a l i s e  th e  purchasing power and c r e a t e  wealth 
in Lesotho r a t h e r  than buy veh ic le s  in SA and have them serv iced  
th e re  as w e l l .  The leade rsh ip  problems of 'one man running two shows' 
became ev id en t .  To ca r ry  ou t  h i s  expansion and d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  p o l i c y ,  
he lacked th e  s k i l l e d  managerial  back up t h a t  Van Gen had mustered,  
moreover, most of these  managers and d i r e c t o r s  on board had l e f t  
following the  depar tu re  of Van Gen. Given the  chronic  shor tage  of
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managerial  s k i l l s  in Lesotho, the  search once again cont inued in SA, 
with l e s s  success fu l  r e s u l t  as LNDC sa la ry  s t r u c t u r e  could not match 
SA's to  a t t r a c t  the  creme de la creme from t h a t  country .  One former 
d i r e c t o r  of the  co rpora t ion  put i t  r a t h e r  b lu n t ly :
"Our i n d u s t r i a l  s ec to r  and bus iness  e n t e r p r i s e s  were se t -up  through 
the  a s s i s t a n c e  of fo re ign  e x p e r t i s e .  We have tended to  r e ly  on 
ex te rn a l  e x p e r t i s e ,  and t o  ge t  them here  is  q u i t e  a problem.
The top people - exper t s  from o u t s id e ,  want power - they want money, 
which th in g s  are  not a v a i l a b l e  f o r  them here .  What we ge t are  grabs  - 
n ice  people but not the  b e s t ,  ( in te rv iew )
Like h i s  p redecesso r ,  Betchtel  had a c e n t r a l i z e d  s t r u c t u r e  and dom­
inated  th e  dec is ion  making. He worked c lo se ly  with the  PM - Chairman 
and some board members - p a r t i c u l a r l y  m in i s t e r s  of Finance and Trade 
who were a l so  d i r e c t o r s  of Lesotho Bank. This way he was able to  
ge t  th in g s  done with the  minimum f o r m a l i t i e s  of the  board meetings 
and c o n t r o l l e d  the  agenda of p r i o r i t i e s .  As the  government f i n a n c i a l  
e x p e r t ,  managing the  government bank, h i s  advice on what investments 
were v ia b le  and how much money should be spent on them, o f ten  p reva i led  
over t h a t  of th e  M in is te r  of Finance.  The r o l e  of the  board became 
suppor t ive  and f a c i l i t a t i v e  to  the  CEO whose i n t e g r i t y  as an exper t  
was h ighly  esteemed in an area  where bureaucra ts  knew very l i t t l e .
He was too  powerful t o  be d i r e c t e d  by the  Min is t ry  of Finance,  and 
received l i t t l e  d i r e c t i o n  from th e  board,  which in p r a c t i c e  gave 
him wide autonomy to  o p e ra te .  Senna, th e  former CEO of LNDC, 
emphasized th e  po in t  t h a t  'B e t c h t e l ' s  management s t y l e  was t h a t  of 
'one man running two shows ' .  He made a l o t  of ques t ionab le  dec i s ions  
between the  two o rgan iza t ions  without much monitoring from the  Board ' .  
He continued th e  t r a d i t i o n  s e t  by Van Gen t h a t  LNDC1s annual sub­
ventions  should come d i r e c t l y  t o  the  corpora t ion  and not via the
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Minis t ry  of Trade.
The f i n a n c i a l  performance of LNDC was, however d e t e r i o r a t i n g ,  because 
th e  s u b s i d i a r i e s  managed by incompetent and i l l - q u a l i f i e d  managers 
were u n p r o f i t a b l e ,  notably  the  ho te l s  were a f i n a n c i a l  d r a in .  Bet- 
ween1974-75, th e  managerial  c r i s i s  deepened and major s t r u c t u r a l  
changes took p lace  beginning with changes in CEO. The temporary 
r e p r i e v e  of l eade rsh ip  provided by Betchtel  ended when h is  c o n t r a c t  
with Lesotho Bank exp i red .  The general  manager of LNDC - Brink acted 
as CEO fo r  some time,  to  be followed by another  ac t ing  - Creed. The 
s u b s ta n t iv e  CEO, a Swedish, was appointed in 1975, through the  a s s i s ­
tance  of the  World Bank. Ulma R oos ta l ' s  approach could be descr ibed  
as a ' r e f l e c t i v e  pause'  whereby he ha l ted  a l l  expansion and investment 
dec i s ions  in order  to  'p ick  the  p iece s '  and sewn them to g e th e r  to  
make sense of the  investment s t r a t e g i e s  and d i r e c t i o n  th e  co rpo ra t ion  
was to  fo llow.  He conso l ida ted  the  c o r p o r a t io n ' s  p r o je c t s  which had 
H i th e r to  evolved in an uncordinated manner, in to  a p o r t f o l i o ,  and 
designed the  s t r u c t u r e  to  manage i t .  One d iv i s io n a l  d i r e c t o r  
c h a r a c te r i s e d  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  as fo llows:
I t  was a t  t h i s  s tage  t h a t  we f e l t  we were j u s t  r o l l i n g  down the  road 
without a c l e a r - c u t  plan of what s t r u c t u r e  we needed, and how long 
such a s t r u c t u r e  would c a r ry  us in o rder  t o  achieve our o b j e c t i v e s .
We engaged a c o n su l t a n t ,  t o  take  a comprehensive look a t  LNDC and 
i t s  s u b s i d i a r i e s  and advise  us on what we were doing,  ( in te rv iew )
The r e p o r t  of th e  co n su l t an t  led to  the  es tab l ishm ent  of th re e  d iv i s io n s  
a t  th e  headquar te rs .  The P ro jec t  department which analysed and e v a l ­
uated th e  co rpo ra t ions  investments ( the  fo re runne r  of the  p re sen t  New
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I n d u s t r i e s  Division - NID), the  Admin is t ra t ive  department and Comp­
t r o l l e r  of Finance to  look a f t e r  the  f i n a n c i a l  ope ra t ions  of the  
s u b s i d i a r i e s .  Roostal began to  l o c a l i s e  some posts  a t  LNDC, and 
d i l u t e  what many government c r i t i c s  c a l l e d  the  'hub of e x p a t r i a t e s ' .
The temporal na tu re  of l eade rsh ip  was the  hallmark of t h i s  per iod .
A year  l a t e r  1976 Roostal was replaced by a Canadian - Roger Gurr, 
who came through the  auspices  of the  Canadian I n te rn a t io n a l  Develop­
ment Agency - CIDA. The government was reviewing i t s  f i r s t  f iv e  
year  development plans and the  review was c r i t i c a l  of the  ro le  of 
LNDC, and i t s  f a i l u r e  to  meet the  job c r e a t io n  t a r g e t s ,  and c a l l e d  
fo r  r e th in k in g  of i t s  s t r a t e g i e s .  The t r i g g e r  of t h i s  c a l l  fo r  
change, i t  could be argued was th e  f in a n c i a l  burden the  government 
was b ear ing .  The mining r o y a l t i e s  and lev ie s  t h a t  Van Gen had 
nego t ia ted  had expired and SA companies decl ined  to  renew them.
There was a lso  a s h i f t  in government economic s t r a t e g y  which had 
prev ious ly  emphasized the  development of a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c to r .  Indust ry  
had suddenly become a top  p r i o r i t y  and a l l  focus was on what the  
i n d u s t r i a l  c a t a l y s t  - LNDC was doing. S t r a t e g i e s  t h a t  had h i t h e r t o  
passed unnot iced or  t a k e n - fo r - g r a n t e d ,  were challenged and c lo se ly  
s c r u t i n i z e d .  The government second f i v e  year  development plan 
o b je c t iv e s  were to  c r e a t e  4500 new jobs in manufacturing and the  
promotion of s m a l l - s ca le  indigenous in dus t ry .  R12 m i l l io n  was to  be 
in je c ted  in to  Trade and Commerce and government had c l e a r l y  ind ica ted  
t h a t  i t  would spearhead investment,  u sua l ly  through LNDC and i t s  
s u b s i d i a r i e s ,  where t h i s  proves th e  e f f e c t i v e  and e f f i c i e n t  approach
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to  s t a r t  v ia b le  ventures  which c o n t r ib u te  to  the  i n d u s t r i a l  s t reng th  
of th e  country  (Second Plan,  1975-80). The s u b s i d i a r i e s  a l so  continued 
to  lose  money, see Figure 6 .3 .
Figure 6.3







Source: LNDC Financia l  Records
That was the  lean period when LNDC was completely dependent on the  
government f o r  both r e c u r r e n t  expenditure  and c a p i t a l  investments 
and p r e c i p i t a t e d  more government involvement in th e  opera t iona l  
a c t i v i t i e s  of th e  c o rp o ra t io n .  The government I n d u s t r i a l  Planner 
expla ined  why:
"Where LNDC as an e n t i t y  i s  opera t ing  with i t s  own re sou rces ,  the  
Board (of LNDC) wil l  have th e  l a s t  say.  But where they cannot 
f inance  t h e i r  own p r o j e c t s  and the  bulk of the  resources  has to  
come from government, we have t o  s a t i s f y  ourse lves  t h a t  t h e i r  p r o j e c t s  
a re  v i a b l e ,  and the  Central  Planning has t o  app ra i se  them. In t h a t  
case ,  we take  th e  dec is ion  and not th e  Board".
The u n c e r t a in ty  concerning management, and the  high tu rnover  which
preva i led  between 1973 and 1976 had cons ide rab le  negat ive  e f f e c t s  on 
LNDC and o f f s e t  the  progress  which had been made in the  ea r ly  y ear s ,
(World Bank Report,  1982). From 1973, no CEO of LNDC las ted  fo r  more
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than two years  in t h a t  p o s i t i o n .  No fewer than s ix  in d iv idua ls  held 
t h a t  p o s i t i o n  in le ss  than nine y e a r s ,  most of whom were p a r t  of 
t e ch n ica l  a s s i s t a n c e  to  Lesotho. Competent managers could not be 
r e c r u i t e d  and r e t a in e d ,  th e  p o s i t io n  which led t o  a rap id  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  
in the  performance of the  co rp o ra t io n .
Since th e  emphasis around t h i s  period was on job c re a t io n  - a t  l e a s t  
from th e  government po in t  of view, the  companies t h a t  were los ing 
money e i t h e r  through dec l in ing  markets,  poor management, o r  both,  
were sus ta ined  through heavy dosage of government subs idy. Again, 
fo llowing s e izu re  of power in 1970, Jona than 's  regime lacked popular 
support  and c a r r i e d  the legit imacy stigma th a t  may have even tua l ly  
con t r ib u ted  to  i t s  downfall in 1906. There was a f e e l in g  among 
par ty  apparatus  t h a t  the  c lo su re  of u n p ro f i t ab l e  s u b s id i a r i e s  was a 
p o l i t i c a l  r i s k  t h a t  could exacerbate  and diminish the  f l i c k e r i n g  
p o l i t i c a l  conf idence ,  and r e f l e c t  on h is  incompetence to  develop 
and manage the  economy of the  country .
The Government In te rvenes
The government a t t i t u d e  towards LNDC management had changed, and 
was h ighly  c r i t i c a l  of the  fo re ign  exper ts  and t h e i r  a b i l i t y  and d e s i r e  - 
t o  t r a i n  th e  lo c a l s  f o r  managerial  p o s i t i o n s .  They moved s w i f t ly  to  
t i g h t e n  t h e i r  con t ro l  and d i c t a t e  the  proceedings by p u t t in g  p ressure  
on LNDC to  speed up l o c a l i s a t i o n .  The p o s i t io n  of  deputy CEO was 
c re a te d ,  and the  board of LNDC, a f t e r  c o n su l t a t io n s  with the  govern­
ment, appointed a Mosotho economist,  then th e  d i r e c t o r  of Central  
Planning and Development. The ' c o n s u l t a t i o n 1 a c t u a l l y  r e f e r s  to  
n eg o t ia t io n s  between LNDC chairman and the  m in i s t e r  in charge of
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Centra l  Planning to  r e l e a s e  the appointee to  LNDC. In p r a c t i c e ,  the  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  and s e l e c t i o n  of the  candida te  was a p o l i t i c a l  dec is ion  
which the board had to  implement.
There was a lso  a mounting p o l i t i c a l  p ressu re  t h a t  the  es tab l ishment  
o f  LNDC has b en e f i t ed  fo re ign  inves to rs  and neglec ted  indigenous e n t e r ­
p r i s e s .  As in d ica ted  e a r l i e r ,  LNDC s u b s id i a r i e s  were managed by f o r e ig n e r s ,  
imainly SA managers, and th e  headquar te rs  was equa l ly  dominated by fo re ign  
e x p e r t s  with a s p r in k l e  of  lo ca l s  no more than 5, a t  middle management 
l e v e l .  Realiz ing th e  i n d i s p e n s a b i l i t y  of fo re ig n  investment and 
e x p e r t i s e  to  the  development of Lesotho, and the  lack of s k i l l e d  managers 
in the  local  market,  Roger Gurr, the  CEO, reached a compromise so lu t io n  
with the  government by e s t a b l i s h i n g  a sepa ra te  d iv i s io n  with in  LNDC - 
Basotho E n te rp r i se  Development - BED t h a t  would s p e c i f i c a l l y  promote 
th e  development of s m a l l - s ca le  indigenous e n t e r p r i s e s .  The former 
chairman of LNDC expla ined  the  unders tanding underlying t h i s  d ec i s io n :
“There was a po l icy  arrangement between LNDC, Min is t ry  of Central  
Planning and Min is t ry  of Trade,  t h a t  BED would only deal with the  
p r o j e c t s  up to  R100,000 and LNDC with anything beyond t h a t  amount." 
( in te rv iew)
I m p l i c i t l y ,  t h i s  arrangement r e leased  LNDC to  concen t ra te  on fo re ign  
investment as local  e n t e r p r i s e s  could not q u a l i f y  and meet LNDC 
investment c r i t e r i a .  Moreover, t h e  magnitude of investments o f fe red
r
by LNDC companies and fo re ig n  in v e s t o r s ,  c rea ted  more employment 
opp o r tu n i t i e s  than th e  small local  e n t e r p r i s e s .  A f te r  two years  the  
government r e a l i z e d  t h a t  t h e re  was a need to  e s t a b l i s h  BED as a f u 11- 
f le tched  p a r a s t a t a l  and break i t  away from LNDC so t h a t  i t  could
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o p era te  independently and source i t s  own funds independently .  Through 
the  a s s i s t a n c e  of CIDA, obviously expedited by Roger Gurr, t h i s  was 
achieved in 1978.
Major environmental  changes were tak ing  place  w i th in  the  reg ion .  SA 
'homelands ' ,  Botswana, Swaziland and Malawi a l l  had e s t a b l i s h e d  
development co rpo ra t ions  t h a t  competed with LNDC f o r  managerial  s k i l l s  
in SA market.  A study commissioned by LNDC Board t o  look a t  managerial  
s a l a r i e s  of LNDC and i t s  s u b s id i a r i e s  in order  to  reduce the  lo s se s ,  
recommended t h a t  to  a t t r a c t  good managers, major changes in s a la ry  
s t r u c t u r e  were imperative t o  reward performance.  They recommended:
- P r o f i t  Sharing (up to  13% - to  motivate su b s id ia ry  managers).
- Tax adjustment - p a r t i c u l a r l y  fo r  e x p a t r i a t e s .
- Housing allowances.
- Medical insurance schemes.
Salary  inc reases  has o f ten  been a co n t ro v e rs ia l  i s su e  which br ings  
to  su r face  the  simmering and su b t l e  c o n f l i c t  and envy of bureaucra ts  
towards LNDC management. I t  i s  one is sue  which g enera te s  d i f f e r e n t  
pe rcep t ions  about the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  of the  co rpo ra t ion  and the  
government. Questions were r a i s e d  by d i f f e r e n t  m i n i s t r i e s  as to  
whether th e  co rpo ra t ion  was an in te g ra l  p a r t  of th e  Min is t ry  of Trade,  
and hence bound by c i v i l  s e r v ic e  sa la ry  s t r u c t u r e ,  o r  a p r iv a te  
e n t e r p r i s e  whose s a la ry  was determined by management and of ten  
influenced by what the  compet itors  o f f e re d .  D i f f e r e n t  ' r e f e r e n c e  
o th e r s '  became an i s su e ,  management looked to  th e  p r i v a t e  s ec to r  
and managerial  p ro fess ion  and defined themselves in t h a t  con tex t ,  
while the  p o l i t i c i a n s  took a ' them (management) and u s '  a t t i t u d e .
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I t  was not an easy dec is ion  f o r  bureaucra ts  to  approve b e t t e r  s a l a r i e s  
and perks  fo r  LNDC and i t s  s u b s i d i a r i e s  t h a t  they could not enjoy within  
c i v i l  s e r v i c e .  After p ro t r a c te d  n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  based on commissioned 
s tu d ie s  and p ressu re  from management, the  government was persuaded to  
accept th e  changes only a f t e r  CIDA, which was a l ready  involved in LNDC 
through CEO, and a lso  helped t o  s e t  up BED, had supported LNDC.
The homeland of Transkei which shares  borders with Lesotho to  the  
South,  was granted ’ independence'  by SA and Lesotho decl ined  to  
recognize  i t  as an independent s t a t e ,  and Transkei c losed borders  and 
cu t  o f f  Leso tho 's  t r a d e  l i n k s .  The r e s u l t a n t  was LNDC, under govern­
ment d i r e c t i v e ,  had to  inves t  heav i ly  on s u b s t i t u t e  shopping cen t re s  
t o  counter  the  border c lo s u r e s .  This investment proved u n p ro f i t ab le  
a few months l a t e r  when P r e to r i a  r e s to re d  o rder  to  the  s i t u a t i o n  by 
reopening the  borders and th e  shopping complex had to  be c losed .  I t  
was a p o l i t i c a l  dec is ion  d i r e c t e d  a t  a perceived p o l i t i c a l  c r i s i s ,  
and LNDC had l i t t l e  chance ( i f  any) t o  n e g o t i a t e  f o r  a l t e r n a t i v e  
responses .  I t  had to  ab rup t ly  h a l t ,  suspend, abandon, or  r e - d i r e c t  
i t s  s t r a t e g i e s  t o  the  'he re  and now' o rders  of th e  government. The 
IDA d iv i s io n a l  d i r e c t o r  descr ibed  h is  f r u s t r a t i o n s  of such d ec i s io n s :
"When we have th e  m i n i s t e r i a l  p re s su re ,  we take  th e  view t h a t  i t s  
the  exception t o  the  po l icy  made by po l icy  makers and th e re fo re  
we must t ake  a p o s i t i v e  a t t i t u d e  towards i t .  Even making t h a t  
allowance you f in d  t h a t  t h e r e  a re  problems (as th e  above p r o je c t  had).
But in t h a t  process  you commit a l o t  of t ime on something t h a t  you 
knew was a dead dog. In some cases  we took a c l i n i c a l  and independent 
l i n e  and t o l d  th e  m in i s t e r  why we could not undertake h i s  des i red  
p r o j e c t .  He understood and accepted  our d e c i s io n " .
Thus while government in te rv e n t io n  is  not n e c e s s a r i l y  a good or  bad 
th in g ,  a c t u a l l y  i t  has been an opportune t r i g g e r  of change, but the
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unpred ic tab le  na tu re  of the  d i r e c t i o n  the in te rv en t io n  w i l l  take ,  
and which in te rv e n t io n s  or  p ressu res  are  amenable to  n eg o t ia t io n s  
became problematic  in terms of s t a b l i z i n g  and in t e r n a l i z i n g  change.
The World Bank Moves In
The World Bank - WB, a s s o c ia t i o n  with LNDC goes back to  1973 when
a t  the  he igh t  of le ad e rsh ip  c r i s i s ,  following the  depar tu re  of 
Rembrandt group, th e  government nego t ia ted  temporary te chn ica l  a s s i s ­
tance  with th e  Bank. The c l o s e r  l inks  of co-opera t ion  began in 1976 
when the  government requested  WB to  provide f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  to  
LNDC. A thorough e v a lu a t io n  of LNDC and i t s  s u b s id i a r i e s  was under­
taken by the WB, and the  a p p ra i sa l  mission recommended broad changes 
from p o l i c i e s ,  o rg a n iz a t io n a l  s t r u c t u r e s ,  f i n a n c i a l  systems, s t a f f i n g ,  
co rpo ra te  s t r a t e g y  as well as c a p i t a l  s t r u c t u r e  and amendments to  LNDC 
a c t .  These changes were to  be e f f e c t e d  as a condi t ion  of cons ider ing  
the  f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e ,  and were c r i t i c a l  and v i t a l  t o  a l l  the
th re e  i n t e r a c t a n t s  - WB, LNDC, and government because they became
th e  c r i t e r i a ,  compliance with which would determine fu tu r e  a s s i s t a n c e s .  
The most s i g n i f i c a n t  ones are  summarised below (WB r e p o r t ,  1980):
- The Corporation s h a l l  no t normally incur fo re ign  exchange r i s k s  
from i t s  loans repayab le  in fo re ig n  currency (WB had agreed with 
th e  government to  absorb the  r i s k s ) .
- The Corporation w i l l  develop and maintain a s o l id  and well balanced 
organ iza t ion  and a competent management team. P rofess iona l  and 
o th e r  s t a f f  sh a l l  be r e c r u i t e d  so le ly  on the  b a s i s  of t h e i r  qua l ­
i f i c a t i o n s  and exper ience  ( c l e a r l y  t h i s  was meant to  curb c o r ru p t io n '
153
and nepot ism).
- The C orpora t ion ' s  equ i ty  and t o t a l  exposure per investment sh a l l  
not exceed 10% and 20% re s p e c t iv e ly  of i t s  net  worth.
- The WB noted t h a t  LNDC Board had not been providing  the  co rpora t ion  
with s u f f i c i e n t  d i r e c t i o n ,  due in the  main to  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  composit ion.  
The government was urged to  en large  i t  t o  nine and appoint d i r e c t o r s  
with t e ch n ica l  e x p e r t i s e .  The board,  in d i r e  f i n a n c i a l  and managerial  
s t r a i t s ,  was eager t o  p la ca te  the  WB, they acceded and the  PM became 
the  P re s id e n t ,  while the  M in is ter  of Trade became the  Chairman and 
o ve rsee r  of  the  co rp o ra t io n .
The need to  develop local human resources  in LNDC had been d iscussed ,  
and a f i v e - y e a r  t r a i n i n g  program f o r  Basotho s t a f f  was agreed upon.
(This r e f l e c t e d  th e  mood of the  p o l i t i c i a n s  who f e l t  they were 
g e t t i n g  a raw deal from fo re ign  e x p e r t s ,  and t h a t  t h e i r  managerial 
know-how lacked local  anchorage).
-  To ensure  t h a t  LNDC's s t r a t e g i e s  were c o n s i s t e n t  with government 
p o l i c y ,  the  co rpora t ion  had to  submit i t s  annual programs to  the  
M in i s t r i e s  of Finance,  Central  Planning and Trade and take  t h e i r  
views and comments t o  th e  Board.
The former Permanent Sec re ta ry  - PS of  Trade argued t h a t  as the  c h i e f  
accountant of the  m in i s t ry ,  she had to  'ensure  e f f i c i e n t  use of govern­
ment funds through con t ro l  and c l o s e r  screening  on LNDC b u d g e ts ' .
While the  former CEO, Senna complained t h a t  'our  budgets were no longer 
submitted d i r e c t l y  to  the  Treasury,  but had to  go through Minis try
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of Trade. This means we have to  n e g o t ia te  with our m in is t ry  (Trade) 
as well as Finance f o r  urgent a c t i o n .  We have very l i t t l e  chance of 
defending our p roposa ls ,  we re ly  on the  m in is t ry  to  p resen t  our c a s e ' .
This c l e a r l y  marked a major depar tu re  in the  conception of the  p o l i t i c a l  
Board t h a t  the  f i r s t  CEO of  the  co rpo ra t ion  had envisaged.  I t  c rea ted  
independent u n i t s  with d i v e r s i t y  of views and f a c i l i t a t e d  power p o l ­
i t i c s  among m i n i s t r i e s .  M in is te rs  no longer regarded themselves as 
e x - o f f i c i o  board members, r a t h e r  they redef ined  themselves as 'govern­
ment' and board members. As th e  country was then under one-man r u l e ,  
the  m in i s t e r s  were appointed in and out by the  PM, a f a c t o r  which was 
seen as f o s t e r in g  consensus decision-making on board as a l l  the  
m in i s t e r s  r a l l i e d  behind t h e i r  l e ade r ,  and the  voices  of d i s s e n t  were 
kept to  the  minimum. The CEO main preoccupation was to  e x e r t  h is  
in f luence  on the  Chairman, convince him and the  r e s t  would fo llow.
With the  PM becoming th e  P res iden t  and no longer ch a i r in g  the  board,  
the  m in i s t e r s  were r e leased  to  vent t h e i r  paroch ia l  i n t e r e s t s  t h a t  
were o f ten  a t  var iance  with each o th e r .  The CEO had to  s e l l  h is  
ideas ,  dec i s ions  and envisaged changes,  and persuade broader  segments 
of a c t o r s .  There was a l so  a tendency to  impose predetermined Cabinet 
dec i s ions  on those  i s sues  t h a t  were of  p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t  to  the  
government, a m at te r  which aroused oppos i t ion  from some Board members 
who f e l t  the  m in i s t e r s  were i n h i b i t i n g  the  board d e l i b e r a t i o n s :  ' I t
i s  not unusual f o r  m in i s t e r s  t o  t e l l  the  Board t h a t  the  Cabinet has 
a l ready  decided on an i s sue  we a re  about to  d i s c u s s .  That completely 
shuts  o f f  the  d i s c u s s i o n ' ,  observed s ec re ta ry  of  Lesotho Chamber of 
Commerce. These p o l i t i c a l  games b a f f led  even the  p o l i t i c i a n s  them­
selves  as th e  former Chairman of  th e  corpora t ion  complained:
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"Minis te rs  are  e x - o f f i c i o  members of the  board,  but f o r  some reason,  
they argue t h a t  they are  th e re  as LNDC board members, not as m in i s t e r s .  
They make dec i s ions  which make mockery of t h e i r  concurrence in the  
Board, because the  following day when you pursue the  d e c i s io n ,  you 
are  t o l d  t h a t  as a m in i s t e r  I d o n ' t  support  t h a t  d e c i s io n .  I only 
agreed as a board member. There was always t h i s  dilemma."
The novelty  of i n d u s t r i a l  development in Lesotho, inexper ience  and 
lack of t e c h n ic a l  s k i l l s  among dec is ion  makers,  and in fo rm a l i ty  of 
s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s io n ,  became apparent when th e  WB, with a seasoned but 
d i f f e r e n t  exper ience  of i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  world appra ised  LNDC. The LNDC 
a c t  (see  Appendix 1) a u th o r i s e s  the  Board to  determine the  c o rp o r a t io n ' s  
share  c a p i t a l .  However, the  government and LNDC had never bothered to  
determine i t .  Being 100% owned and f inanced by the  government, exempted 
from ta x ,  and from paying out d iv idends ,  i t  was commonly assumed t h a t  
i t s  c a p i t a l  was the  cumulative g ran ts  and loans t h a t  the  government 
had made to  th e  co rp o ra t io n ,  but t h i s  was not e x p l i c i t l y  s t a t e d  any­
where in the  a c t .  Through the  WB recommendation, the  LNDC ac t  was 
amended and th e  c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  au thor ized  c a p i t a l  s e t  a t  R10 m i l l i o n ,  
and th e  paid up c a p i t a l  a t  R4 m i l l i o n .  Added to  t h i s  was a share 
c e r t i f i c a t e  phenomenon. WB expected LNDC t o  hold share  c e r t i f i c a t e s  - 
as would normally be th e  case  - in those  in s tances  where i t  had 
investments .  But th e  concept of stock market,  of  inves t ing  in 
sh a res ,  was and s t i l l  i s  a l i e n  to  most people in Lesotho. Tac it  
agreements and unders tandings  had been made, p a r t i c u l a r l y  between 
LNDC, s u b s i d i a r i e s  and the  government. Such loose ly  coupled a r range­
ments, th e  WB, i n s i s t e d  should be formal ized and legal agreements 
drawn.
While the  co rpora t ion  was s t i l l  h ighly  c e n t r a l i s e d  and Roger Gurr 
making a l l  the  major dec i s ions  a t  th e  headquar te rs  and in the 
s u b s i d i a r i e s ,  t h a t  s t r u c t u r e  could not turn-around the  downward
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t r end  in performance in the  s u b s i d i a r i e s .  A d iv i s io n a l  d i r e c t o r  had 
t h i s  to  say about the  headquar te rs  - su b s id i s a ry  i n t e r a c t i o n :
Around 1976 th e  subsid iaries?  f in a n c i a l  a c t i v i t i e s  were t o t a l l y  c e n t r a l ­
i zed .  All t h e  companies'  accounts were done here a t  the  headquar te rs .  
We had lo t s  of  accountan ts ,  everybody was an accountant ,  we had to  
p repare  accounts  and budgets f o r  the se  companies. D e ce n t ra l i z a t io n  
began to  take  p lace  g radua l ly  in 1977/78. ( in te rv iew )
A d iv i s io n  was c rea ted  a t  the  HQs t h a t  v/ould provide managerial backup 
and monitor th e  performance of the  s u b s i d i a r i e s .  A r a t h e r  s t i f f  
cond i t ion  had a lso  been a t tached  by the  WB review mission t h a t  requ i red  
LNDC to  r e c r u i t  a d i r e c t o r  of opera t ions  ( to  superv ise  the  c rea ted  
d iv i s io n )  s a t i s f a c t o r y  to  the  WB. A 78 year  old American Peace Corps, 
Walter Burns, r e t i r e d  p re s id e n t  of some American Corpora tion ,  was in 
Lesotho, and LNDC leeched on him. The former CEO of the  co rpo ra t ion  
desc r ibedhim as ' t h e  good diamond that  wehavebeen looking f o r ' .  Burns 
was ins t rumenta l  in e s t a b l i s h i n g  the  opera t ions  d iv i s io n  and in fus ing  
h is  dear ly  needed wealth of exper ience .  The fo llowing o rg an iza t io n a l  
s t r u c t u r e  emerged as a r e s u l t  of  gradual growth, m o d i f ica t io n s ,  and 
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Key:  formal i n t e r a c t i o n
  informal i n t e r a c t i o n
J u s t  over one year  as the  CEO and he lp ing  LNDC su rv ive  through i t s  
bleak f i n a n c i a l  pe r iod ,  Roger Gurr , was r ep laced  by h i s  loca l  deputy 
CEO in 1977 when th e  government appoin ted  John Bow who had been groomed 
through the  a s s i s t a n c e  of WB in r e a d in e s s  f o r  the  p o s i t i o n .  His 
appointment s ig n a l l e d  the  government i n t e n t i o n s  to  d i c t a t e  the  
d i r e c t i o n  and management of  th e  c o r p o r a t i o n .  Ted Waddington, PS of
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Finance,  descr ibed  the  appointment as the  government's  'major dec is ion  
t o  make LNDC more r e l e v an t  to  development s t r a t e g i e s ' ,  while the  
D i rec to r  of Planning argued t h a t  the  appointment was the  f i r s t  ' s i g n i f i ­
can t  change' by the  government. I t  had a cau t ious  p o l i t i c a l  support  
and marked what was gene ra l ly  descr ibed  as th e  beginning of  ' r e a l  
changes'  in the  management of LNDC. But t h e r e  were a lso  some s c e p t i c s  
both lo c a l s  and f o r e ig n e r s ,  who wondered whether he would make i t  
where no loca l s  had ventured and succeeded be fo re .  Colonial  hegemony 
s t i l l  in f luences  th e  views of most Basotho tremendously.  E f f i c i e n t  
management i s  s t i l l  c lo se ly  l inked with fo re ign  exper ts  (unders tand­
ab ly ,  these  v/ere the  people who have been and s t i l l  manage most 
success fu l  big e n t e r p r i s e s  in developing n a t io n s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  in Lesotho) 
and people gen e ra l ly  seem to  lack confidence and are  s ce p t i c a l  about 
lo ca l s  in such managerial  p o s i t i o n s .  Others viewed Bow as a local  
conduit  t h a t  would rehash th e  views of  fo re ign  personnel t h a t  dominated 
LNDC. Bow gave the  fol lowing account of th e  s ce p t i c a l  a t t i t u d e s  he 
encountered in tak ing  over as th e  CEO of th e  c o rpo ra t ion :
There were those  who sa id  ah w e l l ,  i t ' s  a Mosotho in charge now, w e ' l l  
see how he f a r e s ,  ( in te rv iew )
He was a young t a l e n t e d  and char i sm a t ic  p r a c t i t i o n e r ,  hardworking, 
i n t o l e r a n t  and always d r iv in g  h i s  s t a f f  to  high l e v e l s  of  performance.
His exper ience  as government d i r e c t o r  of Central  Planning provided 
him with a va luab le  in s ig h t  in to  th e  i n t r i c a c i e s  of  th e  b u reau c ra t ic  
system and how i t  o p e ra te s ,  and had e s ta b l i s h e d  c lo se  connections  
with key p o l i t i c a l  a c t o r s .  As a deputy c h ie f  execu t ive  f o r  two 
y e a r s ,  he had kept a low p r o f i l e  while a ff irming h imself  as a fo r ce fu l  
and i n s p i r a t i o n a l  l eade r .  He was ins trumental  in n e g o t i a t in g  the  
c o r p o r a t io n ' s  s a la ry  reviews t h a t  v/ere even tua l ly  approved by the  
government. Before h is  appointment,  he was on execu t ive  t r a i n i n g
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program in t h e  US, organized by WB. Thus, he took over the  leadersh ip  
with a b roader  pe rcep t ion  of LNDC's d i r e c t io n  and had a thorough grasp 
and c o n t ro l  of h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  and fu n c t io n s .  He was a courageous 
and p e r su as iv e  communicator as w i l l  be demonstrated l a t e r .  Describing 
th e  image and th e  c u l t u r e  t h a t  he brought to  LNDC, a former d iv i s io n a l  
d i r e c t o r  observed:
Drive and hardwork is  what c h a r a c te r i s e d  most of our s t a f f .  The 
co rp o ra t io n  got the  r e p u ta t io n  of  being a good payer with good 
remuneration package,  but a s so c ia ted  with t h a t  was the  aspec t  t h a t  
i f  you d i d n ' t  perform you were f i r e d .  Consequently,  people who 
jo ined  us were people with ambition and d r iv e ,  ( in te rv iew )
The appointment of a local  CEO, i t  was argued, would bring s t a b i l i t y  
to  management problems and ensure  c o n t in u i ty .  Bow had a local  touch 
and f a m i l i a r i t y  and would change the  face of Lesotho with care  and 
unders tanding  to  consu l t  and involve o the r  prominant groups in the  
coun t ry ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  the  indigenous e n t e r p r i s e s .  Thus, a l l  shades 
of  views, s p ec u la t io n s  and expec ta t ions  were expressed ,  a l b e i t  in 
a suppressed manner, regard ing h is  appointment.  But p o l i t i c a l l y ,  
th e  most important con s id e ra t io n  was the  symbolic s ig n i f i c a n c e ;  the  
c o rp o ra t io n  could now be t r u l y  seen as Lesotho owned and managed.
He t h e r e f o r e  assumed h is  execut ive  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  with a s trong 
p o l i t i c a l  suppor t  almost comparable to  Van Gen's.
Summary
The preceding account of th e  c o r p o r a t io n ' s  development in d ic a te  t h a t  
in the  l a t e  1960 's i t s  s t r a t e g y  evolved in an e xp lo ra to ry  and 
o p p o r tu n i s t i c  f a s h io n ,  o f ten  revolv ing  around the  v i s io n  and percep t ions  
of  the  CEO who had enormous powers and inf luence  over th e  p o l i t i c a l  
a c t o r s ,  in p a r t i c u l a r  the PM. His e x p e r t i s e ,  bus iness  connections 
wi th in  the  SA environment,  competent management and p r o f i t a b i l i t y  of
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h is  o p e ra t io n s ,  ex te rna l  sources of funds t h a t  he c o n t r o l l e d ,  b o l s t ­
ered h i s  s t r a t e g i c  dec is ion  p re ro g a t iv e .  From 1967 to  1972 the  s t r a t e g y  
c r y s t a l l i s e d  around the  growth and development of h a n d ic r a f t  in d u s t ry .  
Because of the  in te rp la y  of  var ious  f a c t o r s ,  inc luding f requen t  l e a d e r ­
ship  changes,  recess ion  in SA and world h a n d ic ra f t  markets and d e t e r ­
i o r a t i o n  in f i n a n c i a l  performance of the  subs id ia ry  companies, from 
the  beginning of 1973 th e r e  was a s h i f t  in the  investment s t r a t e g y  
of  the  co rpora t ion  from h a n d ic r a f t s  to  h o te l s  in the  f a s t  growing 
t o u r i s t  in d u s t ry ,  and j o i n t  ventures  in motor veh ic le  d e a le r sh ip  
f r a n c h i s e .
The period  1973-1977 was marked by more changes than s t a b i l i t y ,  and 
f requen t  bouts of  CEOs changes,  co nso l ida t ion  and designing  of 
s t r u c t u r e s ,  f i n a n c i a l  c r i s i s ,  e x te rn a l  p ressures  and government 
i n t e rv e n t io n .
F in a l ly ,  when Bow took over as CEO, the  co rpora t ion  had b u i l t  up a 
hotch-potch of p o r t f o l i o  as v a r iga ted  as the  d i f f e r e n t  CEOs t h a t  
had managed i t .  There was no c l e a r  p a t t e r n  of which d i r e c t i o n  the  
co rpora t ion  was headed. In the  next Chapter we see which d i r e c t i o n  
he fol lowed,  why and how.
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Chapter 7
The Period of Paradigm S h i f t s :  1977-82 
What Business should we r e a l l y  be in ?
The momentum of change i n i t i a t e d  by the  WB appra isa l  team of c o n su l t an t s  
and th e  l o c a l i s a t i o n  of the  CEO p o s i t i o n ,  c rea ted  an oppor tun i ty  f o r  the  
new leade r  - Bow, to  re d e f in e  th e  purpose and d i r e c t i o n  t h a t  he wanted 
the  co rp o ra t io n  to  fo llow. To in t roduce  such large  s ca le  ' frame b reak ing '  
changes,  Bow needed the  co -opera t ion  and commitment of h is  s t a f f ,  he 
had to  r e ly  on the  s k i l l s  and e x p e r t i s e  of h is  e x p a t r i a t e  execu t ives  
most of whom were h ighly c r i t i c a l  about h is  appointment and openly 
chal lenged h is  a u th o r i ty  and made c o s t l y  and enormous demands of ten  
with a t h r e a t  of r e s ig n a t io n  i f  t h e i r  demands were not met. As a l ready  
poin ted ou t ,  a t t r a c t i n g  s k i l l e d  managers has always been LNDC's main 
problem, most of those  t h a t  came - as w i l l  be shown l a t e r  in t h i s  
c h ap te r ,  were p a r t  of b i l a t e r a l  agreements between Lesotho and o th e r  
f r i e n d l y  c o u n t r i e s .  Thus, whatever dec is ion  the  CEO v/ould t a k e  to  
e x e r t  h i s  a u t h o r i t y ,  he would have to  be mindful of t h i s  d e l i c a t e  
ba lance .
Bow had to  r e s t o r e  conf idence t o  h is  doubtful  execu t ives  and took some 
harsh dec is ions  such as accept ing  r e s ig n a t io n s  and not renewing some 
c o n t r a c t s ,  t o  demonstrate h is  in to le ra n c e  to  r e s i s t a n c e  i n te n t  on 
undermining h i s  a u th o r i t y .  Such p u n i t iv e  ac t ions  send a powerful 
s ignal  throughout the  co rpo ra t ion  t h a t  they e i t h e r  co -opera te  and 
comply or  leave; and enabled th e  CEO to  re -o rgan ize  h i s  s en io r  manage­
ment and appoint those t h a t  were suppor tive  of h is  v i s ion  to  promote 
the  changes.
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The focus of concern by a l l  the  ac to r s  with the  s take  in LNDC, was on 
how to  red re ss  the  d e t e r i o r a t i n g  performance of the c o rp o ra t io n  and 
make i t  p r o f i t a b l e ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y ,  the  s u b s i d i a r i e s .  Bow had argued 
to  the  Board t h a t  the  co rpora t ion  was s t i l l  wedded to  the  old exp lo r ­
a to ry  s t r a t e g i e s  even when th e  s i t u a t i o n s  had d r a s t i c a l l y  changed and 
c a l l e d  f o r  prudence in the  deployment of the  c o r p o r a t io n ' s  re sources  
and review i t s  s t r a t e g y .  Explaining why he f e l t  th e re  was a need fo r  
change, Bow e labo ra ted  as fo llows:
I t  was my view over the  years  up to  the  t ime when I became CEO in 1977, 
th e re  had not r e a l l y  been an in-depth  look a t  which way LNDC was going 
and why; or how i t  was performing. I t  tended to  fol low the  same 
p a t t e rn  t h a t  Van Gen had s e t ,  which was b a s i c a l l y  g e t t in g  in as a 
s t a r t e r  [of indus t ry ]  and involved in equ i ty  investment.  I f e l t  t h a t  
had been achieved. We have proved t h a t  Lesotho has i n d u s t r i a l  po ten­
t i a l ,  and with good management in p lace ,  in v es to r s  can make money, 
( i n t e r v i e w ) .
There were some ex te rna l  d i r e c t o r s  of the  Board who f e l t  t h e  same and 
pointed out t h a t  s t r a t e g i c  change would enhance the  c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  
chances of securing f in a n c i a l  support  from the  WB. As one o u ts id e  
d i r e c t o r  put i t  more f o r c e f u l l y :
We h av en ' t  conscious ly  t r i e d  to  s i t  back from our day- to -day  o p e ra t io n s ,  
the  h u r ly - b u r ly ,  the  h u s t l e  and b u s t l e ,  and to  t r y  to  take  th e  considered 
view of what i t  i s  we a re  t r y i n g  to  do, how good we are  a t  doing i t  
given our r e so u rce s ,  s e t t i n g  ourse lves  a t a r g e t  where we want t o  be 
in f i v e  years  t ime,  and c h a r t in g  t a c t i c a l  plans  f o r  g e t t i n g  us where 
we want t o  go. As a r e s u l t  of h in d s ig h t ,  t o  re-examine the  c r i t e r i a  
t h a t  we use to  make investments and look a t  our o rg a n iz a t io n a l  s t r u c ­
t u r e .  Very fundamental re -examinat ion of t h e se  th ings  which a re  very 
important in de termining  what an o rgan iza t ion  is  and how i t  works,  we 
needed to  do t h a t .  I f  you never do t h a t ,  a l l  t h a t  happens i s  t h a t  
your o rg an iza t io n  j u s t  develops in a s o r t  of  shamblic way from one 
year  to  th e  next without any c l e a r  sense of  the  d i r e c t i o n  and percep­
t i o n  of what i t  is  you a re  doing r i g h t  or  wrong. There d o e s n ' t  seem 
to  be c l e a r  sh in ing  l i g h t  -  perhaps i t  got clouded - then i t ' s  
about t ime we got the  d u s te r  of  and dus t  i t  down, ( in t e r v i e w ) .
Following t h i s  apparent recogn i t ion  of the  need fo r  change, th e  policy  
paper o u t l i n in g  the  proposed changes was p resen ted  to the  board.
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The Investment Promotion S tra tegy
Investment promotion was the  pet  idea of Bow. While in the  USA, 
a t tend ing  the  execut ive  t r a i n i n g ,  as p a r t  of h is  programme, he a ttended 
the  I r i s h  seminar where I r i s h  I n d u s t r i a l  Development Authori ty  - I IDA, 
was promoting investments t o  I r e lan d .  He got so impressed by t h e i r  
p r e s e n ta t io n  and f e l t  i t  would be app rop r ia te  t o  LNDC and would e f f e c t ­
ive ly  marry the  d i s j o i n t e d  e f f o r t s  t h a t  were being made by m i n i s t r i e s ,  
Lesotho embassies abroad, and LNDC. He made the  proposal to  the  board 
s t r e s s i n g  t h a t  the  co rpo ra t ion  should d e s i s t  from being an i n s t i g a t o r ,  
inves t ing  in equ i ty  and becoming a holding company, r a t h e r ,  i t  should 
become a f a c i l i t a t o r ,  a development f inance  co rpora t ion  -  DFC, t h a t  
would a t t r a c t  and f i e l d  p rospec t ive  inves to rs  through a well co­
o rd ina ted  and d i r e c ted  investment promotion. E labora t ing  on the 
d i s t i n c t i o n  between the  two approaches Bow pointed out t h a t :
"The holding company inves t s  in equ i ty  in o rder  to  e s t a b l i s h  and manage 
i t s  s u b s i d i a r i e s ,  whereas the  DFC promotes, f a c i l i t a t e s ,  and f inances  
bus iness  t h a t  a re  run by p r i v a t e  ind iv idua ls  and/or companies".
LNDC had been t r a f f i c i n g  in both and had encountered ser ious  managerial 
problems. There was a p re ss ing  need f o r  LNDC to  devote s i g n i f i c a n t  
resources  and energ ies  to  th e  ta sk  of seeking out and a t t r a c t i n g  fo re ign  
manufacturing companies to  Lesotho i f  i t  was going to a:hieve the  c r e a t io n  
o f  4500 new jobs  in manufacturing as t a rg e te d  in th e  second f iv e  year  
development p lan .  I t  was t h e r e f o r e  proposed t h a t  the  co rpora t ion  
should change i t s  s t r a t e g y  and ins tead  of having a f i n g e r  in every p ie ,  
i t  should:
1 Investment Promotion Policy  Statement,  1977.
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1. Agress ive ly  promote Lesotho as an investment l o c a t io n ,  support  
and a s s i s t  p r i v a t e  i n i t i a t i v e .  In t h i s  regard  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  
e f f o r t s  would take  p lace  and would inc lude  not only SA, which 
has been a major source of in v e s to r s  to  Lesotho, but a l so  Europe 
and North America.
2.  In conjunct ion  with r e l e v a n t  m i n i s t r i e s  and a f f e c t e d  groups ( l i k e  
Lesotho Chamber of Commerce) i d e n t i f y  investment p r i o r i t i e s  and 
comparative  advantages t h a t  the  country  has to  o f f e r  and promote 
major s ec to r s  within  th e se  areas  t o  p o t e n t i a l  in v es to r s  ( in  
p r a c t i c e ,  t h i s  approach tended to  emphasize 'mass marketing'  of 
Lesotho in o rder  to  ge t  wider exposure and secure  p u b l i c i t y  f o r  
t h e  country ,  without t a r g e t i n g  any p a r t i c u l a r  segment of p o t e n t i a l  
i n v e s t o r s ,  and accepting  whatever job c r e a t in g  p r o j e c t s  inves to rs  
p roposed ) .
3. Improve the  performance of the  s u b s i d i a r i e s  to  th e  po in t  where 
income from t h i s  p o r t f o l i o  would s u s ta in  th e  c o r p o r a t io n ' s  
o pe ra t ing  cos ts  and genera te  investment c a p i t a l .
4.  E s ta b l i s h  th e  foundations  f o r  a s trong i n s t i t u t i o n  managed by 
l o c a l s ,  through in te n s iv e  s t a f f  development.1
This s t r a t e g y  marked th e  beginning of  a well s t r u c t u r e d  and co-o rd ina ted  
e f f o r t  t o  promote investment in Lesotho. There had been no attempts  
to  seek fo re ig n  investments and ' s e l l '  Lesotho as a v ia b le  investment 
a r e a .  The co rpora t ion  had in th e  main responded t o  'w ork- ins '  and 
in q u i r i e s  from p o te n t i a l  i n v e s t o r s ,  o r  b r ig h t  ideas  by government or
1 Investment Promotion Policy  Sta tement,  1977.
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from w i th in .  The new s t r a t e g y  emphasized labour in ten s iv e  manufacturing 
i n d u s t r i e s .  As the  d i r e c t o r  of Investment Promotion Unit po in ted ou t ,  
t h e r e  was nobody in t h i s  region with t h a t  s o r t  of program, i t  was 
unique and the  f i r s t  investment campaign in the  reg ion .  The co rpora t ion  
i n s t a n t l y  gained p u b l i c i t y  as more informat ion was dis seminated about 
investment c l im ate  in Lesotho, p r i n c i p a l l y  through conferences  in SA. 
E s s e n t i a l l y  th e  s t r a t e g y  comprised of s e l l i n g  the  comparative advantages,  
package of  in c e n t iv e s ,  and f a c i l i t a t i v e  a s s i s t a n c e  o f f e red  by Lesotho 
and LNDC. These included the  following:
- a s ix  year  tax holiday under the  Pioneer In d u s t r i e s  program.*
Companies can apply f o r  complete exemption from company tax fo r  
t h e  f i r s t  s ix  years  of o pe ra t ion .
- A n o n - n a t io n a l i z a t i o n  po l icy .
- D uty-f ree  and p r e f e r e n t i a l  access  t o  the  w or ld ' s  major consumer 
markets where SA is  shunned.
-  Assurance of  p r o f i t  r e p a t r i a t i o n .
- Equity or  loan p a r t i c i p a t i o n  [neg o t iab le  between LNDC, in v es to r  
and government depending on type of investment] .
- Tra in ing  g ran ts  to  cover 75 per cen t  of t r a i n i n g  c o s t s  of in v e s t o r s .
While th e  board was g e n e ra l ly  suppor t ive  of the  changes,  the  cab ine t  
which had to  endorse some f i s c a l  po l icy  aspec ts  of the  s t r a t e g y  (eg
* Pioneer s t a t u s  are  a s e t  of tax  incen t ives  awarded by an independent 
Board ope ra t ing  under the  aeg is  of the  M in is te r  of Trade. LNDC CEO 
is  a member.
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tax exemptions,  dividends and p r o f i t s  r e p a t r i a t i o n )  was ' c o o l 1 and 
somewhat askance about i t .  F i r s t ,  the  government was ambivalent 
about whether investment campaign to  promote Lesotho as a v iab le  
investment lo c a t io n ,  c o n s t i t u t e d  an expected a c t i v i t y  of the  co rp o ra t io n ,  
and secondly,  the  s t r a t e g y  was biased in favour of fo re ign  inves to rs  
and es t ranged  the  co rpo ra t ion  from th e  indigenous business  community 
who argued t h a t  i t  [LNDC] should be promoting p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  
investment.  Bow expla ined  the  reasons f o r  government uneas iness :
The Cabinet saw LNDC as an e n t rep ren eu r .  They apprec ia ted  t h a t  th e re  
was a shor tage  of s k i l l e d  indigenous managers,  but f e l t  t h a t ' s  what 
LNDC is  th e re  f o r .  I t  should manage or p a r tn e r  every fo re ign  in v e s t ­
ment r a t h e r  than in v i t e  and encourage them to  inves t  in Lesotho, 
( i n t e r v i e w ) .
The problem fac ing  the  Cabinet in t h e i r  a t tempt to  block t h i s  p o l i t i ­
c a l l y  s e n s i t i v e  change, was th e  pe rennia l  managerial  problems in LNDC 
managed s u b s i d i a r i e s .  Performance wise,  t h i s  was the  weakest l ink  
in the  c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  a c t i v i t i e s ;  i t  a l so  rep resen ted  th e  most d i f f i c u l t  
problems in so f a r  as i t  requ i red  a much g r e a t e r  input  of management 
and f i n a n c i a l  s k i l l s .  There was a nonchalant and negat ive  a t t i t u d e  
developing among su b s id ia ry  managers towards proposed changes.  As 
Bow observed ' they  lacked sense of e f f i c a c y  and involvement in the  
changes and f e l t  they were not los ing  money, LNDC was, and th e  govern­
ment would b a i l  i t  out anyways' .  Foreign in v e s t o r s ,  i t  was argued, 
would have a s take  to  p r o t e c t  and develop, and would provide  s k i l l e d  
management to  safeguard t h e i r  investment.  I f  th e  investment f a i l s  
to  y i e ld  an adequate r e t u r n ,  the  in v e s to r  takes  th e  l o s s ,  whereas 
i f  LNDC continued to  inves t  in equ i ty  and incur  lo s se s ,  the  o b l ig a t io n
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f a l l s  on i t  o r  the  government to  fork out a d d i t io n a l  funds.  Beyond 
t h a t ,  fo re ign  investment t r a n s f e r s  a bundle of resources  t h a t  LNDC 
so dear ly  needed: c a p i t a l ,  t e chn ica l  know-how, management s k i l l s ,  
and marketing knowledge. As with any huge s h i f t ,  the  tu rns  were slow 
and while the  government was pondering the  impl ica t ions  of the  proposed 
change, Bow submitted a proposal to  the  board onwards to  the  government 
t o  n e g o t i a t e  t e ch n ica l  a s s i s t a n c e  from I IDA in o rder  to  implement the  
investment campaign.
While Bow, l i k e  most of h i s  p redecessors  s t i l l  enjoyed d i r e c t  access  
t o  th e  PM and p re s id en t  of the  co rp o ra t io n ,  the  i n t e r a c t i o n  p a t t e r n  
between the CEO and the  government had changed. The new s t r u c t u r e  
requ i red  him to  go through the  paren t  m in is t ry  ie Trade, which v/ould 
put the  proposal to  Cabinet or  forward i t  to  co -o rd ina t ing  m in i s t ry ,  
in t h i s  case  i t  was Central  Planning, which n e g o t ia te s  with o the r  
governments o r  funding o rgan iza t io n s  on behalf  of LNDC. This s tandard  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  which ob ta ins  whenever the  co rpora t ion  has to t r a n s a c t  
with ex te rna l  i n t e r n a t io n a l  o rgan iza t ions  is  depic ted  in f ig u re  7.1 
below. However, in p r a c t i c e ,  management pointed out the  process  was 
not as smooth as dep ic ted .  Once the  process e n te r s  the  government 
sc reening  procedures ,  each m in is t ry  app l ie s  i t s  own c r i t e r i a  to  
s a t i s f y  i t s e l f  before  i t  p rocesses  th e  p r o je c t  to  the  next m in i s t r y ,  
r e j e c t s  i t  or c a l l s  f o r  a d d i t io n a l  in format ion .  Even though the  
n e g o t i a t io n  is  done by th e  government, once the  agreement has been 
reached,  LNDC can d i r e c t l y  i n t e r a c t  with the  e x te rn a l  ac to r s  provid ing 
a s s i s t a n c e .
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Figure  7.1
LNDC management^,  Board of  D i r e c t o r s ^  Line Min is try  ^ C o - o r d i n a t i n g
I n i t i a t e s  a 
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m i n i s t ry  ve ts  
and n e g o t i a t e s
Feedback
The i n s i g h t f u l  exper ience  and connections  wi th in  the  government 
bu reaucracy  were an a s s e t  t o  Bow. Investment promotion was h i s  
fundamental  phi losophy  t h a t  was supposed to  c a t a p u l t  LNDC onto path 
towards p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  and he was not  going to  l e t  b u r e a u c ra t i c  
wrangling r e t a r d  h i s  p ro g re s s .  His r e l a t i o n s h i p  with th e  PM could 
be d es c r ib e d  as ' f a t h e r  and s o n ' .  This was r e f l e c t e d  in th e  tone of 
t h e i r  correspondence  and Bow's defe rence  to  th e  PM. "I would pick 
up th e  phone and c a l l  the  ' o ld  man' and t e l l  him t h a t  I have got  an 
urgen t  problem which needs t o  be solved ___  '
' I  had spoken to  the  m i n i s t e r s  and they  did not  help  me, so I went 
t o  th e  ' o ld  man' and sa id  I want t h i s  is sue  r e so lved  immediately,  I 
have promised in v e s t o r s  l i k e  OK Bazaars ,  CNA and they  a re  ready to  
come in .  And he would say 'What do you want me do John '?"  A pro tege  
of  J o n a th a n ' s  g en e ra t io n  of  execu t ive  e l i t e s ,  he knew t h a t  in Lesotho,  
i t  was not  what you know but  who you know t h a t  counted in th e  h a l l s  
of  power. He d i scussed  h i s  p roposa ls  d i r e c t l y  with th e  PM and once 
he won h i s  s u p p o r t ,  a d i r e c t i v e  would be sen t  t o  th e  execu t ing  m i n i s t e r s .
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I t  would seem t h a t  some kind of t a c i t  unders tanding had developed 
between him and the  PM whereby he was given a f r e e  hand to  c r e a t e  
job  o p p o r t u n i t i e s .  Those who opposed him were o f ten  o v e r - ru led  and 
r i sk ed  th e  accusa t ion  of hampering management from doing i t s  jo b .
He defended h is  s h o r t - c i r c u i t i n g  of the  chain of command:
I did not address them [ l e t t e r s ,  memoranda] to  th e  Permanent Secre ta ry  
o r  the  M in i s t e r .  I t  would be a waste of t ime. I have had an exper­
ience with some m in i s t e r s ,  they could stop c e r t a i n  th ings  because they 
did not agree with them. I did not want t h a t  to  happen. I wanted the  
m a t te r  t o  be stopped - i f  i t  had t o ,  a t  the  top by the  PM himself .
I t  was a d i r e c t  personal appeal to  him to  in te rvene  on behalf  of LNDC. 
Of course ,  you tend to  ge t  unpopular with many people in c i v i l  s e r v ic e ,  
but i t  i s  a b so lu t e ly  important t h a t  the  CEO of t h i s  co rpora t ion  should 
ge t  to  th e  head of the  government i f  he wants to  get  r e s u l t s .
Thus, while  o s t e n s ib ly  following the formal channels of  communication 
to  get  approval of h is  proposed changes, th e re  were a s e r i e s  of back­
s tage  persuas ions  of memoranda addressed d i r e c t l y  to  pM and some copied 
t o  the  M in is te r s  of Trade and Finance.  He appealed to  the pM fo r  
government support  to  ensure t h a t  the proposal went through u rgen t ly ,  
l i s t i n g  names of SA's big chain s to re s  t h a t  had a l ready  ind ica ted  t h e i r  
d e s i r e  to  lo ca te  in Lesotho. He had trawled wide and deep fo r  opin ions ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  among SA i n d u s t r i a l i s t s ,  and had f u r t h e r  engaged a team of 
SA c o n su l t an t s  to  a s s i s t  LNDC draw investment p o t e n t i a l ,  e s t a b l i s h  the  
f a c t o r s  t h a t  in f luence  i n d u s t r i a l i s t s '  loca t ion  d e c i s io n ,  and t h e i r
i
a t t i t u d e s  towards LNDC compared to  i t s  compet itors  f o r  investment.
The r e s u l t a n t  consultancy r e p o r t  formed p a r t  of a barrage  of information 
t h a t  was sen t to  the  PM, and i t  paid o f f .
The P-E Consultants  r e p o r t  had shown, among o th e r  t h in g s ,  t h a t ,  89 per 
cent of SA i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  a s soc ia ted  an investment in Lesotho with
 ^ P-E Consult ing Group, 1978.
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p o l i t i c a l  u n c e r t a in ty .  Lesotho 's  compet itors  - ie SA 'homelands' ,  
Botswana and Swaziland, o f fe red  b e t t e r  in c en t iv e s  to  in v e s to r s ,  and 
the  government ove r tu re s  to  e s t a b l i s h  d ip lomat ic  r e l a t i o n s  with eas te rn  
block c o u n t r i e s  worried SA.* The r e p o r t  s t r e s s e d  t h a t  p ro je c t in g  the  
c o r r e c t  image in the  market place  was v i t a l  t o  p o t e n t i a l  in v e s to r s ,  
and the  government ac t ions  did not enhance t h a t .  This c l e a r ly  bothered 
the  government and spurred the  PM in to  pub l ic  pronouncement of h is  
government r e s o lu t e  support  of fo re ign  investment.  In 1978, he opened 
the  launching of investment promotion in a conference  j o i n t l y  organized 
by LNDC and Anglo American Corporation (SA) in which he decla red:
I t  would not be presumptuous of me to  claim t h a t  our record of re spec t  
fo r  f r e e  e n t e r p r i s e  can be borne out not only by those  p r iv a te  concerns 
long e s t a b l i s h e d  in Lesotho, but a l so  by the  l a t e  a r r i v a l s  of Holiday 
Inns and o th e r s .  All th e se  e s t a b l i s h e d  concerns t e s t i f y  to  the  f e r t ­
i l i t y  of cond i t ions  which have been p ro tec ted  and j e a l o u s ly  nurtured  
s ince  our independence.  (P-E Report,  1978).
Besides the  PM, Bow had in v i ted  m in is te r s  of  Trade and Finance r e s p e c t ­
ive ly ,  on d i f f e r e n t  promotion campaigns to  address  the  i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  
in SA, o f f i c i a t e  on opening of new p r o j e c t s ,  th e  g e s tu r e  they immensely 
enjoyed. With the  backing of the  World Bank, he had cunningly convinced 
the  Cabinet t h a t  promotion of Lesotho as an investment p o t e n t i a l ,  did 
not c o n s t i t u t e  the  'normal '  a c t i v i t y  or  expected bus iness  of LNDC, i t  
ought to  be done by government, but s ince  they lacked the  capac i ty ,
LNDC was the  log ica l  agent to  undertake i t ,  and needed p o l i t i c a l  and 
f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  to  f inance  fo re ign  t r a v e l  by LNDC r e p r e s e n ta t i v e s .  
No c l e a r  and f i n a l  'go-ahead '  dec is ion  was made, but th e  a c t iv e  and 
v i s i b l e  involvement of Cabinet m in i s t e r s  in promoting fo re ign  in v e s t ­
ment, g radua l ly  diminished p o l i t i c a l  r e s i s t a n c e ,  p ro jec ted  the  govern­
* Cuban d e lega t ion  had v i s i t e d  Lesotho on what was descr ibed  as a 
' f a m i l i a r i z a t i o n  m is s io n ' .
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ment to  the  f o r e f r o n t  of the  change process ,  while management o rches­
t r a t e d  i t  from backstage,  and brought g r e a t e r  unders tanding to  govern­
ment as m in i s t e r s  i n te r a c t e d  with inves to rs  to  answer ques t ions  about 
government i n d u s t r i a l  p o l i c i e s .  The PS Finance observed t h a t  ' t h e  
m i n i s t e r s '  involvement led to  b e t t e r  unders tanding of the  government 
i n d u s t r i a l  po l icy  to  i n v e s to r s ,  and helped to  p r o j e c t  the  p o s i t i v e  
image which John Bow was so much concerned a b o u t . '
In 1978, b i l a t e r a l  agreement was en tered  in to  between Lesotho and 
I re land  which seconded a team of exper ts  from I IDA to  LNDC fo r  an 
i n i t i a l  period of two ye a r s ,  sub jec t  to  review of the  p rog ress .  The 
I r i s h  ex p e r t s  were brought in to  help LNDC launch and implement in v e s t ­
ment promotion,  they were bringing the  I n d u s t r i a l  Development Author ity - 
IDA, e x p e r t i s e  t h a t  was deemed r e lev an t  to  LNDC, and to  t r a i n  the  local  
s t a f f  on p ro fes s iona l  marketing and p re sen ta t io n  of p ro j e c t s  to  p o t e n t i a l  
i n v e s t o r s .  Like the WB, the  I r i s h  had s t i p u l a t e d  the  terms and condi t ions  
under which t h e i r  exper ts  would serve in LNDC, making i t  c l e a r  who owned 
and c o n t r o l l e d  the r e l a t i o n s h i p ;  the  r e s u l t  of which has been t h a t  i t  
is  unc lea r  how much a u th o r i ty  the  CEO had over the  exper t s  and who 
a c t u a l l y  d i r e c t s  the  t r a i n i n g  o f fe red  by the  e x p e r t s .
The IDA would be prepared to  provide an ongoing i n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n ­
ship  with LNDC while our s t a f f  a re  serving Lesotho. This would take  
th e  form of  our supporting  and monitoring the  s t a f f ' s  c o n t r ib u t io n  to  
LNDC throughout t h e i r  term of o f f i c e .  We would expect t h a t  i f  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  a re  exper ienced with IDA s t a f f  serving LNDC, IDA.will 
be consu l ted  before  any d i s c i p l i n a r y  ac t ion  i s  taken by LNDC.
Through th e  a s s i s t a n c e  of the  I r i s h ,  a new sec t ion  -  Investment Promotion 
depar tment,  was e s ta b l i s h e d  with in  the  New In d u s t r i e s  d iv i s io n .*  The
 ^ Connolly Report,  1978
* Following the  in t roduc t ion  of a new s t r a t e g y  the  d i v i s i o n ' s  name was 
changed.
th r e e  I r i s h  exper ts  have occupied the key p o s i t io n s  of F inancia l  Con­
t r o l l e r ,  d i r e c t o r  opera t ions  and d i r e c t o r  of New In d u s t r i e s  d iv i s io n  - 
NID in o rder  to  f a c i l i t a t e  the  t r a i n i n g  of sen io r  and middle management. 
Thus, with r e q u i s i t e  manpower in p lace ,  the  c o r p o r a t io n ' s  s t r a t e g y  
g radua l ly  s h i f t e d  from being equ i ty  holder t o  t h a t  of midwifery ro le  - 
promote and f a c i l i t a t e  fo re ign  investment.
D iv e s t i t u r e :  A P o l i t i c a l  Quandary
The necessary  c o r o l l a r y  of investment promotion was the  urgent need to  
improve the  performance of subs id ia ry  companies. The e f f e c t iv e n e s s  of 
the  promotion would depend on demonstrable success fu l  performance of 
LNDC companies.  The CEO presented  a paper t o  the  Board, cata loguing  
major problems fac ing  these  companies, such as incompetence and f r e ­
quent changes in management, inadequate marketing re sea rc h ,  undercap­
i t a l i z a t i o n  and weak accounting informat ion systems. He recommended 
t h a t  the  co rpora t ion  should d iv e s t  of those bus inesses  t h a t  were 
u n p r o f i t a b l e ,  r o l l  over the  proceeds t o  . in tens i fy  and concen t ra te  on 
investment promotion,  and reduce the  c o r p o r a t io n ' s  heavy dependence 
on government su b s id ie s .  LNDC had to  carve a market n iche ,  and 
concen t ra te  on those  areas  where i t  had p o te n t i a l  s t r e n g th s  to  accom­
p l i s h  i t s  broad job c r e a t io n  o b j e c t i v e .  Bow observed t h a t :
We soon discovered t h a t ,  in o rde r  to  ge t  the  most out of our l imi ted  
r e so u rce s ,  we had to  co ncen t ra te  our e f f o r t s  in a few a reas  where 
we could do w e l l ,  we had learned  the  lessons  of being involved in 
every th ing .
Preference  was to  be given to  th e  loca l s  in s e l l i n g  th e  companies, 
where they were a v a i l a b l e ,  keen to  buy and had the  f i n a n c i a l  resources  
and managerial e x p e r t i s e  to  ensure  t h a t  jobs  would be preserved.
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Management had envisaged s i t u a t i o n s  where i t  would be impera tive  fo r  
the  co rpo ra t ion  to  hold eq u i ty  and had b u i ld - in  f l e x i b i l i t y  and opt ions  
to  accommodate such co n t in g en c ie s ,  e s p e c i a l l y :
1. Where th e  in v e s to r  wants LNDC to  take  a minor ity  equ i ty  in o rder  
t o  harness  local  support  and be seen as a local  company.
2. Where th e  indus t ry  was u n a t t r a c t i v e  to  p o t e n t i a l  in v es to r s  but i t  
was f e l t  t o  be important t o  the  n a t iona l  economy [eg Loti  Bricks 
L td] ,
3. The indus t ry  was of na t iona l  s ig n i f i c a n c e  and the  c o r p o r a t io n ' s  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  was e s s e n t i a l  to  oversee r  na t iona l  i n t e r e s t ,  and 
l a s t l y ;
4. Where the  indus t ry  was a money-spinner - eg the  brewery and Holiday 
Inns,  where dividends inflows would i n j e c t  i n v e s t ib l e  and d i s c r e ­
t io n a ry  revenue.
The r e a c t io n s  of  the  Board was p re d ic tab ly  d iv ided ,  with th e  p o l i t i c i a n s  
arguing t h a t  such a d ec i s io n  amounted to  be t raya l  o f  n a t iona l  t r u s t ,  
while management which had managerial problems with the  s u b s i d i a r i e s ,  
welcomed th e  riddance of  what they saw as f i n a n c i a l  d r a in .  Thus, th e  
twin p i l l a r s  of  government philosophy t h a t  LNDC should in v es t  in equ i ty  
and manage th e  companies were being th rea tened  -  d is investm ent was 
unknown t e r r i t o r y .  Bow expla ined  how th e  government reac ted :
s e l l i n g  th e  s u b s id i a r i e s  was regarded as a taboo. People believed 
th a t  LNDC was holding th e se  companies f o r  the  n a t io n .  There was 
t h i s  deep f e l t  view in Cabinet t h a t  t h i s  was con t ra ry  to  what LNDC 
stood f o r ,  what the  government decided to  do. People thought I must 
be c razy .
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The local  d i r e c t o r ,  s e c re ta ry  of Lesotho Chamber of Commerce, ob jec ted  
t o  the  proposed s t r a t e g y  on the  b a s i s  t h a t  what management requ ired  
was t o  mainta in  s t a b i l i t y  and c o n t in u i ty  in th e se  companies, and t h a t  
can be brought about by p a r tn e r sh ip  between LNDC and local businessmen 
o r  every fo re ig n  company promoted by LNDC, not d i v e s t i t u r e . '  Within 
t h e  Min is t ry  of  Trade,  t h e r e  was l i t t l e  accord between the  Chairman 
and th e  Permanent S e c re ta r y .  She (PS) argued t h a t  LNDC had d r i f t e d  
away from i t s  mandate, i t  should develop and promote i n d u s t r i e s  t h a t  
f o s t e r  s t rong  l inkages  with th e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c t o r . 1 (This would 
seem t o  be th e  view t h a t  persuaded LNDC management l a t e r  t o  inves t  in 
BFV - th e  asparagus p l a n t ,  and Loti Bricks -  the  b r ick  p la n t  which 
u t i l i s e s  the  local  c lay  d e p o s i t . )  The i n d u s t r i a l  p lanners  in the  
M in is t ry  of Planning were uncer ta in  about th e  proposed changes,  but 
f e l t  i t  would r e l e a s e  funds (subsidy)  f o r  o th e r  p r o j e c t s .  They were 
much concerned about th e  ' t r a n s f e r  of  technology '  which they f e l t  
fo re ign  in v e s to r s  had.
The government had always attempted t o  ge t  a s u b s t a n t i a l  s take  in 
equ i ty  because i t  was in th e  na t iona l  i n t e r e s t  to  ge t  involved in th e  
economy which has been completely  dominated by fo re ign  companies - 
mainly South A fr ican .  For t h a t  na tu ra l  d e s i r e  t o  be subordinated 
sometimes t o  deal with th e  r e a l i t i e s  of  th e  s i t u a t i o n  was not an easy 
t a s k  f o r  th e  change promoters .  As one ex te rn a l  d i r e c t o r  commented in 
support  o f  th e  changes,  t h e  i s sue  involved a t r a d e  o f f  and the  
government had t o  choose:*
The consequencies of having a po l icy  which s t e e r s  your investments 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  towards wholly-owned o r  m ajo r i ty  LNDC owned companies 
i s  t h a t  you go t  t o  be prepared t o  inves t  cons ide rab le  man re so u rce s ,
* External d i r e c t o r s '  views a re  h ighly  esteemed because they are  
seen as o b je c t iv e  e x p e r t s .
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t ime resources  in the  monitoring and c o n t r o l l i n g  of those investments .
I f  you lack those  re sou rce s ,  then i t  makes sense  to  t r y  to  push through 
investments  in which we are  only minor i ty  sh areho lde rs .
The advocates  of  change were in a much s t r o n g e r  p o s i t io n  even though 
they  were support ing d r a s t i c  changes t o  t h e  p re sen t  s t r u c t u r e .  Their  
p r i o r  in v e s t ig a t i o n s  had revea led  th e  m in i s t ry  o f  Finance was los ing 
p a t i e n ce  about continuous losses  by th e  p a r a s t a t a l s  and the  new 
management had evoked a p i c t u r e  of th e  f u t u r e  t h a t  was f a r  more promising 
and powerful than the  government 's  pe rcep t ions  o f  the  c u r re n t  s i t u a t i o n .  
In h i s  budget speech, th e  M in is te r  of  Finance had r e i t e r a t e d  the  
government d i s p le a s u re  a t  th e  poor r e tu rn s  th e  t r e a s u r y  was g e t t i n g  
and urged a l l  p a r a s t a t a l s  t o  improve t h e i r  performance:
I t  i s  a cause of g re a t  concern t h a t  so few of  our  p a r a s t a t a l s  are  
producing p r o f i t s  and some of  th e se  which a re  p r o f i t a b l e  are  providing  
small d iv idends to  government in r e tu rn  f o r  th e  investment made. We 
have th e  r i g h t  to  expect a much b e t t e r  r e t u r n  from our la rge  in v e s t ­
ments in p a r a s t a t a l s .  I want t o  remind th e  boards and managements 
concerned t h a t  we are  looking f o r  p r o f i t a b l e  performances,  we cannot 
t o l e r a t e  heavy burden of s u b s id i e s .
Management c e n t r a l  argument was t h a t  th e  mode of  investment was an 
important element of s t r a t e g y  which could no t  be taken in i s o l a t i o n  
o f  th e  resources  a v a i l a b l e  t o  p r o t e c t  those  investments .  I t  was t h a t  
continued feedback of th e  s t r a t e g y  leading t o  investment p ro je c t s  being 
made in which LNDC had m a jo r i ty  s t a k e s ,  lead ing  t o  g re a t  p ressu re  on 
th e  o rg an iza t io n a l  s t r u c t u r e  t o  manage and monitor th e  p r o j e c t s ,  the  
f a i l u r e  t o  cope which r e s u l t e d  in f i n a n c i a l  lo s se s  and pressure  on 
th e  co rpora t ion  t o  review i t s  s t r a t e g y  and produce a good new m ajo r i ty  
equ i ty  investments again .  That cyc le  o f  commitment to  a p a r t i c u l a r
1 Min is t ry  o f  Finance, Budget Speech 1978/79.
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course of action as s im pl i f ied  in f igure  7 .2 ,  is  what LNDC has gone 
through and the  new CEO wanted to  get  out of i t  and t r a n s f e r  most of 
managerial and f in an c ia l  pressures  to  p r iv a te  inves to rs .
Figure 7.2
Committed S t r a t eg ic  Cycle
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I f  a l l  the  economic arguments made sense to  a l l  concerned, what was 
seen as p o l i t i c a l l y  damaging was the  f a c t  t h a t  not many locals  could 
a fford  to  buy and success fu l ly  manage the  divested  companies, and 
n a tu ra l ly  foreign companies - mostly SA, moved in to  buy them out ;  
e f f e c t i v e l y  revers ing the very s i t u a t i o n  LNDC was thought would r ed re s s .  
The CEO had appealed to  government [meaning to  PM i f  impasse was to  be 
resolved] to  support  h is  changes in vain .  But a t  t h i s  s tage o ther  
powerful ac tors  - I r i s h  team, had entered the scene and backed the  
changes. B i l l  Bury, the  d i r e c t o r  of Finance and one of the  longest  
serving IDA exper ts  argued r a t h e r  fo rce fu l ly  t h a t :  'Our primary task  
is  to  c r e a t  new jobs ,  t o  knock on in v e s t o r ' s  doors and promote foreign 
investment. The major chunk of our exper t  team is  wasted on managing 
the  corpora tion on a day-to-day b a s i s .  We should d ives t  and concen tra te  
on loan p o r t f o l i o ' .  The World Bank having appraised the  corpora tion 
and s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  progress  had been made on the negotia ted  changes,
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extended th e  f i r s t  l i n e  of  c r e d i t  - a concessionary loan of US $2.5 
m i l l i o n  t o  LNDC through th e  government. In i t s  Report (1980) to  th e  
government and LNDC, th e  Bank had recommended t h a t  as soon as p o s s ib l e ,  
LNDC should adopt th e  co rp o ra te  s t r a t e g y  t h a t  ' conso l ida ted  the  e x i s t i n g  
companies on a f i n a n c i a l l y  sound foo t ing  and where necessary  and f e a s i b l e ,  
s e l l  them o f f ' .  The support  of  WB was c l e a r l y  i n f l u e n t i a l  in swaying 
th e  government views as th e  Bank had even made i t  a condi t ion  of  th e  
second loan t h a t  the  co rp o ra t io n  should d i v e s t  or  l i q u id a t e  a l l  companies 
t h a t  f a i l e d  t o  respond t o  t i g h t e r  f i n a n c i a l  c o n t r o l s .  Reminiscing of  
t h a t  d e c i s io n ,  Bow observed r a t h e r  g r a t e f u l l y :
Had i t  not been of the  support  of the  WB, I doubt i f  I would have been 
able  t o  ge t  out of those  companies.  I f  LNDC alone had pursued th e  idea ,  
i t  would have taken much longer to  convince th e  government t h a t  changes 
were impera t ive .  Governments tend to  hold WB in awe, and tend to  
b e l ie v e  them more than t h e i r  own i n s t i t u t i o n s .
A t e n t a t i v e  unders tanding was even tu a l ly  reached whereby th e  co rpo ra t ion  
could  d iv e s t  but only a f t e r  such a dec is ion  has been c lea red  by the  
board and Cabinet .  E f f e c t i v e l y ,  t h a t  meant t h a t  board o f  LNDC would 
submit recommendations t o  government in d ic a t in g  th e  companies being 
so ld ,  t h e i r  p rospec t ive  buyers ,  and th e  p r i c e .  While some companies 
were subsequently d iv e s t e d ,  t h i s  process  in p r a c t i c e ,  amounts t o  
government c o n t r o l l i n g  th e  dec is ions  t o  d i v e s t ,  the  pace of d i s i n v e s t ­
ment p rocess ,  who q u a l i f i e s  to  buy which companies, an ambiguous 
c r i t e r i a  which i s  o f ten  based on p o l i t i c a l  c o n s id e ra t io n s .  A 
s t r i k i n g  in s tance  of t h i s  was when th e  government tu rned  down the  
s a l e  o f  Limefford Trading, a lo ss  making s u b s id ia ry  of  LNDC (R138,000 
in 1980), because the  p ro sp ec t iv e  buyer,  a local  consortium, was 
regarded as p o l i t i c a l l y  unacceptable .  Senna remarked t h a t  in some 
cases  the  recommended buyers were re j e c t e d  because 'some m in i s t e r ( s )
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were i n t e r e s t e d  in buying th e  company, but could not meet the  asking 
p r i c e . '  The r e s u l t a n t  of  t h a t  veto was t h a t  th e  co rpora t ion  i s  s t i l l  
s e t t l e d  with the  company t o  da te  [ see  f i g u r e  4 .2  ch. 4 ] ,  while in some 
cases  th e  dec is ion  to  go-ahead was delayed f o r  near ly  two y e a r s ,  during 
which per iod  the  company's market value  had decl ined  and th e  buyer l o s t  
i n t e r e s t .  Thus, while  management had su c c e s s fu l ly  mustered support  and 
n eg o t ia ted  s t r a t e g i c  changes,  th e  implementation of those  changes has 
become problematic  as each s tage  of th e  process  c r e a te s  a d d i t io n a l  i l l -  
def ined  f a c t o r s  t h a t  a re  not always wi th in  management c o n t r o l ,  impede 
quick responses  to  perceived  o p p o r tu n i t i e s ,  and may re q u i re  f u r t h e r  
n e g o t i a t io n s  (eg resubmit a s h o r t - l i s t  of p o t e n t i a l  buyers without any 
s p e c i f i c  recommendations, and leave i t  t o  government to  o f f e r  th e  s a l e  
t o  th e  buyer t h a t  meets t h e i r  c r i t e r i a ,  o r  postpone the  s a l e  f o r  some 
year s  and s t a r t  a l l  over again - which i s  what LNDC has done).  This 
p a r t l y  exp la ins  why t h i s  p rocess ,  began in 1978 and s t i l l  in progress  
when t h i s  re search  was done, has moved so slowly,  much t o  the  obvious 
f r u s t r a t i o n  of  management.
The broader app rec ia t io n  o f  t h i s  change only began to  emerge around 
1985 as r e f l e c t e d  in th e  government fo u r th  f i v e  year  development p lans :
The growth of i n d u s t r i a l  s e c t o r  has been e r r a t i c .  The e a r l i e s t  
e f f o r t s  were concentra ted  on LNDC's a c t i v i t i e s  involving d i r e c t  
investment,  u sua l ly  in import s u b s t i t u t i o n  p r o j e c t s .  By the  mid- 
1970s many of the se  s u b s i d i a r i e s  were lo s s  makers and i n d u s t r i a l  
production a c tu a l ly  f e l l  in 1977-78. In l i n e  with government 
commitment t o  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  led development,  LNDC began to  more 
a c t i v e l y  seek to  a t t r a c t  f o r e ig n  c a p i t a l  and know-how (4th Plan,
1985).
The downward t rend  o f  major lo s ses  which the  co rpora t ion  has been 
exper ienc ing  s ince  th e  e a r l y  1970s, culminating in a loss  of  R1.4 m i l l io n
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in 1977, was s ig n i f i c a n t ly  decl ining since the launch of investment 
promotion and disinvestment in 1978, as f igure  7.3 below shows. By 
the end of 1980, there  was a marked s h i f t  in the investment p o r t fo l io *  
of the  corporation from wholly-owned and/or majority equity  down to  
about 17 per cent of the whole p o r t f o l io .  The bulk of the  investment 
was being channelled in to  f a c i l i t a t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s  l ike  granting loans 
and providing fac tory  s h e l t e r s  and bui ld ings  to  newly promoted companies. 
Figure 7.4 i l l u s t r a t e s  the  breakdown of the p o r t f o l io .  The s h i f t  towards 
loans, loan guarantees to  inves tors ,  and in d u s t r ia l  e s t a t e s ,  has led to  
the c rea t ion  of a new d iv is ion  - Real Es ta te ,  to  look a f t e r  the  corpor­
a t i o n ' s  growing property p o r t f o l io ,  i t  fu r th e r  led to  amendment of the  
LNDC Act 1967, which had not provided fo r  any guarantees by the  co r ­
pora tion.
Figure 7.3
Financial  Performance fo r  the year  ending:
1979 1980 1981
Loss fo r  the  year R531,000 95,000 8000
Fiaurp 7 4  Distribution of L N D C  i n v e s t m e n t
Building
41%
Source: LNDC Annual Report 1980
* The notion of ' p o r t f o l i o '  was introduced by the World Bank consu l tan ts  
to mean ca tegor ies  of s e c u r i t i e s  or investments held.
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S tr u c tu r a l  Changes and D econ cen tra t ion  o f  A u th or ity
Following th e  agreement signed with WB about s t a f f  development and 
t r a i n i n g ,  and th e  a r r i v a l  of  th e  IDA team, a t r a i n i n g  u n i t  was e s t a b l i s h e d  
w i th in  th e  Admin is tra tion  d i v i s i o n ,  Management Train ing Unit - MTU,to 
provide  t r a i n i n g  of LNDC headquar te rs  s t a f f  as well as the  su b s id ia ry  
companies. The u n i t  a l so  co -o rd ina ted  a l l  t r a i n i n g  e f f o r t s  t h a t  the  
d i v i s i o n a l  d i r e c t o r s  recommended from time to  t im e .  From 1979-80 as 
th e  new s t r a t e g y  g radua l ly  generated inflow of a p p l i c a t io n s  from 
p o t e n t i a l  i n v e s t o r s ,  management energ ies  and focus  s h i f t e d  from Operation 
d i v i s i o n  -  0D, and th e  managing of  s u b s i d i a r i e s  towards th e  New Indus­
t r i e s  d i v i s i o n -  NID. The d iv i s io n  had become th e  nerve c en t r e  of 
s t r a t e g i c  marketing,  re sp o n s ib le  f o r  ' s e l l i n g  LNDC a l l  over th e  world, 
recommending long and medium term s t r a t e g i e s  to  th e  CEO, and fo r  
g e n e ra t in g ,  appra is ing  and commissioning new p r o j e c t s . *  I t  had emerged 
as an i n f l u e n t i a l  d iv i s io n  t h a t  c o n s t i t u t e d  the  main bus iness  of the  
c o rp o ra t io n ,  l i a i s i n g  with the  m i n i s t r i e s  o f  Trade and Central  Planning 
to  i d e n t i f y  and recommend sec to r s  in which the  co rpora t ion  should 
concen t ra te  i t s  investment promotion.
Aggressive rec ru i tm en t  was launched to  s t a f f  the  d iv i s io n  as the  
demand increased  f o r  p r o j e c t  o f f i c e r s  who would undertake investment 
campaigns and eva lua te  p r o j e c t s  from th e  t a rg e t e d  markets of  SA,
Europe, Far East  and North America. C o inc iden ta l ly  in 1978-79, th e  
U nivers i ty  of  Lesotho produced i t s  f i r s t  B.Com. gradua tes  and became 
a rec ru i tm en t  t a r g e t  by th e  co rpo ra t ion  as t h e se  s o r t  o f  s k i l l s  were 
in high demand both a t  the  headquar te rs  and th e  su b s id ia ry  l e v e l .  In 
1980, th e  I r i s h  e s t a b l i s h e d  th e  I n s t i t u t e  o f  Accounting in Maseru -
* New In d u s t r i e s  Divis ion Policy  Sta tement ,  1979.
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t h e  c a p i t a l  of Lesotho, as p a r t  of a wider t e ch n ica l  a s s i s t a n c e  to  
Lesotho to  combat accounting s k i l l  d e f i c i e n c e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  in LNDC 
companies who are  th e  major p a r t i c i p a n t s  in t h i s  program. Thus, th e  
l o c a l i s a t i o n  process  t r i g g e r e d  in p a r t  by demand f o r  investment p ro ­
mote rs ,  and p ro p i t io u s  production of  commerce g radua tes ,  began t o  
extend t o  th e  s u b s i d i a r i e s  as th e  loca l  gradua tes  moved in to  managerial  
p o s i t i o n s  in th e se  companies. More lo c a l s  were being sponsored by th e  
co rp o ra t io n  a t  the  U n ive rs i ty  of  Lesotho as well as pos t  g radua te  
s t u d i e s  abroad, under th e  ausp ices  o f  WB, IDA and o th e r  funding ag en c ie s .  
There were about 40 t r a i n e e s  in var ious  degree  programs in 1980.
The o b je c t iv e  was t o  match every e x p a t r i a t e  with a local  c o u n te r p a r t  
and to  t r a i n  th e  local  f o r  eventual in d ig en iza t io n  of  the  p o s t ;  t h i s  
was b a s i c a l l y  WB recommendation. The t r a i n i n g  was g e n e ra l ly  widely 
supported by management, e x te r n a l  a c to r s  and the  government. However, 
t h e  type  of t r a i n i n g  req u i red  caused c o n f l i c t  which has not been f u l l y  
reso lved  between th e  fo re ig n  exper ts  and th e  young local t r a i n e e s .
The l a t t e r  expected formal academic t r a i n i n g ,  ie  pos t  gradua te  degrees .  
They perceived  s h o r t  te rm, o n - th - jo b  coaching as inadequate  t o  i n s t i l  
t h e i r  confidence  and f e l t  i t  deprived them of  t h e i r  p ro f e s s io n a l  growth 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s .  A se n io r  degree imbued t h a t  conf idence ,  and was seen 
as th e  t i c k e t  t o  more s e n io r  p o s i t i o n s  and h igher  s a l a r i e s .  The 
c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  p r a c t i c a l  p o l ic y  -  even n a t i o n a l l y ,  endorsed t h i s  percep­
t i o n  as those  with s en io r  degrees  had moved in to  h igher  managerial  
p o s i t i o n s .  The I r i s h ,  on t h e  o th e r  hand, some of them academics from 
U nive rs i ty  of  Dublin, were on a s h o r t  term r e l e a s e  and emphasized on- 
th e - jo b  t r a i n i n g ,  monitoring th e  progress  and s e l e c t in g  those  with a 
p o t e n t i a l  f o r  managerial  a b i l i t y  f o r  f u r t h e r  degree t r a i n i n g .  B i l l  
Bury, th e  f i n a n c i a l  c o n t r o l l e r  was astounded by what he regarded as 
lack of  ap p rec ia t io n  f o r  job  exper ience  implied by th e  l o c a l i s a t i o n  
d r iv e :
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They assume t h a t  bas ic  t h e o r e t i c a l  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  can be merged towards 
job  exper ience  without  ever  ga in ing th e  exper ience .  I f ind  i t  d i f f i c u l t  
t o  conceive of people managing companies who have never worked in a 
management fu n c t io n .  I am not sure  how you can give advice about 
marketing,  s t a f f  r e l a t i o n s ,  and l i t t l e  a sp ec t s  of environment - 
where e s s e n t i a l l y  we a re  t a l k i n g  from a u n i v e r s i t y  background o r  non 
a t  a l l .
The i s su e  got too p o l i t i c i z e d ,  and was i n t e r p r e t e d  as y e t  another  ploy 
t o  impede lo ca l s  from resuming managerial  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  and 'on-  
t h e - j o b '  t r a i n i n g  has q u i e t l y  faded away from focus ,  with the  r e s u l t  
t h a t  fo re ign  e x p e r t s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  IDA, have a c t u a l l y  stayed longer 
than planned because they s t i l l  had to  t r a i n  lo ca l s  on the  job a f t e r  
completing t h e i r  degree programs. This i s  what Phil  Howard, the  
B r i t i s h  co n su l t an t  from B r i t i s h  Overseas Executive Service -  BOES, 
had t o  say about t r a i n i n g  to  LNDC Management in 1981.
Throughout th e  co rpo ra t ion  th e  urgent  need i s  f o r  a h igher  s tandard  
of  management, sadly t h e r e  seems l i t t l e  unders tanding of  what manage­
ment i s  a l l  about o r  th e  personal q u a l i t i e s  requ i red  f o r  th e  j o b .
I t  must be recognized t h a t  good managers a re  in sh o r t  supply th rough­
out th e  world.  I t  must a l s o  be recognized t h a t  while  academic or  
classroom learn ing  can add t o  a p e r so n 's  s k i l l s  in management, they 
a re  not s u f f i c i e n t  t o  make a good manager. The high c o s t  o f  formal 
ex te rn a l  management t r a i n i n g  should be confined to  people who have 
a l ready  proved t h e i r  management a b i l i t y  through o n - th e - jo b ,  c a r e f u l l y  
monitored performance.
As a r e s u l t  of the  agg re ss ive  l o c a l i s a t i o n  coupled with t r a i n i n g ,  t h e  
headqua r te r s '  s t a f f  complement in 1985, stood a t  100 with d i f f e r e n t  
p ro fe s s io n a l  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ,  t h e  e x p a t r i a t e  component had been reduced 
t o  l e s s  than t e n ,  mainly IDA e x p e r t s .  The t r a i n i n g  and development 
po l icy  had a l so  generated  ambitions  and high expec ta t ions  of  th e  high 
ach ievers  t o  aim f o r  th e  to p  i e  contend f o r  th e  success ion t o  th e  CEO
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p o s i t i o n ,  more so f o r  those  a lready d i r e c t o r s  of d i v i s i o n s .  But as 
i t  tu rned  o u t ,  n e i t h e r  management nor th e  board have any powers t o  
make r e a l i t y  of those  e x p e c ta t io n s ,  the  success ion dec is ions  a re  handed 
down from above by th e  government. This has boomeranged on th e  corpor­
a t io n  in t h a t  they have l o s t  some of  t h e i r  experienced and b e s t  t r a i n e d  
s t a f f ,  who res igned t o  t a k e  up l u c r a t i v e  jobs  in o th e r  o r g a n iz a t io n s .
Howard had a l so  recommended changes in th e  o rgan iza t io n a l  s t r u c t u r e  
which s t i l l  had c e n t r a l  c o n cen t ra t io n  o f  power. The increased a c t i v i t y  
and growth, t h e  a r r i v a l  o f  e x p e r t s  who became d iv i s io n  d i r e c t o r s ,  could 
no longer be adequate ly  c o n t r o l l e d  by c e n t r a l i s e d  headquarters  adminis­
t r a t i o n  with CEO making a l l  t h e  dec is ion  -  as Bow put i t ,  from "se r io u s  
problems of loss  making s u b s i d i a r i e s  t o  some of th e  most t r i v i a l  dec­
i s io n s  l i k e  when and how much t e a  or  co f fee  LNDC should buy".  His 
le ad e rsh ip  s t y l e  was v a s t l y  d i f f e r e n t  from h i s  p redecesso rs .  The 
d i r e c t o r  of NID descr ibed  h i s  leade rsh ip  s t y l e  as a 'mix of  t a s k - o r i e n t e d  
and p a r t i c i p a t i v e . '  He d e c e n t r a l i z e d  a u t h o r i t y ,  de lega ted  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
t o  o t h e r s ,  and exe rc i sed  h i s  o v e ra l l  a u th o r i t y  downwards through the  
d i v i s io n a l  d i r e c t o r s  whi le  r e c e p t iv e  t o  upward flow of  change ideas 
and proposa ls  from h i s  e x ec u t iv e s .  He seemed t o  have a c l e a r  v i s io n  
of  what changes he wanted t o  i n s t i t u t e ,  and th e  type of  re sources  
needed t o  implement them. A d iv i s io n a l  s t r u c t u r e  giv ing s p e c i f i c  
managerial  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  and a u th o r i t y  to  fu n c t io n a l  a c t i v i t y  emerged 
[see  f i g u r e  7 . 5 ] .
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F igure  7.5
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LNDC Organizational S t ruc tu re
The d i f f i c u l t i e s  of co -o rd ina t ing  and in teg ra t in g  mul t ip le  over-arching 
goals and o rgan iza t ional  problems, led to  the  formation of d ec i s io n ­
making s t ru c tu re s  t h a t  would f a c i l i t a t e  in t r a  and i n t e r  d iv is iona l  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in dec is ions .
Management Committees were fo r  the  f i r s t  time e s tab l i shed  to  provide 
a forum through which d e l i b e ra t io n s  and major policy  decis ions  would 
be made by management. The f i r s t  of these  committees was the  Executive 
Committee, composed of CEO and the  four  d iv is iona l  d i r e c t o r s ,  i t s  main 
ro le  i s  to  advise the  CEO and decide on s t r a t e g i c  dec is ions ,  ope ra t iona l  
p o l i c i e s  and sen ior  s t a f f  appointments. The techn ica l  committee 
(investment) was formed on the  advice of WB to  appra ise  the  f e a s i b i l i t y  
of p ro je c t s  and advise the CEO on investment decis ions  of the  co rpora t ion .  
To ensure t h a t  investment dec is ions  were co n s i s ten t  with government plans 
and not de tr imenta l  to  local  i n t e r e s t s ,  Ministry of Planning and BED
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a re  members, inc luding the  four  d iv i s io n a l  d i r e c t o r s  and CEO who c h a i r s  
i t .  L as t ly ,  manpower committee was c rea ted  as a b u f fe r  zone between 
th e  CEO and s t a f f .  There were growing in s tances  of u n f a i r  d i sm is sa l s  
where th e  CEO had been in c o n f l i c t  with th e  s t a f f  a t  the  ope ra t iona l  
leve l  leading t o  t h e i r  d i s m is s a l .  Manpower Committee, i s  cha i red  by 
d i r e c t o r  of  Adminis t ra t ion  and advises  CEO on personnel m a t t e r s .  The 
members again inc lude  a l l  t h e  d iv i s io n a l  d i r e c t o r s .
Apart  from th e se  management committees which f a c i l i t a t e  i n t e r d i v i s i o n a l  
i n t e r a c t i o n  t h e r e  a re  a l so  i n t r a - d i v i s i o n a l  committees which promote 
communication w i th in  th e  c o rp o ra t io n ,  a t tempt t o  achieve a g r e a t e r  
sense of co rpora te  be longing, leading to  a much g r e a t e r  degree of 
co -ope ra t ion  between th e  d iv i s io n s  and enhance management cohesiveness 
a t  board l e v e l .  The s t r u c t u r e  of  the  dec is ion  making committees is  
such t h a t  management c o n t r o l s  most of the  in format ion ,  i t  f o s t e r s  
d i s cu s s io n  o f  problems and a c ross  f e r t i l i z a t i o n  of  ideas a t  various  
s tages  of th e  committees given t h a t  d iv i s io n a l  d i r e c t o r s  s e a t  in a l l  
o f  them, management s e t s  th e  agenda, and th e  board approval,  depending 
on th e  is sues  involved,  becomes a f o r m a l i ty .  This was the  view expressed 
by government members, M in is t ry  of  Planning,  about investment d ec i s io n s :
The board rubber stamps investment committee d e c i s io n s .  There i s  the  
b u i l d - i n  m a jo r i ty  by LNDC and th e  committee g e t s  what i t s  sends the  
board .  Week before  investment meeting,  LNDC has pre- inves tment  meeting 
where d ec i s io n s  are  made, and i f  they a re  not s a t i s f i e d  with th e  p r o j e c t ,  
i t  does not go through to  th e  committee.  So whatever reaches  the  
committee has been i n t e r n a l l y  approved and decided long way back.
This view was shared by M in is t ry  of  Trade who f e l t  they had no resources
and s k i l l s  t o  c lo se ly  s c r u t i n i z e  LNDC proposa ls .  The d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n
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was g radua l ly  extended to  th e  s u b s i d i a r i e s  as they were s e l e c t i v e l y  
given autonomy and f l e x i b i l i t y  to  develop t h e i r  own programme. In 1981, 
each of the  s u b s id ia ry  companies had formed i t s  own board o f  d i r e c t o r s
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t h a t  were appointed by th e  headquar te r s ,  which a l so  has two s en io r  
execu t ives  from the  Operat ions d iv i s io n  on th e se  boards.  The r o l e  o f  
t h e s e  boards i s  to  provide leade rsh ip  guidance in the  formula t ion  and 
implementation of  o p e ra t io n a l  s t r a t e g i e s .  However, in p r a c t i c e  the  
headquar te rs  on a s e l e c t i v e  b a s i s ,  keeps a t i g h t  con t ro l  and managers 
g e t  s t r a t e g i c  as well as o p e ra t io n a l  d i r e c t i o n s  from the  Operat ions 
d i v i s i o n ,  in s p i t e  of th e  l a t t e r ' s  r e p r e se n ta t io n  on the  su b s id ia ry  
boards .  This i s  d iscussed  in d e t a i l  in Chapter 8.  Thus, d e c e n t r a l ­
i z a t i o n  p rocess ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  a t  th e  su b s id ia ry  leve l  e f f e c t i v e l y ,  be 
i t  c o s t l y ,  complemented th e  l e a rn in g ,  t r a i n i n g  and l o c a l i s a t i o n  process  
t h a t  was underway by prov id ing  'hands on exper ience '  t o  young local  
g radua tes  -  an o v e r r id ing  and c r i t i c a l  f a c t o r  to  th e  CEO and th e  
government.
The IDA t e ch n ica l  a s s i s t a n c e  was re n e g o t ia t ed  in 1981, extended f o r  
another  two y e a r s ,  and a new batch of IDA personnel resumed t h e i r  
execu t ive  p o s i t io n s  a t  t h e  d i v i s i o n a l  level  with one change, th e  
d i r e c t o r  of NID had been l o c a l i s e d  and John C ur t in ,  th e  I r i s h  e x p e r t ,  
became th e  execut ive  a d v i s e r .  F inanc ia l  management s k i l l s  have been 
th e  most d i f f i c u l t  t o  develop, and LNDC has continuously  r e l i e d  on 
th e  IDA t o  provide f i n a n c i a l  c o n t r o l l e r .  The new d i r e c t o r  and le a d e r  
of  th e  I r i s h  team, Pat O'Connor was a man of  substance and g r a v i t a s ,  
an experienced p r a c t i t i o n e r ,  who had held  s e n io r  appointments in 
in d u s t ry ,  such as Imperial  Chemical I n d u s t r i e s  ICI, and IDA. O'Connor 
be l ieved  t h a t  e f f i c i e n t  management of th e  s u b s i d i a r i e s  was e s s e n t i a l  
t o  genera te  r e - i n v e s t a b l e  p r o f i t s  in o rder  to  diminish dependence on 
government g r a n t s .  Thus, he e f f e c t i v e l y  put a break on th e  d i v e s t i t u r e  
process and the  management focus balanced between th e  investment s id e  
of th e  co rpora t ion  -  NID as well  as th e  income genera t ion  -  OD.
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Because he was so a c t i v e  and involved in major d e c i s io n s ,  O'Connor 
had no t ime to  t r a i n  and coach h is  local  c o u n te rp a r t .  He was so 
powerful t h a t  some s t a f f  members be l ieved  he was th e  e f f e c t i v e  CEO 
and t h a t  no major dec i s ion  could be made without h i s  approval.  The 
d i r e c t o r  o f  Opera t ions ,  then O'Connor 's  c o u n te r p a r t ,  poin ted out t h a t  
John Bow would seldom take  a dec is ion  without consu l t ing  him. When 
John res igned t o  take  up a p r i v a t e  consu l tancy ,  Pat was e f f e c t i v e l y  
t h e  manager of  t h i s  c o r p o r a t i o n ' .  [That was under th e  l e ade rsh ip  
o f  Senna.]  Aggressive,  r e s u l t s - o r i e n t e d  s t y l e  of  management was what 
t h e  CEO-Bow wanted, but th e  sh o r t - t e rm  na tu re  o f  the  e x p e r t s '  c o n t r a c t ,  
and th e  need t o  show r e s u l t s  t o  t h e i r  sponsoring o rg a n iz a t i o n s ,  o f ten  
c o n f l i c t e d  with Bow's d e s i r e  f o r  coaching and development of local  
u n d e rs tu d ie s .  He expla ined  th e  problem:
What used t o  happen was t h a t ,  I i n s i s t e d  t h a t  I wanted th e  local  
'u n d e r s tu d i e s '  t o  be involved in each p rocess .  But th e  exper t  did  
not see  th in g s  in t h a t  l i g h t ,  he was going to  be here f o r  two- th ree  
y e a r s ,  and wanted th in g s  t o  be done with in  t h a t  t ime horizon.  He 
was prepared t o  s a c r i f i c e  th e  t r a i n i n g  of  these  guys [unde rs tud ie s}  
in th e  i n t e r e s t  o f  g e t t i n g  th in g s  done, whereas in my view I had 
th e  long-term view of th e  c o rp o ra t io n ;  I wanted th ings  done but 
a l so  needed t o  grow th e se  people .
Thus, each team of IDA-experts had i t s  own agenda, a s e t  of dec is ions  
and changes they  had t o  implement concu r ren t ly  with th e  expected 
t r a i n i n g  r o l e .  Maintaining t h a t  ba lance has not always been easy ,  
o f ten  th e  e x p e r t s '  agenda has superseded management intended o b je c t iv e  
o f  t r a i n i n g .
The Board and S t r a t e g i c  Decision-making
The c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  po l icy  s ta tem ent  de f in e s  th e  r o l e  of  th e  Board o f  
D irec to rs  as a superv isory  organ f o r  th e  r e p re se n ta t io n  of  the  n a t io n a l  
i n t e r e s t s  with r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  the  co rpo ra te  fu n c t io n ;  s e t t i n g
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corpo ra te  o b je c t iv e s  and po l icy  dec is ions  and ensur ing t h a t  management 
implements those  d e c i s io n s .  Management p repares  and submits sho r t - te rm  
and medium term programs of  a c t i o n ,  1-3 y e a r s ,  mainly investment p ip e ­
l i n e ,  inc luding  th e  budget,  f o r  d iscuss ion  by th e  board,  as a document­
a t io n  o f  performance in tended by management. I t  meets q u a r t e r l y  t o  
conduct the  business  o f  th e  c o rp o ra t io n .  These programs should show 
th e  resources  a v a i l a b l e  t o  th e  co rpora t ion  t o  e f f e c t  the  p lan s ,  the  
proposed major changes and m odif ica t ions  in th e  s t r u c t u r e s ,  s en io r  
s t a f f  appointments inc lud ing  po l icy  changes in th e  s u b s i d i a r i e s .
The programs submitted t o  board a re  developed in c lo se  co -opera t ion  
with th e  a s p i r a t i o n s  of  government as expressed in budget speeches ,  
c o n su l t a t io n s  with the  chairman of  th e  co rpo ra t ion  who b r i e f s  the  
management about c ab in e t  views and p lan s ,  and through the  informal 
i n t e r a c t i o n  with th e  key m i n i s t r i e s  t h a t  a re  members of  th e  board.
In each of th e se  m i n i s t r i e s ,  t h e r e  a re  'desk o f f i c e r s '  who deal with 
s p e c i f i c  i s sues  r e l a t i n g  t o  LNDC, eg borrowing from i n t e r n a t io n a l  
f i n a n c i a l  markets,  t e c h n i c a l  b i l a t e r a l  agreements such as I r i s h  
connection; t h e i r  views a re  o f ten  r e f l e c t i v e  of  th e  government th in k in g .  
However, t h e  r e a l i t y  i s  v a s t l y  d i f f e r e n t  from t h i s  o f f i c i a l  p o s i t i o n  
and has va r ied  overtime with d i f f e r e n t  le ade rsh ip  s t y l e s ;  some CEOs 
have r e l i e d  on th e  government t o  provide  th e  guidance,  while  o the rs  
l i k e  Bow and most o f  h i s  fo re ig n  predecessors  have sought t o  mainta in  
o p e ra t io n a l  autonomy while  keeping th e  government informed of  major 
changes in o rder  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  f i n a n c i a l  suppor t .
As a l ready  pointed o u t ,  t h e  board o f  D irec to rs  i s  heav i ly  b iased in 
favour o f  ex a l ted  busy c ab in e t  m in i s t e r s ,  and o th e r  d i r e c t o r s  inc luding  
th e  CEO, a re  appointed by t h e  head of  th e  government, making i t  a 
h ighly  p o l i t i c a l  board,  a f a c t o r  which has not endeared i t  to  manage­
ment and o th e r  ex te rna l  a c to r s  with a s take  in th e  co rpora t ion  l i k e
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WB, who would l ik e  t o  see a more p ro fes s iona l  and e f f e c t i v e  board.
There was a general  agreement among management t h a t  the  board has 
been i n e f f e c t i v e  in p rovid ing  guidance,  n o n -p ro fes s iona l ,  has a myopic 
v i s io n  and sense o f  d i r e c t i o n ,  and t h a t  i t  was mainly mired in p o l i t i c a l  
i s s u e s .
The ambiguity and confusion of  who should provide  th e  o v e ra l l  guidance 
and s e t  po l icy  d i r e c t i o n s  o f  th e  co rpora t ion  has r e s u l t e d  in growing 
d i s p a r i t y  between th e  e x p ec ta t io n s  of government and th e  c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  
performance.  Not only was th e  board f a i l i n g  to  give  management c l e a r  
sense o f  d i r e c t i o n ,  but t h e r e  were a l so  d i v e r s i t y  of views amongst 
p o l i t i c i a n s  as to  what LNDC should be doing as the  IDA ex p e r t  exp la ined :
You had m i n i s t r i e s  of Planning and Trade, c lo se  people who had d i f f e r e n t  
ideas  of  what the  r o l e  o f  LNDC was. Some people would l i k e  t o  see i t  
involved in a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o j e c t s .  Other people would be saying we 
should be br inging  up f o r e ig n e r s  with s k i l l s  to  run the se  b u s in e s se s .  
Some would say LNDC should be developing n a tu ra l  r e sou rces ,  l i k e  
wool scour ing .  All t h e s e  i s su e s  are  swimming around in government - 
no m a t te r  what your po in t  of  view was, you did  not ge t  a c l e a r  answer 
of what bus iness  the  c o rp o ra t io n  was in ,  how i t  should be changed t o  
c r e a t e  more j o b  o p p o r t u n i t i e s ,  ( in t e rv i ew ) .
Under th e se  c i rcumstances ,  management has appropr ia ted  t o  i t s e l f  th e  
r o l e  o f  s t r a t e g i c  decis ion-making e s p e c i a l l y  when they concern expansion 
and investment t h a t  can be financed  i n t e r n a l l y .  This view i s  r e f l e c t e d  
in Bow's d e s c r ip t i o n  of  th e  r o l e  of th e  board.
Apart  from a few in d iv id u a l s  (mostly o u ts id e  d i r e c t o r s )  o th e r s  ha rd ly  
understood what was happening, and a l o t  was l e f t  t o  management to  
see what should happen and how i t  should happen, e s p e c i a l l y  in terms 
o f  p r o j e c t s  and inves tments .  Those who could understand and ana lyse  
whatever management submitted t o  th e  board,  d id  not come openly in 
the  d e l i b e r a t i o n s ,  they tended to  wait  f o r  m i n i s t e r ' s  views. Our 
boards do not have th e  power and a u th o r i t y  t h a t  they should.  They 
a re  not even r e sp o n s ib le  f o r  major dec is ions  l ik e  appointment of  t h e  
CEO, and th e  board know they  cannot f i r e  th e  CEO even when they f e e l  
he i s  i n e f f e c t i v e .  I t  i s  not c l e a r  who he i s  accountable  t o .
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The PS - Min is t ry  of  Trade concurred: 'The c l e a r  d i r e c t i o n  as t o  where 
p r i o r i t y  and emphasis should be, ought t o  have come from both the  
m in i s t ry  and th e  Board. You f in d  t h a t  Board i s  h ighly  in f luenced  by 
m i n i s t e r s . '  The p o l i t i c a l  na tu re  of th e  board i s  seen as i n h i b i t i n g  
c o n s t r u c t i v e  input  and change i n i t i a t i v e  from the  n o n - p o l i t i c i a n s  with 
t e c h n ic a l  s k i l l s  who would not want t o  be seen as c r i t i c a l  of  govern­
ment p o l i c i e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i f  th e  dec i s ions  a re  not favourab le  to  
government,  eg d is inves tment  and increased  budget a l l o c a t i o n s .  I t  
poses d e l i c a t e  dilemmas f o r  those  o u ts id e  d i r e c t o r s  in v i t e d  t o  board 
by head of government as t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  d i r e c t o r  found out:
Sometimes I f in d  myself  being the  only person who i s  making d e t a i l e d  
and c r i t i c a l  comments from th e  papers as they come through, and I 
f in d  t h a t  s l i g h t l y  embarrassing because I am an o u t s id e r ,  we d o n ' t  
even have a s u b s t a n t i a l  s take  in LNDC e i t h e r  in loan o r  sh a res .  I 
sometimes ask myself  -  what am I doing here ,  what r i g h t  have I t o  
make c r i t i c a l  remarks of  t h i s  c o rp o ra t io n ,  ( in t e rv i ew ) .
While th e  government o b j e c t iv e  of  i n v i t i n g  ' o u t s i d e r s '  was t o  br ing  
in d i f f e r e n t  p e r sp ec t iv e s  and new ideas  t o  th e  board,  the  ' o u t s i d e r s '  
have o f ten  gone ' n a t i v e '  and a l igned  themselves with management in 
s t r a t e g i c  changes,  much t o  th e  d i scom f i tu re  of  government. Thus, 
in general  th e  r o l e  of  th e  board in top  decis ion-making has become 
t h a t  o f  a condui t  t h a t  e i t h e r  l e g i t im iz e s  management dec is ions  o r  a 
forum f o r  management t o  n e g o t i a t e  with c ab in e t -cu m -d i rec to r s .  The 
former m in i s t e r  of Trade put i t  r a t h e r  poignant ly  t h a t  LNDC Board, in 
most cases  i s  ' j u s t  t h e  rubber  stamp of  what th e  management has a l ready  
d e c id e d ' .  I t  was p a r t l y  t h i s  s t r u c t u r e  which encouraged th e  CEO t o  
seek access  t o  the  p innac le  of power in government, and undermine th e  
procedures  and in te rmedia ry  a c to r s  -  e s p e c i a l l y  th e  t h r e e  m i n i s t r i e s  
on board.  Negotia t ing with th e  prime m in i s t e r  and cab ine t  m in i s t e r s  
and harness ing  t h e i r  suppor t  p r i o r  to  board meeting ensured a smooth 
passage of  dec is ions  through th e  board.
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P o l i t i c a l  p ressu res  had not gone completely  away. While the government was 
seemingly s a t i s f i e d  with the job o p p o r tu n i t i e s  c rea ted  by investment promotion 
s t r a t e g y ,  (eg in 1981, th e re  were 25 a c t i v e  LNDC su b s id ia ry  and a sso c ia ted  
companies, s teady in c rease  o f  fo re ig n  i n v e s t o r s ,  and upward trend in job 
c r e a t i o n ,  see f i g u r e  7 .6 ) ,  the  'n a t i o n a l  ownership'  i s sue  r e su r faced .  A 
sovereign s t a t e  wi thout  contro l  of  the 'commanding h e ig h t s '  of the national 
economy was a thorny i s sue  to p o l i t i c i a n s  as fo re ign  companies th r ived  while 
local  e n t e r p r i s e s  co l lapsed  under severe  compet it ion  from well e s t a b l i s h e d  SA 
companies. Government put p ressu re  on LNDC to e s t a b l i s h  a min ia tu re  stock 
exchange t h a t  would s e l l  b lue -ch ip  shares  in LNDC investment p o r t f o l i o  to the 
l o c a l s .  Lesotho Investment Holding - LIH, a wholy owned su b s id ia ry  o f  LNDC 
was e s t a b l i s h e d  in 1981 to  enable  the pub l ic  to i n v e s t  in successfu l  LNDC 
e n t e r p r i s e s .  Ted Waddington, PS o f  Finance,  who s e t  i t  up, observed th a t  
the re  was cons ide rab le  c r i t i c i s m  by the government and the local  business  
community t h a t  LNDC was only a s s i s t i n g  fo re ign  e n t e r p r i s e s ,  and we [govern­
ment] considered  t h a t  Basotho should be able  to  acquire  i n t e r e s t  in the  more 
successfu l  e n t e r p r i s e s ' .  This i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a 'paper  company', a t r u s t  fund,
with an au thor ized  c a p i t a l  of  R2.5 m i l l i o n  made up o f  LNDC shares  held in some
*
p r o f i t a b l e  a s s o c i a t e  companies . Because o f  the  level o f  development and 
novel ty  of  the  concept o f  s tock  market,  i t  was decided t h a t  the publ ic  should 
not i n v e s t  in shares  o f  ind iv idua l  companies, bu t  in a basket of  shares  r e p r e ­
sented in LIH to spread the  r i s k .  This obvia ted  any poss ib le  i n t e r f e r e n c e  
with the management o f  the companies, and a l so  ensured t h a t  LNDC would a c t  as 
an investment broker  fo r  the p u b l i c .  The response o f  the publ ic  has been 
luke-warm, with only one t h i r d  o f  the  shares  subscr ibed . Management a t t r i ­
butes  low response to  the n ove l ty  o f  the idea o f  investment in shares ,  o the rs  
argue t h a t  the  pub l ic  does not  t r u s t  an investment in a government owned 
i n s t i t u t i o n .
*
a s s o c ia te  companies are  those where LDC holds a 50% equ i ty  or  l e s s
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Following a cab ine t  r e s h u f f l e  in 1981, t h e r e  was a change of Chairman 
from the  M in is te r  of Trade -  th e  pa ren t  m in is t ry  of  LNDC, to  the
m in i s t e r  of Central  Planning. Otherwise th e  m in i s t e r  of  Trade re ta in e d
h i s  p o s i t io n  on board.  In th e  same period th e  government e s t a b l i s h e d
Centra l  Bank of Lesotho a f t e r  in t roducing  th e  local  currency -  Loti
in 1980*. These changes were in troduced to  con t ro l  the  burgeoning out
of fo re ign  investment,  t o  f o s t e r  f i n a n c i a l  cond i t ions  conducive t o
economic growth and t o  promote payment arrangements such as r e p a t r i a t i o n
of  p r o f i t s ,  i n t e r e s t s  o r  d iv idends .
D i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  of Resource Base
For a long time management's main concern had been how to  genera te  
d i s c r e t i o n a r y  funds and reduce t h e i r  dependence on the  government f o r  
c a p i t a l  investments .  Dividends,  i n t e r e s t s  and p r o f i t s  from t h e i r  equ i ty  
investments were used to  meet op e ra t io n a l  expend i tu res .  The co rpo ra t ion  
annual budget was routed  through the  Minis t ry  of Trade and included 
with in  the  ove ra l l  m in i s t ry  a l l o c a t i o n .  The M in is te r  of Trade was th e  
so le  n e g o t i a to r  f o r  h i s  m in i s t ry  and LNDC in c a b in e t ,  and whenever t h e re  
were c u t s ,  h is  m i n i s t r y ' s  i n t e r e s t s  took precedent over ' h i s  co rpo ra t ion
Following th e  success fu l  implementation o f  th e  broad o rg a n iz a t io n a l  
changes nego t ia ted  with th e  World Bank, and th e  u t i l i z a t i o n  of  th e  
f i r s t  c r e d i t  f a c i l i t y  of 1977, management, through th e  government, 
reneg o t ia t ed  th e  second l i n e  of  c r e d i t  f o r  R4.5 m i l l i o n  in 1981. 
E s s e n t i a l l y ,  t h e  WB had a l ready  worked out th e  d e t a i l s  and agreed with 
management in fo rm al ly ,  t h a t  th e  c r e d i t  w i l l  be g ran ted ,  but had to  
be channelled through th e  formal procedures of th e  board submit t ing 
th e  proposal t o  pa ren t  m in is t ry -T rade  which would forward i t  to  a
* One l o t i  = one rand. Lesotho currency i s  pegged on a 1=1 t o  SA 
currency.
c o -o rd in a t in g  m in is t ry  -  Planning, t o  n e g o t i a t e  on behal f  of  LNDC.
The WB agreement i s  guided by s tandard  re p o r t in g  and monitor ing pro ­
cedures  t h a t  inc lude  th e  terms and covenant t o  be observed th roughout 
th e  du ra t io n  of the  c r e d i t  f a c i l i t y ,  and covered a thorough a n a ly s i s  
of  o rg a n iz a t io n a l  a c t i v i t i e s  such as th e  fo llowing:
-  P r i o r  t o  any proposed amendment t o  th e  LNDC Act, government s h a l l  
inform WB of  the  amendment so proposed to  enable WB t o  exchange 
views with government and LNDC on such proposed change.
-  LNDC s h a l l  exchange informat ion with WB on any proposal t o  change 
i t s  ' s t a tem en t  o f  p o l i c y '  and s h a l l  not amend o r  a l t e r  such s t a t e ­
ment except  in agreement with WB.
These agreements and t h e i r  s t a t u s  as reviewed by th e  WB f o r  th e  second 
l i n e  of  c r e d i t  are  h ig h l ig h ted  in appendix I I .  The i n t e r e s t i n g  paradox 
o f  t h i s  agreement was t h a t  LNDC has only deployed about h a l f  of the  
c r e d i t  funds s ince  1981; because of th e  d e t a i l e d  informat ion t h a t  i s  
r e q u i r e d ,  few p r o j e c t  p roposa ls  pass th e  WB c r i t e r i a ,  and LNDC has had 
t o  r e n e g o t i a t e  ex tens ion  o f  d ead l ine  which was in 1984, t h r e e  t im es .
The former chairman o f  LNDC complained about t h e se  s t r i n g e n t  procedures .  
'Each one of th e se  o rg a n iz a t io n s  [ e x te rn a l  f i n a n c i e r s  provid ing  LNDC 
with loans ,  g r a n t s ,  e t c ]  has go t  i t s  own p o l i c i e s  and c o n d i t io n s  under 
which i t  can r e l e a s e  i t s  funds to  LNDC. The p r o j e c t  ev a lu a t io n  p ro­
cedures  t h a t  LNDC follows t o  s a t i s f y  th e se  cond i t ions  a re  so complicated 
t h a t  few indigenous businessmen can a f fo rd  t o  comply with th em ' .  The 
process  of  r e l e a s in g  th e  funds involves  NID submit t ing an investment 
proposal t o  th e  Investment committee,  which app ra i se s  i t  and submits 
i t  to  th e  board,  and th e  board forwards i t  t o  WB f o r  f u r t h e r  review.
I f  th e  WB i s  s a t i s f i e d  with t h e  p r o j e c t  p roposa l ,  LNDC w i l l  then be
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c r e d i t e d  with the  amount of the  p ro j e c t  to  draw a g a in s t .
The dec is ion  t o  d i v e r s i t y  resource  op t ions  to  i n t e r n a t io n a l  f i n a n c i a l  
markets was based on a commonly shared problem by both management and 
th e  government; they both d e sp e ra te ly  wanted WB concessionary f i n a n c i a l  
a s s i s t a n c e .  However, management had o th e r  ideas  about WB r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  
as t h e  CEO expla ined:
We use WB f i n a n c i a l  support  t o  genera te  more funds from home government. 
I f  they (WB) have approved th e  l i n e  of  c r e d i t  as an express ion  o f  t h e i r  
t r u s t  and conf idence in us ,  i t  su re ly  puts  p re ssu re  on the  government 
t o  show t h e i r  commitment towards LNDC. Their  condi t ions  a re  r i g i d  and 
unp a la tab le ,  but t h a t  has developed a p ro fes s io n a l  approach in th e  way 
our s t a f f  analyse  p r o j e c t s .
There i s  a bus iness  sense in t h e i r  covenants which i s  sometimes incon­
s i s t e n t  with th e  p o l i t i c a l  demands made on LNDC, and we do sometimes 
ask them to  bend th e  ru l e s  and procedures to  accommodate our p e c u l i a r  
problems. At o th e r  t imes  we simply defy them.
The F inancia l  D i rec to r  saw th e  i n t e r a c t i o n  with th e  WB as a breakthrough 
to  ob ta in  a po in t  of  r e f e r e n ce  on LNDC c r e d i t  worth iness .  E l l i g i b i l i t y  
to  WB l in e  o f  c r e d i t  opened doors t o  o th e r  o p p o r tu n i t i e s .  Following 
the  normal o f f i c i a l  channels  another concessionary  g ran t  was nego t ia ted  
and agreed upon by th e  government and African Development Bank -  ADB 
f o r  R3 m i l l i o n .  This was by f a r  th e  most r e s t r i c t i v e  loan f o r  LNDC, 
and whi le  th e  funds were t h e r e  f o r  LNDC t o  use,  i t  became almost imposs­
ib l e  t o  deploy th e  funds wi thou t  r e n e g o t i a t in g  f o r  th e  m odif ica t ion  of 
th e  terms and a t  t imes completely  ignoring  them. The cond i t ions  o f  
th e  loan s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  t h e  funds should not be used t o  f inance  any 
South AFrican r e l a t e d  investments  o r  pay f o r  th e  c o s t  of  m a te r ia l  from 
t h a t  country .  As poin ted ou t  elsewhere (see  Chapter 5) SA i s  LNDC's 
b ig g e s t ,  i f  not th e  only ,  s u p p l i e r  of raw m a te r i a l ,  major in v e s to r  
market,  and b ig g es t  market f o r  Lesotho-based SA companies, m a jo r i ty
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o f  which a re  in p a r tn e r s h ip  with LNDC.
More agreements were subsequently  i n s t i g a t e d  by th e  co rpo ra t ion  and 
n e g o t ia ted  by government. They included European Investment Bank -  
EIB, global loan of  R3 m i l l i o n ,  with a covenant t h a t  t e x t i l e  i n d u s t r i e s  
f inanced  by th e  loan should not be exported t o  European community. 
F inanc ia l  package of  DM 4 .4  m i l l i o n  with K r e d i t a n s t a l t  Fur Wiederaufbau -  
KFW, of  Germany was c l inched  t o  f inance  an import s u b s t i t u t i o n  p r o j e c t  -  
Lot i  Br icks ,  one o f  LNDC's wholly-owned companies. Negot ia t ions  were 
a l s o  en te red  in to  with I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Finance Corporation with view to  
t h e i r  s u b s t a n t i a l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  with LNDC. The d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  d r ive  
was in p a r t  a response t o  a s e r i e s  of  commissioned s tu d ie s  which ind ica ted  
t h a t  most of  th e  in v e s to r s  in LNDC promoted p r o j e c t s  were high r i s k ,  
' l o o s e - f o o t '  investments .  Inves to rs  -  p a r t i c u l a r l y  SA i n d u s t r i a l i s t s ,  
were l ee ry  of  f l u c t u a t i n g  ' p o l i t i c a l  tem pera ture '  between SA and Lesotho, 
and could only in v es t  h eav i ly  i f  t h e r e  were o th e r  i n t e r n a t io n a l  organ­
i s a t i o n s  such as IFC, t o  boos t  c o n f id e n ce .1
Bow's r e l a t i v e  success in mobi l iz ing  resources  from m u l t i - l a t e r a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  and th e  genera l  managerial  input he got from th e se  organ­
i z a t i o n s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  WB which f i e ld e d  superv is ion  teams b i -a n n u a l ly  
t o  review th e  performance,  in s p i r e d  him to  in t roduce  even deep changes.
In 1982, he submitted a proposal t o  th e  board and requested t h e  govern­
ment t o  f l o a t  25 pe r  cen t  o f  i t s  o rd inary  shares  in LNDC to  some s e l ­
ec ted  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  such as th e  Dutch FMO, IFC, 
Commonwealth Development Corporation -  CDC and th e  German, DEG. The 
Corporate S ecre ta ry  expla ined  th e  mot ivation behind t h i s  change:
1 P-E Consult ing Report ,  1978.
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The major reason was to  ge t  c a p i t a l  i n j e c t i o n  from o u ts ide  the  govern­
ment through sharehold ing, but a l so  to  d e p o l i t i c i z e  th e  board.  We 
wanted a p ro fes s iona l  and c o n s t r u c t i v e  board -  hard-nosed businessmen 
who would r e a l l y  keep us on our  toes  a l l  t h e  t im e .  T h a t ' s  why we 
recommended o rgan iza t ions  l i k e  CDC, IFC, t h e  kind o f  mind the  q u a l i t y  
of  which does help to  improve and change f o r  t h e  b e t t e r .  So th e  more 
o f  them t h e r e  a re ,  we hope t h e i r  p ro f e s s io n a l  philosophy w i l l  g radua l ly  
be in fused  throughout th e  board ,  (emphasis s u p p l i e d ) .
C lea r ly  such a change was going to  d i l u t e  t h e  government i n t e r e s t  in 
LNDC, and a p o l i t i c a l  dec i s ion  had t o  be taken  by c a b in e t ,  which was 
t o  t r a c k  f o r  years  as the  p o l i t i c i a n s  r econs ide red  t h e i r  i n d u s t r i a l ­
i z a t i o n  s t r a t e g y .  They ( p o l i t i c i a n s )  were not p a r t i c u l a r l y  happy with 
th e  WB save f o r  th e  funding r e l i e f )  which had a t  t imes hus t led  them 
in to  dec i s io n s  they did not favour .  The M in i s t e r  o f  Trade and c h a i r ­
man of  LNDC complained about t h e  i n f l e x i b i l i t y  of th e  fo re ign  f i n a n c i e r s  
t o  th e  changing local c o n d i t io n s .  They were devoid of  local  touch,  
over ly  b iased  in favour of  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r ,  and r e s t r a i n e d  th e  LNDC 
and government responsiveness  t o  emerging o p p o r t u n i t i e s  and problems 
they  faced .
The a c t i v e  r o l e  of  WB in adv is ing  LNDC has declined over t ime and has 
been confined mainly t o  t h e  superv is ion  o f  t h e  g ra n t s  s ince  the  
a r r i v a l  o f  th e  I r i s h  t e c h n ic a l  team -  IDA. There have been c o n f l i c t  
of  views and s t r a t e g i c  approaches between t h e  more cau t ious  and 
conse rv a t iv e  WB and th e  IDA team t h a t  had a d i f f e r e n t  philosophy of  
what a development f inance  co rp o ra t io n  should be doing .  The F inanc ia l  
C o n t r o l l e r  expressed t h i s  viewpoint when he argued t h a t  ' t h e  concept 
o f  development o rgan iza t ion  been expected t o  make p r o f i t s  a t  the  same 
time c r e a t e  more jo b s ,  was no t  r e a d i ly  r e c o n c i l l a b l e 1.
Competit ion and Leadership Change
Having dominated th e  SA in v e s to r s  market f o r  nea r ly  t h r e e  years  with
197
a unique investment promotion s t r a t e g y ,  LNDC was confronted by f i e r c e  com­
p e t i t i o n  from wi th in  i t s  'major '  market - SA. Republic of South Afr ica  
revea led  i t s  i n d u s t r i a l  d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  s t r a t e g y  to promote development in 
the homelands and reduce concen t ra t ion  of economic a c t i v i t i e s  in c e r t a i n  
m e t ropo l i t an  a reas .  Lucra t ive  incen t iv e  packages were o f fe red  to a t t r a c t  
labour in te n s iv e  firms to those ta rg e ted  a reas .  They included:
o r e b a te s  on t r a n s p o r t  o f  outgoing goods by r a i l ,  road,  sea o r  a i r .  The 
t r a n s p o r t  reba te  ranges from 40 per cen t  to 60 per cen t .
o E l e c t r i c i t y  concessions  (100 percen t  of  Lesotho 's  e l e c t r i c i t y  comes from 
SA).
o Train ing allowance of  125 per cen t  of t r a i n i n g  expenses incurred .
o Rental concessions  based on the value of ren ted  proper ty  and payable as
taxab le  cash g ran t  fo r  a per iod  of  10 ye a r s .
o Reloca tion  c o s t s  which a re  reimbursed to i n d u s t r i a l i s t s ,  up to R500,000 fo r
1
moving f a c t o r i e s  or p a r t s  to a development po in t .
* A l o t  o f  companies t h a t  were loca ted  in Lesotho, some in j o i n t  venture  
with  LNDC, e s p e c i a l l y  those t h a t  were producing fo r  the SA and Lesotho 
markets,  moved to  the homelands. The pressu re  mounted on management to 
improve t h e i r  incen t iv e  package from those remaining; the cos t  o f  c a p i t a l  
in SA was 3 per cen t  lower than in Lesotho where i t  was 15 per c en t ,  
e l e c t r i c i t y  r a t e s  were high,  and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  c o s t s  high fo r  expo r te rs  
because Lesotho r e l i e s  whol ly on SA t r a n s p o r t  f a c i l i t i e s .
Regional In d u s t r ia l  Development In cen t iv es ,  October 1985. 
* Data of the  actual  numbers was not  a v a i l a b l e .
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A comprehensive study was commissioned, with the  a s s i s t a n c e  of IDA, 
t o  review LNDC's incen t iv e  package, and recommendation submitted t o  
c a b i n e t .  LNDC had proposed the  fo llowing changes in t h e i r  incen t iv e  
package:
-  Extension of  tax  ho l iday  from 6 years  t o  10 y e a r s .
-  N egot ia t ion  with WB to  lower th e  agreed lending r a t e  in o rde r  t o  
make i t  compet it ive  with SA r a t e s  (see  Appendix I I ) .
-  Es tabli shment of  expor t  f inance  c r e d i t  t o  a s s i s t  e x p o r t -o r i en te d  
companies.
The SA homelands were allowed by SA a u t h o r i t i e s  to  e s t a b l i s h  h o te l s  
with  gambling f a c i l i t i e s ,  and t h a t  was th e  l a s t  blow t o  LNDC's major 
money-spinner Holiday Inns ,  which had th r iv e d  almost e n t i r e l y  from 
SA t o u r i s t s  and gamblers,  y i e ld in g  high div idends eg R157,000 in 
1979, R157,000 ir> 1980 and R200,000 in 1981J  Actual ly  th e  hote l  
had t o  co ncen t ra te  on gambling as occupancy r a t e  plummeted, and a t  
one s tag e  i t  was a s u b jec t  of  n e g o t i a t io n  with government who wanted 
t o  t u rn  i t  in to  a h o s p i t a l .  The neighbouring co u n t r ie s  of  Botswana 
and Swaziland had a l so  awaken t o  th e  need t o  agg ress ive ly  campaign 
f o r  investment from SA and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y .  Thus, LNDC no longer 
enjoyed a t t r a c t i v e  i n c en t iv e s  i t  once had, i t  had become one of th e  
p o s s ib le  choices  in th e  in c e n t iv e  compet it ion f o r  investment,  and as 
management r e a d i l y  r e a l i z e d ,  they  had to  come up with something 
s p e c i a l ,  they  could not match th e  'homelands' who are  supported by SA.
* LNDC Annual Report,  1982.
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SA has been th e  major lo c a t io n  f o r  m u l t in a t io n a l  co rpora t ion  investment 
in Afr ica  and according t o  some e s t i m a te s ,  28 per cent  of  manufacturing 
employment in SA i s  in fo re ig n  c o n t r o l l e d  co rp o ra t io n s ,  Black (1986).
Most of th e se  co rpo ra t ions  were under p o l i t i c a l  p ressu re  from t h e i r  
home c o u n t r ie s  to  p u l l  out of  SA (eg Barclays Bank investment of R100 
m i l l i o n ,  in SA Defence bonds caused p o l i t i c a l  f u r o r e ) .  Bow's promotion 
s t r a t e g y  focused on those  companies, and o f f e red  Lesotho and LNDC as 
a l t e r n a t i v e  investment lo c a t io n  f o r  those  companies t h a t  wanted t o  
main ta in  t h e i r  overseas  markets from l e s s  p o l i t i c a l  s e n s i t i v e  p o s i t i o n .  
Funds were requ ired  t o  i n t e n s i f y  th e  campaign and th e  government had 
a l ready  de fau l ted  twice  on th e  R690,000 annual budget agreed with 
management in 1979. Bow's in f luence  on the  PM was rap id ly  dec l in in g  
and t h a t  meant h is  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  in g e t t i n g  r e s u l t s  was equal ly  
waning. New a c to r s  had come in to  the  cab in e t  and so were new is sues  
which had d iv e r te d  the  PM's a t t e n t i o n  e lsewhere .  As Bow observed:
The PM had surrounded h imse lf  with some o th e r  people d iv e r t in g  h is  
a t t e n t i o n  t o  o th e r  i s s u e s .  In my l a s t  year  a t  LNDC I only saw him 
once when I was tender ing  my r e s ig n a t i o n .
The M in is te r  of Trade echoed th e  same f r u s t r a t i o n  he encountered in 
Cabinet where h is  co l leagues  had developed o th e r  p r i o r i t i e s  de-emphasizing 
th e  r o l e  of  in d u s t ry ,  r e s u l t i n g  in budget cu ts  to  indus t ry  which a f f e c t e d  
LNDC's subventions .
John Bow res igned  in September 1982 leaving LNDC f i rm ly  committed to  
investment promotion s t r a t e g y  y e t  not as p r o f i t a b l e  as he had hoped 
the  co rpo ra t ion  would be,  see  f i g u r e  7 .7 .  These f i g u r e s  should be 
read with cau t io n ,  they mask th e  r e a l  performance.  A c l o s e r  s c r u t in y  
would show t h a t  th e  r ea l  d e f i c i t  of th e  co rpo ra t ion  was f a r  l e s s  than 
R1,118,000, th e  d i f f e r e n c e  coming from co nd i t ions  imposed by the  
government (eg non-payment o f  R690,000 f o r  promotion expendi tu re ,  and
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w ithhold ing  of d ividend by Holiday In n s ) .  While performance-wise 
Bow had n o t ,  r e l a t i v e l y  speaking , succeeded to  tu rn  around LNDC to  
p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  he had enhanced th e  image of loca l managers and demon­
s t r a t e d  t h a t  given th e  r i g h t  q u a l i f i c a t io n s  and exper ience , they  were 
as capable  as any o f t h e i r  fo re ig n  c o u n te rp a r ts .  He was h igh ly  re spec ted  
w ith in  th e  business  community and had managed to  ward o f f  government 
in te r f e r e n c e s  in  LNDC through h is  c lo se  r e l a t io n s h ip  with th e  PM', 
observed th e  d i r e c to r  o f  NID. By th e  same token , h is  le ad e rsh ip  s t y l e  
and in f lu en ce  had dominated th e  co rp o ra t io n  and th e  government key 
d ec is io n  makers t h a t  many people  and th e  s t a f f  f e ld  LNDC would not be 
th e  same w ithout him. I t  was th e  view e q u a lly  expressed by th e  WB 
in i t s  p r o je c t  completion re p o r t  (1983): "Mr Bow provided LNDC with 
s trong  le a d e rs h ip ,  helped to  c o r r e c t  many of th e  d e f ic ie n c ie s  of th e  
p a s t ,  and broadened LNDC's ro le  in to  th e  main a c to r  in th e  i n d u s t r i a l  
development f i e l d " .  He had s e t  a managerial hu rd le  a g a in s t  which h is  
successo rs  have been measured, and o f te n  found wanting.
Figure 7 .7  
LNDC PERFORMANCE 
R000
3 1 s t  March 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
CORPORATION
P r o f i t / ( l o s s ) 66 (15) (101) 286 636 (599)
GROUP
P r o f i t / ( l o s s ) (1355) (313) (531) (105) (8) (1118)
Source: World Bank Review Report on LNDC, June 30, 1983.
As succession  p o licy  does no t e x i s t  in LNDC, (because i t  would not 
work, as th e  D irec to r  o f  A dm in is tra tion  poin ted  out 'Our s t r u c tu r e
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has no growth beyond th e  d iv i s io n s ,  t h a t  growth and succession  a re  
impaired by p o l i t i c a l  in te rv e n t io n .  We have th e se  educated young s t a f f ,  
w ith  v a s t  experience  -  tw elve years  in th e  same p lace ,  s a tu r a t io n  has 
cropped up and t h a t ' s  why some a re  r e s ig n in g 1. (Also r e f e r  to  e a r l i e r  
d iscu ss io n  on t r a in in g  and l o c a l i s a t i o n ) .  There was no immediate 
rep lacem ent, and P e te r  Senna, th e  co rp o ra te  s e c re ta ry  acted  as CEO 
f o r  some tim e . The board pu t p re ssu re  on th e  government to  appoin t 
th e  CEO, and was jo in e d  in by th e  WB in t h e i r  r e p o r t  to  LNDC and 
government.
We understand th a t  government has not y e t  appoin ted  a successo r to  
Mr Bow, who re l in q u ish e d  h is  pos t as CEO. The delay  in s e le c t io n  of 
a new CEO is  very u n fo r tu n a te ,  as i t  would have been d e s i r a b le  t h a t  
Mr Bow and h is  successor overlap  fo r  some t im e .  We would a p p re c ia te  
being kept up to  d a te  on developments and would expect to  be informed 
once th e  new CEO i s  s e le c te d ,  to g e th e r  with d e t a i l s  of th e  appo in tee 's  
experience  and q u a l i f i c a t i o n s .
The c o rp o ra te  s e c re ta ry ,  who was a d iv i s io n a l  d i r e c t o r  of A dm inistra tion  
and had acted  as  CEO during  th e  absence of Bow, was e v en tu a lly  appointed 
su b s ta n t iv e  CEO. I t  was g e n e ra l ly  be lieved  w ith in  th e  co rp o ra tio n  
t h a t  he was not an obvious government choice and t h a t  th e  p o l i t i c i a n s  
might have been h u rr ied  in to  appoin ting  him under WB p re s su re .  Per­
haps more d is tu rb in g  f o r  th e  management and e x te rn a l  in v e s to r s ,  and 
p o ss ib ly  f o r  th e  government as w e l l ,  was th e  r e a l i z a t i o n  t h a t  th e  
c o n t r a c t s  of th e  I r i s h  team were coming to  an end in 1983. Bow was 
th e  a r c h i t e c t  o f  investm ent promotion and an i n i t i a t o r  o f  th e  I r i s h  
connec tion . The d ep a r tu re  o f  one a f t e r  th e  o th e r  would c re a te  
m anagerial d is tu rb an ce  none o f  th e  a c to r s  wanted to  see . I t  was 
e s s e n t i a l  th e re fo re  to  maintain coitinuity ad s t a b i l i t y  by appoin ting  
a known investment advocate from w ith in  w hile  th e  government renego t­
ia te d  th e  ex tension  o f th e  IDA e x p e r ts ,  which was agreed upon in 1983.
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Senna was not seen as a p a r t i c u l a r l y  s trong  le ad e r .  He was n o to r io u s ly  
in e f f e c t iv e  and in d e c is iv e  in board and management committees and 
f a i l e d  to  measure up to  th e  s tandards  o f  h is  p redecesso r .  Most of 
a l l  he lacked th e  necessary  and e s s e n t i a l  in f lu en ce  and s k i l l  t o  ge t 
a c t io n  from th e  bureaucracy . The d iv is io n a l  d i r e c to r s  and p ro je c t  
managers complained about lack o f  support and p ro te c t io n  from m in is­
t e r i a l  in te r f e r e n c e ,  and h is  in d ec is iv en ess  in decision-m aking, causing 
delays in p ro je c t  im plem entation. His f a i l u r e  to  provide e f f e c t iv e  
lead e rsh ip  and in s p i r e  confidence  in th e  s t a f f ,  r e s u l te d  in th e  power 
s h i f t  from CEO and s l ip p ed  to  th e  i n f l u e n t i a l  IDA ex p er ts  a t  th e  
d iv is io n a l  l e v e l ,  and th e  emergence o f  fragmented, d iv i s io n a l ly  
o r ie n te d  changes, which we now tu rn  to  in th e  next c h ap te r .
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Chapter 8
R eorgan iza tion : 1982-86 
A New In d u s t r ie s  D iv ision  -  NID
This c h ap te r  looks a t  th e  re o rg a n iz a t io n  process c a r r ie d  ou t between 
1982-86, a t  th e  headquarte rs  o f  LNDC. I t  focuses on th e  two key 
d iv is io n s  -  NID and OD, and d e sc r ib e s  how and what s t r a t e g i c  changes 
were in troduced  and su s ta in ed  ( i f  ever) by success ive  IDA ex p er ts  on 
sh o r t- te rm  -  two year  c o n t r a c t s ,  th e  resurgency of th e se  d iv is io n s  
to  powerful p o s i t io n s  of e f f e c t i v e ly  decid ing  th e  f u tu r e  d i r e c t io n  
o f  th e  co rp o ra t io n ,  and th e  power balance between them and th e  CEO. 
Given t h a t  th e  changes a f fe c te d  th e  two most v i t a l  d iv is io n s  t h a t  
c o n s t i t u t e  th e  main business  a c t i v i t y  of th e  co rp o ra t io n  ( i e  the  
s t r a t e g i c  investment and job  c re a t io n  s ec t io n  -  NID, and th e  revenue 
g enera tion  sec t io n  -  OD) and t h a t  th e  d iv is io n s  were involved in 
d i s t i n c t i v e l y  d i f f e r e n t  a c t i v i t i e s ,  th e  p re s e n ta t io n  has been d iv ided  
in to  two p a r t s  A and B in o rd e r  to  give a sharp focus on issu es  in 
each d iv i s io n ,  a lso  to  make i t  more manageable and read ab le .  The 
in te r a c t io n  process between th e  HQ and th e  su b s id ia ry  companies, and 
th e  s p e c i f ic  change process in each o f LNDC companies a re  described  
in Appendix I I I .
The New Management
Following th e  r e s ig n a t io n  o f  John Bow in 1982, LNDC went through a 
period o f chequered ex p er ien ce ,  from lead e rsh ip  probelms t h a t  p e rco la ted  
throughout th e  co rp o ra t io n  to  heightened le v e l s  of com petition in i t s  
domain market in SA. This was happening a t  a time when the  government 
concern with i n d u s t r i a l i z a t io n  was waning and was preoccupied with 
p o l i t i c a l  m a t te r s ,  c h ie f  among them was th e  f r o s ty  r e la t io n s h ip  with
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SA. Senna took over a t  th e  time when long-term changes in the  market 
p lace  o f  LNDC had j u s t  been launched, ( i e  th e  co rpo ra tion  was tak in g  
a b a t te r in g  from th e  'homelands' com petition) and i t  needed a s trong  
le ad e rsh ip  to  f i g h t  back e f f e c t i v e ly  to  rep o s tu re  th e  b u s in e ss .  But, 
as I have a lready  no ted , he was perceived  as a lame-duck c h ie f  e x ec u t iv e ,  
h is  i n a b i l i t y  to  in f lu en ce  e v e n ts ,  t o  d e te r  unwanted government i n t e r ­
v en tio n s ,  to  in s p i r e  and guide o rg a n iz a t io n a l  (change) p ro a c t iv e n e s s ,  
and r i s k  ta k in g ,  s ev e re ly  diminished h is  power base . His ten u re  was 
a f a i t h f u l  c o n tin u a tio n  o f  Bow's s t r a t e g y ,  and given h is  incompetence, 
i t  was thought h igh ly  u n l ik e ly  t h a t  he would 'sweep th e  chessboard 
and s t a r t  new game', th e  r e s u l t  o f  which was in e v i ta b ly  more power 
ceded to  execu tive  e x p e r ts  to  take  th e  i n i t i a t i v e  on which course 
investment promotion should fo llow .
A Harvard law graduate  by t r a i n i n g ,  Senna 's  immediate concern was to  
e s t a b l i s h  h is  le ad e rsh ip  c r e d i b i l i t y ,  and in search of p o l i t i c a l  
'co n n ec tio n ' which was a b so lu te ly  e s s e n t i a l  f o r  h is  own job s e c u r i ty  
and e f f e c t iv e n e s s ,  he tended to  lean too  c lo se ly  to  h is  Chairman -  
M in is te r  o f  Trade who se ized  th e  oppo rtu n i ty  to  ge t h im self d i r e c t l y  
involved in th e  day-to -day  m inu tiae  o f  th e  company and i n t e r f e r e  in 
some o p e ra t io n a l  d e c is io n s  where he had personal i n t e r e s t s .  That 
ta rn ish e d  Senna 's  p o s i t io n  even f u r th e r  w ith in  the  s t a f f  and i r o n i c a l l y  
even with th e  Chairman. When th e  c o n t ra c ts  o f  th e  IDA ex p er ts  exp ired  
in 1983, they  were rep laced  by ano ther  t r i o  o f  d iv is io n a l  e x e c u t iv e s .  
Throughout t h i s  period  o f  IDA e x p e r t s '  su cce ss io n s ,  th e re  were no 
documented po licy  s ta tem en t which provided g u id e l in e s  o r  l in k  between 
th e  changes t h a t  had been s t a r t e d ,  which could serve as a b a s is  f o r  
c o n t in u i ty  a f t e r  t h e i r  d e p a r tu re .  Most o f  th e  loca l 'u n d e r s tu d ie s '  
were too ju n io r  and inexperienced  to  s u s ta in  th e  change momentum.
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Subsequently , each IDA team introduced  a spa te  of changes t h a t  were 
com pletely  d i s jo in te d  and unco-ord inated  with what t h e i r  p redecesso rs  
had done. The D irec to r  o f  Finance a lluded  to  t h i s  view when he expressed 
h is  d is i l lu s io n m e n t  with th e  slow p rogress  o f  investment promotion.
When I came here th re e  years  ago, I had p lans to  improve performance 
o f LNDC and a s s i s t  i t  r e a l i z e  i t ' s  f u l l  p o te n t ia l  . . .  I soon r e a l iz e d  
t h a t  I was looking in th e  f u tu r e  o f  LNDC through a t i n t e d  v is io n  . . .
A f te r  being in Lesotho you become pragmatic about what w i l l  happen 
in th e  f u tu r e .
B uild ing  Middle Management C ap ab il i ty
The d e c e n t r a l i z a t io n  p rocess  had not gone deep enough w ith in  the  
d iv i s io n s .  When Brendan Martin took over as execu tive  ad v ise r  irr NID, 
in 1983, he ch ron ic led  a s e r i e s  of managerial b o tt len eck s  which he 
had to  deal with in o rd e r  to  improve th e  performance o f th e  d iv i s io n .  
The d iv is io n  was s t i l l  h igh ly  c e n t r a l i s e d  with th e  d i r e c to r  and h is  
a d v ise r  involved in a l l  o p e ra t io n a l  d e t a i l s  o f  th e  two department -  
ie  investm ent promotion, and p r o je c t  a p p r a i s a l .  You had to  go down 
th re e  grades before  you found anybody, he remarked. All th e  massive 
ta sk  o f p r o je c t  programming, su p erv is io n  o f th e  a p p ra is a ls  and 
p rocess ing  o f recommendations to  Investment Committee, were being 
d i r e c t l y  handled by th e  d i r e c t o r ,  th e  r e s u l t  o f  which was th e  
choking o f  decision-m aking p ro cess .  Martin observed:
You had an absence o f  day-to -day  d i r e c t io n  and c o n tro l  o f  what was 
going on in th e  d iv i s io n .  That was th e  f i r s t  th in g  t h a t  s tru ck  my 
mind. Below t h a t ,  th e  e f f e c t  was lack o f  t r a i n i n g ,  (o n - th e - jo b )  
su p e rv is io n ,  personal development, and a l l  th e  kind o f th in g s  
t h a t  you would normally expect with middle management. At th e  to p ,  
in d i r e c t o r ' s  desk and John C u r t in 's ,  h is  a d v is e r ,  you had b o t t l e ­
necks -  d e c is io n s  no t being made.
P ro je c t  O ff ice rs  -  POs, were th e  f i r s t  p o in t  o f  co n tac t  with the  
p o te n t ia l  in v e s to rs ,  they  were th e  c o rp o ra t io n s 's  'sa lesm en ' who had
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c lo se  touch with th e  market and knew what the  a t t i t u d e s  and p e rcep tions  
of in v e s to rs  were towards i t s  promotion package, y e t  they had no c l e a r  
r o le  to  in f luence  th e  decision-m aking process of th e  investments they 
promoted. Martin decided to  change t h a t  s t r u c tu r e ,  in s tead  he de lega ted  
more r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  to  middle management by upgrading some p o s i t io n s  
and c re a t in g  's e n io r  p r o je c t  managers' r o le  to  develop personal 
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  th e  programming o f  s e c t io n a l  s t a f f ,  p lann ing , a s s ­
e ss ing  th e  market o p p o r tu n i t ie s  f o r  t h e i r  product s e c to r s ,  s e t t i n g  
t a r g e t s  and monitoring th e  achievements f o r  t h e i r  product s e c to r s ,  
s e t t i n g  t a r g e t s  and m onitoring th e  achievements of those  t a r g e t s ,  
and th e  genera l day-to -day  bus iness  of su p erv is io n  and con tro l  of 
t h e i r  s t a f f .  The d ec is io n  recommendations about v i a b i l i t y  of p ro je c ts  
were to  be taken a t  a locus of co n tro l  and b e s t  inform ation -  th e  
s en io r  p r o je c t  managers' l e v e l .  They would a lso  be ab le  to  p re sen t  
t h e i r  p ro je c t  p ro p o sa ls ,  a f t e r  endorsement by th e  d iv is io n a l  d i r e c to r ,  
t o  th e  investment committee and fo llow  them through to  implementation. 
That marked a com pletely  new r o le  f o r  th e  p ro je c t  o f f i c e r s ,  and a 
d epar tu re  from th e  s t r u c tu r e  where they  were merely 'paper p ro c e sso rs '  
who gathered  th e  necessa ry  inform ation  based on a standard  c h e c k - l i s t  
f o r  th e  d i r e c to r  to  make recommendations to  th e  investment committee.
I t  a lso  took o f f  th e  p re s su re s  of d ec is io n  p i le -u p  from th e  d i r e c to r  
and f a c i l i t a t e d  quick responses to  in v e s to r s '  p ro p o sa ls .
However, th e  r e s t r u c tu r in g  o f  th e  d iv is io n  was not an easy ta s k ;  th e re  
were e s ta b l i s h e d  a t t i t u d e s  and r e g i d i t i e s  which had to  be overcomed, 
p a r t i c u l a r ly  from s e n io r  management as Martin l a t e r  d iscovered:
There a re  two kinds o f  a t t i t u d e s  t h a t  p re v a i l  in LNDC: th e re  is  th e  
co rpo ra te  a t t i t u d e  and th e  d iv i s io n a l  a t t i t u d e  which we t r y  to  
develop. They seem to  be working a t  va riance  with each o th e r .  I 
am freq u e n t ly  as ton ished  in  management meetings where P ro jec t  Managers' 
a re  r e fe r re d  t o  as " ju n io r  s t a f f " .  I f  you tak e  somebody with the  
s o r t  o f p ro je c t  experience  th e se  people have, 4-6 years  experience ,
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you soon r e a l i z e  t h a t  they have th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  th e  whole 
in d u s t r i a l  s e c to r  in Lesotho. They a re  p laying  a leading  ro le  and 
deserve  to  be recognized as managers worthy o f t h a t  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y .
Within NID we t r y  to  do t h a t ,  but t h a t ' s  not f u l l y  shared by s en io r  
management. I f  you look a t  th e  CYs of our CEOs, you f in d  t h a t  most 
of them have been 'p u b l ic  se rv an ts  a t  h e a r t '  and tend to  hold to  
t h a t  c i v i l  s e rv ice  approach where approval i s  sought a t  every le v e l .
This r e ta rd s  d e leg a tio n  and f u l l  development of s t a f f .
P a r t  o f s e n io r  management neg a tiv e  a t t i t u d e  could have been p a r t ly  
due to  s a la ry  adjustm ents t h a t  followed immediately a f t e r  th e  re -o rg an -  
iz a t io n  was undertaken. P ro je c t  managers were now e n t i t l e d  to  a 
package o f a llow ances, eg housing allow ance, c a r  advance e t c . ,  which 
had h i t h e r to  been th e  p re se rv e  o f  top  management, and p a r t ly  because 
d e sp i te  th e  c o rp o ra t io n 's  d ec la red  personnel p o licy  t h a t  ' s a l a r y  in c rease s  
and promotions were based on performance not on s e n i o r i t y ' ,  i t  had not 
been p o s s ib le  to  id e n t i fy  and measure performances in a h igh ly  c e n t r a l ­
ized s t r u c tu r e .  There were a lso  some underly ing  p re ssu re s  to  le v e lo u t  
and equate  s a l a r i e s  to  p o s i t io n s  r a th e r  than perform ances. Taking 
advantage of low morale and poor p ro d u c t iv i ty  t h a t  were m anifested  
in a l l  th e  d iv is io n s  of th e  c o rp o ra t io n * , Martin had put a s trong  
proposal to  th e  Board t h a t  in  o rder  to  f o s t e r  the  personal commitment 
t h a t  was expected and to  m otiva te  th e  p r o je c t  o f f i c e r s  to  improve 
t h e i r  performance, they  must f i r s t  be adequate ly  remunerated and 
recognized f o r  t h e i r  c o n t r ib u t io n .  The m a tte r  was r e f e r r e d  to  Cabinet 
and ev en tu a l ly  th e  s a l a r i e s  were improved.
While th e  p r o je c t  managers e n th u s i a s t i c a l l y  welcomed t h e i r  upgraded 
s t a t u s ,  execu ting  t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  proved d i f f i c u l t ;  making 
d ec is io n s  in a reas  which had been r e f e r r e d  to  th e  d i r e c t o r ,  w ithout 
th e  necessary  experience  and s k i l l s  c re a te d  more problems f o r  th e  
p ro je c t  managers as well as th e  ex ecu tive  d i r e c t o r ,  as he exp la ined :
* The au thor was a d is c u s sa n t  in two of th e  seminars on the  m otivation  
in 1983, organized by th e  Corporation f o r  i t s  d iv is io n a l  execu tives  
to  overcome the  low morale and increased  re s ig n a t io n s .
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I f e e l  t h a t  i t  has been one of our big f a i l u r e s  in th e  l a s t  th re e  
y e a r s .  We have f a i l e d  to  provide a formal superv iso ry  s k i l l s  
c o u rse ,  f o r  people who were sen io r  p r o je c t  o f f i c e r s  and suddenly 
had to  do managerial fu n c t io n s .  What I have t r i e d  to  do is  exp la in  
t o  th e  managers on a one-to -one  b a s i s ,  th e  s o r t  o f  th in g  t h a t  I 
would want to  see happen -  p repare  monthly programmes f o r  t h e i r  
s e c t io n s  and monitor them. We hold monthly d iv is io n a l  meetings 
where managers exchange views on th e  problems they  encountered.
I t  has been slow, but we a re  g e t t in g  t h e r e .
NID a ls o  had th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  handling th e  e x te rn a l  in te r a c t io n  
w ith  government on m a tte rs  of investment subven tions, and o th e r  
f in a n c ie r s  l ik e  WB, ADB, e t .  t h a t  LNDC so h eav ily  depended on f o r  
f in a n c ia l  as well as te c h n ic a l  a s s i s t a n c e ,  and y e t  th e re  was no 
s t r u c tu r e  f o r  dea ling  with t h a t  huge a rea  o f  work; i t  in e v i ta b ly  had 
to  be done by the  d i r e c to r  and h is  e x p e r t  a d v ise r .  The WB as a lready  
no ted , normally re q u ire s  a massive documentation of d e ta i l e d  inform­
a t io n  to  be prepared by th e  d i r e c to r  p r io r  to  t h e i r  review v i s i t .  
During t h a t  period  th e  d i r e c t  would l i t e r a l l y  be cu t o f f  from a l l  
o th e r  d u t ie s  while p rep a rin g  th e  WB r e p o r t ;  subsequently some urgent 
and im portant d ec is io n s  were d e ta in ed ,  aw aiting  the  a t t e n t io n  of th e  
d i r e c t o r .  The in te r f a c in g  s e c t io n  was c rea ted  -  Market Planning 
U nit, t o  co -o rd in a te  th e  c o r p o r a t io n 's  r e la t io n s h ip s  with e x te rn a l  
o rg a n iz a t io n s ,  and l i a i s e  with government on a l l  a c t i v i t i e s  where 
LNDC i n t e r e s t s  were a f f e c t e d .  Martin exp lained  how he presen ted  
h is  proposal to  the  Board;
We needed a PR (Public  R e la t io n s )  u n i t  to  improve our image with 
government. They never seem to  be aware o f  th e  achievement of LNDC. 
We had made some achievements which th e  m in is te r s  should have been 
proud o f ,  but they  did  no t seem to  be aware o f  them and have no 
p e rsp e c t iv e  on where th e  c o rp o ra t io n  was and where i t  was headed.
We needed to  c r e a te  a p o s i t iv e  environment f o r  in d u s try  throughout 
th e  co u n try .  There was a complete lack  o f  p ro fe s s io n a l  approach to  
m otiva ting  th e  government in th e  d i r e c t io n  t h a t  we wanted them to  
go. The same was t r u e  with e x te rn a l  o rg a n iz a t io n s ;  we had WB coming 
in ,  c r i t i c i z i n g  us, t e l l i n g  th e  co rp o ra t io n  to  make changes of one 
kind o r  ano ther ;  and th e  c o rp o ra t io n  re a c t in g  to  t h a t ,  never con­
s id e r in g  th e  v i s i t  beforehand, never reviewing i t s e l f  independently ,
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but w aiting  fo r  WB to  t e l l  i t .  The problems they have i d e n t i f i e d  have 
no t always been the  most c r i t i c a l  in my view.
Market Planning Unit was conceived as th e  in te rn a l  agent t h a t  would 
m otiva te  th e  kind of support th e  co rp o ra t io n  wanted to  p ro je c t  to  
i t s  ex te rn a l  in t e r a c t a n t s .  I n t e r n a l ly ,  i t  would f o s t e r  in te rn a l  
changes, c a r ry  out an independent a p p ra isa l  of what th e  d iv is io n s  and 
th e  co rp o ra t io n  were doing and reach a judgment on what changes were 
d e s i r a b le .  These ro le s  i t  was thought would evolve overtime as th e  
u n i t  got more inform ation and broader p e rsp ec t iv e  o f th e  c o rp o ra t io n 's  
a c t i v i t i e s .
We saw t h i s  as being i n i t i a l  s tep s  where they  would s e t  up a source 
of inform ation and m onitoring o f various  d iv i s io n s ,  w r i te  up re p o r ts  
f o r  e x te rn a l  consumption, and in te rn a l  as w e l l .  But in th e  process 
they  would become a kind o f a nerve c e n tr e  with re le v a n t  in fo rm ation , 
and become a c e n t r a l  fo rce  in th e  management and planning of th e  
c o rp o ra t io n .  That i s  only beginning to  come about now th re e  years  
l a t e r ,  by th e  process o f t r i a l  and e r r o r .  There i s  g rad u a lly  an 
understanding of th e  need to  m otivate  changes and a t t i t u d e s .
Within th e  d iv is io n  th e re  were, however, varying pe rcep tio n s  o f what 
Marketing P lan n in g 's  r o le  was, some saw i t  as th e  research  and 
development sec t io n  t h a t  should undertake market resea rch  in o rder  
t o  guide th e  investment d e c is io n s  o f  th e  d iv i s io n ,  o th e rs  thought i t  
was a PR u n i t  t h a t  p repares  speeches f o r  th e  Chairman and th e  CEO 
when they went on promotion to u r s .  A ll th e se  views m ir ro r  th e  
confusion t h a t  was c re a te d  by th e  e s tab lish m en t o f  th e  U nit. The 
Unit was e s s e n t i a l l y  a 'c a s u a l ty  w a rd ',  a convenient compromise, 
t o  accommodate the  v ic tim s of th e  major re o rg a n iz a t io n  o f th e  in v e s t ­
ment promotion departm ent. I t s  o p e ra t io n s  were very much akin to  
what th e se  people were doing in th e  o ld  investm ent promotion and 
th e re fo re  seen as a p p ro p r ia te  r e lo c a t io n  o f  th e  redundant s k i l l s .
Apart from th e  economic a n a ly s t ,  a l l  th e  s t a f f  th e re  were from 
investment promotion departm ent t h a t  had been disbanded.
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R e - in t e g r a t io n  o f  Investm ent Promotion
I t  was th e  b e l i e f  o f  management t h a t  investment promotion should be 
k ep t a s e p a ra te  fu n c tio n  t h a t  would con tinuously  promote v ia b le  p ro je c ts  
t o  accomplish LNDC's main o b je c t iv e  o f  c re a t in g  job  o p p o r tu n i t ie s .
But beginning in 1982 when th e  co rp o ra t io n  faced s t i f f  com petition 
from SA, and r e a l iz e d  t h a t  i t  was not in th e  league to  compete on 
a t t r a c t i v e  f in a n c ia l  in c e n t iv e s ,  d i f f e r e n t  s t r a t e g i e s  were t r i e d  w ithout 
much su ccess .  The new ex ecu tiv e  d i r e c to r  -  M artin , had a d i f f e r e n t  
approach . He took th e  view t h a t  investment promotion could only be 
s u s ta in e d  as a sep a ra te  department i f  i t  had s k i l l e d  and experienced  
s t a f f  in  p ro je c t  a p p r a i s a l ,  ie  promoters who would be ab le  to  t a l k  to  
i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  about t h e i r  b u s in e sse s ,  th e  s p e c i f ic s  of t h a t  business  
and be ab le  to  convince th e  in v e s to rs  about how investment in Lesotho 
would b e n e f i t  t h e i r  p a r t i c u l a r  in d u s try .  That approach was q u i te  
d i f f e r e n t  from th e  prev ious one which was mainly "mass marketing" 
o f  LNDC and Lesotho through p u b l ic iz in g  investment in c en t iv es  to  a l l  
p o te n t i a l  in v e s to r s .  I t  depended on most of th e  work being done by 
th e  prom oter, th e  d iv i s io n a l  r o le  was pure ly  l im ited  to  c ross-check ing  
t h a t  th e  i n v e s t o r 's  b u i l t - i n  assumptions were s a t i s f a c t o r y .  This is  
how Martin described  th e  d i f f e r e n c e .
That s o r t  o f approach has t o  be regarded as a PR e x e rc is e ;  in o th e r  
words, you a re  not r e a l l y  shoo ting  with your rTTle a t  th e  t a r g e t ,  
you a re  spreading  your message, and i t s  a r e a l l y  e f f e c t iv e  way o f 
doing i t .  But, we have spread th e  message (about LNDC) very widely 
throughout South African in d u s try  and abroad.
But in o rd e r  t o  a c tu a l ly  g e t  a good r e tu rn  on p r o je c t s ,  id e n t i fy  
good s o l id  companies, you need to  know who you a re  ta lk in g  to  and why; 
t h i s  re q u ire s  knowledge o f th e  in d u s try  t h a t  you a re  dea ling  w ith .
To expect somebody who had never worked c lo s e ly  with a c lo th in g  
in d u s t ry ,  d id  not know what i t s  balance sh ee t  looked l ik e ,  d id  not 
know th e  products  nor th e  people  in t h a t  in d u s try ,  to  expect e f f e c t ­
ive  promotion from such people would be u n r e a l i s t i c .
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The new approach involved a more b as ic  resea rch  in to  economic 
fa c to r s  such as the  import s t r u c tu r e  of th e  country , id e n t i fy in g  key 
products  to  con cen tra te  on and th e  demand p a t t e r n s ,  th e  d i s t r i b u t io n  
channels , and f i n a l l y  p u t t in g  to g e th e r  a p ro je c t  p r o f i l e  which could 
be marketed to  local e n trep ren eu rs  capable  o f  implementing i t  o r  
fo re ig n  in v es to rs  with managerial know-how and technology.
Investment promotion was subsequently  in te g ra te d  in to  th e  p ro je c t  
a p p ra isa l  departm ent, as a sh o r t- te rm  expedience in o rder t h a t  people 
who would be working on a d a i ly  b a s is  with th e  in d u s t r ie s  could con­
c u r re n t ly  undertake promotion as they  gained depth and experience of 
th e  market requirem ents of a p a r t i c u l a r  in d u s try .  At t h a t  p o in t ,  th e  
d iv is io n  began to  s p e c ia l i z e  i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  by in d u s t r i a l  s e c to r ,  eg 
t e x t i l e ,  agro , eng in ee rin g , and pharm aceutica l, with each s e c t io n ,  
under superv is ion  of p r o je c t  manager, fo llow ing a ta rg e te d  investment 
promotion on i t s  s p e c i f i c  s e c to r .  The diagram below i l l u s t r a t e s  th e  
p o s i t io n  o f  th e  d iv is io n  a f t e r  r e s t r u c tu r in g .
Figure 8.1
D iv is ion  D irec to r
IDA
Executive D irec to r
Market Planning Real E s ta te  P ro jec t  Department
T e x t i le  Agro Engineering
i i i
(P ro je c t  O ff ice r)  PO PO PO
Reorganized s t ru c tu re  of NID
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The new approach c lo se ly  f i t t e d  in to  government new emphasis on im port- 
s u b s t i t u t i o n  investm ent, whereby th e  p ro je c t  o f f i c e r  would fo rm ula te  
a p r o je c t  proposal based on local resources  ie  raw m a te r ia l s ,  and 
market i t  to  p o te n t ia l  in v e s to rs  in t h a t  in d u s try .  In troducing  th o se  
changes, p a r t i c u l a r ly  investm ent promotion, was not an easy ta sk  f o r  
M artin ; he needed a l l  h is  h igh ly  esteemed e x p e r t i s e  and power to  push 
them through , but with a weak CEO and a support of o th e r  IDA d iv i s io n a l  
e x p e r t s ,  h is  problem was confined  to  NID:
The response was c e r t a in l y  of s u rp r i s e  and shock around th e  investm ent 
promotion. People found i t  a very s tra n g e  move. Investment promotion 
had been h a i le d  as a s o r t  o f  new credo and a d i r e c t io n  w ithin th e  
c o rp o ra t io n  only a few years  befo re  t h a t ,  and a l o t  of people had 
b u i l t  up s k i l l s  t h a t  were in t h a t  d i r e c t io n .  [Most of them ended 
up in th e  newly c o n s t i tu te d  Market Planning Unit and ev en tu a lly  
r e s ig n e d ] .*
The Investment Promotion Unit had a 'h igh  p r o f i l e '  w ith in  th e  co rp o r­
a t io n ,  p a r t i c u l a r ly  during John Bow's term , as i t  was described  as 
h is  taost successfu l s t r a t e g y '  by th e  World Bank.
The process of promoting investm ents  under th e  new approach was a ls o  
slow er, more time consuming due to  re sea rch  involved, and t r ig g e re d  
a s trong  re a c t io n  from P ro je c t  Managers and o f f i c e r s  whose performance 
a p p ra isa l  under th e  approval c r i t e r i a ,  depended on th e  number o f  jo b s  
c re a te d  per given y e a r .  The main approval c r i t e r i a  of th e  d iv is io n  
had to  be changed to  th e  p r o je c t s  d e a l t  with by in d iv idua l o f f i c e r s  
r a th e r  than th e  number o f jo b s  approved.
* Comment supp lied .
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From 1982 to  1986 th e re  was a s ig n i f i c a n t  inc rease  in the  number of 
investm ents  promoted under t h i s  new approach, q u a l i ty  of p ro je c ts  
had improved, and th e  number of jobs  had eq ually  Increased [see  t a b le  
8.1 below] and, th e  companies ta x  revenue c o n tr ib u t io n  to  th e  t r e a s u ry  
in c reased  to  about 14 pe r c e n t .
Table 8.1
S u ccess fu l ly  Implemented P ro je c ts  and Jobs Created






Source: New In d u s t r ie s  D iv is ion  Programme f o r  1986/87
These f ig u re s  should be in te r p r e te d  with c au t io n ,  th e re  were a number 
o f  in te rv en in g  f a c to r s  t h a t  could have c o n tr ib u ted  to  b e t t e r  in v e s to rs  
coming to  Lesotho, perhaps th e  most s ig n i f i c a n t  one was th e  inflow of 
SA in v e s to rs  seeking to  r e lo c a te  in Lesotho in o rder  to  circumvent 
th e  t h r e a t  o f  economic san c tio n  a g a in s t  t h e i r  coun try . Thus, th e  
r e s t r u c tu r in g  proved e f f e c t i v e  in in c reas in g  th e  cap ac ity  of the  
d iv is io n  to  d iv e r s i f y  and broaden i t s  investment base in to  d i f f e r e n t  
s e c to r s  o f  th e  in d u s try  and in c rease  i t s  c ap a c i ty  to  in t e r a c t  with 
d i f f e r e n t  a c to r s  and made e f f i c i e n t  use o f  promotion resources  through 
s e le c t iv e  and ta rg e te d  approach.
Enter th e  heavy hand of P o l i t i c s  -  Changing CEO
J u s t  as th e  confusion  and shock caused by th e  re o rg an iza tio n  was beg-
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inning to  s e t t l e  down and everybody was g e t t in g  to  g r ip s  with the  new 
s t r a te g y  and t ry in g  to  make sense of t h e i r  new ro le s  under c lo se  support 
and su p erv is io n  of th e  ex ecu tive  d i r e c t o r ,  th e re  was ano ther major and 
sudden change to  fo llow . Hardly two years  in h is  post as th e  c h ie f  
ex ecu tive  of LNDC, Senna was suddenly rep laced  in 1984, in what was 
seen as a demotion. There was no advance n o t ic e  to  th e  board o r  the  
s t a f f  t h a t  th e  CEO might be re p laced , when unexpectedly th e  government 
announced th e  appointment o f  a new CEO. While th e  appointment i t s e l f  
was not so much su rp r is in g  to  most people given th e  rec en t  government 
s im i la r  in te rv e n t io n s ,  what was r a th e r  s t a r t l i n g  about i t  was t h a t  
i t  was not c l e a r  what Senna 's  f u tu r e  ro le  ( i f  any) w ith in  LNDC would 
be. The normal p ra c t ic e  would have been f o r  the  government to  t r a n s f e r  
him to  another p o s t ,  p o ss ib ly  back to  c i v i l  s e rv ice  where he o r ig in a l ly  
came from. I t  was l e f t  t o  th e  new CEO and th e  board to  f in d  him 
"something to  do". His p revious  pos t of D irec to r  of A dm inistra tion  
had been f i l l e d  and f o r  a w hile  he remained in abeyance as a l t e r n a t iv e  
p o s i t io n  was being n e g o tia ted  between th e  new CEO and th e  government. 
Eventually  th e  f i f t h  d iv is io n  was c rea ted  -  Legal d iv i s io n ,  of which 
he became th e  d i r e c to r  and co rp o ra te  s e c re ta ry  as w e ll .
His successor -  Sydney S e l lo ,  was a c i v i l  s e rv a n t ,  former permanent 
S ec re ta ry  of Trade, who was re tu rn in g  from a sh o r t  s t i n t  in d ip lom atic  
s e r v ic e .  An attem pt to  understand how such appointments a re  made, 
would have to  focus i n t e r  a l i a  on th e  c a lc u lu s  employed by government 
in reaching t h e i r  d e c is io n ,  a r a th e r  complex p o l i t i c a l  process t h a t  
defy any s im p l i s t i c  g e n e r a l iz a t io n s .  As th e  PS o f Trade a p t ly  observed, 
' t h e  appointment of CEO i s  a p o l i t i c a l  d ec is io n  taken somewhere w ith in  
th e  government' without th e  involvement o f  th e  Board. There was no 
p a r t i c u l a r  i d e n t i f i a b l e  a c to r  o r  group of a c to r s  re sp o n s ib le  f o r  such 
d e c is io n s .  I t  tended to  s h i f t  and vary from time to  time and with
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in d iv id u a ls  and p o s i t io n s  invo lved . Some tim es the  dec is io n s  were 
made by s en io r  cab in e t  m in i s te r  -  i t  may be a m in is te r  not a t  a l l  
r e l a t e d  to  LNDC o p e ra t io n s ;  on o th e r  tim es th e  PM would make the  
d e c is io n .  Relevant experience  and managerial competence would seem 
to  be o f  subord ina te  im portan t to  th e  paramount d iv e rse  p o l i t i c a l  
c r i t e r i a  which inc lude : being member o f ru l in g  p a r ty ,  f in a n c ia l  c lo u t  -  
ie  f in a n c ia l  support t o  p a r ty  o r  government a c t i v i t i e s ,  in s id e  connec­
t io n s  w ith in  th e  ru l in g  c o a l i t i o n s  and a f f i n i t y  to  i n f l u e n t i a l  power 
h o ld e rs .  Under th e se  c ircum stances  th e re  was l i t t l e  d isp u te  over 
th e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of th e  re a so n (s )  f o r  th e  d ism issa l  of Senna -  t h a t  
i t  had nothing to  do with h is  managerial incompetence nor was i t  an 
e f f o r t  by th e  government to  in fu se  new dynamic and s trong  le a d e rs h ip .*  
The appointment was g e n e ra l ly  in te rp re te d  as a p o l i t i c a l  patronage to  
accommodate th e  ru l in g  p a r ty  co lleag u e  when th e re  were no s en io r  
p o s i t io n s  a v a i la b le  in government. [A c tua lly  a l l  LNDC local CEOs 
were sen io r  c i v i l  s e rv an ts  and members of th e  ru l in g  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y . ]  
See F urther changes of CEO l a t e r  in th e  c h a p te r .
The in te rv e n t io n  was no t welcomed by th e  c o rp o ra t io n 's  management, 
p a r t i c u l a r ly  th e  d iv i s io n a l  d i r e c to r s  who had usurped the  CEO powers 
and were e f f e c t i v e ly  running th e  LNDC. There was a general degree 
of anx ie ty  and resentm ent amongst most s e n io r  local d i r e c to r s  who 
f e l t  they were b e t t e r  q u a l i f i e d  and experienced to  have been appointed 
compared to  t h e i r  new e x e c u t iv e .  They had no recourse  to  th e  govern­
ment a c t io n ,  no e f f e c t iv e  board to  complain to  (non-government members 
of the  board were e q u a lly  unhappy) and o f course t h e i r  c h ie f  execu tive  
was the  b e n e f ic ia ry  of th e  a c t io n .  This in te rv e n t io n  opened up a 
r i f t  between th e  ex ecu tiv e  management and th e  new CEO who was seen 
as the  'government m an'. What was a lso  d is ru p t iv e  about the  change
* In c id e n ta l ly ,  in 1984 LNDC had a good performance on both job 
c re a t io n  and p r o f i t a b i l i t y  c r i t e r i a .
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in lead e rsh ip  was i t s  e f f e c t  on d iv is io n a l  r e s t r u c tu r in g  process and 
on s t a f f  m orale. NID execu tive  d i r e c to r  had argued fo r  th e  need to  
develop an in te rn a l  c u l tu r e ,  a s e t  of o rg a n iz a t io n a l  v a lu es ,  which 
a re  shared by a l l  s t a f f  a t  LNDC, but because of what was perceived  to  
be lack o f  s trong  lead e rsh ip  and a c l e a r  v is io n  f o r  th e  co rp o ra t io n  
th e se  e f f o r t s  lacked in te rn a l  c o -o rd in a t io n  a t  th e  top  and became 
d i s jo in te d  h a l f -h e a r te d  d iv is io n a l  p u r s u i t s  t h a t  co llapsed  whenever 
such d is ru p t io n  occurred . This was how NID execu tive  d i r e c to r  d esc r ibed  
th e  e f f e c t  of lead e rsh ip  changes:
The e f f e c t  i s  d e v a s ta t in g .  I have been con tinuously  t ry in g  to  b u ild  
up management in t h i s  d iv is io n  . . .  I b e l iev e  th e  r i g h t  approach to  
develop management in an o rg an iz a t io n  such as t h i s  i s  to  g ive  c l e a r  
d i r e c t iv e s  to  people . You s e t  down c le a r ly  what each person is  expected 
to  do -  q u a n t i t a t iv e ly  and q u a l i t a t i v e l y ,  and ensure t h a t  a manager -  
p a r t i c u l a r ly  a new manager -  somebody j u s t  promoted, has got a c l e a r  
v is io n  of where he/she i s  supposed to  be going. But th e re  i s  no 
c o n t in u i ty  and s t a b i l i t y  a t  th e  top  to  lend support and give d i r e c ­
t i o n .  This week we have one CEO with a c e r t a in  s ty l e  to  r e a c t  t o ,  
next week ano ther man comes in and emphasizes something e l s e .  I t  
can be very u n s e t t l in g  to  peop le . A sense of consis tency  should be 
th e r e .
The changes a t  th e  top  had led to  th e  s i t u a t i o n  where co n tro l  over 
top management had not been ex erc ised  on th e  continuous b a s i s ,  as a 
r e s u l t  paroch ia l  d iv i s io n a l ly  o r ie n te d  s t r a t e g i e s  were pursued, 
in form ally  d iscussed  and agreed among d iv i s io n a l  d i r e c to r s ,  and th e  
CEO would o f ten  be involved -  where need be in th e  s igning  s ta g e .  I t  
a l l  began in 1983 when investm ent promotion department was disbanded 
and merged with P ro je c t  departm ent. The d i r e c t o r  of NID, one o f  th e  
p ioneers  of th e  investment promotion idea , was im p l ic i t ly  opposed to  
th e  r e s t r u c tu r in g  and wanted th e  CEO and th e  Chairman to  be f u l l y  
involved in th e  p ro cess ,  hoping they  would support him to  block th e  
changes. However, h is  a d v ise r  -  th e  IDA e x p e r t ,  ou t manoeuvred him 
and c a r r ie d  out th e  changes i n t e r n a l ly  w ithout them and subsequently  
p resen ted  th e  proposal which was an f a i t  accompli, to  execu tive  com­
m itte e  fo r  r a t i f i c a t i o n .  Because of informal in te rd iv i s io n a l  i n t e r -
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a c t io n  and c o n su l ta t io n ,  th e  execu tive  committee tended not to  give 
a p p ro p r ia te  weight to  d iv i s io n a l  is su e s  and c o n s t ru c t iv e  debate  on 
major d iv is io n a l  p o licy  is su e s  and co rp o ra te  s t r a te g y  were minimal 
as d i r e c to r s  had a lready  agreed on th e  d e c is io n s  p r io r  to  committee 
m eetings. The F inanc ia l  D ire c to r ,  not s a t i s f i e d  with th e  p ro cess ,  
n e v e r th e le s s  defended i t :
At th e  top  we have not had th e  c o n t in u i ty  to  give us reason and 
judgment; in th e  middle each d iv is io n  has i t s  own axe to  g r in d .  We 
r e a l l y  d o n ' t  have any planning  mechanism. We d o n ' t  r e a l l y  have a 
forum f o r  managers to  g e t  to g e th e r  and th ra s h  t h e i r  ideas o u t .  We 
tend  to  f in d  o u rse lves  doing our own th in g s  . . .  j u s t  making sure  t h a t  
th e r e  i s  no breakdown somewhere.
While th e  d i r e c to r  o f  A dm in is tra tion  observed th a t :
Our CEO i s  merely th e re  to  c h a i r  th e  m eetings, in most cases he is  
v i r t u a l l y  in s t ru c te d  by th e  d iv is io n a l  d i r e c to r s  as to  what to  do, 
and t h i s  i s  l ik e ly  to  con tinue  as long as they keep on bringing  
c i v i l  s e rv a n ts .
The puzzling  f e a tu re  o f  LNDC government r e l a t io n s h ip  was t h a t  i t  was 
o f te n  th e  ex te rn a l  funding agencies  l ik e  WB t h a t  would a ttem pt to  
normalize th e  in te r a c t io n  o f  th e  a c to r s  and express  execu tive  manage­
ment concern to  th e  government through th e  biannual review teams, 
mainly as mentioned e a r l i e r ,  because th e  formal channels of commun­
ic a t io n  weigh s ta r k ly  in fav o u r o f th e  government. I t  was fo r  t h i s  
reason t h a t  management decided to  in c rease  s tak e  holding o r  debt 
f in an c in g  by e x te rn a l  in v e s to r s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  la rg e  in f lu e n t i a l  
c o rp o ra t io n s  whose advice would be heeded by government. [See 
Chapter 7 on Resource d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n . ]
The new CEO's f i r s t  ta sk  was to  undertake a f a m i l i a r i z a t io n  to u r  of 
th e  major f in a n c ie r s  in o rd e r  t o  r e s u r r e c t  t h e i r  confidence in LNDC 
and con tinue  t h e i r  su p p o rt .  In 1985 th e  European Investment Bank -
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EIB extended th e  second l in e  of c r e d i t  of R4.3 m il l io n  to  LNDC.
Around th e  same p e r io d ,  n e g o t ia t io n s  began in 1982, were con tinu ing  
with th e  German f inance  co rp o ra t io n  f o r  investment in developing 
c o u n tr ie s  -  DEG, and th e  German agency fo r  te c h n ic a l  co -o p e ra t io n  -  
GTZ, aimed a t  a t t r a c t i n g  th e  Germans to  tak e  up eq u ity  investment in 
LNDC. A comprehensive a p p ra is a l  of th e  o p e ra t io n s  of th e  LNDC was 
undertaken by German c o n su l ta n ts  over a two year p e r io d ,  and th e re  
were in d ic a t io n s  t h a t  o th e r  p o te n t ia l  shareho lders  were aw aiting th e  
a p p ra isa l  dec is io n  o f DEG, fo llow ing which they  would make t h e i r  
d ec is io n s  known. I t  was widely be lieved  w ith in  th e  co rpo ra tion  t h a t  
lead e rsh ip  i n s t a b i l i t y  was causing g re a t  concern to  ex te rn a l a c to r s  
with s tak e  in th e  c o rp o ra t io n ,  and in 1985 a s e r i e s  of review m issions 
by major p a r t i c ip a n t s  inc lud ing  WB and th e  I r i s h ,  v i s i t e d  LNDC to  
s c r u t in iz e  i t s  o p e ra t io n s ,  review th e  c o n tr ib u t io n s  of th e  IDA team, 
and th e  c o rp o ra t io n 's  fu tu r e  s t r a t e g i e s  as seen by management as well 
as th e  government.
The o th e r  s ig n i f i c a n t  changes of t h i s  period  were th e  re n e g o t ia t io n  
of the  lending p o l ic ie s  which had been agreed to  with th e  WB when 
th e  l a t t e r  f i r s t  g ran ted  l in e  o f  c r e d i t  to  LNDC in 1978. The p o l i c i e s  
had s e t  th e  maximum and lower le v e ls  of s e c u r i ty  cover -  eg 60 per 
cen t and 40 per cen t r e s p e c t iv e ly  o f  th e  t o t a l  investment c o s t .
But because o f  th e  t ig h te n in g  com petition  r e fe r re d  to  e a r l i e r ,  NID 
f req u e n t ly  had o p p o r tu n i t ie s  to  a t t r a c t  in v e s to rs  who e i t h e r  because 
of f in a n c ia l  i n a b i l i t y  o r  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  a l t e r n a t iv e  o f f e r s  of low- 
c o s t  f inance  from SA were u nw ill ing  to  accep t more than 40 per c en t  
o f  th e  t o t a l  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  f in an c in g  t h e i r  p r o je c t .  The e f f e c t  
o f  i n s i s t in g  as a m a tte r  o f  p o licy  f o r  s u b s ta n t ia l  a d d i t io n a l  s e c u r i ty  
would have been a n ega tive  impact on in v e s to rs  pe rcep tion  o f th e
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c o rp o ra t io n 's  o v e ra l l  in cen t iv e  package, which was a lready  under 
severe  com petitive  p re s su re .  A degree of f l e x i b i l i t y  was th e re fo re  
req u ired  to  make i t  p o s s ib le  f o r  NID to  a t t r a c t  in v e s to rs  w ithout a 
n o to r i a l  bond on a l l  t h e i r  t a n g ib le  a s s e ts  which was what th e  r i s k  
cover re q u ire d .  The approval was g ran ted  a f t e r  p ro t ra c te d  exchange 
o f memoranda between th e  WB and LNDC, which i r o n ic a l ly  revealed  t h a t  
NID had a lready  su c c e ss fu l ly  promoted some in v e s to rs  through re la x a t io n  
o f  th e  exposure r e s t r i c t i o n s .
There was a tendency to  p la y -o f f  f in a n c ie r s  a g a in s t  each o th e r ,  p re ss in g  
f o r  bending of r u l e s ,  and more l ib e r a l  terms in o rd e r  to  make funds 
a v a i la b le  to  wider usage, o f ten  o u ts id e  th e  boundaries of the  agreement. 
For in s tan ce  ADB p ro h ib i te d  th e  purchase of raw m a te r ia ls  from South 
A frica  o r  promotion of South A frican in v e s to r s ,  but th e  World Bank 
and European Investment Bank funds could be used to  promote South 
AFrican in v e s to rs  to  Lesotho, while ADB funds were ren e g o t ia ted  to  
allow f o r  t r a in in g  and promotion of indigenous businessmen who use 
SA c o n su l tan ts  and im ports . That way the  co rp o ra t io n  was ab le  to  
undertake investment denied i t  under terms and co n d itio n s  of co -opera t ion  
with one agency -  say World Bank, but made p o s s ib le  by r e la x a t io n  of 
terms o f agreement by a n o th e r .  The su ccess fu l and p r o f i t a b l e  in v e s t ­
ments in th e  brewery company were th e  p o in t  in case  where WB had f irm ly  
ob jected  to  LNDC g e t t in g  involved in t h a t  v en tu re ,  y e t  LNDC went ahead 
because c a p i t a l  was made a v a i la b le  by o th e r  f inanc ing  a c to r s ,  eg CDC. 
Thus, re n e g o t ia t io n  o f  lending p o l ic ie s  seen in t h i s  p e rsp ec t iv e  was 
an investment s t r a te g y  of widening th e  op tions  o f  resource  a v a i l a b i l i t y  
and deployment, and o f making f u l l  use o f  th e  f a c i l i t i e s  t h a t  were 
about to  e x p ire .
220
'P ro d u c t '  Development Review
The b as ic  'p ro d u c t '  marketed by LNDC is  Lesotho as a v ia b le  in v e s t ib le  
lo c a t io n .  In o rder to  improve th e  environment fac in g  th e  p o te n t ia l  
i n d u s t r i a l i s t s ,  the  ex ecu tiv e  d i r e c to r  -  NID, had proposed to  the  
board th e  review o f some a sp ec ts  of f i s c a l  p o licy  in o rder  to  make 
th e  'p ro d u c t '  more c o m p e t i t iv e .  The focus of th e  review was on:
-  P ioneer in d u s t r ie s  encouragement a c t .  The government had agreed 
to  extend th e  tax  ho lidays  from 6 to  10 y e a r s ,  but th e  re v is io n  
had not been made s t a t u t o r y ,  making i t  in o p e ra t iv e  as an in c e n t iv e .  
Market Planning was to  c o -o rd in a te  with th e  M in istry  of Trade to  
fo rm alize  i t ,  and i t  was f i n a l l y  g a ze tted  -  (government Gazette 
E xtraord inary  No.25) and inc reased  to  10-15 y e a r s . 1 The WB had 
a lso  s tro n g ly  suggested t h a t  i t  would be usefu l f o r  LNDC to  be 
d i r e c t l y  involved in th e  a d m in is tra t io n  o f  P ioneer in c e n t iv e s .
That way th e  co rp o ra t io n  would no t only be responsive  to  market 
changes but would a lso  in f lu en ce  th e  type  o f  investments d es ired  
through d is c r im in a t io n s  and s e le c t iv e  awarding o f th e  p ioneer 
s t a t u s .  That was however tu rned  down, i t  was perceived as a t h r e a t  
to  government co n tro l  o f  th e  co rp o ra t io n  and th e  economy of th e  
country .
-  Rental p o lic y :  NID undertook a complete review o f th e  r e n ta l  
p o l ic ie s  to  ensure t h a t  they  were com petit ive  with p re v a i l in g  
s tandards  in th e  reg io n .  This was followed by a head-hunt f o r  
a p ro fess io n a l  to  head th e  Real e s t a t e  departm ent.
1 LNDC Q uarterly  R eport, 1986.
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- T ran sp o rta t io n  r a t e s  were high in Lesotho f o r  the  e x p o r t -o r ie n te d  
i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  who r e ly  e x c lu s iv e ly  on SA t ra n s p o r t  system which 
i s  h ighly  su b s id ized .  Market Planning i n i t i a t e d  d iscu ss io n s  with 
th e  South African M in is te r  of T ransport in o rder to  n e g o t ia te  f o r  
harmonization o f  th e  r a t e s ,  a l l  in v a in .
-  A g ro - in d u s tr ie s :  There was no c l e a r  p o licy  framework a ss ig n in g  
r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  to  th e  LNDC on a g r o - in d u s t r i e s .  In fo rm ally , a l l  
government i n i t i a t e d  p r o je c t s  t h a t  have reached commercial s tag e  
should be tu rned  over to  LNDC. but th e re  were c o n f l i c t  o f  i n t e r e s t s  
between M inistry  o f A g r ic u l tu re  t h a t  wanted to  and s t i l l  manage 
some lu c ra t iv e  p ro je c t s  w hile  LNDC wanted to  develop them to  f u l l  
commercial concerns. That kind of c o n f l i c t ,  of v i s ib l e  government 
involvement in business  a c t i v i t i e s ,  was seen as an impediment to  
LNDC's s t r a te g y  of p ro je c t in g  i t s e l f  as an independent market- 
o r ie n te d  e n te r p r i s e .  NID f u r th e r  found i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  a t t r a c t  
p r iv a te  in v es to rs  in to  th e  a g ro -se c to r  due p a r t ly  to  perceived  
high p o l i t i c a l  r i s k  a s so c ia te d  with j o i n t  venture  with th e  
government.
At th e  w rit in g  o f  t h i s  s tu d y , t h i s  is su e  had not been re so lv ed ,  both 
LNDC and M in istry  of A g r ic u l tu re  continued to  manage t h e i r  s e p a ra te  
agro commercial concerns.
The o b je c t iv e  of t h i s  a g g re ss iv e  'p ro d u c t '  development s t r a te g y  was 
to  repackage and re p o s i t io n  Lesotho, but mainly LNDC in th e  i n t e r ­
n a t io n a l  markets in o rd e r  to  cash on th e  growing an ti-S o u th  A frican  
investment campaign f o r  most fo re ig n  m u l t in a t io n a ls  t h a t  were under 
p re ssu re  from t h e i r  home governments to  e i t h e r  d iv e s t  o r  r e lo c a te
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new investments e lsew here. The SA market share  was f a s t  d im in ish ing  
under s t i f f  com petition , and NID was developing new markets o v e rsea s .
In a p ress  r e le a s e ,  th e  new CEO of LNDC announced the  rev ised  in cen t iv e  
package intended to  spur e x p o r t -o r ie n te d  i n d u s t r i a l i s t s .  He d ec la re d :
"Lesotho wants to  a t t r a c t  in v e s to rs  from anywhere in th e  world , inc lud ing  
South A frica ,(L eso th o )  o f f e r s  a h igh ly  favourab le  investment en v iro n ­
ment and an a t t r a c t i v e  in c e n t iv e  package.
A major element of th e  package i s  t h a t  th e  LNDC w i l l  f a c i l i t a t e  i n t e r ­
n a t io n a l  marketing f o r  th e  new i n d u s t r i a l i s t  through p r e f e r e n t i a l  
and d u ty - f re e  access o f  Lesotho-manufactured goods to  l u c r a t iv e  world 
m arkets" .
A new in te rn a t io n a l  a i r p o r t  had j u s t  been completed in 1985, and i t  
was hoped i t  would enhance th e  overseas promotion and f a c i l i t a t e  th e  
d iv e rs io n  o f some overseas investm ents to  Lesotho e s p e c ia l ly  from 
those  c o u n tr ie s  t h a t  shunned 'c o n ta c t '  with SA, they could now f l y  
d i r e c t  to  Lesotho -  be i t  over SA. The F ar-E aste rn  markets o f  Hong­
kong and Taiwan, West Germany, and th e  Nordic m arkets, were promoted 
through e la b o ra te  v isu a l  a id s  p r e s e n ta t io n s ,  l i t e r a t u r e  m a te r ia l s  
and th e  appointment o f  a Chinese c o n su la te  -  de s ig n a te  based in 
Hong-Kong to  promote LNDC i n t e r e s t s .  That s t r a te g y  o f d iv e r s i fy in g  
th e  promotion catchment, has proved su ccess fu l  i f  measured a g a in s t  
subsequent investment inflows from th o se  markets and LNDC t r a d e  in 
those  c o u n t r ie s .  For in s ta n c e ,  West Germany and th e  Nordic c o u n t r ie s  
a re  th e  major export markets o f  canned asparagus from LNDC's w holly- 
owned su b s id ia ry  company. The Germans have a lso  made d i r e c t  in v e s t ­
ments in LNDC eq u ity  and provided te c h n ic a l  and managerial e x p e r t i s e  
to  two LNDC s u b s id ia r i e s  -  eg Maseru Motors and Loti Brick Ltd.
 ^ LNDC Q uarter ly  Report, 1986.
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In 1985-86, NID execu tive  d i r e c to r  relaunched investment promotion. 
Three years  on a f t e r  th e  d iv is io n  was reo rgan ised  in to  fu n c t io n a l ly  
segmented s e c to r s ,  i t  was f e l t  t h a t  s u f f i c i e n t  s k i l l s  and experience  
from working on p ro je c t s  in s p e c i f i c  market s e c to r s  and dea ling  with 
i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  had been developed to  w arrant re launching  ta rg e te d  
investment promotion. The P ro je c t  managers could now resea rch  and 
develop a s p e c i f i c  re so u rce  based p ro je c ts  and market them to  
p o te n t ia l  in v e s to r s .  Such ta rg e te d  approach culminated in th e  s ign ing  
o f th e  R13.3 m il l io n  j o i n t  ven ture  f o r  wool and mohair scouring p r o je c t  
between LNDC and Shanghai C orporation o f  China in 1986.^
The development of a 'p ro d u c t '  - Lesotho, t h a t  was not completely 
under th e  management c o n t r o l ,  bu t depended on n e g o t ia t io n  with o th e r  
more powerful p o l i t i c a l  a c to r s  who might have d i f f e r e n t  p e rcep tio n s  
on how i t  should be developed soon proved to  be a complex p o l i t i c a l  
ta n g le  f o r  LNDC. The government had o th e r  p reoccupations more 
important to  p o l i t i c i a n s  than th e  p o l i t i c a l l y  s ta b le  and economically 
growing image t h a t  LNDC wanted to  p o r tray  to  in v e s to rs .
Macro Environment Turbulence
The year  1985 was marked by heightened p o l i t i c a l  te n s io n s  in s id e  th e  
country as well as e x t e r n a l l y .  In te r n a l ly  th e  government was p repa ring  
f o r  th e  'g en e ra l  e l e c t i o n s '  fo llow ing  th e  1970 ab o r t iv e  one. The 
e le c t io n s  never q u i te  took p lace  because on th e  nomination day, a l l  
opposit ion  p a r t i e s  boycotted  them and th e  ru l in g  p a r ty  nominees were 
re tu rned  unopposed, d ec la red  winners and formed a new government. In 
th e  cab ine t r e s h u f f l e ,  fo llow ing  th e  'mock e l e c t i o n ' ,  the  new Chairman 
o f LNDC was appointed (by v i r tu e  of being a new M in is te r  of T rade).
1 The S ta r ,  December 19, 1986.
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R ela tions  between Lesotho and South A frica  were a t  t h e i r  lowest ebb 
and SA p r i n t  and network media which i s  a lso  shown in Lesotho, made 
wide p o l i t i c a l  gain of th e  e le c t io n  snub in Lesotho, th u s ,  f u r th e r  
fanning up p o l i t i c a l  te n s io n  between th e  two c o u n t r ie s .  With the  
p re s su re  o f  economic san c tio n s  a g a in s t  SA looming h igh , SA government 
s e n t  ou t a very powerful warning to  san c tio n s  advocates by imposing 
a l im ited  economic blockade to  Lesotho.
"The Lesotho government i s  aw aiting  a re p ly  from P re to r ia  to  an urgent 
appeal f o r  t a lk s  about th e  t h r o t t l i n g  o f i t s  t i n y  kingdom by South 
A frica  . . .
South A frica  has denied t h a t  i t  i s  blockading Lesotho . . .  i n s i s t in g  
t h a t  i t  i s  merely su b je c t in g  people leaving  th e  kingdom to  thorough 
sea rch es ,  necessary  to  p reven t t e r r o r i s t s  s l ip p in g  th rough".
The 'go-s low ' border s ea rch ,  as i t  was c a l l e d ,  la s te d  f o r  hard ly  two 
weeks, and as explained  e lsew here, th e  Jonathan government crumbled 
and c o l la p se d ;  and f o r  th e  f i r s t  time Lesotho was under m i l i t a r y  ru le  
which came to  power in January 20, 1986. I t  marked a new ch ap te r  in 
a n a tion  where m i l i t a r y  c a r e e r  had no s t a t u s  and was o f ten  regarded 
as th e  p lace  f o r  th e  uneducated. SA's b r i e f  r e f le x  o f  economic 
muscle drove home q u i te  d e c is iv e ly  j u s t  how L eso tho 's  s o c io - p o l i t i c a l  
and economic r e a l i t i e s  a re  in e x t r ic a b ly  in te r tw in ed  with th e  Republic, 
and was a sharp reminder o f  th e  overhanging presence of t h i s  powerful 
and ind ispensab le  a c to r  t h a t  Lesotho and hence LNDC d ec is io n  makers 
should always co n s id e r  in t h e i r  s t r a t e g i c  d e c is io n s .  I t  f u r th e r  
quashed a l l  th e  a ttem pts  by LNDC to  a t t r a c t  la rg e  fo re ig n  investments 
to  Lesotho as an a l t e r n a t i v e  to  SA and warped fo re ig n  in v e s to r s '  
p e rcep tion  o f in v es t in g  in LNDC, e s p e c ia l l y  those  in v e s to rs  who 
were le e ry  o f  omnipotent p resence of SA in Lesotho. As th e  D irec to r  
o f  Marketing exp la ined :
1 The Guardian, January 13, 1986.
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When fo re ig n  in v es to rs  asked us about p o s s i b i l i t y  of South Africa 
c lo s in g  th e  borders ,  we would c o n f id e n t ly  t e l l  them: ' t h a t  would 
never happen' and they b e liev ed  us . We now c a r ry  a new tag-name 
o f  'u n s ta b le  and r isk y  c o u n try '  and our investment promoters have 
a hard time convincing p o te n t i a l  in v e s to rs  t o  lo ca te  in Lesotho.
The whole promotion s t r a te g y  needs to  be reviewed, we now deal with 
a d i f f e r e n t  s i tu a t io n  from what we had in 1978.
The new m i l i t a r y  government ushered in new a c to r s  t h a t  included new 
Chairman o f  th e  C orpora tion , j u s t  th r e e  months a f t e r  h is  p redecessor 
was appoin ted . Following th e  wider changes t h a t  ensued, th e  CEO was 
changed and given a m in i s t e r i a l  p o s i t io n  and a couple of months l a t e r ,  
h is  b ro th e r ,  Ben S e l lo ,  a c i v i l  s e rv an t  and former permanent s e c re ta ry  
of M in istry  of Planning, was appointed c h ie f  execu tive  of LNDC. The 
D irec to r  o f  Operations had ac ted  during th e  absence of the  su b s ta n t iv e  
c h ie f  ex ecu tiv e ,  and management and some members of th e  board, had 
hoped t h a t  th e  u l t im a te  appointment would be amongst one of the  
d iv is io n a l  d i r e c to r s .  'The appointment o f  ano ther c i v i l  s e rv an t  was 
the  l a s t  th in g  we expected to  happen, and some of th e se  boys ( d i r e c to r  
of New In d u s tr ie s  d iv is io n  had j u s t  re s igned )  f e l t  enough was enough ', 
argued th e  d i r e c to r  o f  A d m in is tra t io n .  T heir  r e a c t io n  a t  th e  'impos­
i t i o n '  o f y e t  another c i v i l  se rv an t  -  who were regarded as 'ex e c u t iv e s  
on t r a n s i t '  because of t h e i r  o f ten  sh o r t- te rm  s ta y ,  was one of muted 
anger and f r u s t r a t i o n .  Two most s e n io r  d iv is io n a l  d i r e c to r s  with 
th e  longest s e rv ice  (13 y e a rs )  subsequently  res igned  in what was 
believed  to  be a s ign  o f  p r o t e s t  a t  being c o n s ta n t ly  overlooked in 
favour of c i v i l  s e rv a n ts .  Once again i t  b e f e l l  on th e  World Bank 
to  su b tly  warn th e  government t h a t :
"a gap e x i s t s  between high s t a f f  tu rn o v e r  and d i f f i c u l t i e s  in r e c r u i t in g  
o f  q u a l i f i e d  s t a f f ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  a t  th e  middle and s e n io r  management 
l e v e l .
We would recommend t h a t  in o rd e r  to  r e t a in  experienced s t a f f  and 
a t t r a c t  q u a l i f i e d  people , LNDC in c o n s u l ta t io n  with government, should
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review c a re e r  o p p o r tu n i t ie s  and compensation package with a view 
of making them more c o m p eti t iv e .
A t a c i t  sense of h o s t i l i t y  and m is t ru s t  between th e  new CEO and s e n io r  
management had developed t h a t  f u r th e r  a l ie n a te d  th e  CEO from h is  
l ie u te n a n ts  -  d iv is io n a l  d i r e c t o r s .  He was not q u i te  seen as one 
o f  them and t h a t  a t t i t u d e  could be in fe r r e d  from th e  in te rv iew s  w ith  
th e  CEO and from th e  co rp o ra te  news l e t t e r s  and memoranda to  s t a f f  
where he emphasized t h e i r  lo y a l ty  to  th e  co rp o ra t io n .  [When I was 
in te rv iew ing  him, he would not proceed with th e  in te rv iew  u n t i l  I 
have to ld  him what th e  d iv i s io n a l  d i r e c to r s  have sa id  to  me. R ea liz ing  
my in d igna tion  a t  such a c o n d i t io n ,  he poin ted  out t h a t  he merely 
wanted to  ensure t h a t  h is  p o l i c i e s  were not m is in te rp re te d .  The 
in te rv iew  f i n a l l y  got underway w ithout any compromise of rev e a l in g  
my o th e r  in te rv ie w s .]  (See M a r t in 's  comments on CEOs from c i v i l  s e rv ic e  
background).
On th e  economic f r o n t  th e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  had reached an a l l  tim e 
high o f more than 25 per c e n t ;  th e  rand currency and hence Lesotho 
currency -  L o t i ,  tumbled sev e re ly  a g a in s t  a l l  major cu rre n c ie s  because 
o f  p o l i t i c a l  u n re s t ,  SA deb t c r i s i s ,  and e x te rn a l  p re ssu res  e x e r ted  on 
SA, a l l  o f  which made c a p i t a l  a v a i l a b i l i t y  f o r  investment sca rce  and 
more c o s t l y .  General s a le s  ta x  was increased  from 10 per c en t  t o  12 
pe r  cen t in SA, and Lesotho followed s u i t ,  thus  making th e  c o s t  of 
imported m a te r ia l  from SA more expensive f o r  Lesotho m anufactu rers .
Following Cabinet approval to  open 25 p e r  cen t o f  LNDC's e q u i ty  to  
o u ts id e  in v e s to r s ,  coupled with th e  in c reas in g  r a t e  of government 
in te rv e n t io n s ,  management had in v i te d  various  in te rn a t io n a l  o rg an iz -
1 World Bank Review R eport, 1986.
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a tio n s  to  take  up eq u ity  shares  in an e f f o r t  to  in su la te  the  corpor­
a t io n  from government in f lu en c e ,  w ithout much success . The main 
reason f o r  lack of i n t e r e s t  by in v es to rs  was a c lause  in th e  LNDC 
a c t  which p ro h ib i ted  i t  to  pay ou t any d iv idends. Secondly, th e  
government was uneasy about th e  d i lu t io n  of i t s  equ ity  and perceived 
loss  of c o n t ro l .  A fte r  th e  n e g o tia t io n  process t h a t  la s ted  fo r  
approximately th re e  years  between LNDC, Lesotho government and DEG*, 
th e  government f i n a l l y  agreed to  change th e  c a p i t a l  s t ru c tu re  o f  LNDC 
and o ffe red  DEG 6 per c en t  cumulative non-voting p reference  shares of 
DM1 m il l io n ,  in 1986. The su b sc r ip t io n  agreement s e t  out th e  following 
s a l i e n t  terms and co n d it io n s  to  be observed by a l l  th re e  p a r t i e s  -  
much to  the  p a r t i a l  r e l i e f  of management:
-  "We accept th a t  government may have a c o n tro l l in g  i n t e r e s t  as a 
shareholder o r  on board l e v e l ,  but we fe e l  i t  im perative t h a t  the  
co rpo ra tion  follows usual business  l in e s  in the  course of i t s  day- 
to -day  business and board has f u l l  power and r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  f o r  
th e  c o rp o ra t io n 's  p o l ic y ".^
-  The LNDC Act 1967, g iv ing  th e  government d is c re t io n a ry  r i g h t  to  
determine th e  d i r e c t io n  of th e  co rpo ra tion  had to  be changed.
- The board and th e  c o rp o ra t io n 's  s t r u c tu r e s  were changed through 
th e  appointment o f  DEG d i r e c t o r  to  th e  board, and th e  e s tab lishm en t 
o f  th e  p o s i t io n  o f  a c o rp o ra te  P lanner, as p a r t  of th e  agreement
to  upgrade the  management s t r u c tu r e  t h a t  the  Germans, were so 
c r i t i c a l  o f .
-  L a s t ly ,  in as f a r  as LNDC was involved in n o n -p ro f i ta b le  p ro je c ts
* DEG -  Deutsche F in a n z ie ru n g sg e se l lsc h a f t  fu r  Betulingungen in 
Entwi ck1ungs1andern.
1 DEG Appraisal Report, 1985.
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on beh a lf  of th e  government of Lesotho, LNDC should be provided 
with a d d i t io n a l  funds to  cover th e se  c o s t s .
I t  was be lieved  t h a t  DEG d ec is io n  to  in v e s t  in LNDC would g ive  impetus
t o  o th e r  in te rn a t io n a l  o rg a n iz a t io n s ,  p a r t i c u l a r ly  those  t h a t  had 
c l e a r ly  in d ica ted  t h a t  t h e i r  response would depend on DEG's d e c is io n  
and s tren g th en  management a l l i a n c e .
New A ctors , New Emphasis
With th e  experience  of economic blockade s t i l l  f re sh  in t h e i r  minds, 
th e  new Chairman and h is  CEO have a lready  ve rb a lized  t h e i r  new credo
in various  p o l i t i c a l  and bus iness  f o r a ,  about th e  d i r e c t io n  which
they  b e lie v e  LNDC should fo l lo w . In h is  address to  th e  Lesotho 
Chamber o f  Commerce conference which has had s t r a in e d  r e l a t io n s h ip  
with LNDC, th e  CEO urged th e  lo ca l business  community to  unleash 
t h e i r  e n t re p re n e u r ia l  t a l e n t s  in p a r tn e rsh ip  with LNDC. He promised 
them t h a t :
"gone were th e  days (h o p e fu lly  f o r  good) when th e  LNDC perceived  and 
in te rp re te d  i t s  r o l e  as merely a v e h ic le  f o r  th e  promotion and co­
o rd in a t io n  o f  th e  inflow  o f fo re ig n  investment to  th e  exc lus ion  o f 
indigenous e n tre p re n e u rsh ip " .
The Chairman had a l s o  po in ted  ou t t h a t  th e  p o licy  o f  'The new L eso tho1 
was t h a t  th e  e f f o r t s  of investm ent promotion must a lso  be d i r e c te d  
a t  loca l e n tre p re n eu rs  and lo ca l c a p i t a l .  Thus, LNDC has to  encourage 
and a s s i s t  lo ca l  businessmen to  id e n t i fy  and develop bankable p r o je c t s  
and th re e  lo ca l  e n te r p r i s e s  were e s ta b l i s h e d  through LNDC promotion, 
and in one -  Peacock Garments -  LNDC has c o n t ro l l in g  i n t e r e s t .
1 LNDC Q uarte rly  N ew sle t te r ,  1986.
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The emphasis on ' l o c a l  d r iv e '  was extended to  th e  management cadre  
and th e  high execu tive  p r o f i l e  of fo re ig n  ex p e r ts  was d r a s t i c a l l y  
c u r t a i l e d .  Except f o r  th e  p o s i t io n  of F inanc ia l  C o n tro l le r ,  which 
has proved d i f f i c u l t  to  l o c a l i s e ,  th e  I r i s h  have a l l  l e f t .  A
d i f f e r e n t  lead e rsh ip  s ty l e  was a lso  ev iden t from th e  increased  s iz e
o f th e  decision-m aking committees -  eg Management and Executive 
Committees, which included th e  P ro jec t  managers, w hile  th e  CEO had
more o u ts id e  communication and c o n su l ta t io n  w ith  government and lo ca l
businessmen about d e s ired  changes than in te r n a l ly  with h is  immediate 
d iv is io n a l  d i r e c t o r s .  This was how he desc ribed  h is  managerial 
philosophy and how he in s t ig a te d  th e  changes in th e  c o rp o ra t io n :
' I  am b a s ic a l ly  a dreamer which I co n s id e r  to  be th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  
of th e  c h ie f  execu tive  o f f i c e r .  He must go beyond th e  confines  of 
th e  c u r re n t  o p e ra t io n s ,  and th e se  were some o f th e  ideas  t h a t  
j u s t  came on board and I have bounced them a g a in s t  my co lleagues  
and were acce p tab le ,  so I have s t a r t e d  implementation now.'
Thus, LNDC had begun to  s h i f t  i t s  co n cen tra t io n  on promoting fo re ig n  
manufacturing in v e s to rs  t h a t  were perceived  to  have managerial know­
how, technology, market in fo rm ation , and h ighe r  p o te n t ia l  to  c r e a te  
jo b s ,  to  an in te r n a l ly - o r i e n te d  twin approach o f promoting th e  lo ca l 
e n te r p r i s e s  as w e l l .  The new c h ie f  ex ecu tive  be lieved  t h a t  s u f f i c i e n t  
loca l c a p i t a l  and s k i l l s  had been developed and more lo c a ls  had 
reached a s tag e  where they  could in v e s t  in p ro je c ts  of th e  magnitude 
comparable to  f o r e ig n e r s ,  hence deserved LNDC f in a n c ia l  and managerial 
e x p e r t i s e  to  launch them. This view however, was not widely shared 
by management even though they  grudgingly  went along with th e  changes. 
I t  was in te rp re te d  as a p o l i t i c a l  ploy of th e  new government keen on 
su s ta in in g  th e  t i d e  o f  popu lar  support t h a t  followed th e  coup.
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Performance wise,  1985, and 1986 were g e n e ra l ly  p r o f i t a b l e  and th e  
t ren d  was on th e  in c rease  d e s p i t e  l eade rsh ip  i n s t a b i l i t y  and unfavour­
ab le  economic and p o l i t i c a l  c o n d i t io n s .  Net opera t ing  income had 
gone up from a low of  R550,000 in 1985 to  R4.2 m i l l io n  in 1986, 
most of  which was in th e  form of  dividends from s u b s id ia ry  companies, 
i n t e r e s t s  on loans and management fees  f o r  s e rv ice s  rendered to  
s u b s i d i a r i e s .
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B Res truc tur ing  Operat ions Divis ion -  OP
The p re s e n ta t io n  up to  now has concen tra ted  on th e  co rpora te  changes 
as perceived and i n i t i a t e d  through th e  lenses  of top  management from 
th e  headquar te rs .  In t h i s  s ec t io n  we look a t  headquarters  -  s u b s id ia ry  
i n t e r a c t i o n ,  desc r ibe  th e  change process  in th e  companies and th e  r o l e  
o f  s u b s id ia ry  management in th e  s t r a t e g i c  change p rocess .  This s e c t io n  
looks a t  the  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  of  th e  Operations Divis ion and i t s  i n t e r ­
ac t io n  with th e  s u b s i d i a r i e s .
The OD as a l ready  expla ined was i n i t i a l l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  to  monitor and 
manage th e  d iv e rse  p o r t f o l i o  of  LNDC -  managed s u b s i d i a r i e s .  Beginning 
in 1977 when investment promotion was launched, th e  d iv i s io n  has 
opera ted under the  shadow of  NID, o c ca s io n a l ly  su r fac ing  to  prominance 
depending on th e  approach followed by new CEOs and th e  I r i s h  d i v i s i o n a l  
ex ecu t iv e s ,  t h a t  i s ,  whether they  emphasised ope ra t ions  and e f f i c i e n t  
management of  the  companies t h a t  c o n s t i t u t e d  th e  revenue s id e  of LNDC 
o r  th e  marketing and investment promotion.  The process  of  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  
has been going on a c t u a l l y  s in ce  1979, when th e  I r i s h  team -  IDA jo in e d  
LNDC, however, th e  tendency was t o  r e a c t  t o  s p e c i f i c  problems -  mainly 
f i n a n c i a l  and management problems, under p re s su re  from World Bank.
A c l e a r  change of s t r a t e g y  and s t r u c t u r e  began t o  emerge e a r ly  in 1983.
S t r u c t u r a l  Changes: C en t ra l i zed  -  D ece n t ra l i z a t io n
LNDC has always been a heav i ly  c e n t r a l i z e d  o rgan iza t ion  with th e  head­
q u a r t e r s  co -o rd ina t ing  s u b s id ia ry  a c t i v i t i e s ,  managing the  t r o u b l e  
shooting in the se  companies, and g e n e ra l ly  formula t ing and making 
s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s io n s .  Thus in s p i t e  o f  th e  d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  which
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began in the  e a r ly  1980s and management dec la red  po l icy  t h a t  they 
a re  not involved in management of th e  companies, but merely 'monitor '  
them, th e re  has been a tendency f o r  ' c reep ing  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n '  o f ten  
t r i g g e r e d  by cont inuous  poor f i n a n c i a l  and managerial  performance of  
th e  companies. The dominant s t r a t e g y  o f  th e  OD towards the  companies 
was f i n a n c i a l  c o n t r o l .  Accounting systems and budgetary c o n t ro l s  
were very much in vogue as moni tor ing ins t rum ents ,  the  r e s u l t  of which 
was th e  Finance d iv i s io n  became h igh ly  i n f l u e n t i a l  and a c t i v e  in the  
management of  the  companies, as one company manager put i t :  ' i t  was 
management by remote c o n t r o l ,  they (HQ) would c a l l  us t o  account f o r  
var iance  in our  budget,  and t e l l  us how we should go about t o  r ed re ss  
i t ' .  Because of  t h a t  ' remote  f i n a n c i a l  c o n t r o l ,  a s t r u c t u r e  had 
emerged whereby the  company accountants  were d i r e c t l y  accountable  t o  
th e  f i n a n c i a l  c o n t r o l l e r ,  while  the  managers who had to  j u s t i f y  the  
deployment of funds t o  th e  accoun tan ts ,  were r e spons ib le  to  the  OD, 
a r a t h e r  c o n f l i c t f u l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  f o r  th e  OD a t  the  company level 
as well as between th e  d i v i s i o n s .  The WB had recommended t h a t  because 
of the  c lo se  co n tac t  t h a t  OD had with th e  companies, i t  should assume 
the  e n t i r e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of th e  company management and management 
accounting department was e v e n tu a l ly  located  in OD. The management 
accounting sec t io n  and th e  company c o -o rd in a to r s  became one monitoring 
group under OD, and th e  emphasis of th e  superv is ion  s h i f t e d  from 
f in a n c i a l  d i s c i p l i n e  t o  inc lude  management a u d i t .  Moreover the  
p o r t f o l i o  had been s t e a d i l y  d i v e r s i f i e d  in to  loans ,  e q u i ty ,  a s s o c i a t e  
companies, and f a c to ry  s h e l l s ,  c r e a t i n g  i n t e r a c t i o n  with various  a c to r s  
in charge of th e se  p o r t f o l i o s ,  and changes in the  information systems. 
This was how th e  F inanc ia l  C o n t r o l l e r  expla ined h is  adamant o b je c t io n :
233
My view i s  t h a t  the  f i n a n c i a l  c o n t r o l l e r  should be more c lo s e ly  involved 
than th e  management people who o f ten  change a l o t .  Very o f ten  manage­
ment people (OD) who a re  involved in th e  companies, may g e t  too  c lo se  
t o  th e  s i t u a t i o n .  Finance people tend to  be d i s t a n t  and l i t t l e  more 
d i s p a s s io n a t e ,  which i s  q u i t e  e s s e n t i a l  to  mainta in c r i t i c a l  o b j e c t ­
i v i t y  and t o  in c u lc a te  f i n a n c i a l  d i s c i p l i n e  in the  companies.
That approach was problematic  because i t  provided th e  companies with 
l i t t l e  o r  no planning , c re a te d  c o n f l i c t i n g  commands from head q u a r te rs ,  
r e ta rd e d  t r a i n i n g  and development of  indigenous managers from exper­
iencing f u l l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  and g e n e ra l ly  made i t  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  th e  
managers t o  respond t o  t h e i r  own perceived compet it ive  s i t u a t i o n .
I t  was f o r t u i t o u s l y  abandoned In 1983, fo llowing th e  a r r i v a l  of new 
IDA exper ts  and a new s t r a t e g y  to  ' c o n c e n t r a te  on bu i ld ing  up a w e l l -  
managed reduced p o r t f o l i o  of  p r o f i t a b l e  bus inesses  supported by a 
h igh ly  s k i l l e d  t a s k - f o r c e , was unve i led .  I t  led to  the  review and 
r eo rg an iza t io n  of OD designed t o :
Communicate c l e a r l y  t o  s t a f f  what we were t r y i n g  t o  achieve in OD 
so t h a t  they know what was expected o f  them in car ry ing  out t h e i r  
work. We began to  th in k  s t r a t e g i c a l l y  about where the  d iv i s io n  
s tood and what we were t r y i n g  to  do. ( in t e rv i e w ) .
The s t r u c t u r e  of  th e  d i v i s i o n  was changed and s en io r  execut ive  manage­
ment was expanded to  inc lude  two deputy d i r e c t o r s ,  one to  r e p r e se n t  
th e  d iv i s io n  in a l l  t h e  management committees, and th e  o th e r  to  super­
v i s e  th e  company c o - o r d in a to r s .  The r e s t  of  the  c o -o rd in a to r s  were 
segmented in to  groups according t o  exper ience  and s k i l l s ,  and ass igned  
s p e c i f i c  company o r  group o f  companies t o  monitor and l i a i s e  with on 
a d a i ly  b a s i s .  This viewpoint was ampli f ied  by one company manager:
'what happens i s  t h a t  we deal  with th e  company co -o rd in a to r  -  a l so  
known as 'desk o f f i c e r s ' ,  in almost every th ing  e l s e  and the  Board 
j u s t  r a t i f i e s  whenever i t  m e e t s ' .  The co -o rd in a to r s  a l so  rep resen ted  
OD in the  Boards of  th e  s u b s id ia ry  companies, undertook annual perform­
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ance a p p r a i s a l  of  the  companies and a u th o r i zed  or  vetoed company d e c i s io n s  
r e q u i r i n g  headqua r te r s  approval  eg c a p i t a l  expansion,  budgetary  o v e r ­
spending,  s a l e  of  c a p i t a l  a s s e t s  e t c .  They submitted monthly r e p o r t s  
on the  performance of  the  companies, and th e s e  went t o  th e  exec u t ive  
committee and th e  Board as feedback and s p e c i f i c  recommendations f o r  
a c t io n  t h a t  would then  go t o  th e  companies as a d i r e c t i v e .  See f i g u r e  
8 .2  f o r  th e  OD organograph.
Figure 8.2  
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I t  was from t h a t  nucleus  o f  reo rgan ized  s t r u c t u r e  t h a t  a ' Task F o rce1 
was formed which was b a s i c a l l y  a combination o f  d i f f e r e n t  minds from 
OD and o th e r  d i v i s i o n s  of  th e  c o rp o ra t io n  -  ie  NID, Finance,  Legal 
and Personne l ,  t h a t  could be drawn on depending on th e  n a tu re  of  the  
company problem. E s s e n t i a l l y  t h e  t a s k  f o r c e  committee was th e  form­
a l i z a t i o n  o f  the  o p e ra t io n s  t h a t  t h e  OD was a l ready  engaged in spasm­
o d i c a l l y  in r e a c t in g  t o  company problems.  This view is  cap tured  in 
th e  Executive d i r e c t o r ' s  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  why th e  t a sk  fo r c e  was 
e s t a b l i s h e d .
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"We f e l t  in our review t h a t  a l o t  of th e  demands on s t a f f  t ime was 
coming up in an unplanned way. I t  was not OD decid ing t h a t  th e se  
are  our p r i o r i t i e s ,  t h i s  i s  where we in tend to  a l l o c a t e  our s t a f f  
t ime . . .  a company would g e t  in to  t r o u b l e  and we would g e t  in to  
some f i r e - f i g h t i n g  e x e r c i s e ,  which cobbled-up a l o t  of s t a f f  t ime 
and was i n e f f e c t i v e  because we never analysed th e  fundamental problems. 
So we decided t o  c o n s ta n t ly  monitor and i d e n t i f y  the  companies t h a t  
were p o t e n t i a l l y  r i s k y  and i n s t i g a t e  remedial  a c t io n s  be fo re  th e  
c r i s i s .  That tends  t o  head o f f  a l o t  of  th e  rescue  case s .
That s t r a t e g y  i s  s t i l l  evo lv ing -  you cannot change a s t r a t e g y  
and expect i t  t o  work o v e rn ig h t ,  you got t o  be p a t i e n t  and c o n s ta n t ly
work a t  i t  -  t h e r e  i s  s t i l l  a l o t  of  l ea rn ing  going on."
Because the  rescue  companies would be e i t h e r  in s u f f i c i e n t  f i n a n c i a l  
o r  managerial  s t r a i t s  o r  bo th ,  Task Force in t e rv e n t io n  b r ing ing  in
th e se  inpu ts ,  was o f ten  welcomed by company managers. The i n t e r ­
vention as th e  d i r e c t o r  o f  OD descr ibed  i t  was b a s i c a l l y  a d i s c i p l i n a r y  
input meant to  r e o r i e n t  company management and put th e  company back 
in to  the  d e s i r ed  t r a c k  and hand i t  back t o  th e  managers.
The new r o le s  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  requ i red  a c q u i s i t i o n  and c r a f t i n g  
on of s p e c i f i c  s k i l l s  t o  be ab le  t o  go in and s ize -up  th e  company, 
assess  i t s  s t r e n g th s  and weaknesses,  i d e n t i f y  i t s  com pet i to rs ,  th e  
market t r e n d s ,  and th e  market niche t h a t  i t  should focus on. These 
s k i l l s  were not r e a d i l y  a v a i l a b l e ,  they  were p a r t  o f  a long-term 
in t e r m i t t e n t  process  o f  developing loca l  managerial  s k i l l s  o f  which 
LNDC and i t s  companies were seen as th e  l o g ic a l  medium of access  to  
gain experience of  dea l ing  with companies. I t  opened up th e  c o n t ro ­
v e r s i a l  su b jec t  of o n - th e - jo b  t r a i n i n g ,  coaching and the  whole
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managerial  exper ience  gained from ac tua l  immersion in company o p e ra t io n s ,  
which th e  lo c a l s  regarded as th e  l a s t  phase of  t h e i r  pos tg radua te  t r a i n ­
ing .  Consequently,  t h e  d i v i s i o n a l  d i r e c t o r  had to  pe rso n a l ly  spearhead 
th e  ' t a s k  f o r c e '  and undertake rescue o pe ra t ions  -  a despe ra te  dec is ion  
t h a t  even tua l ly  generated g r e a t e r  enthusiasm and support  as more com­
panies  were tu rned  around t o  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  and th e  ' t a s k  f o r c e '  gained 
c r e d i b i l i t y  and r e s p e c t  i n t e r n a l l y  as well as e x t e r n a l l y  f o r  saying 
jo b s .
From th e  ' t a s k  f o r c e '  exper ience ,  a s e r i e s  o f  o th e r  s i g n i f i c a n t  change 
s p in -o f f s  fo llowed.  The f i r s t  one,  though no t  d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  to  
' t a s k  f o r c e ' ,  was th e  l o c a l i s a t i o n  of  th e  pos t  o f  d i r e c t o r  of  the  
d iv i s io n  in 1984, and th e  I r i s h  exper t  became execut ive  a d v i s e r ,  f r e e in g  
him f o r  more a c t iv e  involvement in t a sk  f o r c e .  Secondly, because of 
th e  'p re-emptive  s t r a t e g y ' ,  o f  th e  t a sk  fo r c e ,  OD was able  t o  review 
the  c o r p o r a t io n ' s  p o r t f o l i o  and make recommendations t o  sl im i t  down 
by d iv e s t in g  those  companies t h a t  had been tu rned  p r o f i t a b l e  o r  con­
t inued  to  make lo s s e s .  Only those  companies t h a t  were in s t r a t e g i c  
in d u s t r i e s  and those  t h a t  genera ted  s u f f i c i e n t  income flows t o  f inance  
th e  c o r p o r a t io n ' s  o pe ra t ing  expenses were r e t a i n e d .  Th i rd ly ,  th e  
success of  ' t a s k  f o r c e '  s t r a t e g y  led t o  investment in an area  where 
OD had no e x p e r t i s e ,  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  reasons .  Because of  the  continuous 
c r i t i c i s m s  of  being l a b e l l e d  a f o r e ig n - o r i e n t e d  c o rp o ra t io n ,  management 
i d e n t i f i e d  t h r e e  loca l  companies t h a t  could be a s s i s t e d  by th e  t a s k  
fo rce  in an e f f o r t  t o  change t h e  general  percep t ion  of  th e  pub l ic  
and improve image o f  th e  c o rp o ra t io n  and harness  p o l i t i c a l  suppor t .
The s t r a t e g y ,  back f i r e d  in t h a t  LNDC was s h o r t  of t o p - l e v e l  exper ience  
of  deal ing  with sm a l l - s c a le  indigenous companies, with rudimentary 
managerial  s k i l l s ,  and had to  i n j e c t  s u b s t a n t i a l  r e sou rces ,  ie  provide 
OD c o -o rd in a to r  to  a c t u a l l y  manage Peacock Garment, which was in l a d ie s  
fash ion  f o r  th e  middle and low end of  the  market and put in more
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c a p i t a l  t o  a po in t  where i t  now has a m a jo r i ty  s take  in t h a t  company. 
The investment c rea ted  a p o l i t i c a l  problem f o r  LNDC as to  whether i t  
should conver t  th e  loans in to  equ i ty  or  hold them in escrow with a 
c o n d i t io n  t h a t  they be purchased by th e  shareho lders  once th e  company 
becomes p r o f i t a b l e .  OD found i t s e l f  s tuck  in and committed f u r t h e r  
t o  ensure  t h a t  th e  rescue succeeded l e s t  they would be accused of 
abandoning local  bus inesses  t o  p e r i s h .  As one OD execu t ive  put i t  
' i t  was a dec is ion  based on i n t e r n a l  p re s su re s  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  reasons ,  
and we came out second b e s t ' .  L a s t ly ,  as th e  co -o rd in a to r s  gained 
exper ience  and conf idence ,  a 'company development approach'  was i n t r o ­
duced by th e  execu t ive  d i r e c t o r .  E s s e n t i a l l y  t h a t  was IDA ' imported '  
techn ique  whereby b e t t e r  managed companies were i d e n t i f i e d  and the  
' t a s k  f o r c e '  moved in ,  and in c o l l a b o r a t io n  with th e  company managers 
looked a t  i t s  s t r e n g th s ,  s ig n p o s t  th e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s ,  and develop a 
bus iness  plan to  improve them. Thus, i t  was used as a s t r a t e g y  of 
b o l s t e r i n g  th e  e x i s t i n g  p o s i t i o n  by inc reas ing  p r o d u c t iv i t y ,  u t i l i s i n g  
th e  f u l l  c ap a c i ty ,  and g e n e r a l ly  looking f o r  c o s t  reduc t ions  to  improve 
the  e f f i c i e n c y  o r  r e p o s i t i o n in g  th e  product in o rder  to  co n so l ida te  
the  company's p o s i t io n  in th e  market.  That approach was p red ica ted  
upon having competent managers in th e  companies and increased s t a f f  
a t  t h e  headquar te rs .  B e t t e r  re c ru i tm en t  and s e l e c t i o n  procedures 
were adopted t o  ensure  t h a t  more s k i l l e d  and experienced managers 
were employed, and some degree o f  autonomy on op e ra t io n a l  m at te rs  was 
given t o  managers. To a t t r a c t  such s ca rce  competent managers, the  
reward package was d r a s t i c a l l y  improved t o  g ive  s t a t u s  and incen t ives  
f a r  s u p e r io r  t o  even th e  d i v i s i o n a l  d i r e c t o r s  such as th e  company c a r ,  
f r e e  housing and 7 per cen t  share  o f  th e  p r o f i t s .  For th e  f i r s t  t ime 
performance app ra i sa l  o f  th e  company managers was introduced which 
f a c i l i t a t e d  th e  changes as managers were c a r e fu l  t o  conform to  OD 
d i r e c t i v e s  and gu ide l ine s  t o  ensure  p o s i t i v e  a p p ra i s a l  by year  end.
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The cumulative e f f e c t  of a l l  t h e se  m odif ica t ion  of personnel p o l i c i e s ,  
s t r u c t u r a l  changes and purposefu l muddling have r e s u l t e d  in a new 
i n t e r a c t i o n  between OD and th e  companies, a change from managing to  
consultancy  which management defined as t h e i r  new approach in the  
c o n t ro l  of  the  companies. Declar ing i t  a new d i r e c t io n  f o r  th e  f u t u r e ,  
t h i s  was how th e  d iv i s i o n a l  d i r e c t o r  and h i s  execut ive  d i r e c t o r  descr ibed  
t h e i r  evolving approach.
Our r o l e  i s  no longer t h a t  of  managing as t h a t  of gu id ing, adv is ing ;  
in o th e r  words we are  moving in to  some kind of  consultancy r o l e  to  
ensure  t h a t  th e r e  i s  p roper  management in p la ce .  In the  p a s t  we 
used t o  manage and because of s k i l l  d e f i c i e n c i e s  we had t o  t e l l  them 
(managers) what t o  do. But, because the  q u a l i t y  of managers has 
improved and continues  to  improve, we now come in mainly as a back- 
stoppage and on s t r a t e g i c  m a t t e r s ,  and we charge management fees  f o r  
th e se  s e r v i c e s .
Thus OD has g radua l ly  developed an in-house management consultancy 
team t h a t  genera ted revenue f o r  th e  c o rp o ra t io n .  The approach was 
widely supported by th e  e x te r n a l  f i n a n c i e r s  e s p e c i a l l y  th e  WB which 
had c o n s i s t e n t l y  put p re s su re  on LNDC t o  change i t s  p o r t f o l i o  from 
managed s u b s i d i a r i e s  to  loans  and m inor i ty  eq u i ty ,  t o  obv ia te  th e  
problem of  s k i l l  d e f i c i e n c i e s .
Expansion Decis ions:  r e d e f in in g  th e  Roles
Continuing with th e  r e o rg a n iz a t io n  p rocess ,  in 1985, OD s t r a t e g i c  
plan was accepted by th e  Board.  The plan sought t o  change th e  ' p r o j e c t  
hand-over '  process from NID to  OD when p r o j e c t s  become ope ra t iona l  and 
apply th e  t a sk  fo rce  e x p e r t i s e  t o  g e t  involved with the  management 
support  s e rv ice s  a t  an e a r l i e r  s tag e  t o  a s s i s t  companies through t h e i r  
t e e th in g  problems -  many of  which hard ly  survived t h i s  s tag e .  Under 
th e  old  procedure,  NID would promote a p r o j e c t ,  help i t  s e t  up and
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manage i t  f o r  an average per iod  of  s ix  months to  a y ea r ,  o r  u n t i l  
i t  was f u l l y  o p e r a t i o n a l ,  a t  which po in t  a hand over r e p o r t  would be 
prepared by NID and OD would take  i t  over t o  provide th e  a f t e r  ca re  
s e r v i c e s .  But as th e  d i r e c t o r  of OD pointed o u t ,  th e  d iv i s io n  had 
a success fu l  new approach of managing th e  companies making i t  l o g ic a l  
f o r  them to  take  over  t h a t  r o l e ,  i t  was a mismatch and u n d e r u t i l i z a t i o n  
o f  th e  co rpo ra te  resources  f o r  NID t o  continue  in t h a t  r o le :
I d o n ' t  t h in k  i t ' s  NID's job  to  so lve th e  ' e s tab l i shm en t  problems'  
of  th e  new companies. Their  job  i s  t o  be knocking on the  doors of  
i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  and g e t t i n g  good q u a l i t y  investments .  I f  th e  s t a f f  
in t h a t  d iv i s io n  a re  now bogged down in the  management of th e se  
companies in t h e i r  e a r ly  s t a g e s ,  t h e i r  scope of promoting new i n v e s t ­
ments i s  reduced.
Because NID had s u f f i c i e n t  managerial  problems of deal ing  with newly 
e s t a b l i s h e d  companies, th e  agreement on the  change plan t h a t  OD 
should move in a t  an e a r l i e r  s tage  of the  p r o j e c t  eva lua t ion  and 
work c lo se ly  with NID u n t i l  a l l  con t rac tu a l  p re l im in a r i e s  had been 
complied w i th ,  was a r r iv e d  a t  with ease  and without p ro t r a c te d  d i s ­
cuss ions .  The changes were subsequently  extended to  the  'approval 
system' in th e  Investment Committee which was reviewed and t ig h te n e d  
t o  ensure  t h a t  r i s k y  p r o j e c t s  were nipped in th e  bud, thus  improving 
th e  su rv iva l  r a t e  of  those  t h a t  were approved. Employment c r e a t i o n ,  
was no longer th e  predominant c r i t e r i o n ,  i t  was important t o  main ta in  
c r e d i t  r a t i n g  with e x te r n a l  f i n a n c i e r s ,  who were l e a s t  concerned about 
the  s o c ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  c r i t e r i a ;  and a high m o r t a l i t y  r a t e  of  f a i l ­
ing companies did  not enhance t h a t  o b j e c t iv e .
As ind ica ted  e a r l i e r  on, th e  d iv i s io n  was tak ing  a c r i t i c a l  review 
of th e  c o rpo ra te  p o r t f o l i o ,  p a r t l y  due t o  changes in management a t t i ­
tude regard ing  th e  re levance  of some investments he ld ,  changes in th e  
economic environment of the  country - g r e a t e r  wealth had been
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genera ted  and th e r e  were small but  growing indigenous ven ture  c a p i t a l ­
i s t s  making some of the  c o rp o ra t io n s  inves tments  not  worth holding 
on to ;  and p a r t l y  due t o  changes in th e  c a p i t a l  s t r u c t u r e  of  the  
c o r p o r a t i o n .  The p r o f i t a b i l i t y  e x p e c ta t io n s  of  management and the  
f i n a n c i e r s  had d r a s t i c a l l y  changed as could be deduced from the  
d i r e c t o r  of  OD's remark:
We have not  go t  any s p e c i f i c  r a t e  of  r e t u r n  t h a t  we i n s i s t  upon.
We now however expec t  some of  our companies t o  meet t h e i r  i n d u s t r i e s '  
r a t e  of  r e t u r n .
We a re  in to  a l o t  of  e q u i ty  investments  today t h a t  we d o n ' t  th in k  
a re  r e a l l y  r e l e v a n t  t o  LNDC, l i k e  th e  motor d e a l e r s h ip s  -  P ioneer  
Motors,  Maseru Motors and Limefford Ltd.  The d ec i s io n  was r i g h t  
ten  years  ago when th e  o b j e c t i v e  was to  s h i f t  purchasing power from 
SA to  Lesotho and t h e r e  were no lo c a l s  ready t o  e s t a b l i s h  them; 
t h a t  has been done,  and i t s  t ime to  g e t  ou t  of  t h a t  s e c t o r .
At t h a t  t ime i f  th e  company made a break-even or  l o s s ,  but  s h i f t e d  
th e  purchas ing power, management would be s a t i s f i e d ,  however overt ime 
as more and more e x t e r n a l  f i n a n c i e r s  were involved ,  p r o f i t  o b j e c t i v e  
became im por tan t ,  and t h a t  has subsequently  been fol lowed by g r e a t e r  
focus on d iv idend  inflows from a l l  t h e  s u b s i d i a r i e s .  Thus, the  
degree t o  which p r o f i t  o b j e c t i v e  was important  then  and now has 
changed as f i g u r e  8 .3  below i n d i c a t e s .
Figure 8 .3  Sequen t ia l  Emergence of  Performance C r i t e r i a
Period Performance C r i t e r i a
Then Job Crea t ion
1967-1976 S h i f t  Purchasing Power
1977-1982 Break-even/Loss
1983-1986 P r o f i t  o b j e c t i v e
div idend d i v e s t  ( P r o f i t a b l e  
but  d i s p en s ab le )
( S t r a t e g i c  P r o j e c t s  
Now Retained)
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The s h i f t s  in performance were not s t r i c t l y  sequen t ia l  as dep ic ted  
because employment c r e a t i o n  was and s t i l l  i s  important throughout ;  
th e  diagram attempts  t o  r e f l e c t  management s h i f t  of emphasis from 
one c r i t e r i a  and the  emergence of th e  o th e r s  as the  co rpora t ion  dev­
eloped and changed.
F in a l ly ,  th e  l a s t  s i g n i f i c a n t  change of th e  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  involved 
changing the  expansion and d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  dec is ion  process  followed 
by NID. Companies wishing to  expand t h e i r  o p e ra t io n s ,  broaden t h e i r  
product l i n e  o r  d i v e r s i f y  in to  o th e r  a c t i v i t i e s  were appra ised  by 
NID. Management assumption then was t h a t  NID s k i l l  in ' p r o j e c t  
a n a l y s i s '  would be re l e v a n t  in guiding t h e i r  d ec i s io n ,  which would 
then be handed over to  OD. But the  OD management had con tes ted  th e  
delay caused and unnecessary in t r u s io n  caused by 'new f a c e s '  from 
NID who were completely u n fa m i l ia r  with the  s i t u a t i o n  in the  
companies, and o f ten  got no co -opera t ion  from the  managers.  The 
expansion d e c i s io n ,  they argued, was d i f f e r e n t  from asse ss ing  a 
new bus ines s .  That ro le  f i t t e d  optimally  with the  'Company Develop­
ment' s t r a t e g y ,  and th e  t a sk  fo rce  is  now required  to  engage in 
company a p p r a i s a l ,  n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  w r i t in g  expansion p roposa ls ,  and 
p re sen ta t io n  to  th e  Investment Committee. This has shortened the  
dec is ion  making process  because th e  co -o rd in a to r s  have c lo se  co n tac t  
with th e  companies a re  f a m i l i a r  with t h e i r  performance and markets ,  
hence d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  o r  expansion would not r e q u i re  in depth a n a ly s i s  
t h a t  NID would have t o  do.
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Chapter 9
The Processes  o f  S t r a t e g i c  Change: An I n t e r p r e t a t i o n
The preceding d e s c r i p t i v e  da ta  of  chap te rs  6 t o  8 has provided an 
in form at ive  gamut of change expe r iences .  I t  i s  th e  purpose of t h i s  
c h ap te r  t o  provide a summary a n a ly s i s  and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  the se  
d e s c r i p t i v e  accounts and cons ide r  t h e i r  im p l ica t ions  f o r  state-owned 
e n t e r p r i s e s .  I t  seeks t o  make sense of th e  n a tu re  of s t r a t e g i c  change 
d e c i s io n s  in LNDC, h ig h l i g h t  th e  important p a t t e r n s  t h a t  developed 
over th e  period from 1967 t o  1986 t h a t  form p a r t  of a ' b a s i s '  f o r  
th e  improved unders tanding of management of s t r a t e g i c  dec is ions  process 
in SOE; and a ssess  how th e  e x te n t  change re s e a rc h ,  in p a r t i c u l a r  the  
process  models reviewed in chap te r  two, would i l lu m in a te  t h e  observed 
change process  in LNDC. The chap te r  i s  d iv ided  in to  t h r e e  p a r t s ,  th e  . 
f i r s t  p a r t  addresses  d i s c e rn a b le  s t r a t e g i c  change p a t t e r n s  w i th in  the  
con tex t  o f  th e  process and p o l i t i c a l  t h e o r i e s .  Secondly,  a micro 
i n t e r a c t i o n  p e r s p e c t iv e ,  in which s t r a t e g i c  changes are  analysed from 
with in  th e  c o rp o ra t io n .  The focus i s  mainly on th e  a c to r s  and t h e i r  
s t r a t e g i c  behaviour.  The l a s t  p a r t  adds complexity t o  the  micro 
process  by br inging in to  t h e  scene th e  e x te rn a l  ' s i g n i f i c a n t  o t h e r s '  - 
macro i n t e r a c t i o n ,  i d e n t i f y  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  and t h e i r  r o l e  in s t r a t e g i c  
changes.
I t  needs t o  be emphasized t h a t  th e  r e a l i t y  o f  s t r a t e g i c  change dec is ions  
in LNDC, as indeed in o th e r  SOEs, i s  f a r  too  complex and i n t r i c a t e  to  
be t o t a l l y  captured by or  reduced t o  a model. I have at tempted to  
preserve  th e  r ichness  of  most s p e c i f i c  s t r a t e g i c  changes,  however,
I cannot pu rpor t  t o  have e x t e n s iv e ly  fathomed t h a t  complicated and 
o f ten  s h i f t i n g  problematic  s i t u a t i o n .  The d a ta ,  however, do provide 
a s u f f i c i e n t l y  rounded b a s i s  f o r  i n s i g h t f u l  unders tanding of  s t r a t e g i c  
changes as they took p lace  in LNDC.
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The Formative Process of  Corporate  S t ra tegy
Examination of how LNDC was e s t a b l i s h e d  and developed during i t s  
formative  y e a r s ,  bears  ou t  many of th e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  we would expect 
t o  f ind  in a newly e s t a b l i s h e d  and growing c o rp o ra t io n .  The d a ta  
revealed  th e  profound 'p io n ee r in g  in f lu en c e '  t h a t  th e  founding CEO 
had on th e  way in which th e  co rp o ra t io n  developed and how t h a t  r o l e  
s h i f t e d  over t im e .  He was p iv o ta l  v i s i o n a i r e  t h a t  provided th e  
d i r e c t i o n  and sense o f  purpose in almost a l l  s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s io n s ,  
and the  ' co re  of  th e  c o l l e c t i v i t y '  - Berg (1979),  around which th e  
board and government r a l l i e d  t h e i r  suppor t .  As i t  was in d ica ted  in 
chap te r  s i x ,  co rp o ra te  d i r e c t i o n  of LNDC dur ing t h i s  period was 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by a slow bu i ld -up  of exp lo ra to ry  s t r a t e g i e s  with  no 
c l e a r  focus ,  o p p o r tu n i s t i c  investments  in h a n d ic r a f t s  and h o te l s  
followed by pause and l e a r n in g ,  and gradual expansion based on 
demonstrable success o f  th e  e a r l i e r  investments .  This period e x h ib i t e d  
what could be descr ibed  as ' e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  s t r a t e g y '  in t h a t  i t  
f e a tu red  what Mintzberg and Waters (1982) c a l l e d  ' c o n t r o l l e d  boldness  
. . .  i n t u i t i o n  t h a t  d i r e c t s  th e  e n t rep ren eu r ,  i n t u i t i o n  based on wisdom - 
d e t a i l e d ,  ing ra ined ,  p e r so n a l iz ed  knowledge of  th e  w o r ld ' .  Because 
t h i s  s o c ia l  a c t o r  was involved in a l l  aspec ts  of  th e  s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s io n s  
in the  e a r l y  development of  th e  c o rp o ra t io n ,  he maintained a pu lse  on 
c r i t i c a l  in format ion ,  ' c o n t r o l l e d  th e  dec i s ion  premises and th e  c r e a t i o n  
of meaning w i th in  the  f i r m ,  and h i s  ideology provided th e  r a t i o n a l e  by 
which c e r t a i n  courses  of  a c t i o n  and not o th e r s ,  a re  pursued'  -  Gray 
and Ariss  (1985),  P f e f f e r  (1981).  Thus, a s trong sense of l o y a l t y  and 
commitment towards th e  p u r s u i t  of th e  c o r p o r a t io n ' s  mandate as i n t e r ­
pre ted  by th e  CEO, and th e  image of r a t i o n a l i t y  h i s  approach symbol ised,  
had developed among th e  government a c t o r s .  The government r o l e  in th e  
governance of th e  c o rp o ra t io n  was almost submerged in to  management t o  
a po in t  of  complete i n t e g r a t i o n ;  t h e r e  were no def ined  boundar ies ,  f o r
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example, th e  r o l e  of  board under Van Gen's l e ad e rsh ip .  Using a 
' s t r a t e g i c  apex c o n f i g u r a t io n '  model, Hafsi  e t  a l  (1987) r e f e r  t o  t h i s  
phase as c o - o p e r a t iv e ,  leading to  high l e v e l s  of t r u s t  between th e  
c o rp o ra te  a c to r s  in th e  i n f a n t  SOE and t h e i r  government c o u n t e r p a r t s .
But because t h e  i n f a n t  co rp o ra t io n  lacked ' t e c h n i c a l  c o r e ' ,  management's 
main t a s k  was t o  secure  e x te r n a l  re sources  t o  b u i ld  up t h a t  c o r e ,  while 
th e  government provides  f in a n c e .
There were va r ious  s a l i e n t  f a c t o r s  (some r a t h e r  f o r t u i t o u s )  from th e  
o p e ra t io n a l  con tex t  -  managerial  a c t i o n s ,  l e ad e rsh ip  changes,  p o l i t i c a l  
and economic environment of  th e  c o rp o ra t io n ,  which seemed t o  have f a c ­
i l i t a t e d  t h e  emergence of  e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  s t r a t e g y .  Perhaps more 
germane (though not e x c lu s iv e ly )  were:
-  t h e  in t im a te  knowledge of  th e  bus iness  and unders tanding of  t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  CEO had,
-  h i s  recognised  e x p e r t  le ad e rsh ip  and e a r l y  successes  of h i s  investments ,
-  a b i l i t y  t o  o b ta in  necessary  re so u rce s ,  ie  f inance  and t e c h n i c a l ,  
independent of t h e  government,
-  h i s  broad network of connections  t o  both key p o l i t i c a l  and bus iness  
d e c i s io n  makers in s id e  and o u t s id e  Lesotho was h i s  c r u c i a l  leverage  
f a c t o r  in m o b i l i s ing  suppor t  f o r  h i s  s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s io n s ,
-  t h e  newness o f  th e  o rg an iza t io n  and th e  enthusiasm t o  l earn  and t o  
be p a r t  of  i n s t i t u t i o n  bu i ld ing  by government, a f a c t o r  which seems 
t o  have m i t ig a te d  ( a t  t h i s  s tage  a t  l e a s t )  a g a in s t  any c o a l i t i o n  
ch a l leng ing  th e  d e c i s io n s  of  th e  CEO,
-  uniqueness  o f  th e  p roduc ts ,  lack o f  com pet i t ion ,  la rge  market,  
and favourab le  e x te r n a l  co n tex t .
There i s ,  however, no evidence in th e  da ta  t o  sugges t  t h a t  t h i s  s t r a t e g y  
was th e  r e s u l t  o f  p r o a c t iv e ,  f o r e s ig h te d  and r a t i o n a l i s t i c  approach,
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d e l i b e r a t e l y  aimed a t  p o s i t io n in g  the  co rpo ra t ion  in to  a p a r t i c u l a r  
market n iche .  What seems t o  s tand out from t h i s  a n a ly s i s  i s  t h a t ,  th e  
s t r a t e g y  t h a t  f i n a l l y  focused was more of a t e s t i n g - o u t  process  without 
any s p e c i f i c  schedu les ,  th e  exper imentation  with what was perceived 
f e a s i b l e  under the  c i rcum stances ,  th e  keenness of th e  CEO to  fumble 
through and learn  in th e  p ro cess ,  e s p e c i a l l y  th e  p o l i t i c a l  a c to r s  on 
board.  This could be desc r ibed  as ' a c t i o n  d r iv ing  t h i n k i n g ' ,  th e  
i n t u i t i v e  f e e l i n g  of th e  a c t o r ,  ' a c t i n g  on some b e l i e f  of  how th in g s  
should be '  -  Mangham (1987) and co n so l id a t in g  th e  emerging c o n s i s t e n t l y  
winning p a t t e r n s .  Thus a seemingly inconsequent ia l  ' o n e - o f f  d e c i s io n '  
t o  in v e s t  in a cas ino  ho te l  in the  e a r ly  1970s, t r i g g e r e d  a s e r i e s  of 
s t r a t e g i c  changes t h a t  led t o  a booming t o u r i s t  in d u s t ry ,  expansions 
in h o t e l s ,  and high demand f o r  h a n d ic r a f t  p roduc ts .  These changes were 
p o s t e r i o r i  r e s u l t s  of  a c tu a l  dec i s ion  behaviour and not a p r i o r i  planned 
and sys tem at ic  a n a l y s i s .
I t  i s  not suggested t h a t  a l l  was f lu x  and a c c id e n ta l ,  t h e r e  were s t r a t ­
eg ic  changes which i t  could well  be argued were the  r e s u l t  of management 
r a t i o n a l - a n a l y t i c  approach. For in s ta n ce ,  B e t c h t e l ' s  s h i f t  of investment 
s t r a t e g y  from h a n d ic r a f t s  t o  th e  j o i n t  ventu res  in h o t e l s ,  due t o  the  
world reces s io n  and f a l l i n g  p r i c e s  in h a n d ic r a f t s ;  th e  d i v e s t i t u r e  
s t r a t e g y  o f  d ispos ing  of  lo s s  making s u b s i d i a r i e s  in o rder  t o  improve 
th e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  of th e  c o rp o ra t io n ,  and th e  commissioned consultancy 
s tu d ie s  which preceded management dec i s ion  t o  r e s t r u c t u r e  the  corpora­
t i o n  and change i t s  investment s t r a t e g y .  There i s  no denying t h a t  
r a t i o n a l  planning does take  p la ce ,  indeed th e  lab y r in th  of  World Bank 
procedures t h a t  the  Investment Committee has t o  go through each t ime 
a p r o j e c t  i s  evalua ted  a t t e s t  to  t h i s ;  what i s  being chal lenged and 
lacks  support  from t h i s  s tudy i s  th e  seq u en t ia l  not ion of  ' f i r s t  
dec is ion  then a c t i o n ' ,  the  idea t h a t  s t r a t e g i e s  have to  be formulated 
and then implemented, not only winks a t  th e  p o l i t i c a l  impl ica t ions
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involved in th e  p rocess ,  but a l s o  assumes t h a t  th e  c l a r i t y  and com­
prehensive  a n a ly s i s  a re  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  s e t  s t r a t e g i c  process  in to  a c t i o n .  
In o th e r  words, th e  e x te n t  t o  which th e  i n t e n t l y  r a t i o n a l  processes  
a c t u a l l y  drove the  fo rmula t ion  of s t r a t e g y  and t h e  processes  of  s t r a t ­
eg ic  change i s  dubious:  Johnson (1987),  Normann (1985).  Brunssoi gives  
a p e r t i n e n t  obse rva t ion  t h a t :
“There i s  no automatic  l ink  between thought and a c t io n  in o r g a n iz a t io n s .  
I t  may be e a s i e r  t o  t r a c e  th e  l ink  between d e c i s io n s  on th e  one hand 
and ac t ion  on th e  o th e r ,  i f  th e  decis ion-maker and the  p a r t i c i p a n t  a re  
th e  same person.  I t  i s  very much more complicated and d i f f i c u l t  when 
seve ra l  decis ion-makers  and seve ra l  p a r t i c i p a n t s  a re  involved,  and 
when decis ion-makers  and p a r t i c i p a n t s  a re  not th e  same people" .  Brunsson 
(1985).
A c lo se  s c r u t in y  of  th e  da ta  r e v e a l s  t h a t  t h e  d ec i s io n s  taken in most 
cases  had no d i r e c t  bear ing on th e  s i t u a t i o n  they  were supposed to  
r e s o lv e .  Because of th e  prolonged process  of c onsu l t ing  with d i f fu se d  
decis ion-makers  who hold d i f f e r e n t  s e t s  o f  b e l i e f s ,  assumptions ,  exper­
ience ,  and have t h e i r  own ves ted  i n t e r e s t s  t o  p r o t e c t ,  t h e r e  was a good 
deal of  p o l i t i c a l  pos tu r ing  and im prov isa t ion .  Diagnosis of th e  s i t u a ­
t i o n  and development of v i a b le  a l t e r n a t i v e s  d id  not always precede the  
search f o r  s t r a t e g i c  a c t i o n .  The s o lu t io n  may a t  t imes be imposed by 
a c to r s  f a r t h e s t  from th e  locus  of change s i t u a t i o n .  Mazzolini (1979) 
a p t ly  summed up t h i s  viewpoint when he observed t h a t  a company's 
‘s t r a t e g i c  behaviour  i s  not th e  product of  a mere e x e r c i s e  in l o g i c ' .  
S t r a t e g i c  d ec i s io n  is  not decided upon a t  one p o in t  in t ime ,  r a t h e r ,  
i t  i s  a s e r i e s  of a c t io n s  decided upon and taken in success ive  s teps  
a t  d i f f e r e n t  p o in t s  by a c to r s  who, in th e  p rocess ,  a re  in t e r r u p t e d  and 
have o th e r  c o n s id e ra t io n s  to  worry about.  The f i n a l  dec is ion  tended 
t o  be a watered-down compromise t h a t  ensured t h a t  s takes  of the  
decis ion-makers  were enhanced o r  p r o t e c t e d .  The government 's  continued 
subsidy and r e lu c tan c e  to  d i v e s t  in s p i t e  of  f i n a n c i a l  lo s ses  by the  
companies, d e f i e s  many of th e  t e n e t s  o f  r a t i o n a l - a n a l y s t s ,  but makes
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a l o t  of sense from a p o l i t i c a l  p e r s p e c t iv e .  Aharoni (1982) has argued 
t h a t  t h e  ' p r i n c i p a l - a g e n t '  c o n ce p tu a l i z a t io n  of  SOE i s  flawed because 
t h e r e  i s  no one i d e n t i f i a b l e  p r i n c ip a l  who owns the  e n t e r p r i s e ;  r a t h e r  
th e  SOE should be viewed as a c o a l i t i o n  of managers,  t h e  board of  
d i r e c t o r s ,  government m i n i s t e r s ,  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s ,  and o th e r  e x te rn a l  
a f f e c t e d  a c t o r s .  We have a l so  seen t h a t  not only i s  t h e r e  no f a i r l y  
s t a b l e  group of d e c i s io n - a c to r s  who could agree on o b je c t iv e s  and 
s t r a t e g i e s  of change, but consensual d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  c o r p o r a t io n ' s  
mandate i s  problemat ic ;  th e  government has i t s  many varying d e f i n i t i o n s ,  
and e x te r n a l  s takeho lde rs  and management have t h e i r s .  This was r e f l e c t e d  
a l so  in some c o n f l i c t  between government behaviour  and LNDC o b je c t iv e s  
which c o n t r a d ic t ed  th e  very aims of the  e n t e r p r i s e ,  f o r  in s tan ce ,  
government d i r e c t  purchase  of  veh ic le s  from SA was i r r a t i o n a l  in the  
con tex t  of  l o c a l i s i n g  purchasing power in th e  country .  Reconcil ing 
th e se  d iv e r s e  views among t h i s  c o n s t e l l a t i o n  of  i n t e r e s t s  does not 
always produce r a t i o n a l  d e c i s io n s .  What may be perceived as r a t i o n a l  
from one a c t o r ' s  o r  c o a l i t i o n ' s  v iewpoin t,  may be i n t e r p r e t e d  as 
t o t a l l y  incompat ible by ano ther ,  as was th e  case  in th e  s t r a t e g y  to  
promote fo re ign  investment,  and depending on th e  power balance between 
the  a c t o r s ,  the  d ec i s io n s  of th e  more powerful c o a l i t i o n  la rg e ly  
c a r r i e d  th e  day.
Many o th e r  s t r a t e g i c  changes were th e  r e s u l t  o f  a predominant f e a t u r e  
of LNDC lead e rsh ip :  high tu rnove r  of  CEOs who brought in d i f f e r e n t  
pe r sp ec t iv e s  from t h e i r  p red ecesso rs .  We have seen t h a t  t h e r e  was 
no planned leade rsh ip  success ion ,  in s p i t e  of  th e  l e ade rsh ip  tu rbu lance  
which o f ten  followed whenever th e  incumbent CEO d e par ted .  This c l e a r l y  
c o n s i s t e n t  p o l icy ,  on th e  su r fa ce  could be expla ined  as due to  lack of 
indigenous managerial  s k i l l s ,  but on c lo se  examinat ion,  th e  le ade rsh ip  
c r i s i s  bears a l l  th e  markings of p o l i t i c a l  games and jockeying f o r
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power and in f luence  among p o l i t i c a l  s takeho lde rs  unable to  r e c o n c i l e  
t h e i r  c o n s t i t u e n t  i n t e r e s t s  on who should be o f f e re d  th e  execu t ive  
p o s i t i o n .  I t  would seem t o  be a d e l i b e r a t e  p o l i t i c a l  ploy by th e  
government t o  e x p l o i t  an 'ambiguous s i t u a t i o n ' .  By not committing 
i t s e l f  and giv ing an ink l ing  of i t s  i n t e n t io n s  t o  management and o th e r  
a c t o r s ,  i t  keeps th e  op t ions  open to  a f fo rd  f l e x i b i l i t y  of a c t i o n  when 
th e  need a r i s e s .  This i s  of course  a c o n jec tu re  der ived  from t h in  
and s e n s i t i v e  in format ion .
The po in t  I am p u t t in g  across  i s  simply t h a t  th e  thought process  of 
s t r a t e g i c  change is  o f ten  not c l e a r  and e x p l i c i t l y  s t a t e d  - Donaldson 
and Lorsch (1983);  th e  nerve c e n t r e  of s t r a t e g i c  change is  d i f f u s e d  
among d i s p a r a t e  a r ray  of dec i s io n  a c to r s  a t  d i f f e r e n t  t imes f o r  d i f f e r e n t  
i s su e s .  The planned sys tem at ic  approach s h o r t - c i r c u i t s  t h i s  d i v e r s i t y  
and ' b l u s t e r i n g  r e a l  l i f e  chaos '  of s t r a t e g i c  process  in LNDC. I t  
o f f e r s  snapshot  s i m p l i s t i c  exp lana t ions  which a re  ob l iv io u s  t o  th e  
m u l t i p l i c i t y  of motives which led government t o  e s t a b l i s h  LNDC, and 
the  de f a c to  w e l te r  of  goals  t h a t  a re  s e l f - s e r v i n g  o r  serve pa r ty  
i n t e r e s t ,  which government o f ten  d i c t a t e s  t o  th e  c o rp o ra t io n .  There 
i s  ample evidence which w i l l  be developed in th e  next chap te r  showing 
t h a t  power, p o l i t i c a l  manoeuvring and n e g o t i a t io n s  amongst th e  a c to r s  
o f f e r  a b e t t e r  unders tanding of  th e  process of  s t r a t e g i c  change.
Las t ly ,  we should not lose  s ig h t  of th e  micro and macro environments 
t h a t  preceded management s t r a t e g i c  a c t io n s  and /or  were def ined  by 
d e c i s io n - a c to r s  as i n s t i g a t i v e ,  f a c i l i t a t i v e ,  o r  c o n s t r a in in g  of change 
p rocesses .  Pe t t ig rew  (1985,1987) emphasizes th e  same po in t  t h a t  
' s t r a t e g i c  change processes  a re  b e s t  understood in c o n t e x t ' .  However, 
the  environmental co n tex ts  a re  not mere d e s c r i p t o r s  of  th e  background 
events  t h a t  moulded th e  process  nor cons t ra ined  i t .  Rather p rocesses  
may be both cons t ra ined  by s t r u c t u r e s  and shape s t r u c t u r e s  e i t h e r  in
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the  d i r e c t i o n  of p re se rv ing  them or in a l t e r i n g  them. We need t o  
cons ider  the  ac t ions  of th e  o s t e n s ib ly  d is tanced  but powerful a c to r s  
l ik e  th e  Rembrandt group and SA government who c rea ted  a conducive 
change atmosphere f o r  Van Gen, provided th e  p o l i t i c a l  and t e c h n i c a l  
support  he needed, and enhanced h i s  power v i s i b i l i t y  t o  the  government 
which even tu a l ly  (no doubt in reco g n i t io n  of  h i s  power) gave him f u l l  
powers on a wide range o f  i s su es  to  advise  them. The p o l i t i c a l  upheavals 
w i th in  and o u ts id e  th e  coun try ,  the  withdrawal of the  SA's wherewithal 
and changes t h a t  fo l lowed,  and th e  a r r i v a l  o f  e x te rn a l  f i n a n c i e r s  and 
th e  d i f f e r e n t  managerial  phi losophy t h a t  they  brought to  b e a r .  Perhaps 
we should r e s t a t e  in r e f l e c t i n g  on th e  dynamics of th e  background 
con tex t  t h a t  LNDC was e s t a b l i s h e d  in a country  without any SOE exper­
ience ,  and regarded as t h e  f i r s t  a t tempt t o  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e  s t a t e -  
owned e n t e r p r i s e .  P o l i t i c a l l y  Lesotho was ' a  new country '  f r e s h  from 
ob ta in ing  ' independence '  and had inexper ienced and u n sk i l l e d  adminis ­
t r a t i o n  t h a t  r e l i e d  h eav i ly  on fo re ig n  e x p e r t i s e  (and s t i l l  does t o  a 
l e s s e r  e x ten t )  f o r  d i r e c t i o n  of which LNDC's founder and CEO was th e  
p ro ta g o n is t  s c r i p t  w r i t e r  and a c t o r . Thus th e  top-down e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  
s t r a t e g y  has t o  be def ined  in t h i s  co n tex t ,  and th e  development of  the  
c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  s t r a t e g y  needs t o  be seen as c lo s e ly  r e l a t e d  t o ,  and 
p a r t i a l l y  expla ined by i t s  h i s t o r y  -  Johnson (1987).  There were no 
c l e a r l y  manifested  a cc ru a l s  of  b e l i e f s  and myths of s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s ,  
no c e n t r a l  frames of  r e f e r e n c e  t h a t  could be used t o  ques t ion  c h i e f  
e x e c u t iv e ' s  s t r a t e g i e s .  In s h o r t ,  i t  was a per iod  of high ex p ec ta t io n s  
and motivation t o  l earn  by th e  government, th e  two p r in c ip a l  in g re d ie n t s  
e s s e n t i a l  f o r  change t o  t ak e  p lace  -  Brunsson (1985).  I t  i s  not 
suggested t h a t  they were p ass ive  r e a c t o r s ,  p l i a n t  t o  the  in f lu en ce  
of CEO; learn ing  i s  a dynamic i n t e r a c t i v e  p rocess ,  but Suarez c o r r e c t l y  
po in ts  out t h a t  ' t h e  l ea rn ing  process  in th e  ind iv idua l  depends a l s o  
on h is  capac i ty  t o  unders tand ,  and on th e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  and q u a l i t y  
of in format ion '  -  Suarez (1984).  The power ( e x p e r t i s e )  to  in f lu en ce  
o the rs  to  accept  o n e ' s  d e f i n i t i o n  of th e  s i t u a t i o n  seems t o  be what
Van Gen had. Once we embed t h a t  r e a l i t y  in to  the  co n tex t ,  i d e n t i f y  
th e  s c r i p t s  the  var ious  key a c to r s  played and changes t h e r e o f ,  a l l  
of  which mediated in what was perceived and acted upon w i th in  the  
environment -  Pe t t ig rew  (1985),  p a t t e r n s  begin to  emerge t h a t  seem 
t o  account f o r  th e  gradual  emergence of  th e  government r o l e  from 
dormant a c t o r  in th e  e a r ly  1970s when LNDC's l eade rsh ip  was under 
fo re ig n  management, t o  an i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  behaviour ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  a t  
l e ad e rsh ip  level t o  con t ro l  appointment of CEOs. We a l so  gain b e t t e r  
unders tanding  of th e  management a c t io n s  and th e  impromptu s t r a t e g i c  
d e c i s io n s  undertaken a t  a behest  of government.  By th e  same token, 
t h e  broader  s t r a t e g i c  processes  t h a t  c r y s t a l l i z e  w i th in  t h i s  con tex t  
p o in t  a t  th e  inadequacy of the  r a t i o n a l i s t i c  mode of  s t r a t e g i c  change, 
and prompt us t o  search  f o r  exp lana t ions  from o th e r  paradigms t h a t  
t ranscend  a n a l y t i c a l  techn iques  and pe rceive  s t r a t e g i c  dec i s io n s  in 
terms of  p o l i t i c a l  p ro cesses .
The Change P a t t e r n s :  Incremental  and Revolutionary
The empir ica l  s t r a t e g i c  process  s tu d ie s  by Quinn (1980, 1982) have 
brought a new p e r sp ec t iv e  in to  th e  management of s t r a t e g i c  change 
through a notion of  ' l o g i c a l  incremental  ism' which p o s i t s  t h a t  s t r a t e g i c  
change processes  a re  fundamental ly  incremental  -  Donalson and Lorsch 
(1983),  and tend to  evolve as i n t e r n a l  d ec i s io n s  and e x te rn a l  events  
flow to g e th e r  to  c r e a t e  a new shared consensus f o r  a c t io n  among d e c i s io n ­
makers. Quinn p o in t s  out t h a t :
"Each subsystem involved a somewhat d i f f e r e n t  s e t  of p l a y e r s ,  inform­
a t io n  needs,  and t ime im pera t ives .  Each a t tacked  a s p e c i f i c  i s sue  
of corpora te -wide  importance ( l i k e  porduct p o s i t i o n in g ,  . . .  d i v e r s i f i ­
c a t i o n ,  a c q u i s i t i o n s ,  d i v e s t i t u r e s ,  government ex te rn a l  r e l a t i o n s , 
major r e o r g a n i z a t i o n s )* in a d i s c i p l i n e d  way.
* Emphasis has been suppl ied
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. . .  op t iona l  s t r a t e g i e s  w i th in  each subsystem tended t o  demand in c re ­
mental ism and opportunism in t h e i r  fo rm ula t ion .
Because each subsystem had i t s  own c o g n i t iv e  l im i t s  and process  l i m i t s ,  
i t s  s t r a t e g i e s  tended t o  be a r r iv e d  a t  l o g i c a l l y  and inc rem enta l ly .
In th e  hands of a s k i l l f u l  manager, such incremental  ism was not 
muddling (as I have su g g es ted ) .*  I t  was a purpose fu l ,  e f f e c t i v e ,  
p ro a c t iv e  management techn ique  f o r  improving and in t e g r a t i n g  both 
a n a l y t i c a l  and th e  behavioural  a spec ts  of  s t r a t e g y  fo rm ula t ion" .
1980: p . 17.
Incremental  ism allows management t o  l ea rn  from t h e i r  previous  and 
con t inu ing  ac t io n s  as informat ion  d r ip s  in and events  u n f u r l .  I t  i s  
supposed t o  reduce c o g n i t iv e  s t r a i n  by dea l ing  with d i g e s t i b l e  segments 
o f  r e a l i t y  and, i t s  g r a d u a l i s t  na tu re  obv ia te s  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  change and 
minimizes th e  f a i l u r e  r i s k  in la rg e  s ca le  changes - M i l le r  and Fr iesen  
(1982) .  I have quoted Quinn a t  length  in o rd e r  t o  draw a t t e n t i o n  to  
some of  th e  compelling change i s su e s  he r a i s e s ,  t h a t  have a decep t ive ly  
uncanny s i m i l a r i t y  (could say some reveal  a sharp c o n t r a s t )  with the  
f in d in g s  of  t h i s  s tudy .
Discernable  from th e  preceding a n a ly s i s  and throughout  th e  da ta  i s  
a mix of  p a t t e r n s  of exper imenta t ion  and gradual development of co rpor­
a te  s t r a t e g i c  changes,  o c c a s io n a l ly  i n t e r s p e r s e d  with b r i e f  and sudden 
s u r p r i s e s ,  th e  c o o l - o f f  pe r iod  when th e  shock i s  absorbed and s t a b i l i t y  
r e - e s t a b l i s h e d ,  then upheavals t h a t  unleashed a s e r i e s  of concurren t  
s t r a t e g i c  j o l t s .  There i s  a l so  a c l e a r  in d ic a t io n  of s t r a t e g i c  change 
accrua l  and bu i ld -up  from one ano ther  over th e  p e r iod .  In o th e r  words 
th e  s t r a t e g i e s  t h a t  were followed by d i f f e r e n t  CEOs were not t o t a l l y  
d ivorced o r  d i s j o i n t e d  from those  t h a t  preceded them. For in s ta n ce ,  
t h e  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  in to  h o t e l s  c a r r i e d  out  by Betchte l  around 1974-5, 
grew out of the  o p p o r tu n i s t i c  investment in th e  e a r ly  1970s in a
* Comment supplied
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cas in o -h o te l  which was t a r g e t e d  a t  th e  'gambling segment'  o f  the  
t o u r i s t  market.  The co n so l id a t io n  of the  p o r t f o l i o ,  was a change 
in troduced to  concen t ra te  the  co rpo ra te  s t r a t e g y  in to  s p e c i f i c  p r o f i t ­
ab le  and high p r i o r i t y  segments of the  market,  given th e  resources  
and s k i l l s  a v a i l a b l e .  Close ly  r e l a t e d  was a l so  th e  s t r a t e g i c  change 
to  d e s i s t  from holding and managing companies t o  promoting fo re ign  
investment in 1977 and th e  d i v e s t i t u r e  s t r a t e g y  which fo llowed. These 
s t r a t e g i e s  were p red ica ted  upon (as John Bow poin ted out -  see chap te r  
7) the  progress  and f a i l u r e s  of the  e a r l i e r  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  s t r a t e g i e s  
and the  lessons  management had drawn from such exper iences .  The growing 
p re s su re s  from government t o  l o c a l i z e  key p o s i t i o n s  throughout LNDC 
po in t  a t  the  incremental  n a tu re  of the  p rocess ,  cons t ra ined  by the  
impera tives  of t e ch n ica l  s k i l l s  and r e s o u rce s ,  r e l a p se  and temporary 
suspensions when c o n f l i c t i n g  views fron  lo c a l s  and exper t  t r a i n e r s  
i n t e n s i f i e d ,  and gradual r e s u s c i t a t i o n  of th e  process  when the  oppor tun i ty  
p re v a i l e d .  We have a l so  seen th e  ev o lu t iona ry  changes t h a t  took p lace  
in th e  LNDC a c t , as th e  co rp o ra t io n  developed, new and unprecedented 
events  emerged and new d e c i s io n - a c to r s  who questioned some underg irding 
assumptions of the  a c t ,  eg e x te rn a l  f i n a n c i e r s  l i k e  World Bank and 
German GDE.
Las t ly ,  incremental ism was more manifested in th e  s t r u c t u r i n g  and 
reo rg an iza t io n  of the  c o rp o ra t io n .  They were c a r r i e d  out incrementa l ly  
as the  co rpora t ion  grew, d i v e r s i f i e d ,  ob ta ined exper t  advice on how i t  
could bes t  f u l f i l l  i t s  o b j e c t i v e s ,  and changes in CEOs and ex te rna l  
exper t s  who in troduced s t r u c t u r e s  t h a t  were in accord with t h e i r  
managerial  philosophy, ie  c e n t r a l i z e d  s t r u c t u r e s  with t i g h t  c o n t ro l s  
through f i n a n c i a l  systems, o r  Bow's d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  t o  give  more 
con tro l  to  company managers as p a r t  of developing local  managerial 
s k i l l s .  Posed in t h i s  p e r s p e c t iv e ,  the se  p a t t e r n s  would seem to  
support  the  view th a t  an incremental  approach t o  s t r a t e g y  formula t ion
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i s  th e  way in which an o rg a n iz a t io n  l e a r n s .  Secondly,  s t r a t e g i c  changes 
tended t o  i n t e g r a t e  i n to ,  sometimes bu i ld  upon, o r  develop from o the r  
s t r a t e g i e s .  In a r a t h e r  u n re la ted  study of s t r a t e g i c  change in a UK 
men's r e t a i l  s t o r e  -  Johnson (1987) makes s im i l a r  observa t ions  t h a t  the  
impact o f  th e  s t r a t e g y  of one period  can be t r aced  through to  the  s t r a t e g y  
of  a n o th e r " .
Incremental  Change: How ' l o g i c a l '
I t  should be obvious by now t h a t  I have ( d e l i b e r a t e l y )  abs ta ined  from 
th e  ' l o g i c a l '  a sp ec t s  of incremental  ism; from the  connota t ions  of  a 
s k i l l f u l ,  t e l e s c o p i c  manager, with c l e a r  broad s t r a t e g i c  goals of the  
o r g a n iz a t io n ,  and who consc ious ly  and purpose fu l ly  guides s t r a t e g i c  
Changes by f a c t o r i n g  them in to  le s s  complex increments t h a t  are  more 
manageable f o r  implementa tion.  That p e r sp ec t iv e  is  problematic  and 
clouded with what Johnson c a l l s  'dubious c a u s a l i t y ' .  The idea of 
d e l i b e r a t e  and p ro a c t iv e  guidance of the  process  seems to  imply t h a t  
th e  s t r a t e g i c  change processes  could be expla ined by log ica l  incremen­
t a l  ism, t h a t  i t  i s  a ' causa l  f a c t o r '  in s t r a t e g i c  change amenable to  
manipula tion and co n t ro l  by the  management. The s t r a t e g i c  change 
process s tud ied  in LNDC and i t s  s u b s i d i a r i e s  lacked t h a t  ' i f - t h e n  
r e l a t i o n s h i p ' ,  but revea led  t h a t :
1. the  CEOs did  not regard  log ica l  incremental  ism as t h e i r  t h e o ry - in -  
use ,  they did not regard  i t  as t h e i r  managerial  technique to  bring 
about s t r a t e g i c  changes ,  nor was t h e re  evidence of one, eg the  
emergence of d i v i s i o n a l  d i r e c t o r s  as key dec is ion  a c to r s  dominating 
th e  CEO - Senna, could hard ly  be expla ined as a p ro a c t iv e ,  log ica l  
manageria l  s t r a t e g y ,  nor could the  gradual changes in d e f i n i t i o n  
of  performance c r i t e r i a  from accepted losses /b reak-even  to  p r o f i t  
and div idend payout.  I t  w i l l  be argued t h a t  pe rsuas ion ,  p o l i t i c a l  
p re s su re  and format ion of temporary caba ls  formed around i s sues
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were some of the  n e g o t i a t i v e  t a c t i c s  used by management and o th e r  
in t e r e s t e d  p a r t i e s  to  br ing  changes.  That process  may be b r i e f ,  
l i k e  announcement of new CEO, o r  i t  may be p r o t r a c t e d  and involve 
incremental  s tages  of persuas ion  and a rm - tw is t ing .
2.  S t r a t e g i c  dec is ions  were not always under th e  con t ro l  of  CEO, nor 
was the  board and management perceived as f i n a l  a r b i t o r s  of s t r a t e g i c  
changes. There are  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  of dec i s ion  h i e r a r c h i e s  with 
unequal powers, d i f f e r e n t  s k i l l s  and t ime p e r s p e c t iv e s .  Thus, while 
s t r a t e g i c  changes were i n i t i a t e d  by management most of  th e  t im e,  they 
could a l so  o r i g i n a t e  from th e  government -  Mazzolini (1981),  or  worse 
s t i l l ,  be imposed or  s t r a t e g y  be nipped o f f  in i t s  f i n a l  s tage  of 
implementation,  eg d isposa l  of Limefford.  Some s t r a t e g i c  changes 
have come from ex te rna l  s tak eh o ld e r s ,  o r  they may r e s u l t  from negot­
i a t i o n s  amongst a l l  the  in t e r e s t e d  p a r t i e s ,  in which case  th e  f i n a l  
s t r a t e g y  may depend upon a whole range of  i s s u e s ,  inc luding  the  
s takes  involved, the  p a r t i e s  a f f e c t e d ,  power d i f f e r e n t i a l s ,  and the  
t h r e a t  they pose t o  some a c t o r s .  Under th e se  c ircumstances ,  the  
process  of  s t r a t e g i c  dec is ion  and the  guidance of t h a t  process  
r e s id es  in d i f f e r e n t  ind iv id u a ls  a t  d i f f e r e n t  t imes ,  and th e  ro le
of  CEO may be reduced to  a 'compliance* o r  depending on h i s  inf luence  
and p o l i t i c a l  connec t ions ,  he can e x e r t  p re s su re  t o  exped i te  the  
p rocess ,  but the  s t r a t e g y  t h a t  emerged was o f ten  an ' e c l e c t i c  mix' 
of exchanges amongst th e se  a c t o r s ,  d i s t i n c t  from what each had 
in tended.
3. Because the  dec is ions  in some cases  a re  made o u ts id e  the  realm of 
management and without t h e i r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  i t  becomes impera tive 
fo r  CEO to  reveal  and communicate a l l  r e l e v a n t  informat ion about 
the  proposed changes in order  to  ensure  adequate  r e p r e s e n ta t i o n ,
eg m i n i s t r i e s  n e g o t ia t in g  on beha l f  of th e  co rpo ra t ion  on f i n a n c i a l  
mat te rs  l ik e  annual budgets and in t e r n a t i o n a l  borrowings.  By the
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same token,  passing  t h a t  power ( informat ion)  to  the  m in is t ry  has 
of ten  been de t r im en ta l  to  management as i t  f a c i l i t a t e s  t i g h t e r  
c o n t ro l s  and in v i t e s  government in te rv e n t io n .
4.  L as t ly ,  log ica l  incremental  ism presumes s t a b i l i t y  and c o n t in u i ty  in 
l e ad e rsh ip ,  the  in g red ien ts  which, as f i g u r e  9 .1 (a )  shows, have 
been p ro g res s iv e ly  r a r e  in LNDC. Thus th e  e f f e c t i v e  execu t ives  l ik e  
Van Gen, Betchte l  and John Bow, not only were they able  to  manage 
the  ' c o r e ' *  s t r a t e g i c  processes  with in  the  co rp o ra t io n ,  but they 
recognized the  importance of th e  'boundary'  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  and t h e i r  
i n t e r a c t i o n  with the  core  p rocesses .  I t  is  through the  management 
of th e se  i n t e r a c t i o n  processes  and cont inua l  r e d e f i n i t i o n  and 
r e - e v a lu a t io n  of t h a t  process  as changes,  perceived to  be congruent 
with the  views and i n t e r e s t s  of s tak eh o ld e rs ,  were enacted o r  r e s ­
ponded t o ,  t h a t  the  notion  of incremental ism has been invoked.
I have a lready hin ted  t h a t  the  continuous a d d i t iv e  process  of s t r a t e g i c  
changes was o ccas iona l ly  punctuated by abrupt d i s c o n t i n u i t i e s  most of 
which were beyond management c o n t r o l .  M i l le r  and Fr iesen  (1980) have 
noted t h a t  the  depar tu re  of  a former ch ie f  execut ive  may p r e c i p i t a t e  
dramatic changes in management i f  t h e r e  i s  no successor  groomed to  
take  over and continue the  o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s  dominant ideology,  or i f  
t h e r e  is  dear th  of successors  which might prompt head-hunt of key 
executives  from o th e r  o r g a n iz a t i o n s .  Berg (1979) c a l l s  such an 
execut ive  a ' c e n t r a l  person '  who serves  as a symbol, a source of emotions 
around which the  soc ia l  organism can form. A change in such a person , 
he con t inues ,  can o f ten  lead to  profound changes in the  way the  organ­
i z a t io n  o p e ra te s .  The scen a r io  descr ibed  by the se  au thors  c lo se ly  
mir rors  the  r a d ic a l  changes t h a t  e rupted in LNDC and the  subsequent
* 'Core ' and 'boundary'  r e f e r  t o  the  micro and macro i n t e r a c t io n  
re sp ec t iv e ly  of the  co rp o ra t io n  with i t s  environment.
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leadersh ip  chaos t h a t  r eve rbera ted  throughout LNDC companies, beginning 
in 1973 following the  d epa r tu re  of Van Gen.
The r e l a t i v e  c o n t in u i ty  and p r o f i t a b i l i t y  t h a t  th e  co rpo ra t ion  had 
p ro g res s iv e ly  enjoyed suddenly came t o  an end. I t  took years  to  f ind  
a competent replacement of Van Gen, some would even argue t h a t  e f f e c t i v e  
replacement was only achieved in 1977 when th e  p o s i t io n  was lo c a l i s e d ,  
during which t ime the  co rpo ra t ion  had e i t h e r  been without CEO, under 
j o i n t  le ad e rsh ip ,  o r  accountants  and general  managers were appointed 
to  ac t  as ' c a r e t a k e r s * .  For a young developing co rpo ra t ion  t h a t  was 
s t i l l  groping fo r  l eg i t im acy ,  i d e n t i t y ,  and a ttempting  t o  e s t a b l i s h  
i t s  presence f i rmly  in the  market,  t o  be without a s t ro n g ,  p e r s i s t e n t  
and cont inuing  leade rsh ip  was a ' s t r a t e g i c  d i s a s t e r '  which was r e f l e c t e d  
in dec l in e  in performance and a spate  of  r e s ig n a t i o n s  by company managers. 
The dual leadersh ip  of Betchte l  in 1974-75, a f t e r  period of u n c e r t a in ty  
and anxie ty  about f u tu r e  of  the  c o rp o ra t io n ,  brought a new wave of 
s t r a t e g i c  changes: h o t e l s ,  a c q u i s i t i o n s  of motor veh ic le  d e a l e r s ,  and 
brought s t a b i l i t y  ( a l b e i t  unc lea r  because LNDC continued t o  cry f o r  
leade rsh ip  i d e n t i t y )  to  management. But as our da ta  show, from 1975 
t o  1977, t h a t  temporary leade rsh ip  re p r ie v e  was immediately followed 
by a s e r i e s  of d iscont inuous  changes in CEOs and package of changes 
i n i t i a t e d  by each of th e  new ex ecu t iv e s .  For example, Roger Gurr 
conso l ida ted  th e  co rpo ra te  p o r t f o l i o  with th e  aim of i d e n t i fy in g  pro­
f i t a b l e  p o r t f o l i o ( s )  and focus the  c o rpo ra te  s t r a t e g y  in t h a t  d i r e c t i o n ,  
but no sooner had he s t a r t e d  to  implement i t ,  than he had to  leave .  
Roostal ,  who succeeded him, while bu i ld ing  on t h a t  s t r a t e g y ,  had h is  
own agenda, which was to  s t a r t  the  l o c a l i s a t i o n  of  key p o s i t i o n s ,  
r e s u l t i n g  in the  appointment of a local  ex ecu t iv e ,  Bow. As we no ted,  
h is  appointment was followed immediately by r a d i c a l  changes t h a t  
challenged the  whole s e t  of b e l i e f s  and assumptions about what LNDC 
stood f o r .  That was followed by a f i v e  year  per iod  of  c o n t in u i ty  as
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' inves tment  promotion'  was ingra ined as the  new philosophy of management, 
r e l i e v i n g  i t  from the  f i n a n c i a l  s t r a i n s  t h a t  had engulfed LNDC f o r  near ly  
f i v e  y e a r s .  Other changes were g radua l ly  g r a f t e d  on to  f a c i l i t a t e  the  
i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n  of the  new s t r a t e g y ,  f o r  ins tance  th e  managerial  e x p e r t ­
i s e  of the  I r i s h  team. These s t r a t e g i c  changes a re  summarized in f ig u r e  
9 .1 (a )  which a l so  in d ic a te s  th e  high v a r i a b i l i t y  in the  CEO p o s i t i o n .
The depar tu re  of Bow in 1982 was followed by leade rsh ip  chaos and 
i n s t a b i l i t y  reminiscent  of the  1974 le ade rsh ip  c r i s i s .  While th e  i n t e r ­
m i t t e n t  leade rsh ip  changes t h a t  were made in 1983, 1985, 1986, have made 
changes t o  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  ' f o r e ig n  investment '  
s t r a t e g y ,  th e  bas ic  p r i n c i p l e s  of the  s t r a t e g y  have endured and remained 
LNDC's investment p o l i c y .  As I have a l ready  poin ted ou t ,  we co n s ta n t ly  
have t o  c a s t  th e se  s t r a t e g i c  changes in to  th e  proper micro and macro 
con tex ts  t h a t  p reva i led  a t  the  t ime and were perceived to  have lu b r i ca te d  
o r  impeded th e  change p ro cesses .  Ford and Baucus (1987) remind us t h a t  
' con tex tua l  f a c t o r s  serve as p a r t  of th e  exper ience  and r e a l i t y  through 
which decis ion-makers '  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  a re  informed and shaped ' .  Such 
f a c t o r s  as th e  favourab le  r e l a t i o n s  between Lesotho and South Afr ica  
enabling the  l a t t e r ,  through SA i n d u s t r i a l i s t s ,  t o  support  LNDC's 
e f f o r t s ,  and th e  e f f e c t  of th e  occas ional  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  of t h a t  working 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  as i t  happened in th e  e a r ly  1970s and in 1986. The 
emergence of a s trong compet it ion  from the  'homeland 's '  economic 
t r en d s  in SA and changes t h e r e o f  which tend t o  have immediate impact in 
Lesotho, eg i n f l a t i o n ,  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  p r i c e s  and th e  changing consumer 
t a s t e s  ( the  motor veh ic le  d e a le r s  and Lesotho Brewing Company are  a 
po in t  in c a s e ) ,  th e  reces s ion  in th e  1970s, low s k i l l e d  labor  market 
in the  country  and uncompet it ive  s a l a r i e s .  The p o l i t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  
and i n s t a b i l i t y  in Lesotho beginning in 1970, c ab in e t  r e s h u f f l e s  which 
ushered in new members of th e  board and a t  o th e r  t imes  preceded s t r a t e g i c
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changes and /or  f a c i l i t a t e d  th e  implementation process of th e  s t r a t e g y .
We a lso  need to  cons ide r  th e  in f luence  of th e  i n t e r n a t io n a l  o rg a n iz a t io n s  
l i k e  the  WB, IDA, D6E, t h a t  have played such a key ro l e  not only in 
i n s t i g a t i n g  changes,  but a l so  in supporting  management to  b r ing  about 
changes t h a t  would otherwise  have f a i l e d .
I t  i s  not suggested t h a t  t h e se  f a c t o r s  'd e te rm ined1 the  s t r a t e g i c  changes 
t h a t  were pursued throughout t h i s  period even though some had a c l e a r l y  
dramatic  e f f e c t ,  l i k e  SA c lo su r e  of th e  border which wiped o f f  Loti 
B r i c k ' s  major customers in SA, and th e  f r a n c h i s e  motor d e a le r s  could 
not ge t  t h e i r  s u p p l i e s .  Such eco log ica l  determinism would undermine 
th e  complex r e a l i t y  of change in a SOE and amounts to  imposing c l e a r  
d e f i n i t i o n  on a r a t h e r  ambiguous s i t u a t i o n .  But we c o n s ta n t ly  need t o  
pose and r e f l e c t  on the  s i t u a t i o n  in i t s  e n t i r e t y  as i t  manifes ted 
i t s e l f  t o  th e  a c to r s  conf ron t ing  i t ,  and how they in t e r p r e t e d  i t  and 
enacted s t r a t e g i c  a c t i o n s .  Behind th e se  s t r a t e g i c  changes were not 
j u s t  economic, p o l i t i c a l  or  bus iness  ev en ts ,  Pe t t ig rew  (1985) cogen t ly  
observes t h a t  t h e re  were a l so  "processes  of managerial  p e rc ep t io n ,  
choice ,  and ac t ion  in f luenced  by and in f luenc ing  pe rcep t ions  of th e  
opera t ing  environment of th e  f i rm ,  and i t s  s t r u c t u r e ,  c u l t u r e  and systems 
of power and c o n t r o l " .
The o v e ra l l  s t r a t e g i c  change p a t t e r n  t h a t  begins  to  emerge, as dep ic ted  
in f ig u r e  9 .1 ( b ) ,  in d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e r e  were t h r e e  main p a t t e r n s  of 
change: th e  i r r e g u l a r  e v o lu t io n a r y , prolonged d i s c o n t i n u i t y , and 
parad igmat ic . The i r r e g u l a r  e vo lu t iona ry  process  of change cap tu res  
w e l l ’the  period from 1967 to  1973, confi rming t h a t  ' s t r a t e g i e s  do not 
commonly change in cont inuous  incremental  f a sh io n ;  r a t h e r  change - 
even incremental  change -  t ak es  p lace  in s p u r t s ,  each followed by a
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period of  c o n t i n u i t y '  - Mintzberg (1978).  This was a period  of 
cont inuous  and s t ab l e  l eade rsh ip  able  to  champion and s t a b i l i z e  the  
emerging changes.  This period  was followed by event-dominated changes,  
of  prolonged and cumulative d i s c o n t i n u i t y ;  s t r a t e g i c  changes s t a r t e d  
and suddenly abandoned, some were h a l f  implemented and never seen 
through as management -  a t  headquar te r  and company l e v e l s ,  was th e  most 
v a r i a b l e  f a c t o r ,  I r e f e r  t o  t h i s  p a t t e r n  as the  ' s t r a t e g i c  f l u x ' because 
of  the  many changes and t h e i r  momentous n a tu re ,  one t r i g g e r i n g  ano ther ,  
some could be desc r ibed ,  perhaps,  as symptoms of o th e r s ,  and th e  gradual 
a c c e l e r a t i o n  to  a peak when the  o rgan iza t io n  reached a s t a t e  of incon­
gruence with th e  market t h a t  was perceived as a c r i s i s .  The events  of 
1973 t o  1977 when LNDC had h ighes t  managerial  tu rnover  - fou r  CEOs 
w ith in  four  y ea r s ,  f i n a n c i a l  d e t e r i o r a t i o n ,  and cons tan t  government 
i n t e rv e n t io n  with a heavy i n j e c t io n  of sub s id ie s  t o  save i t ,  f a l l  in to  
t h i s  ca tegory .  The s t r a t e g y  t h a t  John Bow followed in 1977 c a p i t a l i z e d  
on the  ' change-ready '  c l im a te  of u n c e r t a in ty  and confus ion , and broke 
away from th e  problematic  co rpo ra te  s t r a t e g i c  t r a d i t i o n ,  chal lenged 
i t s  c r e d i b i l i t y  and took a d iv e r s io n  t h a t  sought a new r o l e  and r e d e f ­
i n i t i o n  o f  the  co rpora te  mandate. I r e f e r  to  t h i s  s t r a t e g y  as pa ra ­
digmatic  - Imershein (1979) ,  Sheldon (1980), Berg (1985). Leadership 
c o n t in u i ty  and s t a b i l i t y ,  and s t ea d in e ss  in purpose,  d i s t in g u i s h ed  
t h i s  p a t t e r n ;  the  CEO was c l e a r l y  ins trumenta l  in the  change process 
t o  i n t e r n a l i z e  and make the  new paradigm s t i c k .  Johnson (1985) po in ts  
a t  the  need f o r  'compatible  and f a c i l i t a t i n g  power c o n f i g u r a t i o n ' ,  
while  Pe t t ig rew  (1985) makes s im i l a r  observa t ion  about changes a t  two 
of IC I ' s  d iv i s io n s  and observes the  importance of le ad e rsh ip ;  "how 
s t rong  change leaders  can make changes happen, but with t h e i r  success ion ,  
how those  change processes  and outcomes do not n e c e s s a r i l y  s t i c k " .
But a f t e r  f i v e  y ea r s ,  the  second longest  serv ing  CEO, t h a t  c o n t in u i ty  
was in te r ru p te d  by a s e r i e s  of i n t e r m i t t e n t  leade rsh ip  changes t h a t  
followed in 1983, 1985 and 1986. Some m odif ica t ions  have been made
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t o  the  d e f i n i t i o n  of fo re ig n  investment s t r a t e g y ,  but the  fundamental 
p r in c ip l e s  of the  s t r a t e g y  have endured and remained the  b lu e p r in t  of 
LNDC investment p o l i c y .  P a t t e r n s  o f  le ade rsh ip  c o n t in u i ty  and s t a b i l i t y  
were observable  from such high performance s u b s i d i a r i e s  as the  Brewery, 
th e  Cannery and Maseru Motors. These s u b s i d i a r i e s  enjoyed f a r  g r e a t e r  
degree of  autonomy on s t r a t e g i c  dec i s io n s  than th e  poor performers ,  an 
in d ic a t io n  t h a t  competent management, p r o f i t a b i l i t y  and l e ss  dependence 
on headquar te rs  were c r i t i c a l  f a c i l i t a t i n g  f a c t o r s  to  ensure  minimum 
in te rv e n t io n  on s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s io n s  by headquar te r s .
Fur ther  observa t ions  t h a t  s tand  out from th e se  p a t t e r n s  i n d ic a te  t h a t  
s t r a t e g i c  changes t h a t  were implemented and endured were those  a ssoc­
ia te d  with a per iod  of  r e l a t i v e l y  c o n s i s t e n t  and cont inuous tenure  of 
CEO. The longer th e  ten u re  of  th e  CEO, th e  more foca l  ro l e  he played 
in managing s t r a t e g i c  change p rocess ;  th e  s h o r t e r  th e  t e n u re ,  more and 
more s t r a t e g i c  dec i s ions  were taken and managed a t  th e  executive  d i v i ­
s iona l  l e v e l .  The e ra s  of Van Gen in 1967 to  1973, and John Bow from 
1977 to  1982, were q u i t e  d i s t i n c t i v e .  These were a l so  the  periods  
c h a rac te r i z ed  by c l o s e r  c o -o p e ra t io n ,  communication, and i n f l u e n t i a l  
CEOs with unlimited  access t o  th e  hub of  p o l i t i c a l  power. Secondly, 
the  change i n i t i a t i v e s  in most cases  were o r ig i n a t e d  from th e  in s ide  
and ou ts id e  dec i s ion  makers, with s p e c i f i c  changes c o n s i s t e n t l y  
dominated by some a c to r s  -  l i k e  change of CEOs. I t  i s  a l so  ev iden t  
t h a t  s ince  1977 when th e  p o s i t i o n  of CEO was lo c a l i s e d ,  government 
in te rv e n t io n  in th e  s t r a t e g i c  dec i s io n s  o f  LNDC has been more v i s i b l e  
than when th e  co rpo ra t ion  was managed by fo re ig n  e x p e r t s .  L as t ly ,  
t h e  t h r e e  s t r a t e g i c  change p a t t e r n s  would seem to  be p rog res s ive ly  
phased in an inde termina te  f a s h io n ,  and s t r a t e g i c  changes t h a t  
followed period  of  c o n t in u i ty  tended to  fue l  o th e r  changes in to  a 
s p i r a l  t h a t  graduated in to  a paradigm s h i f t ,  c o n t in u i ty  and another 
round of s t r a t e g i c  f l u x .
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These p a t t e r n s  are  in format ive  p o in te r s  of  a change process ,  and seem 
to  gen e ra l ly  endorse th e  f in d in g s  of process  t h e o r i e s ;  however, we 
s t i l l  need to  probe f u r t h e r  to  f in d  out why and how c e r t a i n  s t r a t e g i c  
change dec i s io n s  have p e r s i s t e d  while o th e r s  have d e s i s t e d ,  and why 
and how the  a c to r s  have acted  as they d id .
Creating  S t r a t e g i c  Change: Micro In t e r a c t io n  Process 
The Actors and t h e i r  S t r a t e g i c  Actions
"The behaviour of GCEs i s  the  product of var ious  games which t a k e  p lace  
among var ious  in d iv id u a ls  w i th in  th e  companies, government and o f ten  
a l so  in o th e r  o u ts id e  p o s i t i o n s  of in f lu en c e .  Each game i s  played by 
d i f f e r e n t  in d iv id u a l s  and each ind iv idua l  plays  one o r  more d i f f e r e n t  
games with d i f f e r e n t  p a r t n e r s .  Each p layer  has power to  move c e r t a i n  - 
bu t r a r e l y  a l l  - elements o r  p ieces  of th e  game in which he i s  involved. 
Games a re  simultaneous and over lapp ing .  But they are  not played a t  
random and take  p lace  along s p e c i f i c  channels  and r u l e s . "  Mazzolini 
(1979) p . 252.
We look a t  th e  s t r a t e g i c  change games of th e  co rpo ra t ion  from w i th in ,  
i e  the  micro i n t e r a c t i o n  p rocess ,  and what happens and how i t  happens 
when s t r a t e g i c  changes a re  made. We look a t  the  a c t o r s ,  in p a r t i c u l a r  
the  r o l e  of th e  CEO, and t h e i r  ac t ions  in th e  c r e a t io n  of  changes.  I t  
was e a r l i e r  pointed out t h a t  s t r a t e g i c  changes were in the  main i n i t i a t e d ,  
promoted and managed by top management; they a re  the  ones who g e n e r a l ly  
provide  th e  broader long-term micro economic p e r sp ec t iv e  of th e  corpora ­
t i o n .  Even those  s t r a t e g i c  dec i s ions  t h a t  were t h r u s t  upon i t  by ex te rna l  
a c t o r s ,  s t i l l  had to  go through management processes  t o  be knocked in to  
op e ra t io n a l  shape.  There a re  no s p e c i f i c  and binding r u l e s  r e g u la t i n g  
the  process  of s t r a t e g i c  change management a p a r t  from th e  broad gu ide­
l in e s  of the  LNDC a c t ,  which req u i re  the  co rpo ra t ion  t o  submit i t s  
annual plans  and proposed changes to  the  p a ren t  m in i s t r y .  However, in 
p r a c t i c e  the  'buck '  s tops  a t  th e  board level  where th e  superv is ing  
m in i s t e r  i s  th e  chairman. This does not n e c e s s a r i l y  imply t h a t  th e  
board of  LNDC has th e  f i n a l  say on s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s io n s ,  t h e r e  a r e  o th e r
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s i g n i f i c a n t  ac to r s  o u t s id e  management purview, l i k e  government and 
e x te r n a l  f i n a n c i e r s  who o c ca s io n a l ly  decide th e  course  of ac t ion  t h a t  
management should fo l low .  Thus, t h e r e  i s  a degree of t a c i t  semi-autonomy 
in the  way s t r a t e g i c  changes a re  formulated and implemented. This was 
ev iden t  in the  s t r u c t u r a l  designing  and c o n s o l i d a t io n ,  in 1974-76, and 
th e  re o rg a n iz a t io n  c a r r i e d  out in 1983, when management o rc h e s t r a t e d  
the  process  seemingly in su la t ed  from th e  e x te rn a l  a c to r s  in t e r f e r e n c e .
Two types  of s t r a t e g y  subprocesses  were d i s ce rn a b le :
1. S t r a t e g i c  changes which a re  perceived by s takeho lders  as th r e a t e n i n g ,  
i n c o n s i s t e n t  with t h e i r  ideo log ie s  and a re  prone to  in te rv e n t io n  by 
th e s e  a c to r s  and have to  be e x p l i c i t l y  n e g o t i a t e d .  The change process 
tended to  be comprehensive, had broadly  based c o n s u l t a t i o n s ,  and 
o f t e n  longer as the  c o l l e c t i v i t y  of a c to r s  pondered over the  
p o t e n t i a l  outcomes of change.
2. S t r a t e g i c  changes which a re  mainly conf ined to  the  ope ra t iona l  
d e t a i l s  such as r e o r g a n iz a t io n ,  managerial  development e t c .  These 
have tended to  a t t r a c t  l e a s t  in t e rv e n t io n  from ex te rna l  a c to r s ,  
sugges ting t h a t  a l l  s t r a t e g i c  changes a re  not a l i k e .
Caution i s  c a l l e d  f o r  in i n t e r p r e t i n g  t h i s  o b se rva t ion ,  in p r a c t i c e  
th e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  much more f l u i d  than dep ic ted  and very d i f f i c u l t  to  
d i s e n t a n g le ,  i t  has no c l e a r  boundaries of where one begins and ends.
But f o r  a n a ly t i c a l  purposes,  we a re  ab le  t o  le arn  more about the  
s t r a t e g i c  behaviour of  key a c to r s  and how they i n t e r p r e t  t h e i r  r e a l i t y  
under such c i rcumstances .
Although the  s t r a t e g i c  change process  i s  shared by severa l  top and 
middle management execu t ives  -  El-Namaki (1977),  th e  r ea l  in f luence  
has been dominated by d i v i s i o n a l  d i r e c t o r s  who are  in c lose  touch with 
the  company managers and p r o j e c t  o f f i c e r s  and have g r e a t e r  access and
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con t ro l  of th e  in format ion about the  environment of t h e i r  u n i t s  t h a t  
i s  c r u c i a l  in fo rm ula t ing  the  changes .  This domination,  o cca s io n a l ly  
broken by a r r i v a l  o f  s t rong  l e ad e rsh ip ,  has o s c i l l a t e d  between the  
t h r e e  powerful headquar te r  d iv i s io n s  of  Finance,  Operat ions d iv i s io n  
and New I n d u s t r i e s  d i v i s i o n  as they were able  t o  make e f f e c t i v e  claims 
to  so lve p roblemat ic  i s su e s  of the  co rpo ra t ion  -  F l i g s t e i n  (1987), i , e .  
th e  Finance d i v i s i o n  became important a c to r  during th e  f i n a n c i a l  c r i s i s  
o f  1973-77, c o n t r o l l i n g  f i n a n c i a l  c o n s t r a i n t s ,  and headquar te rs  s t a f f  
were mainly drawn from those  with accounting o r i e n t a t i o n .  I have a lso  
in d ica ted  th e  p r o t e c t i v e  response o f  t h i s  d iv i s io n  when t h a t  e x p e r t i s e  
and co n t ro l  o f  u n c e r t a in t y  s h i f t e d  t o  NID which brought a completely 
d i f f e r e n t  s t r a t e g i c  agenda. As th e  companies become more p r o f i t a b l e  
and g enera te  handsome div idend payouts,  the  Operations Divis ion has 
suddenly emerged a new hero provid ing the  much needed income f o r  
r e c u r r e n t  ex p end i tu re  and investment.  There i s  t h e r e f o r e  t h i s  q u i e t  
but s u b t l e  power j o s t l i n g  amongst t h e se  a c to r s  f o r  a p lace  in th e  
' c e n t r e  s t a g e ' ,  f o r  a t t e n t i o n  and c on t ro l  of CEO'S s t r a t e g i c  change 
p r i o r i t i e s .  Each one of  them, e s p e c i a l l y  NID and OD, de f ines  i t s  
goals  as c r i t i c a l  t o  th e  a t ta inm ent  of LNDC mandate.
Within th e  c o r p o r a t io n ,  change i n i t i a t i v e s  could develop from th e  p ro­
j e c t  o f f i c e r s  -  PO, r e f l e c t i n g  th e  d i s co n ten t  of  th e  in v es to r s  about 
p a r t i c u l a r  p iece  of l e g i s l a t i o n ,  th e  uncompet it ive  incen t iv e  package,  
or  lending r a t e s .  Depending on how th e  PO and s en io r  p r o j e c t  manager 
perceive  th e  i s su e s  t o  be c r i t i c a l  t o  t h e i r  investment promotion 
e f f o r t s ,  they  w i l l  be processed f o r  c o n s id e ra t io n  a t  th e  d iv i s io n a l  
execu t ive ,  then  to  t h e  Executive  Committee where management w i l l  
decide on th e  course  o f  a c t i o n ,  and u l t im a te ly  th e  board i f  the  CEO 
needs t h a t  approva l .  S t r a t e g i c  changes have a l so  come from th e  company 
managers through t h e i r  boards ,  from th e  execu t ives  t h a t  superv ise  th e  
companies as they  monitor t h e i r  performance and r e l a t e  i t  t o  t h e i r
264
com pet i to rs .  The changes have a lso  r e s u l t e d  from th e  f r equen t  changes 
in CEOs and IDA team of ex p e r t s  who brought in f r e s h e r  i n t e r n a t io n a l  
and commercially o r ien ted  p e r sp ec t iv e  t h a t  broadened th e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
of  th e  s i t u a t i o n .  But the  i n t e r p r e t a t i v e  frames t h a t  th e se  a c to r s  use 
t o  d e f in e  t h e i r  r e a l i t y  and what LNDC o b je c t iv e s  should be, a re  not 
homogeneous and may i l lu m in a te  as well as b lu r  what they see as the  
a p p ro p r ia t e  change. That has led t o  p o l i t i c a l  in t e rv e n t io n s  when 
p o l i t i c i a n s  f e l t  t h e i r  s o c ia l  i n t e r e s t s  were ignored o r  g lossed over.  
Mazzolini (1979) po in ts  out t h a t  through t h e i r  p o s i t io n s  in the  o rgan iza ­
t i o n ,  t h e i r  sp ec ia l i z e d  t a s k s ,  a c to r s  tend to  develop ' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y -  
in f luenced  p e r c e p t i o n ' .  "Therefore ,  p r o p e n s i t i e s  a re  developed by 
in d iv id u a l s  in p a r t i c u l a r  p o s i t i o n s  which determine to  what s i t u a t i o n s  
a p la y e r  w i l l  be responsive ,  how he w i l l  de f in e  i t ,  and what op tions  
he w i l l  advocate" .
The process  of s t r a t e g i c  change formula t ion  and implementation i s  
summarised in f ig u r e  9 .2 .  S t r a t e g i c  changes may o r i g i n a t e  not only 
from a l l  the se  various  sources ,  most of  which were f a m i l i a r  and known 
to  th e  a c t o r s ,  but t h e re  was a l so  a f r equen t  sp ice  of  s u r p r i s e  and 
unexpected; f o r  example the  impromptu and unceremonious replacement 
of Senna, the  coup d ' e t a t  and border c lo s u r e .  As has been s t r e s s e d  , 
throughout t h i s  chap te r ,  t h e  choice  of  which environmental  f a c t o r s  
are  important and which s t r a t e g i c  changes t o  i n i t i a t e  r e s t  with the  
so c ia l  a c to r s  who use t h e i r  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  judgement t o  enac t  and 
unders tand t h e i r  own r e a l i t y .  I t  i s  from such sense-making of the  
s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  those  who can cope with change, have con t ro l  and 
unders tanding of the  informat ion about change, can in f luence  the 
d e f i n i t i o n  of s t r a t e g i c  changes t h a t  ensue.  The d i v i s i o n s ,  t o  a g r e a t  
e x t e n t ,  have t h a t  information and th e  sources to  provide i t ,  they 
con t ro l  what goes in to  s t r a t e g i c  dec is ion  agenda -  though th e re  are
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d i f f e r e n t i a l  l i m i t a t i o n s ,  and a re  key p layer s  in the  f i n a l  and success ­
fu l  implementation of  the  adopted s t r a t e g i e s .  Power jockeying and 
p o l i t i c s  a l so  in te rvene  to  determine what s t r a t e g i c  changes should 
or  should not be pursued. The ques t ions  of  whether LNDC should con­
c e n t r a t e  i t s  t h i n l y  s t r e t c h e d  resources  between Operat ions d i v i s i o n  
and New Investments d iv i s io n  demonst ra tes  th e  q u ie t  storm t h a t  i s  
brewing between th e  two e s s e n t i a l  d i v i s i o n s ,  with each f e e l i n g  i t s  
a c t i v i t i e s  are  c e n t r a l  t o  th e  purpose of th e  c o rp o ra t io n .
However, LNDC has a h ighly  c e n t r a l i z e d  dec is ion  making s t r u c t u r e  t h a t  
m i t ig a te s  a g a in s t  such p o l a r i z a t i o n ;  some might say r e in f o r c e s  i t .
All management decision-making fo ra  a re  dominated by the  presence  of 
d iv i s io n a l  d i r e c t o r s .  I t  i s  through th e  i n t e r - d i v i s i o n a l  committees 
and execu t ive  committees t h a t  once th e  change awareness has been r a i s e d ,  
th e  is sue  ge ts  tossed  around in d i s cu s s io n s  and informal c o n s u l t a t io n s  
amongst th e  d i v i s i o n s ,  and views a re  expressed ,  th e  a c t o r s 1 s tance  
in d ic a ted ,  informat ion sought i f  need be, and f i n a l l y  th e  sponsoring 
d iv i s io n  p re sen ts  a formal change proposal which embodies th e se  views, 
t o  the  Executive Committee and th e  board,  e i t h e r  f o r  r a t i f i c a t i o n  of 
the  ac t ion  a l ready  taken o r  f o r  a u th o r i z a t io n .  This was th e  process  
behind r e o rg a n iz a t io n  of Operat ions Div is ion in 1983, and when 
d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  of the  accounting in format ion systems was undertaken 
in 1981. The companies had q u a l i f i e d  accountants  and were a l ready  
preparing t h e i r  own annual budgets .  Thus th e  change merely leg i t im ized  
what was a l ready  p r a c t i s e d  by managers.
The d i s t i n c t i v e  f e a t u r e  of  LNDC s t r a t e g i c  changes s ince  1973, a p a r t  
from changes in CEOs, i s  t h a t  most of  them have been a r e s u l t  of 
management ( ex te rn a l  a c to r s  as wel l )  i n t e r p r e t a t i v e  response t o  a 
gene ra l ly  i d e n t i f i a b l e  c r i s i s  co n d i t io n :  problem s i t u a t i o n ,  d e t e r i o r -
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a t in g  performance in d i c a t o r s ,  o r  e x t e r n a l l y  def ined  goals  imposed fo r  
implementation,  in which people were g e n e ra l ly  aware of the  s i t u a t i o n  
and the  need f o r  co rpo ra te  ac t ion  was being d i scu ssed .  However, t h e r e  
was d isco rd  about the  m o d a l i t i e s  of how and what changes should be 
implemented; while a l l  t h e  a c to r s  s u p e r f i c i a l l y  concurred,  they  were 
moved by o th e r  personal as well as c o n s t i t u e n t s '  c o n s id e ra t io n s  -  Hall 
(1972),  and the  g e s t a t i o n  of  th e  s t r a t e g y  could depend on how i t  a f f e c t s  
th e se  c o n s id e ra t i o n s .  Evidence in d ic a te s  t h a t  the  managerial  tu rbu lence  
of 1973 t o  1977, and the  d ec l in e  in f i n a n c i a l  performance of th e  HQ and 
th e  companies t h a t  fo llowed, were beyond to l e r a n c e  zone,  and had t r i g g e r e d  
acknowledgement of th e  problem, even though i t  was defined from d i f f e r e n t  
p e r s p e c t i v e s .  The c lo su re  of South African borders  and near demise of 
some LNDC companies led t o  the  search f o r  a l t e r n a t i v e s  from the  SA 
market,  and the  su p e r io r  in cen t iv e  package o f f e red  by LNDC com pet i to rs  
in SA s ig n a l l e d  which avenue of the  so lu t io n  could be pursued, ie  
government ac t ion  was re q u i r e d .  Under th e se  c ircumstances  the  s eq u e n t ia l  
process o f :  - r a i s in g  th e  concern about the  s i t u a t i o n ,
- the  acknowledgement and unders tanding of the  s i t u a t i o n ,
- planning and implementation,
- monitoring and s t a b i l i s i n g  change (Pe t t ig rew  1985), 
were v i s i b l e  in a d i f f e r e n t  form. As I have a l ready  in d ic a ted ,  th e  
process  was, in most c a se s ,  dominated by the  same prime movers who 
p i lo t e d  th e  s t r a t e g i c  change proposals  through committee s ta g e ,  imple­
menta tion and s t a b i l i z a t i o n  of the  changes.  Once th e  problem awareness 
was on th e  t h r e s h o ld ,  th e  next most important phase of the  d i r e c t o r  
championing the  change was t o  s e t  out in a proposal t o  the  Executive 
Committee a plan of a c t i o n ,  s e t t i n g  out the  r a t i o n a l e  and t a r g e t s  of 
th e  proposed change, and s t a r t e d  implementing i t .  The l a s t  t h r e e  
s tages  (mainly from what I c a l l e d  Operat ional  s t r a t e g i c  changes) were 
in te rmingled  and f in e - tu n ed  as problems cropped up from implementation.  
S t r a t e g i c  change in a c t io n  was th e  main educating approach, and a
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v a r i a n t  of  one-to-one was used to  t r a i n  and coach in d iv id u a l s  on the  
jo b ,  o r  on a group b a s i s ,  they  were guided, supported and more e la b o r a ­
t i o n s ,  readjustm ents  made as b e t t e r  unders tandings  emerged. (See 
c hap te r  8: Reorganization of NID and OD). The approach was c o n s i s t e n t  
with Z i f ' s  (1981) p ro p o s i t io n  t h a t  a bus iness  o r i e n t a t i o n  (as  opposed 
t o  a p o l i t i c a l  which would seek support  be fore  a s t r a t e g i c  a c t i o n )  was 
more l i k e l y  t o  i n i t i a t e  a c t io n  f i r s t  and support  during the  process  
of  implementation.  The r i s k s  of  r e b u f f  and p o l i t i c a l  r e s i s t a n c e  are  
high as was th e  case when th e  recommendation t o  endorse  management s a le  
of Limefford was r e j e c t e d  by th e  government. Group meetings were e s t ­
ab l i shed  where in d iv id u a ls  could d i scu ss  t h e i r  t a sk  r e l a t e d  problems 
and how they resolved them. As th e  d i r e c t o r  o f  NID exp la ined ,  'We 
encouraged p ro j e c t  managers t o  hold weekly meetings with t h e i r  s t a f f  
and go through t h e i r  work load, a l l o c a t e  th e  work to  s t a f f  and t o  monitor 
t h a t  the  work i s  being done. On a one- to -one  b a s i s ,  I then b u i l t  on the  
s t r e n g th s  of in d iv id u a ls  t o  f o s t e r  the  s o r t  of change I want t o  see 
happen*. The gradual progress  of ' e a r l y  a d o p te r s '  f o s te r e d  de term ina t ion  
and commitment on o th e r s  t o  b a t t l e  with t h e i r  problems and show r e s u l t s .  
This was c o n s i s t e n t  with th e  c u l t u r e  of LNDC t h a t  John Bow had developed. 
The s p i r i t  of de te rm ina t ion  t o  do w e l l ,  and th e  mot iva t ion  t o  grapple  
with problems and come on top  was the  o p e ra t iv e  trademark of h i s  regime. 
I t  w i l l  be r e c a l l e d  t h a t  LNDC had gained a favourab le  pub l ic  image of 
being a good payer in th e  coun t ry ,  but was equa l ly  known f o r  being a 
demanding o rg a n iz a t io n ,  where one had to  'shape  up o r  shove o f f ' .  Thus, 
s t a t u s  and i n t e g r i t y  were perceived  t o  be a t  s tak e ;  being sacked from 
LNDC meant one was i n e f f i c i e n t  o r  incompetent,  and few wanted to  c a r ry  
t h a t  l a b e l .  This was how th e  execu t ive  d i r e c t o r  of Operat ions descr ibed  
th e  p r o f i l e  of LNDC and th e  s t a f f  in th e  loca l  community; ' t h e  s t a f f  
have a high p r o f i l e  in th e  community, t h e i r  s t a t u s  a re  high and as a 
r e s u l t  they have to  l i v e  up t o  t h a t ,  they  have t o  p r o j e c t  themselves 
as high powered' .  (Also see comments of  NID d i r e c t o r  about LNDC as
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good payer in chap te r  7 ) .  People who moved from LNDC had landed in 
p re s t i g io u s  jo b s .  Experience from th e  co rpo ra t ion  was h igh ly  valued, 
but had to  be earned.
There were o th e r  incen t iv es  t h a t  could have f a c i l i t a t e d  and influenced  
th e  adoption of the  changes,  and th e se  were the  matching of  improved 
reward system and b e t t e r  c a r e e r  progress  with the  change. The reorgan­
i z a t io n  process c a r r i e d  out in NID in 1983 f i t s  the  above s ce n a r io .  A 
g r e a t  deal  of t ime was spent in c r e a t in g  awareness and s e l l i n g  the  
problem d e f i n i t i o n  wi th in  the  d i v i s i o n s ,  g e t t i n g  acquain ted with the  
con tex t  of the  problem, and once the  s t r a t e g y  was implemented so lu t io n s  
emanated from unforeseen o p p o r tu n i t i e s  c a p i t a l i z e d  upon, plans  were 
reviewed as more learn ing  took p lace ,  adjustments  made, and new pres su res  
ap p l ied .  This was where th e  r e a l  i s s u e s ,  f e a r s  and perceived problems 
were a i r e d ,  not in th e  formal dec i s ion  making committees. The committee 
s tages  mainly appra ised  the  b u i l t - i n  assumptions of th e  proposed changes 
and the  methods of o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n .  As poin ted out e a r l i e r ,  t h i s  
s t r a t e g y  ' r u s h 1 from problem-awareness to  s t r a t e g y  implementation (a 
view t h a t  management would c o n te s t  as they f e l t  they were being sys temat ic  
and a n a ly t i c a l  in t h e i r  approach),  seemed to  be p rev a len t  in what was 
perceived as 'management t e r r i t o r y ' ,  in o th e r  words in those  ope ra t iona l  
a c t i v i t i e s  of the  co rpo ra t ion  where t h e r e  was g e n e ra l ly  no i n t e r f e r e n c e  
from ex te rna l  ac to r s  even though they were keen observers .  There are  
important s t r u c t u r a l  and p o l i t i c a l  f a c t o r s  which seem to  give  c lues  
to  t h i s  a l l i a n c e  behaviour .
1. There was a g re a t  deal  of t a sk  interdependence and l inkages  in the  
a c t i v i t i e s  of th e  d iv i s io n s  which c re a te d  broad awareness of co rpo ra te  
a c t i v i t i e s ;  a c o r o l l a r y  of  which was th e  shar ing  of information and 
d e f i n i t i o n s  of the  s i t u a t i o n  as i t  may confron t  a p a r t i c u l a r  d i v i s i o n .
For ins tance ,  NID investment s t r a t e g i e s  w i l l  p a r t l y  depend on Finance
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in d ic a t in g  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of funds and c o n s t r a i n t s  th e r e o f  in t h e i r  
deployment,  i t  a l so  needs Legal d iv i s io n  to  draw, i n t e r p r e t ,  and sign  
c o n t ra c tu a l  agreements with i n v e s t o r s .  Operat ions i s  equal ly  in t e r e s t e d  
in the  kind and q u a l i t y  of investments  NID makes s ince  they w i l l  even t ­
u a l ly  have t o  monitor them. There was a l o t  of winnowing process as 
th e  i s sues  were r a i s ed  and cons idered .  This ' t a c i t  n e g o t i a t i o n '  pro­
g re s s iv e ly  narrow th e  op t ions  and th e  choice  i s  l i k e ly  to  f a l l  w i th in  
accep tab le  margins of th e  o th e r  d i v i s i o n s .
2.  Access to  and shar ing  of s t r a t e g i c  in format ion has led to  informat ion 
assymmetry between LNDC and c o n t r o l l i n g  m i n i s t r i e s .  The pre- inves tment  
committee meetings which brought a l l  th e  d i v i s io n a l  d i r e c t o r s  to g e th e r  - 
excluding the  c h ie f  ex ecu t iv e ,  ensured t h a t  the  d i r e c t o r s  screened and 
defined the  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  s e t  t h e i r  own agenda f o r  Investment Committee, 
and merely went through th e  paces and r e h e a r s a l s  to  endorse t h e i r  own 
d e c i s io n s .  Thus, and ' ex e c u t iv e  management a l l i a n c e '  has emerged t h a t  
c o n t ro l l e d  th e  dec is ion  premises to  b o l s t e r  i t s  c o n s t i t u e n t s '  i n t e r e s t s ,  
reduce the  power advantage of th e  dominant a c to r s  - Cook (1977).
3. The d iv i s io n s  as a l ready  poin ted out a re  c e n t r a l  t o  th e  whole 
purpose of LNDC. All t h r e e  c r i t i c a l  d iv i s io n s  have s ince  1978 been 
supervised by th e  I r i s h  team of e x p e r t s ,  who have proven ind ispensab le  
d e sp i t e  ex tens ive  in d ig e n iz a t io n  program, p a r t i c u l a r l y  on mat te rs  of 
f i n a n c i a l  e x p e r t i s e .  Hickson e t  al  (1971, 1985) have i d e n t i f i e d  th re e  
v a r i a b le s  which they sugges t  exp la in  i n t r a - o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  power:
coping with u n c e r t a in ty  encountered by the  o rg a n iz a t io n ,  
r e p l a c e a b i l i t y  of th e  fu n c t io n s  performed, 
c e n t r a l i t y  of the  a c t i v i t i e s .
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They hypothesized t h a t  the  more a d iv i s io n  was ab le  to  cope with 
u n c e r t a in ty ,  provide a c r i t i c a l  func t ion  f o r  th e  o rg an iza t io n  t h a t  
was not e a s i l y  s u b s t i t u t a b l e ,  the  g r e a t e r  i t s  power with the  o rg a n iz a t io n .  
The authors  po in t  a t  th e  dynamic na tu re  of  th e  process  which s h i f t s  as 
cond i t ions  and a c to r s  change. The power bases of  the  d iv i s io n s  in LNDC 
co r robo ra te  th e se  f i n d i n g s ;  the  e x p e r t i s e  of th e  d i r e c t o r s ,  th e  d i r e  
managerial  shortage  in Lesotho and high c o s t s  of  developing a l t e r n a t i v e s  
and the  c e n t r a l i t y  of the  ro l e  of t h e se  d i r e c t o r s  in th e  p u r s u i t  of LNDC 
mandate of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  and job c r e a t i o n .
4. F in a l ly ,  the  key a c to r s  in the se  d iv i s io n s  came from the  same 
o rgan iza t ion  - I r i s h  I n d u s t r i a l  Development Author i ty  - IIDA, had long 
working exper ience  t o g e th e r ,  and came from a c u l t u r a l  background of  
shared values  and unders tand ing .  A general  convergence around t h e i r  
d iv i s io n a l  i n t e r e s t s  and l o g - r o l l i n g  tended t o  occur .  C o l l e c t i v e ly  
they needed each o th e r  f o r  support  to  accomplish t h e i r  o b j e c t i v e s ,  
but s e v e ra l ly  they have t h e i r  own d i f f e r e n t  personal  c a r e e r  ambi t ions ,  
f u l f i lm e n t  of which in p a r t  depends on ach ieving t h e i r  c o n s t i t u e n t s '  
i n t e r e s t s .  They have to  compromise, which does not n e c e s s a r i l y  r e f l e c t  
t h e i r  r e a l  f e e l i n g s ,  th e  r e s u l t  i s  t a c i t  agreement t h a t  open c o n f l i c t  
should be avoided, t h a t  th e  i n t e r a c t i o n  should continue  on some 
compromise ve rs ion ,  and t h a t  c e r t a i n  people w i l l  have t h e i r  way on 
c e r t a i n  i s su e s .  Working concensus emerges - Lauer (1983).
The po in t  of t h i s  d i s cu s s io n  about the  ro l e  and in f luence  of the  d iv i s io n s  
on s t r a t e g i c  change is  t h a t ,  w i th in  th e  execu t ive  management co re ,  t h e re  
was a powerful a l l i a n c e  of ex p e r t s  who through manipula tion of s t r u c t u r a l  
contex t could in f luence  and give  impetus t o  what s t r a t e g i c  op t ions  the  
Executive Committee and the  board should choose from. While t h i s  
a l l i a n c e  was not n e c e s s a r i l y  composed of  a homogeneous group, i t  r e a l i z e d  
i t s  interdependence and engaged in a s t r a t e g y  of  c o l l a b o r a t io n  and
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r e c i p r o c i t y  which l e f t  l i t t l e  room f o r  in fus ion  of  d i s s e n t in g  views 
w ith in  the  a l l i a n c e .  Consequently,  t h e  way was paved f o r  consensual  
dec i s ion  making in most of the  d ec i s io n  making committees,  Murray (1978).
What i s  becoming c l e a r e r  i s  t h a t  s t r a t e g i c  change can no longer be 
co l lapsed  in to  a top management a c t i v i t y  -  Burgelman (1983),  and govern­
ment a c t i v i t y  t h a t  has t o  be nego t ia ted  between th e se  b i f u r c a t e d  a c t o r s .  
These loaded g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  have t o  be unpacked and extended t o  inc lude  
n e g o t i a t io n s  w i th in  both the  in s id e  and o u t s id e  a c to r s  as w e l l .  This 
extended p e r s p e c t iv e ,  as supported by events  in LNDC, recognizes  t h a t  
s t r a t e g i c  process t ranscends  th e  bottom-up, top-down process o f t e n  
emphasized,  nor can i t  be regarded as a m a t te r  of choice  on the  e x te n t  
t o  which the  process  should be ' o u t s i d e - i n  o r  i n s i d e - o u t '  as Ramamurti 
(1986) argues.  We can p o s i t  t h a t  s t r a t e g i c  change i s  a dynamic m u l t i ­
layered  process fragmented amongst var ious  changing ' p r i n c i p a l s 1 with 
d iv e r s e ,  s h i f t i n g  i n t e r e s t s ,  and power d i f f e r e n t i a l .
There has been a conspicuous absence of th e  r o l e  of CEO as change 
provocateur and as a member of ' ex e c u t iv e  management a l l i a n c e ' .  What 
r o l e  does the  CEO of LNDC play in the  management of  s t r a t e g i c  changes,  
and how does he i n t e r a c t  with h i s  d iv i s io n a l  l i e u t e n a n t s  on whose 
e x p e r t i s e  he r e l i e s  so heavi ly?
The Leadership Task
The ro l e  of CEO as a f a c i l i t a t o r  of change, a v i s i o n a i r e  of a c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  
d i s t i n c t i v e  competence and c h i e f  c o -o rd in a to r  of i t s  s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s io n s ,  
who can in s p i r e  h i s  o rg an iza t io n  through th e  change p rocess ,  i s  one of  
the  most complex and c r i t i c a l  execu t ive  f u n c t io n s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  f o r  a 
SOE. S t r a t e g i c  dec i s ions  emanate from a p l u r a l i t y  of  c o n f l i c t i n g  i n t e r e s t s  
of s t a t e ' s  macro so c ia l  and the  c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  and o th e r  a c t o r s '  micro
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economic o b j e c t iv e s ;  t h e re  is  no complete unanimity w i th in  th e se  th re e  
main camps. Given t h i s  f ragmenta tion  of i n t e r e s t s  and a u t h o r i t y  to  
in f luence  d e c i s io n s ,  the  CEO's t a sk  becomes a d e l i c a t e  ba lanc ing  ac t  
of  t r a d e - o f f s  and p o l i t i c a l  manoeuvring to  c o -o rd in a te  th e  s e t  of  
s ig n a l s  from t h i s  w e l t e r  of a c t o r s .  A h igher  degree of commensurate 
l eade rsh ip  s k i l l s  i s  t h e r e f o r e  ab so lu te ly  e s s e n t i a l  to  f a c i l i t a t e  
unders tanding and to  persuade.
To manage s t r a t e g i c  change s u c c e s s f u l ly ,  we a re  o f ten  t o l d ,  needs d i s ­
t i n c t i v e  competence and s k i l l s  t o  mobil ize  and in f luence  people and 
br idge  the  c e n t r i f u g a l  fo rce s  of  a c t o r s '  i n t e r e s t s  in o rde r  to  focus 
on the  co rpo ra te  mission ( i f  t h e r e  i s  one) .  Ches te r  Barnard,  in h i s  
monumental book, The Functions  of Executive (1938),  has long recognized 
t h a t  th e  su rv iva l  of an o rg an iza t io n  l a rg e ly  depended upon the  q u a l i t y  
and c a p a b i l i t y  of i t s  l e ad e rsh ip ,  v/hich he cogen t ly  descr ibed  a s :
"The ind ispensab le  so c ia l  sc ience  t h a t  g ives  common meaning to  common 
purpose,  t h a t  c r e a t e s  th e  incen t iv e  t h a t  makes o th e r  incen t iv es  e f f e c t i v e ,  
t h a t  in fuses  the  s u b je c t iv e  aspec t  of c o u n t le s s  d ec i s io n s  with c o n s i s ­
tency in a changing environment,  t h a t  produces th e  v i t a l  cohes iveness  
without which co -opera t ion  i s  im poss ib le ."
Donaldson and Lorsch (1983),  Quinn (1980, Pe t t ig rew  (1985), have s t r e s s e d  
s i m i l a r  views in t h e i r  empir ica l  s tu d ie s  on how success fu l  CEOs managed 
s t r a t e g i c  change p rocess .  I t  i s  in t h i s  regard  t h a t  we need t o  examine 
th e  f requent  changes of c h i e f  execu t ives  in LNDC, and t h e i r  impact in 
in fus ing  t h a t  ' c o n s i s t e n c y '  and process  of ' p u rp o s e fu l '  c o -o p e ra t io n .
However, to  unders tand th e  r o l e  of CEO of LNDC in managing s t r a t e g y  
change, we must pe r fo rce  look a t  th e  s t r u c t u r e  of the  top management 
of  LNDC. The c h ie f  execu t ive  of LNDC is  appointed (de f a c to )  d i r e c t l y  
by government. Since the  p o s i t i o n  was l o c a l i s e d  in 1977, th e  CEOs, 
in p r a c t i c a l l y  a l l  c a se s ,  have been c a r e e r  government employees who
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have held sen io r  p o s i t io n s  with in  th e  government appara tus .  They tended 
to  be former permanent s e c r e t a r i e s  from the  m i n i s t r i e s  t h a t  co -o rd ina ted  
o r  supervised LNDC. Most of them had l im i ted  or  no exper ience  in p r iv a te  
s e c to r  o r  any demonstrable r e l e v a n t  s k i l l s  t h a t  could make an impact on 
th e  performance of th e  c o rp o ra t io n .  Thus, they  brought a r e p e r t o i r e  of 
c i v i l  s e rv ice  o r i e n t a t i o n * ,  p e r s p e c t i v e s ,  i n t e r e s t s  and values  in to  an 
o rg an iza t io n  whose lower and execu t ive  management was composed of  local  
bus iness  g radua tes ,  and i n t e r n a t io n a l  exper t s  with t r a i n i n g ,  re fe re n ce  
groups,  and exper ience from bus iness  e n t e r p r i s e s  - Zif  (1981).  Welding 
t h i s  v a r i e ty  of pe rcep t ions  of r e a l i t y  to  br ing  about o rder  in t h i s  
•forced marr iage '  has not always worked harmoniously.  The perceived 
incongru i ty  of s t a t u s  and p ro fes s ion  by th e  ' t e c h n o c r a t i c  management' 
has g radua l ly  opened up a wedge of pe rcep t ions  between them and t h e i r  
' p o l i t i c a l '  CEOs and c r y s t a l l i z e s  t h e  co n s tan t  tens ion  between c o n t in u i ty  
and change. Compounding th e  problem has been the  f a c t  t h a t ,  except  fo r  
two, the  tenure  of CEOs with LNDC has been r e l a t i v e l y  s h o r t ,  s tay ing  
f o r  le s s  than two y e a r s .  The ro le  of CEO depends t h e r e f o r e  in p a r t ,  
in the  management of t h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  on how he p re sen ts  and i d e n t i f i e s  
h imself  to  h is  t e ch n ica l  e x ecu t iv e s ,  and on how they de f ine  and r ed e f in e  
t h e i r  percep t ion  of h is  r o l e  over t ime as s i t u a t i o n s  change, i s sues  
emerge, and judgments he makes.
The study by Hafsi e t  al (1987) has revea led  s i m i l a r  f ind ings  sugges ting 
t h a t  s t r a t e g i c  apex of a SOE has two execu t ive  groups:
1. The Commissar, government appo in tees ,  whose a l l e g ia n c e  and i n t e r e s t s  
a re  with the  p o l i t i c a l  a c t o r s ,  and cons ide r  SOE as a means of promoting 
t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  c a r e e r .
* I t  i s  not suggested t h a t  such a background i s  n e c e s s a r i l y  a bad t h in g .
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2. The Engineers,  a re  the  'execu t ive  management a l l i a n c e '  and those  
below them; they are  p ro fes s io n a l  managers concerned with th e  t e ch n ica l  
and economic goals of the  e n t e r p r i s e  and perceived t h e i r  c a r e e r s  as
c lo s e ly  a ssoc ia ted  with i t s  success .
This model assumes t h a t  as the  co rpo ra t ion  develops (with th e  u l t im a te  
o b j e c t iv e  of being autonomous from government con t ro l  and dependence) 
th e se  execu t ive  groups come to  play d i f f e r e n t  s t r a t e g i c  r o le s  w i th in  
th e  c o rp o ra t io n .  The more dependent the  CEO is  on the  s t a t e  funding,  
th e  more important ro le  the  CEO - a Commissar - plays  in secur ing  the  
necessary  ex te rna l  support ,  lobbying and l i a i s i n g  with those  power
brokers  who w i l l  f a c i l i t a t e  the  proposed changes.  S t r a t e g i c  d ec i s io n s
tend to  be biased towards s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  g o a l s ,  eg uneconomic job 
c r e a t in g  p r o je c t s  such as were d i c t a t e d  to  MID by the  m i n i s t e r s ,  o r  
sub s id ie s  to  mainta in  jobs  in ' s i c k '  s u b s i d i a r i e s .  The more autonomous 
the  co rpora t ion  becomes, re source -w ise ,  and as th e  t e ch n ica l  core  
becomes e s t a b l i s h e d ,  the  more the  'Eng ineers '  emerge as a s i g n i f i c a n t  
fo rce  in f luenc ing  s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s io n ,  and 'commerc ia l - technica l  p u l l s  
begin to  compete with s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  g o a l s ' .  In o the r  words, as the  
co rpora t ion  and i t s  s u b s i d i a r i e s  become more p r o f i t a b l e  and r e in v e s t a b l e  
income flows in ,  and as more equ i ty  c a p i t a l  flows in from in v e s to r s  
buying shares ,  we see the  dominance of some Engineers - ie  Finance 
d iv i s io n  and NID in o r c h e s t r a t i n g  s t r a t e g i c  change and a new modus 
operandi emerges of emphasis on e f f i c i e n c y ,  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  and dividend 
payouts;  job  c r e a t io n  per  se takes  a back s e a t .
Escobar (1982) warns t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no permanency in th e se  groups.
I t  i s  a s h i f t i n g  a l l i a n c e  b u i l t  around i s sues  sponsored by d i f f e r e n t  
a c to r s ,  a melange changing with p o l i t i c a l  and power s h i f t s ,  and th e  
permutations of  the  groups can vary accord ing ly .  For in s tance :
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Engineer versus Engineer,  which would involve n e g o t i a t io n s  between 
d iv i s io n s  about proposed s t r a t e g i c  changes,  o r  between headquar te rs  
and a semi-autonomous su b s id ia ry  l i k e  th e  Brewery which may not 
welcome headquar te rs  in t e r f e r e n c e  in i t s  s t r a t e g i c  change, o r  
Local Engineer and Commissar versus  fo re ig n  Engineer,  in which LNDC 
management team up with government to  n e g o t i a t e  with e x te r n a l  organ­
i z a t i o n s .
What t h i s  model i l l u s t r a t e s  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a c o n f l i c t  of i n t e r e s t s  
and pe rcep t ions  with in  management and the  c o n t r o l l i n g  s tak e h o ld e r s ,  
the  government, regard ing th e  bus iness  of th e  SOE and the  ro le  t h a t  
th e se  two a c to r s  should p lay .  This divergence  of b e l i e f s  o f ten  m anifes t s  
i t s e l f  whenever s t r a t e g i c  dec i s io n s  t h a t  touch on th e se  s e n s i t i v i t i e s ,  
a re  made. Temporary a l l i a n c e s  are  formed from among th e se  a c to r s  fo r  
the  purpose of f o s t e r in g  the  adoption o r  p u r s u i t  of  p a r t i c u l a r  s t r a t e g i c  
ac t ion  -  Mazzolini (1979).  The r e s u l t  i s  not always zero-sum game or 
the  d e s i r ed  outcome, ac to r s  r e c o n c i l e  t h e i r  d ive rgen t  views through 
the  process  of barga in ing ;  compromises are  s t ruck  and q u a s i - r e s o l u t i o n s  
emerge t h a t  av e r t  o u t r i g h t  c o n f l i c t .
There a re  s i g n i f i c a n t  p a r a l l e l s  between Hafsi and Escobar 's  models and 
the  s t r a t e g i c  change-process  in LNDC. There a re  i d e n t i f i a b l e  s t r a t e g i c  
change m an i fe s t a t ions  which suggest  the  c o n s i s t e n t  in f luence  of one 
c o a l i t i o n  over th e  o th e r .  A breakdown of such changes might give us 
an in d ic a t io n  of the  dominant p re fe rences  and by im pl ica t ion  th e  a c to r s  
and t h e i r  ro le  in pushing them. For in s t a n c e ,  t h e r e  was v i s i b l e  govern­
ment p re ssu re  on th e  following changes;
appointment of CEOs and changes t h e re o f  
appointment of chairman and board members 
ind ig en iza t io n  of execu t ive  p o s i t io n s
276
i m p o r t - s u b s t i tu t io n
promotion of local  e n t re p re n eu rs .
There were equa l ly  some s t r a t e g i c  changes which might be sa id  t o  be 
management dominated,  l i k e :
th e  d i v e s t i t u r e  s t r a t e g y  
f o re ig n  investment promotion
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  of  product range and markets by th e  s u b s i d i a r i e s  
r e o rg a n iz a t io n .
The problem though, with t h a t  approach i s  t h a t  by reducing s t r a t e g i c  
change to  a c o n s i s t e n t  s e t  of black and white  behaviour of government 
o r i e n te d  d ec i s io n s  and management b iased  d e c i s io n ,  we lose  th e  fu z z in e s s ,  
th e  mess, and th e  r ichness  of p o l i t i c a l  games in s id e  these  camps, and 
th e  s h i f t i n g  i s sues  and power bases t h a t  so o f ten  t y p i f i e s  the  s t r a t e g i c  
dec i s io n  h ie ra rchy  of a SOE. S t r a t e g i c  changes a re  not a monopoly of 
any one c h i e f  execu t ive  o r  head of th e  government even though they  may 
use t h e i r  power to  f a c i l i t a t e  i t .  As Mazzolini  (1979) c o r r e c t l y  po in t s  
o u t ,  such d ec i s io n s  emanate from an agglomerate of a c t o r s ,  some more 
powerful than o th e r s .  The model i s  a l so  s o f t  on power which seems to  
sugges t  t h a t  th e  two groups have some o f f s e t t i n g  powers over each 
o th e r .  I t s  p o l i t i c a l  process  p e r sp ec t iv e  is  a g r e a t  advance in under­
standing the  s t r a t e g i c  change p rocess ,  but s t i l l  needs t o  delve in to  
exp la in ing  how s t r a t e g i c  changes were sus ta ined  under such complex s i t u a t i o n s .
The Commissar-Engineer dichotomy tends  to  c a s t  th e se  a c to r s  in to  pawns 
of the  s i t u a t i o n  an SOE may f a c e ,  they seem l i k e  condui ts  of t h e i r  
p r in c ip a l s  without v o l i t i o n a l  behaviour ,  and look a t  s t r a t e g i c  dec i s io n s  
in terms of  how they a f f e c t  th e se  p r i n c i p a l s  and respond accord ing ly .
We do not g e t  th e  f e e l  of man th e  a c t o r ,  th e  i n t e r p r e t e r ,  i n i t i a t o r ,
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who i s  in t e r e s t e d  in h i s  long term c a r e e r ,  who ope ra tes  with th e  kind 
of t r a in e d  incapac i ty  developed from educa t ion ,  exper ience  and t r a i n i n g  - 
Mangham (1979).  A d i s t i n c t i o n  between pure ly  s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  and 
t e c h n ic a l  economic s t r a t e g i e s  i s  r a t h e r  a grey a rea .  Management can 
make e i t h e r  one or a combination of them as and when they i n t e r p r e t  
t h e i r  s i t u a t i o n ,  f e e l  t h e i r  l o t  would be enhanced by such a d e c i s io n .
A c l e a r  example was an investment in Peacock Clo th ing .  I t  was a p o l i t ­
i c a l l y  motivated investment by management, meant t o  so f ten  th e  ex te rn a l  
p re s su re s  and to  enhance LNDC's image (which e f f e c t i v e l y  means management 
p o s i t i o n )  t o  the  local  bus iness  community and p o l i t i c i a n s  by being 
involved in r e s u r r e c t i n g  a local  company. Thus, while  the  kind of 
s t r a t e g i c  dec i s io n s  pursued by the  o rg an iza t io n  may in d i c a t e  the  a c to r s  
behind them t h a t  kind of  r i g i d  t y p i f i c a t i o n  can b l ind  us to  the  v a r i a b ­
i l i t y  of dec is ions  and t h a t  in d iv id u a ls  are  c o n s ta n t ly  r ea s ses s in g  t h e i r  
r e a l i t y ,  r e a f f i rm ing  i t  o r  r e c o n s t r u c t in g  i t .
There are  two more important obse rva t ions  about LNDC v/hich need empha­
s iz in g  as f a r  as le ade rsh ip  ro l e  i s  concerned, and might c l a r i f y  why 
s t r a t e g i c  management has f l u c t u a t e d  between th e  d iv i s io n a l  execu t ives  
and the  CEO. F i r s t  of a l l ,  t h e r e  i s  ample evidence to  suggest  t h a t  
most of the  appointments of CEOs and t h e i r  f r equen t  changes th e r e o f  by 
the  government, had no r e l a t i o n s h i p  whatever with th e  expected perform­
ance on the  job ;  which r a i s e s  se r io u s  doubts about concern f o r  t e c h n ic a l  
a b i l i t i e s  as a c r i t e r i a  of  appointment and Vernon's claim t h a t  govern­
ments 'have major s take  in ensur ing t h a t  SOEs ope ra te  well and w i l l  
not change management un less  t h e r e  a re  assurances  t h a t  the  new CEOs 
w i l l  take  over smooth ly ' .  The appointments were mainly p o l i t i c a l  s p o i l s  
t o  ' reward c ron ie s  with execu t ive  p o s i t io n s  even though the  b e n e f i c i a r i e s  
of t h i s  la rgesse  may have no management experience* -  Trebat (1983).
I t  f u r t h e r  exp la ins  why th e  board of d i r e c t o r s  had no con t ro l  over the  
CEO, and could not sack him even i f  they were unhappy with h i s  s tewardsh ip .
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Even th e  chairman, the  m in i s t e r  of th e  superv is ing  m in i s t ry ,  may not 
be involved in the  appointment or  change of h is  execu t ive .  I t  remains 
unc lea r  who the  r ea l  dec i s ion  makers a r e .  Vernon (1984) has observed 
t h a t  th e  d i v e r s i t y  of SOE o b je c t iv e s  t h a t  a re  urged on management would 
not be so d i f f i c u l t  t o  s o r t  ou t i f  i t  were reasonably c l e a r  who in 
government were the  l e g i t im a te  masters  of  the  management. There was 
t h e r e f o r e  what Fubara (1984) c a l l s  'confus ion  of ro le s  and b lu r r in g  
of a c c o u n ta b i l i ty  among boards ,  m in i s t e r s  and CEOs. There were some 
c o n f l i c t s  between government a c t i o n s  and t h e i r  e n t e r p r i s e  o b j e c t i v e s ,  
which he considered as m i l i t a t i n g  a g a in s t  expected p ro f i t -m o t iv a te d  
b e h av io u r ' .  Reasons f o r  t h i s  continued p o l i t i c a l  form of con tro l  a re  
many and v a r i e d ,  and beyond th e  scope of t h i s  r e s ea rc h .  However, a 
con tex tua l  pe rspec t ive  of th e  co rp o ra t io n  o f f e r s  an engaging excuse 
f e r v e n t ly  pursued by some p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t s ,  which sugges ts  t h a t  
t h e r e  i s  a genera l  m i s t r u s t  of managers, many of whom were from SA and 
ove rseas ,  and t h e i r  lo y a l ty  and commitment to  the  development of th e  
country  has always been ques t ioned .  Hence the  view t h a t  i t  i s  through 
government in te rv e n t io n  t h a t  s t r a t e g i c  dec is ion  congruent with n a t io n a l  
i n t e r e s t  can be pursued.
Secondly,  con t ra ry  to  th e  g e n e r a l ly  held view t h a t  success fu l  execu t ives  
in SOEs used t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s  t o  pave way f o r  top  p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n s  - 
Mazzolini (1979),  Suarez (1984) ,  Vernon (1984),  LNDC's success fu l  CEOs, 
few as they were, took the  oppos i te  d i r e c t i o n ,  and have held top p o s i t i o n s  
in in d u s t ry .  Closely r e l a t e d  t o  the  po in t  made above, i s  the  f a c t  t h a t  
those  CEOs who had a longer  t e n u r e ,  l i k e  John Bow, g radua l ly  went ' n a t i v e ' ,  
were completely s o c ia l i z e d  and i d e n t i f i e d  with the  ' execu t ive  management 
a l l i a n c e ' .  S u r p r i s in g ly ,  as h i s  s t a t u s  and p o p u la r i ty  in indus t ry  
increased he f e l l  ou t with h i s  p o l i t i c a l  mentors .  The government's  
in t e n t io n  of c o n t r o l l i n g  management o r i e n t a t i o n  through appointment of 
CEOs was i n e f f e c t iv e  as th e se  execu t ives  seem to  e x p l o i t  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l
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l inks  to  achieve unintended business  g o a ls .  Senna, i t  w i l l  be r e c a l l e d ,  
courted th e  p o l i t i c a l  arm to  ga rner  support  f o r  h i s  p o s i t i o n ,  in the  
process he l o s t  th e  execut ive  a l l i a n c e  and th e  p o l i t i c a l  support  as 
w e l l ,  s ince  he never was perceived as ' t h e i r  man' .  Thus, t h e r e  would 
seem to  be t h i s  su b t l e  tug-of -war  waging between management t o  p reserve  
managerial  autonomy and th e  government t h a t  d i l u t e s  i t  by appoin t ing  
t h e i r  l ike-minded c h ie f  execu t ive s .  The r e s u l t  i s ,  those  with the  
c r i t i c a l  managerial  e x p e r t i s e  requ i red  f o r  th e  su rv iva l  of th e  co rpora ­
t i o n ,  those  who con t ro l  the  necessary  in format ion f o r  s t r a t e g i c  changes 
and have a b i l i t y  to  a l t e r  o t h e r s '  pe rcep t ions  of a s i t u a t i o n  and cause- 
e f f e c t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  in ways t h a t  w i l l  lead them to  ac t  as d e s i r e d ,  main­
t a i n  power p o s i t io n  over t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  c h i e f  execu t ives  who depend on 
them f o r  e x p e r t i s e  and r e o r i e n t a t i o n  to  t h e i r  execu t ive  robes and r o le s  
in t h e i r  f i r s t  year  of execu t ive  appointment.  Johnson (1987) summed up 
t h i s  view when he observed t h a t :  "in as much as power has been shown 
to  devolve upon those  a s so c ia ted  with u n c e r t a in ty  red u c t io n ,  we might 
expect th e  most powerful in d iv id u a ls  and groups to  be those  most 
i d e n t i f i e d  with th e e l en e n ts  of the  s t r a t e g i c  fo rm u la t ion" .
The s t r u c t u r e  of s t r a t e g i c  change process  in LNDC is  rendered more 
complex when we cons ider  the  leverage and in f luence  of th e  t h i r d  fo rce  
of a c to r s  who arguably ,  have as much power, o r  even more, on some 
s t r a t e g i c  i s sues  as the  tv/o thus  f a r  cons ide red ,  ie  management and 
government. This t h i r d  fo rce  of a c to r s  have a t  t imes  played as u l t im a te  
a r b i t o r s  in f o s t e r i n g  a n e g o t i a t i v e  c l im ate  whenever co -ope ra t ion  and 
order  breaks down due to  government i n te rv e n t io n  in s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s io n s .  
We look a t  the se  ex te rna l  a c to r s  and t h e i r  r o l e  in s t r a t e g i c  changes.
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Macro I n t e r a c t i o n  P r o c e s s :
S t r a t e g i c  change and the  E x t e r n a l  O th e r s1
The conventional approach to  th e  s t r a t e g i c  d ec i s io n s  in SOEs has focused 
on th e  i n t e r a c t i o n  between the  s t a t e  and the  SOE, and regards  t h e  former 
as the  p r in c ip a l  ex te rn a l  a c to r  t h a t  in f luences  t h e se  d e c i s io n s ,  with 
occas iona l  re fe rence  to  o th e r  groups o r  p u b l i c s ,  such as consumers,  
s u p p l i e r s ,  t r a d e  unions,  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  banks,  which are  o f ten  
w i th in  th e  immediate domain of the  SOE.* Other ex te rn a l  s takeho lde rs  
t h a t  o v e r t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y  have an impact on i t ,  o r  i n t e r e s t s  in i t s  
s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s io n s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  those  s takeho lde rs  t h a t  provide the  
c r i t i c a l  f i n a n c i a l  and t e ch n ica l  r e sou rce s ,  t h e i r  s t r a t e g i c  a c t i o n s  and 
in f luence  have e i t h e r  not been s p e c i f i c a l l y  addressed ,  o r  have o f t e n  
been subsumed in the  government in f lu en ce .  There i s  a general  recog­
n i t i o n  t h a t  most SOEs in LDCs s t i l l  depend heav i ly  on fo re ign  e x p e r t i s e  
and f in a n c e ,  El-Namaki (1977),  Kiggundu (1986, Fubara (1984),  y e t  th e  
p o s i t i o n a l  ro le  of th e se  e x te r n a l  a c to r s  in s t r a t e g i c  dec i s ions  of 
the se  e n t e r p r i s e s  has r a r e l y  been addressed in the  same breadth  as t h a t  
of th e  s t a t e .  We unwrap them from t h i s  general  c a te g o r i z a t io n  and 
a ssess  t h e i r  inf luence  along with the  government and o the rs  t h a t ,  a l though 
they do not form p a r t  of LNDC, nonthe less  they  do impact i t .
M it ro f f  (1983) has descr ibed  so c ia l  o rg a n iz a t io n s  as a s e r i e s  of r e l a t i o n ­
ships  between a v a r i e ty  of p a r t i e s ,  an organized  c o l l e c t i o n  of i n t e r n a l  
and e x te rn a l  s takeholders  in f luenced  and motivated  by d i f f e r e n t  b e l i e f s  
and assumptions .  A change in s t r a t e g y ,  he argued, a l t e r s  one o r  more 
of the  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  among the  s t ak e h o ld e r s ,  and he proposed var ious  
op t ions  by which such changes may be brought about ,  such as:  use of
* See Mazzolini (1979) Chapter IX
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power and a u t h o r i t y ,  p e rsuas ion ,  barga in ing  by means of economic exchange, 
n e g o t i a t in g  to  reach a compromise, c o - o p ta t i o n ,  and through coa lesc ing  
with o the r  s tak eh o ld e rs  by forming c o a l i t i o n s .  This network of i n t e r ­
dependences between d i f f e r e n t  a c to r s  with a common i n t e r e s t  in an e n t e r ­
p r i s e ,  but d i f f e r e n t  o b j e c t iv e s  and pe rcep t ions  of how and what i t  should 
be doing, m i r ro r s  th e  composite s t r u c t u r e  of LNDC. Apart from the  
government which i s  th e  so le  shareho lder  and i s  both in s ide  ( in  terms 
of th e  heavy c ab in e t  m i n i s t e r s '  presence on board) as well as an o u ts id e  
p a r t  of management, LNDC has an extended h i s t o r y ,  r i g h t  from the  t ime 
i t  was e s t a b l i s h e d ,  of i n t e r a c t i o n  with ex te rn a l  s takeho lders  from 
widely d i f f e r e n t  c u l t u r a l  backgrounds,  s k i l l s ,  p ro f e s s io n s ,  id eo log ies  - 
s u b je c t iv e ,  p e rce ived ,  and o b je c t iv e ,  Brunsson (1985),  while some may 
hold s im i l a r  views and share  common e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  which d i r e c t l y  impact 
or  are  a f f e c t e d  by s t r a t e g i c  changes t h a t  management may i n s t i g a t e ,  
hence they have to  be c o n su l t ed .  Three types  of ex te rn a l  s takeho lde rs  
were d i s c e rn a b le  from th e  da ta :  (a) those  who provided th e  f inance ,
(b) provided f in an ce  and te c h n ic a l  s k i l l s ,  and (c) j u s t  techn ica l  s k i l l s .  
These a c to r s  and t h e i r  s takes  in LNDC are  shown below in f ig u r e  9 .3 .
External  i n t e r a c t a n t s  and t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  in LNDC
Actors Stakes held Performance
expec ta t ion
World Bank Finance & te c h n i c a l  s k i l l s  P r o f i t a b i l i t y
DGE II II II II
KTW II II II
African Development Bank Finance
European Investment Bank Finance




Lesotho Government (Owner) Economic, p o l i t i c a l ,  
soc ia l
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Through negot ia ted  agreements and under tak ings  a r r iv e d  a t  between 
management and these  a c to r s  regard ing  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s ,  d i f f e r e n t  cond­
i t i o n s  and expec ta t ions  of what each a c t o r  should do are  expressed ,  
r o l e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  and o b l ig a t io n s  defined t h a t  must be observed and 
guide s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s io n s ,  even when the  e x te r n a l  a c to r s  w i l l  not be 
t h e r e  - Lauer (1983).  Thus, t h e r e  i s  an element of con t ro l  and r e s t r i c ­
t i o n s  over management s t r a t e g i c  a c t i o n s ;  f o r  i n s ta n ce ,  African Development 
Bank (ADB) l in e  of c r e d i t  to  LNDC s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  the  money should not 
be used to  buy South African inputs  o r  s e l l  t o  South A fr ica .  The snag 
was SA is  Lesotho 's  major s u p p l i e r  of raw m a te r i a l s  and b igges t  market 
f o r  Lesotho-based South African companies, m a jo r i ty  of which are  in 
p a r tn e r s h ip  with LNDC. The World Bank, on th e  o th e r  hand, r e s t r i c t e d  
LNDC to  inves t  no more than 10 per  cen t  of i t s  t o t a l  equ i ty  in any one 
p r o j e c t ,  and IDA has i t s  own c ond i t ions  under which t h e i r  t e c h n ic a l  
ex p e r t s  w i l l  serve LNDC and how they w i l l  be eva lua ted .  These a r ra n g e ­
ments, under normal cond i t ions  come to  be taken f o r  granted as the  modus 
operandi by which the  co rpo ra t ion  has to  be managed. But normali ty  and 
s t a b i l i t y  in a SOE, as t h i s  s tudy s o l i d l y  confi rms,  a re  a r a r i t y .
C o n f l ic t s  u sua l ly  a r i s e  when management pe rce ives  a market oppor tun i ty  
to  be gained by a change of s t r a t e g y  or  th e  government d i r e c t s  manage­
ment to  adopt c e r t a i n  s t r a t e g i e s  which lack management support  and run 
counter  to  o th e r  ex te rna l  a c t o r s '  i n t e r e s t s .  More important,  I found, 
t h a t  th e  ex te rna l  a c to r s  i n i t i a t e d  s t r a t e g i c  changes t h a t  were e i t h e r  
t i e d  d i r e c t l y  to  t h e i r  resource  s takes  o r  were a cond i t ion  of continued 
prov is ion  of such re so u rce s ,  in o th e r  words,  a ' t a k e  i t  o r  leave i t '  
op tion  was o f f e r e d .
Furthermore,  th e r e  was a general  awareness among th e  ex te rna l  a c to r s  
about what o the rs  were doing as well  as shar ing  of information which 
put management under p re s su re  s ince  p o s i t i v e  assessment by one a c t o r  
could prove v i t a l  in management's n e g o t i a t io n s  with o th e r s .  Mazzolini
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(1979) emphasized the  same, t h a t  p layers  are  involved in i n te r lo c k in g  
games, and t h e i r  stand in one game takes  in to  c o n s id e ra t io n  h i s / h e r  
p os tu re  in th e  o th e r  games t h a t  he /she  may subsequently  be involved 
in .
External a c to r s  (excluding government) are  extremely powerful ,  and in 
most cases  they formed a l l i a n c e  with management as they were concerned 
about t h e  same is sues  of p r o f i t a b i l i t y  and t e c h n i c a l  s k i l l s  which were 
low on government p r i o r i t y  l i s t .  Their  in f luence  on government was 
equa l ly  s i g n i f i c a n t  fo r  a v a r i e t y  of reasons :*
1. They provide  and con t ro l  th e  necessary  f i n a n c i a l  r e so u rce s .
2.  Provide superv isory ,  t r a i n i n g  and consultancy s e rv ice  to  f a c i l i t a t e  
e f f i c i e n t  deployment of  t h e i r  funds.
3. They are  an important l ink  to  o th e r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  and t h e i r  own governments which can be c r i t i c a l  to  
a developing country should i t  seek fo re ign  a s s i s t a n c e .
Thus, when s t r a t e g i c  changes a r i s e  which a f f e c t  t h i s  m u l t i p l i c i t y  of 
i n t e r e s t s ,  t h e se  ac to r s  - i n t e r n a l  and ex te rn a l  t o  the  c o rp o ra t io n ,  may 
cha l lenge  and question  some of th e  g e n e ra l ly  accepted  d e f i n i t i o n s  of  the  
s i t u a t i o n  and champion t h e i r  p r e fe r r e d  a l t e r n a t i v e s  through c o n s u l t a t i o n s ,  
barga in ing  with o th e r s ,  and through r e - n e g o t i a t i o n  of th e  agreements l i k e  
the  ex tens ions  of th e  IDA exper t  team. This f u r t h e r  b r ings  back in to  
d i s cu s s io n  th e  po in t  made e a r l i e r  t h a t  management had r e l a t i v e  autonomy 
on o p e r a t i o n a l - s t r a t e g i c  changes.  In th e  l i g h t  of th e se  arrangements 
and agreements ,  i t  may be argued t h a t  management had i m p l i c i t  n e g o t i a t io n s  
with e x te r n a l  ac to r s  in the  sense t h a t  t h e i r  re o rg a n iz a t io n  s t r a t e g i e s
* John Bow's comments about th e  in f luence  of World Bank on LNDC 
d i v e s t i t u r e  s t r a t e g y  and th e  government pe rcep t ion  of  th e  Bank are  
a po in t  in case .  See Chapter 7.
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would seem t o  have been p red ica ted  upon th e  concerns of the  ex te rn a l  
a c to r s  as contained in the  agreements; eg World Bank concern about 
r i s k y  investments .
What emerges t h e r e f o r e ,  i s  not a p l i a n t  and homogeneous so c ia l  organ­
i z a t io n  whose s t r a t e g i c  changes were dominated and d i c t a t e d  by th e  
government,  o r  was i t s  s t r a t e g y  a tw o-ac tor  process  nego t ia ted  between 
management and government, depending on the  i s sues  a t  s t ak e .  But an 
o rg an iza t io n  where: (a) Fragmentation of a u t h o r i t y ,  d i v e r s i t y  of 
i n t e r e s t s ,  and contending d e f i n i t i o n s  of the  s i t u a t i o n  have to  be 
r e -n e g o t i a t e d  - Mangham (1979),  before  a s t r a t e g i c  dec i s ion  was imple­
mented. (b) There were c l u s t e r s  of competing in d iv id u a ls  with in  
management as well as th e  e x te r n a l  a c t o r s ,  advocat ing t h e i r  p a r t i c u l a r  
s t r a t e g i c  d i r e c t i o n .  For in s ta n ce ,  the  government views were as many 
and var ied  as the  m in i s t e r s  on LNDC board inc luding those  who opera ted 
backstage  on m at te rs  concerning LNDC. (Refer to  ch ap te r  7 d i v e s t i t u r e ,  
and 8 fo r  M ar t in 's  comments), (c) The power d i f f e r e n t i a l  amongst the se  
a c to r s  was s i g n i f i c a n t  and d e c i s iv e  in determining whose d e f i n i t i o n  of 
the  s i t u a t i o n  should p re v a i l  over o th e r s  o r  form th e  b a s i s  f o r  negot­
i a t i o n .  F in a l ly ,  s t r a t e g i c  changes t h a t  a f f e c t  most of these  ex te rn a l  
a c to r s  tended to  take  longer g e s t a t i o n  period  as broad c o n su l t a t i o n s  
and sound-up of the  a t t i t u d e s  were t e s t e d .  I t  took near ly  t h r e e  years  
to  f i n a l i z e  the  o f f e r  of p re fe rence  shares  t o  DGE, and longer period 
to  amend th e  LNDC a c t  t o  accommodate th e  i n t e r e s t s  of  new s tak e h o ld e r s .
I t  must be emphasized t h a t  th e  macro i n t e r a c t i o n s  with e x te r n a l  s t a k e ­
holders  were co n t ro l l e d  and processed by th e  government which was the  
guaran to r  of LNDC's loans and g r a n t s ;  a process  which made management 
t a sk  much harder  in t h a t  th e  government may veto the  proposal (though 
t h a t  r a r e ly  happened) to  n e g o t i a t e  f o r  LNDC, p r e f e r r i n g  to  guarantee  
funding f o r  o the r  p r o j e c t s .  Thus, management had t o  s e l l  i t s  proposal
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and n e g o t i a t e  with the  government about the  need f o r  the  l a t t e r  to  
n e g o t i a t e  on i t s  behalf  with a t a r g e t e d  e x te rn a l  f i n a n c i e r .  Mintzberg 
and McHugh (1985) l ikened t h i s  uncomfortable squeeze to  a s i t u a t i o n  of 
d r iv in g  an automobile without c o n t r o l l i n g  th e  s t e e r in g  wheel. 'You 
can a c c e l e r a t e  and brake,  but not determine d i r e c t i o n ' .  LNDC management 
faced a s im i l a r  and s u b s t a n t i a l l y  more complex s i t u a t i o n  where the  d r i v e r ,  
t o  cont inue  Min tzberg 's  metaphor,  had no con t ro l  of th e  brakes and 
received c o n f l i c t i n g  i n s t r u c t i o n s  about the  d i r e c t i o n  to  fo llow. Any 
change of d i r e c t i o n  deemed hazardous and unacceptable  by some powerful 
s tak eh o ld e r s ,  r e s u l t e d  in t h e i r  jamming on the  brakes t o  hold th e  au to ­
mobile,  o r  even change the  d r i v e r .  To proceed, the  d r i v e r  and those  in 
support  of the  d i r e c t i o n  he in tends  t o  fo llow,  have t o  n e g o t i a t e  with 
o th e r s ,  and a l l a y  t h e i r  f e a r s .
In p r a c t i c e ,  however, management i s  s e n s i t i v e  to  th e  p o t e n t i a l  i n t e r ­
vention from the  e x te rn a l  s tak eh o ld e r s  and a p a r t  from the  p rescr ibed  
o f f i c i a l  channels of i n t e r a c t i o n ,  has c rea ted  some s t r u c t u r e s  which 
g r e a t l y  a f f e c t  the  power of t h e se  a c to r s  d i s ru p t in g  s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s io n s .
In LNDC, the  Market Planning Unit was e s t a b l i s h e d  to  f o s t e r  changes 
and c o -o rd in a te  a l l  i n t e r a c t i o n  with ex te rn a l  a c t o r s ,  wi th in  government 
( in  th e  t h r e e  m i n i s t r i e s  r e sp o n s ib le  f o r  LNDC) th e r e  are  'desk o f f i c e r s '  
who deal with s p e c i f i c  i s sues  concerning the  c o rp o ra t io n ,  while the  
World Bank used review missions  t o  monitor the  performance of the  
c o rp o ra t io n .  These boundary scanning and monitoring u n i t s  were e f f e c t ­
ive f e e l e r s  and back channels  t h a t  expedited  communication amongst the  
s takeho lders  and influenced s t r a t e g i c  dec is ion  making p rocess .  That 
i s ,  on the  b a s i s  of pos tu r ing  and s tances  taken by the  WB review 
mission on p a r t i c u l a r  i s s u e s ,  th e  d i scu ss io n s  and sound-ups of the  
desk o f f i c e r s ,  a l o t  of informal readjustm ent and improvisa tion could 
be made to  c r e a t e  zones of agreement needed f o r  the  formal approach, 
knowing t h a t  t h e i r  views c lo s e ly  r e f l e c t  those  of th e  s takeho lders
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they r e p r e s e n t .  "The mission i s  prepared to  recommend to  World Bank 
management t h a t  the  c los ing  da te  f o r  c r e d i t  l i n e  985-LSO be extended 
by one more year .  However World Management may re q u i r e  a d d i t io n a l  
cond i t ions  before  agreeing to  a c lo s in g  da te  ex ten s io n " ,  World Bank 
su p e rv i s io n ,  (1986).  These ' s t a f f e r s '  a re  more f a m i l i a r  with the  
i s su es  and s i t u a t i o n  in LNDC than t h e i r  s u p e r io r s ,  and s ince  they 
were involved or consul ted  in th e  fo rmula t ion  of the  proposed s t r a t e g i c  
changes,  they  of ten  have a determining e f f e c t  on th e  s tands  t h e i r  bosses 
adopt - Mazzolini (1979).
These i n t e r a c t i o n  p a t t e r n s  are  diagrammed in f i g u r e  9.4 which b a s i c a l l y  
e la b o r a te s  on the  macro con tex t  of f i g u r e  9 .2 .  I t  f u r t h e r  shows, as 
was poin ted out e a r l i e r ,  t h a t  t h e r e  were some i m p l i c i t  channels of 
i n t e r a c t i o n  amongst the  e x te rn a l  o rg a n iz a t io n s  on m at te rs  of common 
i n t e r e s t  about LNDC. The d i r e c t  l i n e s  to  and from the  government,  LNDC 
and o th e r  ex te rn a l  s takeho lde rs  in d i c a t e  t h a t  each one of them had i t s  
own n e g o t i a t io n  paramete rs ,  and s p e c i f i c  i s sues  a f f e c t e d  by s t r a t e g i c  
changes.  From t h i s  p e r s p e c t iv e ,  the  government was the  hub through 
which a l l  t h e  spokes converged and diverged in d i f f e r e n t  d i r e c t i o n s .
The p a t t e r n s  f u r t h e r  in d ic a te  t h a t  a t  the  o p e ra t io n a l  level  t h e r e  was 
some degree of  d i s c r e t i o n  and f l e x i b i l i t y  once the  agreement had been 
reached. That i s ,  once th e  o f f i c i a l  n e g o t i a t io n s  were completed,  t h e r e  
was no need f o r  LNDC to  go through th e  government,  d i r e c t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
with th e  e x te r n a l  s takeho lde rs  were no longer r e g u la te d .  The most 
s i g n i f i c a n t  aspec t  of th e  macro i n t e r a c t i o n s  was the  e f f e c t i v e  way 
by which management was ab le  to  in f luence  and c r e a t e  cond i t ions  f o r  
s t r a t e g i c  changes t h a t  they could a c t  on,  through informal i n t e r a c t i o n s  
where people were able  to  c a s t  a s ide  t h e i r  p re sc r ib ed  ro l e s  and meet 
each o th e r  o u ts id e  of ' h i e r a r c h i c a l  c o n s t r a i n t s ' .
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F i n a l l y ,  w ith in  the  broader con tex t  of s t r a t e g i c  change, t h e r e  i s  the  
powerful informal i n t e r a c t a n t ,  who from time to  t ime in te rvenes  in 
var ious  ways and causes LNDC and th e  e x te rn a l  s takeho lders  to  respond 
immediately in o rder  to  r e c o n s t r u c t  t h e i r  new r e a l i t y .  Whilst  t h e r e  is  
no formal i n t e r a c t i o n  between LNDC management with t h i s  i n t e r a c t a n t ,  
each i s  o f ten  aware of what the  o th e r  i s  n e g o t ia t in g  and how t h a t  might 
a f f e c t  th e  o t h e r ' s  i n t e r e s t s .  The in t ro d u c t io n  of 12 per cen t  genera l  
s a l e s  tax  (GST) in SA, made Lesotho imports (95 per  cent  from SA) 
expensive by th e  same percen tage ,  and increased the  production c o s t s  
of LNDC companies t h a t  ge t  a l l  t h e i r  raw m a te r i a l s  from SA and expor t  
t o  th e  same. In s h o r t ,  they were rendered uncompet it ive  in t h a t  they 
were high co s t  producers ,  no wonder some companies moved to  SA homelands 
which have no GST and o f f e r  tax  f r e e  investment package. The d e c l in e  in 
th e  value of the  rand which a f f e c t s  Lesotho currency given t h a t  i t  is  
packed to  the  rand, and i t s  e f f e c t  on LNDC i n t e r e s t  and loan repayments 
to  ex te rn a l  s tak eh o ld e rs .  I t  i s  c l e a r  t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  occurrences  and 
c ircumstances  ex te rna l  to  LNDC do a f f e c t  i t s  s t r a t e g y  and should form an 
i n e x t r i c a b l e  p a r t  of i t s  n e g o t i a t i v e  process f o r  s t r a t e g i c  change, (see  
chap te r  5, monetary and f i s c a l  p o l i c i e s ) .  As we examine how a c to r s  
in s id e  and o u ts ide  LNDC, con f ron t  t h e i r  changing s i t u a t i o n s  and r e - n e g o t i a t e  
a new d i r e c t i o n  fo r  the  c o rp o ra t io n ,  our reco g n i t io n  of the  presence  of a 
p o t e n t i a l l y  a f f e c t e d ,  behind th e  s tage  a c t o r ,  may give a c lue  to  why 
management i n t e r p re te d  t h e i r  r e a l i t y  as they d id .
The analyses  in t h i s  chap te r  have i d e n t i f i e d  th e  p a t t e r n s  of s t r a t e g i c  
changes over the  period from 1967 to  1986, and have shown t h a t  s t r a t e g i c  
changes did not stem from a cont inuous lo g ica l  incremental  ism. But, 
r a t h e r ,  they were the  r e s u l t  of barga in ing  and p o l i t i c a l  games among key 
a c to r s  in s id e  and ou ts id e  th e  c o rp o ra t io n ,  having in f luence  on s t r a t e g i c  
d e c i s io n s .  These key a c to r s  have a lso  been i d e n t i f i e d ,  t h e i r  r o l e s  on 
s t r a t e g i c  changes,  power, i n t e r e s t s ,  and s tances  they took on d i f f e r e n t
288
i s su es  a f f e c t i n g  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s .  Three general  c a te g o r i e s  of  s takeho lde rs  
have emerged, comprising of  management, government and f i n a n c i a l  and 
t e c h n i c a l  s tak eh o ld e r s .  Important d i f f e r e n c e s  e x i s t  between and with in  
th e se  c a te g o r i e s  and y e t  j o i n t  a c t io n  i s  e s s e n t i a l ,  they have t o  ge t  
to g e th e r  and n e g o t i a t e  on what s t r a t e g i c  changes should be pursued.
In th e  next chap te r  we examine how given s t r a t e g i c  changes were n e g o t ia ted ,  
why p a r t i c u l a r  a c t o r ( s )  and not o t h e r s ,  were success fu l  in t h e i r  n e g o t ia ­
t i o n s ,  and how given d e f i n i t i o n s  of  a s i t u a t i o n  were con s t ru c ted  - 
Hall (1972).
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Figure 9.2 S t ra teg ic  change formulation and implementation process
Economic, Soc ia l ,  P o l i t i c a l ,  
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Chapter 10
Managing S t r a t e g i c  Change: The Negotiated Order Process
"Humans, a c t in g  p ragm at ica l ly  and c o l l e c t i v e l y ,  r a r e l y  i f  ever a c t  in 
t o t a l  c o n ce r t ,  and they o f ten  r e s o r t  t o  n eg o t i a t io n  i f  anything a t  a l l  
i s  t o  be accomplished",  Maines and Char lton (1985).
The previous  chap te r  has ind ica ted  t h a t  a 50E, in p a r t i c u l a r  LNDC, is  
not a monoli th ic  e n t i t y  with a u n i ta ry  voice and consensual o b j e c t i v e s ,  
but r a t h e r  i t  r e p re se n ts  a lo ca le  f o r  hard-fought compromises among 
d iv e r se  i n t e r e s t s  with mixed motives,  c h a ra c te r i z e d  by s h i f t i n g  and of ten  
c ross-purpose  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of what the  c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  o b je c t iv e s  are  
and /or  ought to  be. I t  i d e n t i f i e d  the  ' p l u r a l  p r in c ip a l s  and t h e i r  
ag en ts '  with which LNDC has to  contend, and poin ted out t h a t  n e g o t ia t io n  
process  and a c t o r s '  p o l i t i c a l  games seemed to  exp la in  b e t t e r  how s t r a t e g i c  
changes were formulated and implemented; however, we were s t i l l  l e f t  
without a c l e a r  unders tanding of t h a t  p rocess .  This chap te r  develops 
t h a t  p rocess ,  and t ranscends  the  micro-macro in t e r a c t i o n s  and a ttempts  
to  syn thes ize  them, and shed l i g h t  on d i f f e r e n t  i s sues  r a i s ed  in the  
preceding chap te r  by explor ing  in d e t a i l  the  a c t o r s '  l in e s  of ac t ion  
t h a t  c o n s t i t u t e d  n e g o t i a t i v e  change p rocess .
The context  of the  change n e g o t i a t io n s
The con tex t  of change n e g o t i a t io n s  as used here r e f e r s  " s p e c i f i c a l l y  to  
th e  s t r u c t u r a l  p ro p e r t i e s  e n te r in g  very d i r e c t l y  as cond i t ions  in to  the  
course  of th e  n eg o t ia t io n s  i t s e l f " ,  S t rauss  (1978).  S t rauss  f u r t h e r  
drew a t t e n t i o n  to  r e sp ec t iv e  a c t o r s '  ' concept ions  about n e g o t i a t i o n ' .
These conceptions  about n e g o t i a t io n  a c t  as:
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"means of c o n t r o l l i n g  and deal ing  with p ro p e r t i e s  of the  n eg o t ia t io n  
con tex t  - who c o n t ra c t s  with whom, who is  to  be involved in which 
n e g o t i a t i o n ,  t iming,  s t a k e s ,  i s sues  and the  use of option to  n e g o t i a t io n " ,  
O'Toole and O'Toole (1981).
They s e t  boundaries and d i r e c t i o n  wi th in  which management may c r e a t e  
s t r a t e g i c  changes while ensur ing t h a t  a t  c r u c i a l  s tages  of the  s t r a t e g i c  
d ec i s io n  process ,  those  a c to r s  whose i n t e r e s t s  would be impl icated by 
changes were informed and consul ted  about management's proposed l in e  of 
a c t i o n .  There was a shared unders tanding with in  LNDC and government t h a t  
th e  co rpo ra t ion  ( i t  could be added t h a t  the  whole country) has meagre 
f i n a n c i a l  and managerial resources  and depends heav i ly  on ex terna l  
suppor t .  That shared p r i o r i t y  had im pl ica t ions  f o r  the  process  of 
nego t ia ted  changes t h a t  emerged.
The study has revealed t h a t  a l l  s t r a t e g i c  changes t h a t  involved n eg o t ia t io n s  
with ex te rna l  ac to r s  and i s sues  perceived by government to  be of s t r a t e g i c  
importance to  the  na t iona l  economy, had to  be routed through a superv is ing  
m in is t ry  which would in t u rn  n e g o t i a t e  on beha lf  of LNDC and channel the  
proposals  through a c o -o rd in a t in g  m in is t ry  ( i e  co -o rd ina t ing  the  ex te rna l  
a c to r s  with LNDC). The p rocess ,  as was poin ted ou t ,  involved the  
Min is t ry  of Trade, superv is ing  m in i s t ry ,  n e g o t i a t in g  on behalf  of LNDC, 
once the  LNDC management and board have decided what course of ac t ion  
they would l ik e  to  fo llow. I f  an i s sue  involved f i n a n c i a l  dec is ions  l ike  
loans from the  in te rn a t io n a l  f i n a n c i a l  markets ,  the  Minis try of Finance 
would be the  ch ie f  n e g o t i a to r ,  whereas on most o the r  i ssues  l ik e  choice 
of fo re ign  p a r tn e r  or j o i n t  venture  with fo re ign  inves to rs  l ik e  Shanghai 
Corporation of China, Minis t ry  of Planning handles the  n e g o t i a t io n s .
I t  needs to  be emphasized t h a t  the  'back-channel f e e l e r s '  - the  informal 
c o n ta c t s ,  played a c r u c i a l  f a c i l i t a t i n g  ro l e  in developing the  groundwork 
through t h e i r  good rappor t  and sound-ups of t h e i r  c oun te rpa r t s  with in  
the se  ex te rna l  o rg a n iz a t io n s ,  and e s t a b l i s h i n g  the  f e a s i b i l i t y  of t h e i r
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proposa ls ,  They were a l so  a n e g o t i a t io n  s t r a t e g y  which management 
su cc e ss fu l ly  exp lo i ted  to  put p re s su re  on th e  government f o r  increased 
budgetary expenditure  and to  suppor t  and commit i t s e l f  to  proposed 
s t r a t e g i c  changes.  In o th e r  words, once th e  World Bank review team, 
o r  the  EEC re p re s e n ta t i v e  had in d ica ted  to  management t h a t  t h e i r  organ­
i z a t io n s  would be agreeab le  to  back-up the  changes,  i t  became extremely 
d i f f i c u l t  f o r  the  government, st rapped fo r  f inance  and te ch n ica l  s k i l l s ,  
t o  d e c l in e  such an a s s i s t a n c e ,  and th e r e f o r e  had to  be seen as i n s t r u ­
mental through s i g n i f i c a n t  f i n a n c i a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  This does not imply 
t h a t  every s t r a t e g i c  change so i n i t i a t e d  would harness government support ,  
p o l i t i c i a n s  might have t h e i r  own agenda to  pursue,  i t  does however 
in d i c a t e  the  nego t ia t ing  t a c t i c s  of management in enhancing t h e i r  chances 
of success by circumventing formal procedures  to  expedite  th e  n e g o t ia t io n  
p rocess .  A ty p ic a l  example was the  fo re ign  investment s t r a t e g y  and the  
IDA case ,  when John Bow approached the  I r i s h  to  provide te ch n ica l  a s s i s ­
t ance  to  implement the  investment promotion s t r a t e g y  given t h e i r  proven 
exper ience  in t h a t  f i e l d .  The s o f t  g ran t  of R10 m i l l io n  from EEC fo r  
th e  expansion and d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  of asparagus production by BFV 
( su b s id ia r y  of LNDC), a l so  i l l u s t r a t e s  the  p o in t .  Through informal 
backstage approach, management had nego t ia ted  a deal with th e se  e x te rn a l  
a c t o r s ,  which could only be consummated through th e  formal invervent ion  
of the  government as o f f i c i a l  n e g o t i a to r  and gua ran to r  of LNDC. Thus, 
th e  f i n a l  paces and procedures through the  formal channels became a 
mere r o u t in e ,  a view expressed by government i n d u s t r i a l  p lanner :  "while 
we sometimes re -a p p ra i s e  th e se  p roposa ls ,  we (Min is try  of Planning) are  
b a s i c a l l y  a post-bag fo r  LNDC". The government 's  conception of the  
n e g o t ia t io n  procedures was t h a t  they were e s s e n t i a l  to  ensure  c on t ro l  
and j u s t  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of sca rce  resources  t h a t  were demanded by var ious  
s e c to r s  of the  economy. But in a c t u a l i t y ,  as w i l l  be shown, t h a t  
s t r u c t u r a l  l im i t a t i o n  to  e x te r n a l  f i n a n c i a l  resources  and c o n t r a c tu a l
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n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  coupled with con t ro l  of annual budgetary  a l l o c a t i o n s ,  was 
an e f f e c t i v e  con t ro l  mechanism c r e a t in g  perpe tua l  dependency by which 
th e  government in f luenced  th e  s t r a t e g i c  behaviour of management.
The general  p a t t e r n  of n e g o t i a t i o n s  t h a t  emerges i s  to  two p rocesses :
(a) The s t r u c t u r a l  n e g o t i a t i o n s  - predominantly e x t e r n a l l y - o r i e n t e d ,  
a re  the  p re se rve  of  th e  government though they did  not l i m i t  
subsequent form of n e g o t i a t i o n s .  They are  l e s s  co n ten t io u s ,  
involved g e n e r a l ly  compat ible  o b j e c t i v e s ,  leading to  format ion of 
a l l i a n c e  between management and government to  secure  fo re ig n  
re sou rces ;  once approved by LNDC board,  t h e i r  passage through 
formal channels tended t o  be comparat ively smooth. The nego t iab le  
i s su e s ,  t im ing ,  p lace  of n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  th e  s takes  involved were 
normally c l e a r l y  s p e c i f i e d  and determined well in advance. For 
in s tan ce ,  i t  would be known t h a t  Minis t ry  of Finance would be 
n e g o t ia t in g  f o r  a l i n e  of c r e d i t ,  say with WB or  European Investment 
Bank - IEB, in Lesotho f o r  f inanc ing  of a s p e c i f i c  investment.  The 
n e g o t i a t io n s  were not i s o l a t e d ,  one -o ff  d e c i s io n s ,  but were sequen­
t i a l ,  o f ten  in f luenced  by previous agreements and c ond i t ions  with 
the  same a c to r  o r  o th e r  f i n a n c i e r s ,  and were p e r i o d i c a l l y  reviewed 
as ac to r s  r e - a p p ra i s e d  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s  and 'n e g o t i a t e d  r e d e f i n i t i o n '  
of t h e i r  s i t u a t i o n ,  Margolis (1985).
The ac tua l  involvement of government as an agent of f i r s t  co n tac t  
and gua ran to r ,  con fe r red  symbolic s t a t u s  to  th e  n e g o t i a t io n s  and 
leg i t im ised  th e  s t r a t e g i c  i s sues  n e g o t i a t e d .
(b) Unstruc tu red ,  sporad ic  n e g o t i a t io n s  in which t h e r e  were no formal 
d e l i m i t a t i o n s ,  p r e s c r i p t i o n s  o r  procedure on which management had 
to  fol low in c r e a t i n g  s t r a t e g i c  changes.  Under t h i s  p rocess ,  
n e g o t ia t io n s  were h igh ly  p rob lem at ic ,  p o l i t i c a l l y  charged, and 
involved c l o s e r  i n t e r a c t i o n  and a broader spectrum of s takeho lde rs
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because of  con ten t ious  is sues  a t  s take  and d i v e r s i t y  of views on 
th e  a c t o r s '  d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e i r  s i t u a t i o n .  I t  c lo se ly  p a r a l l e l e d  
what Hickson e t  al  (1985) c a l l e d  'v o r t e x - s p o r a d i c '  s t r a t e g i c  
d ec i s io n s  which 'draw in a complex m u l t i p l i c i t y  of information and 
opin ions  on i s sues  t h a t  had se r io u s  r e p e r c u s s i o n s ' .  The changes 
and t h e i r  t ime framework were o f ten  vague, unprecedented,  though 
l inked to  the  c u r r e n t  o r  previous  s t r a t e g i e s .  D i f f e re n t  s e t  of 
a l l i a n c e s  - management and o th e r  e x te rn a l  a c t o r s ,  formed to  f i g h t  
and in f luence  s t r a t e g i c  changes o f ten  a g a in s t  government. In 
chap te rs  seven and e i g h t ,  in s tances  of t h i s  process were shown 
when the  proposed d i v e s t i t u r e  s t r a t e g y  c r ea ted  such a c a u s t i c  
p o l i t i c a l  response and t racked  f o r  y e a r s .  The l o c a l i s a t i o n  
programme and the  headquar te r  r e o rg a n iz a t io n s  survived through 
th e  s t rong a l l i a n c e  among d iv i s i o n a l  d i r e c t o r s  and the  support  
from ex te rna l  s tak e h o ld e r s .
The d i s t i n c t i o n  drawn between th e se  processes  was more apparent than 
r e a l ,  i t  was f l u i d  and inde termina te  and had a lo t  of c r i s s - c r o s s i n g  
in t h a t  the  outcomes of one could lead to  the  emergence of the  o th e r .
An example of t h i s  was found in th e  dec i s ion  by World Bank and DEG 
( r e s u l t a n t  of s t ru c tu re d  n e g o t i a t io n )  demanded d e p o l i t i c i z a t i o n  of 
the  board through reduct ion  of p o l i t i c i a n s ,  a m at te r  which s t i r r e d  
g r e a t  p o l i t i c a l  concern,  and as i t  tu rned  ou t ,  the  board was even tu a l ly  
increased  to  nine to  accommodate o u ts id e  exper ienced business  members 
than reduce p o l i t i c i a n s .
From the se  two n e g o t ia t io n  p rocesses ,  a l so  emerged d i f f e r e n t  n e g o t ia t io n  
t a c t i c s .  Thusm under the  s t r u c tu r e d  p rocess ,  e sp e c i a l l y  when s t r a t e g i c  
changes involved deployment of ex te rn a l  resources  or f a c i l i t y  t o  exped i te  
the  execut ion of the  changes,  the  process  was marked by c o n s i s t e n t ly  
s t rong a l l i a n c e  between management and government to  secure  these
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r e so u rce s .  However, the  a l l i a n c e  was o f ten  s h o r t - l i v e d  and g ra d u a l ly  
te rm ina t ing  i t s e l f  as soon as the  n e g o t i a t io n s  have been completed.  
Beneath th e  su r face  of the  a l l i a n c e ,  as has been pointed o u t ,  were 
s t rong d iv i s io n s  on how th e  nego t ia ted  resources  were to  be deployed. 
Each r e a l i z e d  the  importance of th e  o th e r  in ob ta in ing  what they  both 
c l e a r l y  needed, and ye t  consensus of pe rcep t ions  about how th e  resources  
should be used to  accomplish LNDC mandate remained i l l u s i v e ,  t r i g g e r i n g  
ano ther  bout of  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  For in s tan ce ,  e x t e r n a l l y  sourced funds 
were used mainly t o  promote fo re ig n  investment,  and the  c r i t e r i a  LNDC 
followed to  a s s i s t  i n v e s t o r s ,  ru led  out local  en t rep reneurs  (see  
chap te r  7 on comments of M in is t ry  of Trade),  and t h a t  in v i ted  p o l i t i c a l  
in t e r v e n t io n .
On the  b a s i s  of t h e i r  exper ience  and knowledge of deal ing  with e x te r n a l  
f i n a n c i e r s ,  the  government n e g o t i a t io n  s t r a t e g i e s  and o f f e r s  included 
changes to  i t s  f i s c a l  p o l i c y ,  such as Pioneer In d u s t r i e s  Act which 
provided f o r  a tax  s h e l t e r  to  a minimum of  s ix  years  to  in v e s t o r s ,  
compromises on problematic  i s sues  l i k e  absorbing fo re ign  exchange r i s k s  
fo r  LNDC, and a c l e a r  s ta tement  of commitment to  p r i v a t e - s e c t o r  o r i e n te d  
i n d u s t r i a l  po l icy .  These concessions  and c o u n te r - o f f e r s  were exac ted  by 
e x te rn a l  f in a n c i e r s *  as a quid pro quo f o r  t h e i r  f i n a n c i a l  and t e c h n ic a l  
investment in LNDC. The n e g o t i a t i n g  teams from both s ides  - government 
and fo re ig n  a c t o r s ,  were a r e l a t i v e l y  s t a b l e  group who knew each o th e r  
w e l l ,  who have been involved in va r ious  s i m i l a r  n e g o t ia t io n s  over th e  
years  and had a c l e a r  idea of what to  expect from th e  o the r  on va r ious  
i s su e s .  In o th e r  words, r e g a rd le s s  of p o l i t i c a l  s e n s i t i v i t y  of  the  
investment,  LNDC and the  Lesotho government knew t h a t  World Bank would 
i n s i s t  on economic v i a b i l i t y  of the  proposed change as a prime cond i t io n
* ex te rna l  f i n a n c i e r s  and a c to r s  are  used in te rchangeably  to  r e f e r  to  
' e x te rn a l  s tak e h o ld e r s '  of th e  c o rp o ra t io n .
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of  i t s  suppor t .  The power d i f f e r e n t i a l  between the  i n t e r a c t a n t s  in t h i s  
process  var ied  according to  th e  na tu re  of the  is sues  on agenda, th e  t ime 
p re s su re s ,  and a v a i l a b i l i t y  or n o n - a v a i l a b i l i t y  of a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  the  
government. In those  in s tances  where e x te rn a l  resources  were sought,  the  
s i t u a t i o n  c r i t i c a l  and u rgen t ,  th e  power ba lance was t ipped  in favour of 
fo re ig n  a c t o r s .  The le ad e rsh ip  tu rbu lance  t h a t  followed th e  d epar tu re  
of  Van Gen and h is  co-opted managers,  from 1973 to  1977, and subsequent 
i n t e rv e n t io n  by World Bank which requ i red  in r e tu rn  complete revamping 
o f  LNDC s t r a t e g y  and ope ra t iona l  procedures ,  i l l u s t r a t e  the  p o i n t .  The 
converse  was the  case  in those  s i t u a t i o n s  where LNDC wanted a fo re ig n  
p a r tn e r  t o  inves t  in a v ia b le  p r o j e c t ,  and i t s  n e g o t i a to r ,  th e  government, 
had the  l a t i t u d e  and op t ions  to  choose from or  not t o  n e g o t i a t e  a t  a l l .
The po in t  in case  was Lesotho Brewing Company which was e s t a b l i s h e d  by 
LNDC t o  d i v e r s i f y  i t s  income genera t ing  sources .  The government c l inched  
a deal with South African Breweries - SAB, and CDC, to  take  minor i ty  
sh a res ,  in s p i t e  of World Bank re fu s a l  to  f inance  i t  and s t rong  ob jec t ion  
to  v/hat they  perceived as a r i sk y  investment s t r a t e g y .  On th e  average,  
however, th e  study shows t h a t  ' d i s t r i b u t i o n  of r e so u rce s '  was a s s y m e t r i c a l , 
and the  power was heav i ly  leaded in favour  of  e x te r n a l  a c t o r s ,  as de f iance  
of p recau t ions  from one could e a s i l y  j eo p a rd ize  f u tu r e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  with 
th e  same a c to r  or o the rs  (see  appendix I I ) .  The nego t ia ted  changes took 
p lace  wi th in  the  broader  t ranscending  con tex t  of p o l i t i c a l  i n s t a b i l i t y ,  
economic dependence, l eade rsh ip  changes and in tense  compet it ion  which 
' d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y  in f luenced  the  cond i t ions  in which people  a c t e d ' ,  
Maines and Char lton,  (1985) p . 281.
The complexity of s t r a t e g i c  changes,  and indeed the  n e g o t i a t io n  process  
in LNDC, as pointed out in the  previous  c h ap te r ,  was complicated by the  
omnipresence of government as p a r t  of management - ie  chairman and 
d i r e c t o r s  of the  board,  as p a r t  of ex te rna l  s tak e h o ld e r s ,  and as an 
o f f i c i a l  mediator l ink ing  th e  co rpo ra t ion  with i t s  ou t s ide  environment.
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In t h i s  regard i t s  r o l e  c o n s t i t u t e d  not only the  overarching contex ts  
whereby n eg o t ia t io n  con tex ts  mediate s t r u c t u r a l  con tex ts  and the  ac tua l  
n e g o t i a t io n  - S t rauss  (1978), but by combining a l l  t h r e e  elements to g e th e r ,  
t h e  government 's  in te rven ing  r o l e  c lo s e ly  p a r a l l e l s  Hall and Hall (1982) 
not ion  of ' o r g a n iz a t io n a l  c o n te x t '  d e l im i t in g  th e  n e g o t i a t i v e  con tex t  
though not the  subsequent form of n e g o t i a t i o n . I t  f u r t h e r  r ev ea l s  t h a t  
while  the  c o n t ra c tu a l  and procedural  arrangements made with ex te rna l  
a c to r s  and management r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  were open to  n eg o t ia t io n  as s i t u a t i o n s  
changed, the  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  media tion ro l e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  with i t s  SOE 
was not tempora l,  but has remained r a t h e r  enduring and unchanged, hence 
breeding the  cond i t ions  f o r  th e  emergence of informal channels which to  
a l a rge  e x te n t  in f luence  and determine what w i l l  be n e g o t ia ted .  In o the r  
words, had LNDC had s t r a t e g i c  dec i s ion  p re ro g a t iv e  to  n e g o t i a t e  s t r a t e g i c  
changes d i r e c t l y  with e i t h e r  government o r  any o th e r  ex te rna l  s tak e h o ld e r s ,  
t h e r e  would perhaps be no need f o r  e s tab l i shm ent  of Market Planning Unit 
in LNDC, or  'desk o f f i c e r s '  in government and the  review teams by ex te rna l  
s t ak e h o ld e r s ,  monitor ing and c o -o rd in a t in g  the  nego t ia ted  i s su e s ,  or  
ga th e r in g  information to  f a c i l i t a t e  n e g o t i a t i o n .  Thus, by (government) 
c i rcumscr ib ing  and r e g u la t in g  th e  scope f o r  n e g o t i a t i o n ,  management 
response  to  ward o f f  and circumvent th e  perceived in t r u s io n  in t h e i r  
s t r a t e g i c  dec is ion  making autonomy was to  c r e a t e  an informal n e g o t i a t i v e  
s t r u c t u r e  which can manipulate  the  subs tance of  the  dec is ion  and t r a n sm i t s  
i t s  nego t ia ted  outcomes through th e  formal s t r u c t u r e .
The Unstructured Process:  Paradigmatic  S h i f t  Revis ited
S t r a t e g i c  change, i t  was observed in the  preceding chap te r ,  had come 
about as an a l t e r n a t i o n  of incremental  and adapt ive  process of de lays  
and r e c o n s id e ra t io n s  t h a t  were o cca s io n a l ly  i n t e r l a c e d  by brusque and 
p ropu ls ive  paradigmat ic  s h i f t .  I t  was f u r t h e r  pointed out t h a t  s t r a t e g i c  




owner s i t u a t i o n  in which each of the  subgroups s take  t h e i r  claim and goals  
r e l a t e d  to  t h e i r  c o n s t i t u e n t s .  Under such c i rcumstances ,  i t  was argued, 
while  the  s tak eh o ld e rs  may r e a l i z e  and a p p re c ia t e  the  need f o r  change, 
th e  g r e a t e s t  hurd le  f o r  management was th e  blending and c r y s t a l l i z i n g  
of  the  redef ined  and new changes to  a level  where a compromise focused on 
a s p e c i f i c  s t r a t e g y  (from a mul t i tude  of many t h a t  would be sw i r l in g  
around) could be achieved among the  d i f f e r e n t  i n t e r e s t e d  a c t o r s .  Unlike 
th e  s t ru c tu re d  n eg o t ia ted  change process  d iscussed  in the  previous  s ec t io n ,  
t h e r e  were no normative p r o s c r ip t i o n s  and whi le  some s t r a t e g i c  changes 
were occas io n a l ly  d i c t a t e d  by the  powerful s tak e h o ld e r s ,  t h e re  was some 
degree of l a t i t u d e  in the  way management could n e g o t i a t e  o r  opt not to  
n e g o t i a t e  some changes.  The achievement of s t r a t e g i c  change and whole 
n e g o t i a t io n  process  were p a r t i c u l a r l y  complex and management and o th e r  
in t e r e s t e d  a c to r s  had to  use d i f f e r e n t  techn iques  to  bring about the  
n eg o t ia ted  changes.  Some of the  i n s t i g a t e d  s t r a t e g i c  changes confronted  
and quest ioned the  s e n s i t i v e  and ' i d e a l i s e d  ways of doing b u s i n e s s ' ,  the  
dominant percep t ion  and accumulated exper ience  t h a t  c o l l e c t i v e l y  formed 
a paradigm out of which the  c o rpo ra t ion  ope ra tes  and provides  th e  ac to r s  
with a re fe rence  s t r u c t u r e  f o r  i n t e r p r e t i n g  t h e i r  r e a l i t y  - Berg (1985,
p . 288).
I t  may be argued, t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  the  c r e a t io n  of s t r a t e g i c  change rep ­
r e s e n t s  not only th e  t ran s fo rm a t io n  of th e  underlying b e l i e f  system about 
the  o rgan iza t io n a l  fu n c t io n in g ,  which f o r  a SOE i s  a l l -encompassing ,  but 
a l so  the  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of th e  con tex ts  w i th in  which the  a c to r s  i n t e r a c t  - 
a p a r t i c u l a r  new way of  looking a t  th e  r e a l i t y  around them. Pe t t ig rew  
(1985) has echoed th e  same, t h a t  because s t r a t e g i c  change can pose a 
t h r e a t  and quest ion  th e  c e n t r a l  t e n e t s  of dominant b e l i e f s  and r e p l a c e ­
ment of o rg a n iz a t io n a l  ideology,  such changes go beyond managerial  choice 
and pe rcep t ion .  They may be r e s u l t a n t  of o rg a n iz a t io n a l  c r i s i s ,
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environmental  p r e s su re s ,  and f l u r r y  of execu t ive  ac t ion  - ( p . 137).
These changes began to  take  p lace  in LNDC from 1977 to  1982. The 
co rp o ra t io n  had been d r i f t i n g  from one investment s t r a t e g y  to  ano ther  
wi thout  c l e a r  focus and success when John Bow took over as CEO in 1977.
The change p r e c i p i t a t o r s  -  see chap te rs  s ix  and seven, had caused g re a t  
concern to  both the  government and management. The c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  f i n a n ­
c i a l  performance was in c re a s in g ly  d e t e r i o r a t i n g ,  i t  had been making 
lo s ses  s ince  1973 and only survived through government subsidy .  There 
was lack of c o n s i s t e n t  l e ad e rsh ip  guidance,  a high tu rnover  of  CEOs (had 
seven CEOs with in  a per iod  of ten  year s )  and su b s id ia ry  managers as w e l l ,  
e s c a l a t e d  by a d e spe ra te  and unsuccessfu l  search fo r  replacements  of 
s k i l l e d  South African managers, many of whom gradua l ly  l e f t  LNDC companies 
fo llowing the  d epar tu re  of Van Gen. The world recess ion  had adverse ly  
a f f e c t e d  the  h a n d ic r a f t  indus t ry  where LNDC had invested  heav i ly  in the  
l a t e  1960s. The i n s t a b i l i t y  wi th in  the  region and the  country  in 
p a r t i c u l a r ,  following the  1970 a b o r t iv e  general  e l e c t i o n ,  co n t r ib u te d  
to  the  waning investment confidence  as in v e s to r s  perceived i t  as a high 
r i s k  investment a rea .  (Refer t o  P-E r e p o r t  in chap te r  7 ) .  L a s t ly ,  the  
c e s s a t io n  of th e  income inflows from SA companies in terms of l ev ie s  and 
r o y a l t i e s ,  meant t h a t  management had l o s t  t h a t  s lack  resource  option  
and r e l i e d  so le ly  on government subventions  f o r  both r e c u r r e n t  and 
investment expend i tu re .  I t  was a combination of th e se  'environmental  
p r e s s u r e s '  - by no means exc lus ive  o r  de terminan t ,  and managerial  ac t ion  
or  inac t ion  which began to  unfreeze  th e  a c t o r s '  b e l i e f s ,  and formed the  
premise of John Bow's r eques t ion ing  of the  p re v a i l in g  and taken fo r  
granted s t r a t e g i c  paradigm which could no longer handle the  problems 
which p r e c i p i t a t e d  the  c r i s i s  and which remained unresolved d e s p i t e  
management commitment to  th e  old paradigm, Imershein (1980).
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Paradigm Change: The N e g o t i a t i o n  Process
The s tage  f o r  paradigm change had been s e t  by the  above mentioned change 
t r i g g e r s  and by the  appointment of new local  CEO, enabling management to  
t a b l e  a new agenda, spread the  d i s c o n te n t  and t en s io n  a l ready  high with 
t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  f i n a n c i a l  performance and f u t u r e .  The oppor tun i ty  was 
t h e r e  and th e  time r i g h t  to  complete the  d i s c r e d i t i n g  of the  old dominant 
paradigm which perceived LNDC as an ' investment i n s t i g a t o r 1, holding 
e q u i ty  and managing a l l  i t s  s u b s i d i a r i e s . The s i t u a t i o n  th e  co rpo ra t ion  
faced in 1977-82 was d i f f e r e n t ,  and th e  so c ia l  and economic c o n d i t io n s ,  
e x p ec ta t io n s  and c o n s t r a i n t s  t h a t  guided i t s  e s tab l i shm ent  and the  
previous  s t r a t e g i e s  i t  followed s ince  1967, had e i t h e r  changed or  were 
no longer  r e l e v a n t .  I t s  en trenched s t r a t e g i e s  and s t r u c t u r e s  were being 
urged ' t o  be nimble and a d a p t a b l e ' .  I t  was t h e r e f o r e  imperative f o r  
management to  begin th e  ' s e a rch  f o r  new p e r sp ec t iv e s  and procedures to  
respond to  and transcend th e  new s i t u a t i o n s  and o b s t a c l e s ' ,  Hall (1983).
As a l ready  pointed o u t ,  t h e r e  was a broadly based agreement among the  
key dec i s ion  makers on the  p o s s ib le  causes  of the  problem, most of which 
were known to  be a na t iona l  problem, l i k e  shor tage  of managerial  e x p e r t i s e  
and scarce  f i n a n c i a l  re sources  t o  cont inue  th e  s u b s id i z a t io n .  The new 
s t r a t e g y  proposed by management rede f ined  LNDC as an 1 investment 
f a c i l i t a t o r ,  promoting fo re ig n  investment in the  country  and f i n a n c i a l l y  
a s s i s t i n g  p o te n t i a l  i n v e s to r  to  s e t  up without tak ing  equ i ty  s take  or  
involvement in the  management of  such companies. I t  e s s e n t i a l l y  sought 
t o  a v e r t  any investment r i s k s  and c a l l e d  f o r  a fundamental change to  what 
had been done up to  then and r e p o s i t i o n in g  of the  co rpo ra t ion  in a 
d i f f e r e n t  p o s i t io n  of the  investment market,  and c a l l e d  f o r  divestment 
o f  a l l  loss  making o p e ra t io n s .  Never before  had t h e r e  been a change of 
th e  s ca le  and depth proposed by ' inves tm ent  promotion and d i v e s t i t u r e * .  
Previous s t r a t e g i c  changes had a l l  been w i th in  the  a c t o r s '  paradigm - 
w i th in  t h e i r  t o l e r a b l e  l im i t s  and e x p ec ta t io n s  of th e  goals  LNDC should
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be following and t h e i r  adap ta t ion  as s i t u a t i o n s  changed. The new 
proposed s t r a t e g y  opened up d i scu ss io n  about LNDC domain which f o r  so 
long had been assumed away or  be l ieved  to  be unders tood.
The change t r i g g e re d  r e s i s t a n c e  from a l l  q u a r t e r s ;  wi th in  management 
th e  concern was not with the  s t r a t e g y  per se ,  r a t h e r  with the  c r e d i b i l i t y  
of  the  change provocateur - the  CEO. There was an element of s u r p r i s e ,  a 
' c u l t u r a l  shock'  and power s t ru g g le  with the  appointment of the  f i r s t  
indigenous CEO, in a c o rpo ra t ion  t h a t  from es tab l ishm ent  was predominantly 
managed by fo re ign  e x p e r t s .  The appointment proved unbearable  to  the  
l a t t e r ,  some of whom res igned  leaving room fo r  Bow's suppor te rs  to  
c lo se  ranks and p resen t  a un i ted  a l l i a n c e .  But the  f i e r c e s t  r e s i s t a n c e  
t o  the  r a d ic a l  r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  and re form ula t ion  of the  c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  
r o l e ,  r a t h e r  unexpectedly,  came from government which perceived the  
changes as a p o l i t i c a l  t h r e a t  and a se r ious  compromise of n a t iona l  
i n t e r e s t s ,  tantamount to  r e j e c t i o n  of the  s p i r i t  and r a t i o n a l e  of i t s  
c r e a t i o n .  For in s tance ,  see chap te r  7 on d i v e s t i t u r e  and r e a c t io n s  
of d i f f e r e n t  a c to r s  who perceived the  change as a ' t a b o o ' .  The PS 
of Trade r e fe r r e d  to  the  change as ' t h e  s e r ious  f a i l u r e  where LNDC 
has wronged t h i s  c o u n t r y ' .  The i n t e n s i t y  of oppos i t ion  to  the  changes 
was so immense t h a t  d e s p i t e  show of u n i ty ,  f o r  the  f i r s t  t ime th e  s p l i t  
of views and d i v e r s i t y  of pe rcep t ions  among government ac to r s  regard ing  
the  goals of LNDC sur faced .  What was c l e a r  was t h a t  the  changes in the  
c o r p o r a t io n ' s  environment were pe rceived and defined d i f f e r e n t l y  by 
a c to r s  whose id eo log ies  a re  d i f f e r e n t ,  and tended to  a r r i v e  a t  d i f f e r e n t  
conc lus ions .  Hence o rg a n iz a t i o n a l  a c t ion  became d i f f i c u l t  t o  achieve ,  
Brunsson (1985 p . 137). LNDC had a broad mandate which meant a l l  s o r t s  
of th ings  to  people who held d i f f e r e n t  hypotheses and d e f i n i t i o n s  of 
t h e i r  world,  e s p e c i a l l y  i t s  owners,  the  government, none of which had 
been focused and d iscussed  be fo re .  I t  was always i m p l i c i t l y  assumed 
t h a t  th e re  was a union of minds w i th in  government and management on
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what th e  co rpora t ion  should be doing, as the  former Permanent Sec re ta ry
of  Trade cogently  put i t :
"Somewhere in th e  a c t  (LNDC Act 1967) i t  was our (government) i n t e n t io n
t o  c r e a t e  a development co rpo ra t ion  t h a t  would follow r e le v a n t  i n d u s t r i a l
s t r a t e g i e s " .
Under such c ircumstances ,  Hall and Hall (1982) po in t  out t h a t  ' i f  people 
a re  p u b l ic ly  accountable  and must a c t  under unc lea r  c o n d i t io n s ,  i t  seems 
lo g ic a l  t h a t  they w i l l  n e g o t i a t e ' .  I t  could be argued th e r e f o r e  t h a t  the  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of  th e  n e g o t i a t io n  approach contemplated by management 
depended upon ob ta in ing  the  most d i r e c t  access  to  head of government v/ho 
had co n t ro l  over o th e r s ,  t o  obv ia te  time-consuming m u l t ip l e  n e g o t i a t io n s  
with ind iv idua l  m in i s t e r s  holding d isco rd an t  views. The unorthodox and 
r i s k y  approach of s h o r t - c i r c u i t i n g  th e  formal channels and d i r e c t l y  
n e g o t i a t in g  with th e  p innacle  of power, was th e  most e f f e c t i v e  t a c t i c  
under th e  c ircumstances  given the  d i c t a t o r i a l  p o l i t i c a l  c l im a te  in the  
country  in which the  P.M. was th e  c e n t r a l  f i g u r e  in almost a l l  s t r a t e g i c  
d ec i s io n s  inc luding appoin t ing  or  confirming choice of CEOs.
Thus th e  notion of a c o n s i s t e n t  vocabulary of meanings and shared 
paradigm common to  an o rg an iza t io n  such as a SOE composed of c o n s ta n t ly  
s h i f t i n g  h e te rogene i ty  of i n t e r e s t s ,  would seem to  be i l l u s i v e .  There 
a re  d i f f e r e n t  paradigms held by d i f f e r e n t  changing a c to r s  who come in 
and move out of the  c o rpo ra t ion  and th e  government, some of whom may 
hold views s im i l a r  t o  and c o n s i s t e n t  with the  management whi le  o th e r s  
may emphasize th e  s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  ro l e  of th e  c o rp o ra t io n .  In th e  
1984/85 Budget speech, the  M in is t e r  of  Finance had urged SOEs to  
improve t h e i r  performance and achieve r e tu r n  on t h e i r  investments .
The government, due in p a r t  of ex te rn a l  p re s su re s  of s takeho lde rs  and 
economic problems fac ing  i t ,  had s h i f t e d  from a po l icy  of ' a r t i f i c i a l  
employment boos t ing '  maintained by sub s id ie s  t o  demanding p r o f i t a b i l i t y
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and div idend payout. Thus the  government of the  day had new ac to r s  
who held s im i l a r  economic goals  to  LNDC. S t r a t e g i c  change, t h e r e f o r e ,  
has h igher  chances of success i f  th e  change i n i t i a t o r s  and promoters 
harness  the  suppor t  of th e  powerful in t e r n a l  and ex te rna l  ( p o l i t i c a l )  
a c t o r s ,  who not only can suppress op p o s i t io n ,  but t h e i r  a u th o r i ty  and 
views have some degree of  leg it im acy and c r e d i b i l i t y  with t h e i r  c o n s t ­
i t u e n t s  t h a t  ensures  t h a t  they can hold a tremendous sway.
The idea of LNDC owning the  bus inesses  through 100 per  cent equ i ty  
investment,  however poorly managed, c a r r i e d  a symbolic meaning of g re a t  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  to  government; i t  meant con t ro l  of the  economy h e re to fo re  
in fo re ig n  hands and a measure of economic independence.  I t  was the  
p o l i t i c i a n s '  view t h a t  LNDC and i t s  companies were a medium through 
which indigenous managers could develop p r a c t i c a l  managerial  exper ience .  
D iv e s t i t u r e  chal lenged t h i s  t r a d i t i o n a l  way of ' f u n c t io n in g  and doing 
bus iness  around h e r e ' ,  and had p o t e n t i a l  p i t f a l l s  of  opening up old 
p o l i t i c a l  sca rs  and a l l  the  negat ive  connota t ions  of an economy c o n t ro l l e d  
be f o r e ig n e r s .  I t  was an unknown t e r r a i n  in as ye t  undetermined and 
un tes ted  d i r e c t i o n  without assurances  t h a t  the  a c t o r s '  c u r r e n t  and 
f u tu r e  p o s i t io n a l  power and i n t e r e s t s  w i l l  be p ro te c te d .  Moreover, the  
old defunct  s t r a t e g y  s t i l l  had i t s  f a i t h f u l  i n i t i a t o r s  in p o s i t io n s  of 
in f luence  within  government where t h e i r  ove r t  o r  behind the  scenes 
support  would be c ru c i a l  to  the  success  of the  proposed s t r a t e g i c  
change. The c u r re n t  s t r a t e g y  was no dount i n e f f e c t i v e  but the  proposed 
a l t e r n a t i v e  was perceived worse.  M i t ro f f  (1985),  Cummings e t  al  (1985) 
and Johnson (1987) have argued t h a t  such a change was l ik e  asking an 
o rgan iza t ion  to  ' l e a p  through th e  a i r  without a s a f e ty  n e t ' .  To 
amel io ra te  the  t ens ions  and t h r e a t  c rea ted  by change to  a c t o r s '  cher ished  
i n t e r e s t s ,  Beckett  ( in  Sunday Times, September 14 1986) has suggested 
a 'do lphin  o p t i o n ' .  He argues t h a t  i f  a person i s  on the  bank of  a 
pool perceived to  be f u l l  of sharks and i s  urged to  swim across  to  the
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o th e r  (unknown) s id e ,  he w i l l  not o b l ige  however ca jo led  he /she  may be. 
However, by assu r ing  the  in d iv idua l  and demonstrat ing t h a t  the  dreaded 
' s h a r k s '  t h r e a ten in g  t h e i r  power were a c t u a l l y  ' d o lp h in s '  t h a t  would 
f a c i l i t a t e  passage to  even b e t t e r  f u tu r e  - c u t  l o s se s ,  save government 
subsidy handouts,  then th e  oppos i t ion  may melt  down and the  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  
pe rcep t ion  of a changed s i t u a t i o n  improved. Such a s t r a t e g y  was one of 
many management used,  inc luding  arrangements t o  the  e f f e c t  t h a t  LNDC 
would r e t a i n  ownership of  ' s t r a t e g i c  p r o j e c t s ' ,  which was an important 
compromise a ssur ing  government continued con t ro l  of what i t  regarded as 
n a t io n a l  i n t e r e s t s .  The loca l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  and ownership had even led 
t o  th e  e s tab l i shm ent  of Lesotho Investment Holding, t h a t  would buy 
shares  in fo re ign  companies and s e l l  them to  l o c a l s ,  as f u r t h e r  assurance  
t h a t  a 'paradigm' change was not meant to  uproot government power and 
c o n t r o l .
One of  the  d i s t i n g u i s h in g  f e a t u r e s  of  s t r a t e g i c  change in a SOE i s  t h a t ,  
once s t r a t e g i c  dec i s ions  reach a c e r t a i n  s tage  of p o l i t i c i z a t i o n  and 
in t e r v e n t io n ,  they a re  no longer in the  realm of co rpo ra te  boardroom - 
they  a re  considered o u ts id e  of management a u t h o r i t y ,  w ith in  government 
in th e  p a r lo u rs  of p o l i t i c a l  h ie r a r c h y .  I t  i s  a t  t h i s  s tage  t h a t  
management has t o  keep open the  channels of n e g o t i a t io n  with the  govern­
ment and put p re ssu re  on those  concerned fo r  a c t i o n .  As Margolis (1985) 
a p t ly  pointed o u t ,  once ' t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  has been challenged and the  
chal lenge  has been taken up, a n e g o t i a t io n  i s  on th e  agenda ' ,  a s t a t e  
of encounte r c h a ra c te r i z e d  by i n t e r a c t i o n  and b i l a t e r a l  n e g o t i a t io n s  
between th e  groups Narayanan and Fahey (1982).  But the  complexity of 
n e g o t i a t in g  with th e  p o l i t i c i a n s  rep resen ted  on both s ides  of the  
equat ion  is  enormous. Normally, th e  pa ren t  m in i s t ry  - M in is te r  of 
Trade and chairman of LNDC, i s  supposed to  be i t s  spokesman and 
c h i e f  n e g o t i a to r  in c a b in e t .  Within t h i s  c o n tex t ,  h is  major func t ion  
is  t o  serve as a ' b u f f e r '  between the  two o rgan iza t io n s  and provide
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a boundary-spanning r o l e  such as ga in ing  information and mediating the  
p o l i t i c s  of the  system where LNDC i n t e r e s t s  are  involved, Levy (1982).
But when the  p o l i t i c a l  e s tab l i shm ent  i s  unequivocally  a g a in s t  the  
s p e c i f i c  changes proposed by LNDC, c o n f l i c t  of i n t e r e s t s  crop up and 
th e  m i n i s t e r ' s  a l l e g i a n c e  to  government means the  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  
w i l l  p r e v a i l ,  o f ten  with l i t t l e  o r  no accommodation of the  c o n f l i c t i n g  
i n t e r e s t s  of th e  o th e r  weaker a c t o r s .  Within government, t h e r e  was 
f l u i d  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s io n s ,  m in i s t e r s  come and go due 
to  changes in governments and cab in e t  r e s h u f f l e ,  and new ones may take  
a d i f f e r e n t  s tance  towards LNDC. Worse s t i l l ,  the  government p o s i t io n  
may have long been determined in c a b in e t ,  and th e  re l e v a n t  m in i s t e r  may be 
wai t ing  f o r  the  a p p ro p r ia t e  moment to  announce i t .  Thus, i t  tended to  
be an unp red ic tab le  s i t u a t i o n  with u ncer ta in  outcome and no c o n s i s t e n t  
and e s t a b l i s h e d  c o n t a c t s .  The high tu rnove r  of LNDC chairmen t e l l s  the  
s to r y .  I t  i s  a dilemma the  CEO has to  co n s ta n t ly  balance ,  as pointed 
out in the  previous  c h a p te r ,  to  ensure  t h a t  he main ta ins  s u f f i c i e n t  
c o n tac t  and in f luence  w i th in  the  bureaucracy without e s t r ang ing  himself  
i n t e r n a l l y  from h is  e x ec u t iv e s ,  and should d ec is ions  move out of h is  
c o n t r o l ,  he should s t i l l  have an impact on them. I t  i s  a d e lega te  
process  t h a t  r e q u i r e s  p o l i t i c a l  s k i l l s  and knowledge of e f f e c t i v e  power 
b roke rs .  Inept p o l i t i c a l  n e g o t i a t io n s  can unleash harsh responses  from 
those  a c to r s  who f e e l  they should have been consul ted  about a d e c i s io n .
Within the  government c i r c l e s ,  CEO enjoyed the  unique confidence of the  
Prime M in is te r  and d i r e c t  access  t o  him. Given t h a t  access  rou te  and 
the  domineering in f luence  the  P.M. had over the  whole process of 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  a t  t h e  t ime,  convincing him and harness ing  h i s  support  
was a l l  i t  requ i red  to  t r i g g e r  a c t i o n .  But given the  p r e v a i l in g  mood 
in the  country a t  the  t im e,  banking on P.M. support  was an i l l - c o n c e iv e d  
s t r a t e g y .  He would not be drawn to  a u th o r ize  the  changes g e n e ra l ly  
regarded by h i s  Cabinet as undermining na t iona l  i n t e r e s t s ,  and p o t e n t i a l l y
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t h r e a t e n  h is  power p o s i t io n  which the  s t a t u s  quo had sus ta ined  up to  
now. The language s e l e c t i o n  in th e  n e g o t i a t io n  was equal ly  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  
a r a t h e r  abras ive  and im pat ien t  approach c h a ra c te r i z e d  n e g o t i a t i o n s  with 
th e  m i n i s t e r s .  The tone  changed when p ressu re  was d i r e c te d  a t  t h e  PM, 
th e  l e t t e r s ,  memoirs, sen t  to  him ind ica ted  adoption of a moderate 
s tan ce ,  a defe rence  behaviour ,  ( r e f e r  chap te r  7 on Bow's n e g o t i a t in g  
t a c t i c s  on d i v e s t i t u r e  and h is  r e l a t i o n s h i p  with th e  PM), which connotes 
some degree of obsequious behaviour in which i n t e r a c t a n t s  express  a 
sen timent of regard while  pledging to  t r e a t  one another  in a p a r t i c u l a r  
manner, Levy (1982).  Constant p re s su re  and persuas ion  through d i r e c t  
te lephone c a l l s ,  b r i e f  informal n e g o t i a t io n s  ' i n  camera ' ,  d i r e c t  c o r r e s ­
pondence skipping th e  h i e r a r c h i c a l  channels in o rder  to  put p re s su re  on 
th e  m in i s t e r s ,  and mustering  evidence from commissioned s tu d ie s  h igh­
l i g h t in g  the  p o t e n t i a l  b e n e f i t s  of the  new s t r a t e g y ,  were management 
n e g o t i a t in g  s t r a t e g i e s .  I t  was a t o r tu o u s ly  p ro t r ac te d  process  t h a t  
requ i red  perseverance  and co n s tan t  p re s su re ,  and a shrewd pe rsuas ive  
n e g o t i a t o r .  P o l i t i c i a n s  a re  s k i l l e d  a t  pass ive  responses ,  s t a l l i n g  
a c t io n  and s h i f t i n g  i s sues  to  buy t ime,  and p resen t ing  impressions t h a t  
i s sues  are  under a c t i v e  c o n s id e ra t io n  when they e f f e c t i v e l y  mean to  do 
noth ing ,  hoping the  m a t te r  w i l l  cool o f f  and be dropped. Anastassopoulos  
(1981) sugges ts  t h a t  t h i s  kind of c o n f l i c t  is  not always so lved , 'a  
dec i s ion  may be made so l a t e  t h a t  the  problem s h i f t s  to  another  a r e a ,  
o r  a dec is ion  to  a c t  to  re so lv e  th e  c o n f l i c t  may never be made' .
However, he c o r r e c t l y  observes  t h a t  while the  government may d i s a g r e e  on 
th e  'new r e a l i t y '  t h a t  con f ron ts  the  c o rp o ra t io n ,  'no government would 
push one of i t s  e n t e r p r i s e s  t o  s u i c i d e ' ,  p . 114. Management had no 
s i g n i f i c a n t  power to  marshal l  adequate government support  d e sp i t e  th e  
concessions  o f f e red  to  c r e a t e  accep tab le  zones of agreement,  and th e  
l im i t a t i o n s  of op t ions  to  n e g o t i a t e  due to  re source  contro l  and 
dependence on the  government.  Thus, th e  emergency of a new c h ie f  
execu t ive ,  demonstrat ion of severe  f i n a n c i a l  c r i s i s  and reduc t ion  of
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resource  a v a i l a b i l i t y  to  the  c o rp o ra t io n ,  and th e  breakdown of the  
d i s c r e d i t e d  old s t r a t e g i c  approach he ightened th e  t en s io n  f o r  paradigm 
change and provoked a d i scuss ion  about th e  c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  r o l e ,  but were 
not of themselves s u f f i c i e n t  t o  convince th e  p o l i t i c i a n s  t o  so f ten  and 
change t h e i r  s tance  towards the  proposed s t r a t e g i c  change. Economic 
a n a ly s i s  and r a t i o n a l i t y  of th e  proposed change was not in doubt,  
r a t h e r  the  p o l i t i c a l  s takes  involved in cha l leng ing  th e  e s t a b l i s h e d  
c o n f ig u ra t io n  of power and accept ing  th e  new changes,  were perceived 
high .  In o rde r  to  ' ev en tu a te  fundamental s t r a t e g i c  change, the  in f luence  
of th e  paradigm and th e  power e l i t e s  a s so c ia te d  with i t  need to  be reduced ' ,  
Johnson (1987 p . 256).  The s t r a t e g i c  changes envisaged had e l i c i t e d  ove r t  
p o l i t i c a l  response and requ i red  a c o u n te r v a i l in g  power support  to  e x e r t  
p re s su re  and give a major push t o  th e  change p roposa l .
The In f luence  of External Actors :  Emergence of C o a l i t io n s
Organ iza t iona l  a c t i v i t i e s  a re  c o l l e c t i v e  and c o -o p e ra t iv e  endeavours.  
Successfu l  execu t ives  use t h e i r  power levers  developed from t h e i r  
i n t e r a c t i o n s  along with persuas ion  to  in f luence  o th e r s  on whom they 
depend, and to  con t ro l  s t r a t e g i c  dec i s io n s  through th e  bu i ld ing  of 
c o a l i t i o n s  t h a t  pool t h e i r  resources  to  n e g o t i a t e  i m p l i c i t  unders tandings  
of support  on i s sues  where common i n t e r e s t s  a re  i d e n t i f i e d ,  in o rde r  to  
advance th e  adoption of a favoured s o l u t i o n .  Quinn (1980) has argued 
th e  same, t h a t  ' t o  ga rner  support  behind a new s t r a t e g y  execu t ives  
u sua l ly  t r y  t o  ge t  key people behind t h e i r  s t r a t e g y  by co-opt ing  or 
n e u t r a l i z i n g  se r ious  oppos i t ion  or e s t a b l i s h i n g  zones of in d i f f e r en c e  
where the  proposal  would not be d i s a s t r o u s l y  opposed ' .
The advent of  ex te rna l  s takeho lde rs  - World Bank, the  I r i s h  Development 
Authori ty  - IDA, the  German DGE, and o th e r s  beginning in 1977, marked 
an add i t io n  of a new p e rsp ec t iv e  t o  management and the  s h i f t  of power
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co n f ig u ra t io n  between government and management and the  emergence of 
an a l l i a n c e  between management and th e se  ex te rn a l  s t ak e h o ld e r s .  Mention 
was made in the  preceding chap te r  of th e  f a c t  t h a t  these  o rg a n iz a t io n s  
brought the  dear ly  needed f i n a n c i a l  r e so u rce s ,  managerial s k i l l s  and 
t e c h n ic a l  e x p e r t i s e ,  with a t t e n d an t  terms and cond i t ions  of t h e i r  usage.
I t  was under such n eg o t ia ted  agreements t h a t  WB f inanc ing  and adv isory  
se r v ic e s  t o  LNDC demanded and made a cond i t ion  of a loan agreement (see  
appendix II  f o r  cond i t ions  and annual a p p ra i sa l  of t h e i r  compliance by 
th e  WB) t h a t  a l l  lo ss  making o pe ra t ions  should be d ives ted  and the  
proposed new s t r a t e g y  implemented. The IDA exper ts  a l so  banded to g e th e r  
behind management and found the  changes c o n s i s t e n t  with the  e x p e r t i s e  
and exper ience  they were expected to  impart to  LNDC. These a c t o r s :
"bring with then  the  values  and p e r s p ec t iv e s  learned in t h i s  (exper ience  
from IDA) con tex t  and w i l l  tend t o  pe rce ive  i s sues  and seek to  achieve 
goa ls  in terms of the  o rg an iza t io n s  they have l e f t .  Thus a measure of 
p o t e n t i a l  de f iance  is  r e c r u i t e d  t o  the  o rg a n iz a t io n " ,  Mangham (1979 p . 125).
I t  w i l l  be r e c a l l e d  t h a t  th e  proposed new s t r a t e g y  was a c t u a l l y  ideas  
of WB and the  I r i s h  which John Bow acquired  while on execu t ive  development 
programme in the  United S ta t e s  in p re p a ra t io n  fo r  ascent  to  CEO p o s i t i o n ,  
t h e i r  support  was almost guaran teed .  I t  took a longer period of b a rg a in ­
ing and r e l e n t l e s s  p re ssu re  to  bring about s t r a t e g i c  changes p a r t i c u l a r l y  
as the  changes had broader r a m i f i c a t i o n s ,  and y e t  i t  needed no more than 
agreeing to  the  terms of f inanc ing  and t e ch n ica l  e x p e r t i s e  from o u ts id e  
a c to r s  than th e  government begrudgingly gave in to  the  ' t a k e  i t  o r  leave 
i t '  p ressu re  of  th e se  a c t o r s .  There a re  no c l e a r  cu t exp lana t ions  of 
t h i s  sudden somersault  in government a t t i t u d e  to  what was arguably a 
s e n s i t i v e  p o l i t i c a l  i s su e .  I t  i s  tempting enough to  a t t r i b u t e  th e  
implementation of s t r a t e g i c  change as th e  outcome of in t e rv e n t io n  by 
e x te rn a l  a c to r s  in a form of a c o a l i t i o n  with management, however such 
a con tr ived  c a u s a l i t y  v/ould be a s i m p l i f i c a t i o n  of a complex r e a l i t y .
They were ins trumenta l  but hard ly  s u f f i c i e n t  to  ove rr ide  government
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opp o s i t io n .  The fo llowing combination of  managerial a c t i o n s  and a host  of  
| contextual f a c t o r s  f a c i l i t a t e d  by the  wherewithal and p re s su re  from the 
! ex te rna l  s takeho lde rs  would seem to have been a major push fo r  change imple­
menta tion.  In the f i r s t  p lace ,  th e re  i s  an aura  o f  o b j e c t i v i t y  a s so c ia te d  
with  o u ts id e  s tak e h o ld e r s .  They a re  perceived as o b j e c t iv e  in t h e i r  views, 
and as expe r t s  commanding a r e p e r t o i r e  o f  managerial  exper ience ,  and come from 
p r e s t i g io u s  and powerful o r g a n iz a t i o n s ,  a l l  i n g re d ie n t s  which give fo rce  and 
leg i t im acy  to  t h e i r  s t a t u s  to ensure  t h a t  t h e i r  advice  c a r r i e s  more weight as 
perceived as v a l i d ,  P f e f f e r  (1981 p . 254).  Thus, through t h e i r  advocacy, the 
ex te rna l  s t a k e h o l d e r s 1 support  o f  management a c t io n  c re a te d  and conferred  
leg i t imacy  on the proposed s t r a t e g i c  change. Levy (1982) c a r r i e s  t h i s  p o in t  
f u r t h e r  and observes :
"some of  the p r i v i l e g e  and t r u s t  accorded to them as p ro f e s s i o n a l s  ' rubs  o f f '  
on the ( c o rp o ra t io n ) ,  much to i t s  members' advantage in opening and 
main ta in ing n e g o t i a t io n s  with  o th e r  p a r t i e s " .
In Lesotho such p ro fes s iona l  c r e d e n t i a l s  were c r i t i c a l  given the dominant 
c u l tu ra l  b e l i e f  which tends to l in k  fo re ign  managers with  e x p e r t i s e  and 
competence.
Secondly,  the  power d i f f e r e n t i a l  t h a t  was p rev ious ly  stacked heav i ly  in favour 
o f  government, was d r a s t i c a l l y  a l t e r e d  management way through t h i s  new 
a l l i a n c e * .  The a c to r s  (o u ts id e )  source o f  power based on t h e i r  perceived exper­
t i s e  and a b i l i t y  to cope with environmental  u n c e r t a in t y ,  contro l  of  informat ion 
and f in a n c ia l  r e so u rce s ,  the i n t e r n a t io n a l  bus iness  c o r r id o r  they opened, 
the  governmental connections  t h a t  they had access to  and brought to  LNDC, and 
lack of  s im i l a r  a l t e r n a t i v e s  to government, meant t h a t  th e re  was a new power 
broker t h a t  management could count on fo r  suppor t ,  given t h e i r  common o r i e n ­
t a t i o n  and v a lues .  Aharoni (1986) po in ts  ou t  t h a t  managers are  always t e s t i n g
*The f in e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between ' c o a l i t i o n '  and ' a l i a n c e '  w i l l  not be pursued, 
the two concepts are  used in te rchangeab ly .
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out th e  l im i t s  of t h e i r  perceived autonomy. They:
"scout  and explore  - not un l ike  boxers in a r ing  -  to  f ind  out how f a r  
they  can go and what i s  th e  p o t e n t i a l  power of the  d i f f e r e n t  p layer s  
in the  ex te rna l  c o a l i t i o n " .
This sugges ts  t h a t  management en tered  in to  n e g o t ia t io n  with government,  
aware of t h e i r  powerlessness ,  s c a r c i t y  and c r i t i c a l  na tu re  of resources  
e s s e n t i a l  to  implement changes,  and a b e l i e f  t h a t  change was p o s s ib le  
through a l l i a n c e  with power a c t o r s .  The ne t e f f e c t  of which is  t h a t  
government in f luence  on LNDC has been d i l u t e d ,  i t  no longer holds an 
a b so lu te  monopoly of resource  dependence, r a t h e r  i t  competes with o th e r  
powerful s takeho lders  who tend to  impose r e s t r i c t i o n s  on some i s sues  
regard ing  the  c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  s t r a t e g i e s .
T h i rd ly ,  and c lo se ly  r e l a t e d  to  th e  above was, while both LNDC and 
government d e sp e ra te ly  wanted the  a s s i s t a n c e  of  ex te rn a l  f i n a n c i e r s ,  
t h e i r  motives were q u i t e  v a r i e d .  Management had i t s  hidden agenda 
which was mainly to  gain p ro fes s iona l i sm  and i d e n t i t y ,  and to  
d e p o l i t i c i z e  th e  board of d i r e c t o r s  through an a l l i a n c e  with powerful 
l e g i t im a te  s takeholders  accep tab le  to  government but with such s t rong 
bus iness  o r i e n t a t i o n  and i n t e r e s t s  t h a t  they would become a c o u n te r ­
v a i l i n g  check a g a in s t  government i n t e r f e r e n c e  on management d e c i s i o n ­
making p rocess .  This can t h e r e f o r e  be in t e r p r e t e d  as an i n d i r e c t  
co -op t ing  s t r a t e g y  by management to  in t roduce  in to  the  c o rpo ra te  
h ie ra rc h y ,  l ike-minded s takeho lde rs  who could pu l l  and haul us ing t h e i r  
power, with whom to  n e g o t i a t e ,  coa lesce  with f o r  th e  purpose of f a s t en in g  
th e  adoption or  p u r s u i t  of a p a r t i c u l a r  l i n e  of a c t i o n .  This was 
ev iden t  in the  p ressu res  th e se  a c to r s  exer ted  on government to  reduce 
i t s  r o l e  and v i s i b i l i t y  from th e  management of LNDC, f o r  in s ta n c e ,  DGE 
demanded, as a condi t ion  of i t s  equ i ty  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  amendment of the  
1967 Act,  t o  d e l e t e  a c lause  g iv ing  government d i s c r e t i o n a r y  powers to
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determine the  d i r e c t i o n  which the  co rpo ra t ion  ought to  fo llow. These 
arrangement were i m p l i c i t l y  e s t a b l i s h i n g  new parameters in which govern­
ment was expected to  play a r o l e  in s t r a t e g i c  dec i s ions  while a t  the  
same time s t reng then ing  th e  bonds of a l l i a n c e  between management and 
the se  a c to r s  t o  p reserve  managerial  autonomy. I t  a l so  involved some 
s u b t l e  power and p o l i t i c a l  games in t h a t  t h e r e  are  undefined, perceived 
d i s c r e t i o n a r y  powers which management regard as t h e i r  p re ro g a t iv e s ,  ie  
choice  and de term ina t ion  of s t r a t e g i c  changes,  in which government 
success to  turn-down proposed changes,  could s e t  a precedent and become 
a h a b i t ,  (usu rpa t ion  of appointment of CEO from the  board,  being the  
p o in t  in case) hence e ros ion  of t h e i r  power. Thus n e g o t i a t io n s  were 
not only about i s sues  a t  s t a k e ,  but they were a lso  about a t u s s l e  to  
ward o f f  government i n t e r f e r e n c e  in s t r a t e g i c  dec is ion  making w h i l s t  
ques t ion ing  and express ing  concern over the  i r r e g u l a r  p a t t e rn s  of 
government in t e rv e n t io n  f o r  n e g o t i a t io n  on some s p e c i f i c  change d e c i s io n s .
Four th ly ,  t h e r e  was an underlying p o l i t i c a l  embarrassment t h a t  could 
have p r e c i p i t a t e d  the  eventual acquiescence to  the  fundamental changes.  
John Bow was the  PM's p ro tege ,  and f i r s t  local  CEO promoted to  break 
in to  th e  mould of fo re ig n  dominated execu t ive  p o s i t i o n s .  Much as h is  
proposed changes were unaccep tab le ,  a show of s o l i d a r i t y  with t h e i r  
cand ida te  v/as e s s e n t i a l  t o  ensure  h is  success .  But the  s t r a t e g i c  
change (Investment Promotion) a l so  meant a l o t  t o  the  CEO, i t  marked 
h i s  personal  crusade to  tu rn  around the  mis for tunes  of LNDC, and was 
h i s  f i r s t  major dec is ion  s ince  coming to  power. The s takes  were 
t h e r e f o r e  q u i t e  high,  personal s t a t u s ,  power and c r e d i b i l i t y  were a t  
r i s k ,  and the  p o l i t i c a l  support  was the  vote  of  confidence he needed.
L as t ly ,  r e l a t i o n s  between Lesotho and South Afr ica  were f l u c t u a t i n g  
so much t h a t  what was once an assured and c e r t a i n  SA market,  had 
a c t u a l l y  become problematic  and u n p re d ic tab l e ,  and d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n
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of  investment options  through a t t r a c t i n g  i n t e r n a t io n a l  c a p i t a l  was 
thought to  be a l u c r a t iv e  a l t e r n a t i v e .  Referring to  the se  environment- 
based changes,  Simmons and McCall (1981 p . 172) pointed out t h a t  'an 
o rg a n iz a t io n  may take  a new tu rn  as a r e s u l t  of d i s t a n t  p o l i t i c a l  
o r  economic events of a l t e r e d  s t r a t e g i e s  by some o th e r  o rg an iza t io n  
in i t s  immediate s e t ' .  The border c lo su re  of 'go-s low' as i t  was 
c a l l e d  in 1985-66, quashed a l l  the  s t r a t e g i c  and t a c i t  assumptions of 
compliance by the  o th e r  p a r ty ,  underly ing LNDC fo re ign  investment 
s t r a t e g y ,  t h a t  t h e re  was a sa fe  to  and f r o  t r a n s i t  of goods and 
s e r v ic e s  between the  two c o u n t r i e s ,  and proved once again how the  
power and remote con t ro l  of the  ' i n v i s i b l e  a c t o r '  can a l t e r  the  
p a t t e r n  and s t r u c t u r a l  cond i t ions  of the  s i t u a t i o n ,  n e g o t i a t io n  t a c t i c s  
and in f luence  the  d i r e c t i o n  of subsequent n e g o t i a t i o n s .
What has emerged i s  a two-pronged n e g o t i a t io n  s t r a t e g y  c h a r a c te r i z e d  
by the  management-external a c to r s  c o a l i t i o n  which put p re ssu re  on 
government a t  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s .  Management e x e r t  p re s su re  through 
p e r s u a t io n ,  arguing and appeal f o r  support  t a rg e t e d  a t  head of 
government,  and the 'g iv e - a n d - t a k e '  approach by ex te rna l  a c to r s  who 
wheedle enormous power, t r a d e d - o f f  p rov is ion  of f i n a n c i a l  resources  
and /or  t h e i r  r e n e g o t i a t io n  th e r e o f  to  approval of s p e c i f i c  change 
p roposa l s .  In t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  the  c o a l i t i o n  served as change i n i t i a t o r s ,  
f a c i l i t a t o r s ,  as well as o b s t r u c to r s  t h a t  could use t h e i r  power to  
block th e  c o r p o r a t io n ' s  involvement in c e r t a i n  p o l i t i c a l  p r o j e c t s .
I t  f u r t h e r  co rrobora te s  Johnson 's  (1987 p . 268) f ind ings  t h a t  'major 
s t r a t e g i c  change requ i re s  both an a l l i a n c e  between o u t s id e r s  and 
in t e r n a l  managers ' .  As poin ted out e a r l i e r ,  th e  t a c t i c s  tended to  
be a double a c t  with d i f f e r e n t  s i t u a t i o n a l  s c r i p t ;  they var ied  
depending on the  is sues  fac ing  the  a c t o r s ,  op tions  open to  n e g o t i a t o r s ,  
the  c r i t i c a l  na tu re  of response t ime, and the  r i s k s  involved.  For
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i n s t a n c e ,  d i v e s t i t u r e  was a phased long-term process  t h a t  was reviewed 
c o n s t a n t ly  on the  b a s i s  of c o rpo ra te  performance.  As s i t u a t i o n s  changed 
and were reviewed by a c to r s  through th e  process  of i n t e r a c t i o n  o r  reneg­
o t i a t i o n ,  i s sues  s h i f t ,  lose  and /or  s u s t a in  t h e i r  prominence of a t t e n t i o n  
o r  fade  o f f  a t  o th e r  l e v e l s .  Actors a l so  change, r e cons ide r  t h e i r  s tance  
and meanings they a t t a c h  to  events  depending on the  con tex t  in which they 
occur ,  and may adopt a d i f f e r e n t  p e r sp ec t iv e  of the  o rgan iza t ion  r e a l i t y  
as they i n t e r a c t  with o th e r s  ( th e  I r i s h  connection ,  WB, ADB, EIB, e t c . )  
unencumbered by previous  c o rpo ra te  commitments and arrangements,  in fuse  
new ideas  and d iv e r s e  v a lues ,  expe r iences ,  and frame of r e fe ren ce  f o r  
d e f in in g  co rpora te  r e a l i t y .  Companies t h a t  were a t  one t ime t a r g e t s  
of d i v e s t i t u r e  -  Pioneer Motors,  Maseru Motors,  and Limefford L td . ,  
have s h i f t e d  from ' c r i t i c a l  focus '  because they have become p r o f i t a b l e  
and y i e l d  dear ly  needed d iv idends  a t  a time when p r o f i t a b i l i t y  c r i t e r i o n  
has become the  a c t o r s '  main preoccupa t ion .  While the  'o ld  government'  
i n s i s t e d  on being consu l ted  and t h e i r  approval sought before  s e l l i n g  
of the  companies, th e  'new government'  (pos t  1986 coup d ' e t a t )  - change 
of s t r u c t u r a l  c o n tex t ,  r e q u i r e s  no c o n s u l t a t i o n  on d i v e s t i t u r e  s t r a t e g i e s ,  
thus  i n t e r n a l i z i n g  th e  p rev ious ly  e x t e r n a l l y  n eg o t ia ted  s t r a t e g i c  
d e c i s io n .
I t  a l so  sugges ts  t h a t  c o a l i t i o n s  have temporary d u ra t io n ,  w i l l  disband, 
review and r e c o n s t r u c t  t h e i r  l i n e s  of a l l i a n c e  as t h e i r  problems are  
solved and new cha l lenges  and i n t e r e s t s  emerge. As new issues  of 
p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t  t o  in d iv id u a ls  crop up, they shop around f o r  those  
who might be a l l i e s  in r e l a t i o n  to  the  p a r t i c u l a r  i s su e ,  Hickson e t  al 
(1985).  I t  was a s t r a t e g y  which c h a r a c t e r i z e d  d i f f e r e n t  a l l i a n c e s  
between management and var ious  s t ak e h o ld e r s ,  and playing o f f  one 
group ag a in s t  another  once assured t h a t  th e  consequences w i l l  not be 
de t r im en ta l  o r  can be absorbed through o th e r  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  and breaches
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and depar tu re s  from previous arrangements.  The s t r a t e g y  t o  d i v e r s i f y  
in to  asparagus canning and Loti  Brick Ltd, f a l l  in to  t h i s  ca tegory  of 
s t r a t e g i c  companies*, where management obta ined  a go-ahead from 
government and had th e  f i n a n c i a l  and t e c h n ic a l  support  of  f i n a n c i e r s  
l i k e  EEC and KFW. Change n e g o t i a t io n s  between management and govern­
ment on the  review of investment i n c e n t iv e s ,  as well as wi th in  the  
co rp o ra t io n  with su b s id ia ry  managers on expansions ,  mergers,  and 
r e n e g o t i a t io n  of f r a n c h i s e  te rms, as in th e  case  of  Pioneer Motors, 
tended to  assume a d i f f e r e n t  degree of urgency to  ensure  t h a t  the  
deal in c l inched and jobs  c r e a t e d .  Thus the  p re ssu re  i s  tu rned on 
management, which e s s e n t i a l l y  put i t  in con t ro l  of the  process  as they 
possess  the  knowledge about th e  bus iness  and con t ro l  th e  informat ion 
e s s e n t i a l  f o r  n e g o t i a to r s  to  make d e c i s io n s ,  compared to  t h e i r  c i v i l  
s e r v ic e  c o n t r o l l e r s  who lack s i m i l a r  s k i l l s  and in format ion t o  eva lua te  
management or  o f f e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  p roposa l s .  As was e a r l i e r  poin ted ou t ,  
on such s t r a t e g i c  changes,  management c o n t ro l l e d  th e  con tex t  of 
n e g o t i a t i o n ,  determined th e  agenda and support ing evidence,  and was 
the  dominant pa r ty  in the  n e g o t i a t io n  p rocess ;  the  government r o l e  was 
t o  endorse the  p roposa ls .
I f  we pul l  to g e th e r  and a ttempt to  syn thes ize  the  var ious  s t r an d s  and 
combinations of n e g o t i a t io n  and develop a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  t h a t  r e f l e c t s  
the  p a t t e rn s  and dynamics of the  n eg o t ia ted  change in LNDC between the  
var ious  in t e rn a l  and ex te rn a l  a c t o r s , we come up with a t w o - t i e r  model, 
as in f ig u r e  10.1 which e s s e n t i a l l y  bu i ld s  upon and gives  an i n s ig h t  
in to  the  ' n e g o t i a t i v e  p ro cess '  ind ica ted  in f i g u r e  9 .2 .  Four types
* S t r a t e g i c  companies are  those  in p o t e n t i a l l y  high income genera t ing  
i n d u s t r i e s  and those  u t i l i s i n g  lo c a l ly  based inpu ts .
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of  n e g o t i a t iv e  p a t t e r n s  are  desc r ibed ,  they inc lude  n e g o t ia t io n  between:
e x te r n a l  system and upper t i e r
e x te r n a l  system and lower t i e r
in t e r n a l  system and upper t i e r
i n t e r n a l  system and lower t i e r .
B r i e f l y ,  in the  previous  chap te r  we analysed in d e t a i l  the  micro i n t e r ­
a c t io n  process - the  i n t e r n a l  system of s t r a t e g i c  change in LNDC as 
well  as i t s  ex te rna l  system - how i t  i n t e r a c t e d  with i t s  macro env i ron ­
ment.
Within the  in te r n a l  system, t h e r e  are  two le v e l s  of s t r a t e g i c  dec i s ion  
making, t h e r e  is  the  lower t i e r , which r e f e r s  to  th e  co rpora te  manage­
ment a t  both the  headquar te rs  and i t s  s u b s i d i a r i e s  and the  i n t r a  change 
n e g o t i a t io n s  t h e r e i n .  The upper t i e r  r e f e r s  to  the  government t h a t  is  
the  u l t im a te  a r b i t o r  in most s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s io n s ,  and is  the  exc lus ive  
a u th o r i t y  t h a t  n e g o t i a t e s  and c o n t r a c t s  with ex te rna l  o rgan iza t ions  
on beha l f  of LNDC. What t h i s  study has revealed  is  t h a t  n e g o t i a t io n s  
occurred between government and ex te rn a l  s takeho lde rs  (upper t i e r  and 
ex te rn a l  system) on some s p e c i f i c  change i s sues  such as r a i s in g  c a p i t a l  
from the  ex te rn a l  f i n a n c i a l  markets ,  and b i l a t e r a l  agreements on t e c h ­
n i c a l  and managerial  r e so u rce s .  They are  subsequently  followed by a 
second phase of n e g o t i a t io n s  between s takeho lde rs  and management 
( e x te rn a l  system and lower t i e r )  regard ing  the  implementing and moni­
to r i n g  of th e  agreements.  Management, i t  was poin ted ou t ,  a lso  
n e g o t i a t e  some changes with government ( i n t e r n a l  system and upper t i e r )  
as well as h o r i z o n ta l l y  w i th in  i t s  d iv i s io n s  and v e r t i c a l l y  with the  
s u b s i d i a r i e s  ( i n t e r n a l  system and lower t i e r s ) .
318
Figure 10.1
Two-tier  typology of Negotiated  S t r a t e g i c  Change
Upper t i e r  Lower t i e r
Negotiable is sues :
External
system
. loans - l ines  of c r e d i t  
. b i l a t e r a l  agreements 
. i n d u s t r i a l  pol icy 
. amendment of LNDC Act
. f ranch ise  agreements 
. s t r a t e g i c  changes 
. lending & investment p o l ic ie s  
. t r a in in g  & performance evaluation 
. expansion, c a p i t a l  expenditure 
. ex tens ions ,  rescheduling of grants
^ (1) (2) V
(3)




. budgetary a l lo c a t io n  
. investment incen t ives  
- tax
. f inance & managerial 
a ss i s tance  
. disinvestment 
. f l o t a t i o n  of corpora te  
equity
. reorganiza t ion
. d iv e r s i t u r e s
. personnel p o l i c i e s  
. f in an c ia l  p o l i c i e s
. l o c a l i s a t i o n ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
Key: dynamic in te rchange  of i s sues
The model a ttempts  to  i d e n t i f y  the  types of n e g o t i a t io n s  t h a t  take  
p lace  a t  each of  the  four  c e l l s ,  the  a c to r s  involved in the  n e g o t i a t i v e  
process  and t h e i r  n e g o t i a t in g  s t r a t e g i e s ,  and more im por tan t ly ,  to  
e s t a b l i s h  which s t r a t e g i c  changes a re  neg o t iab le  and/or non-nego t iab le  
among these  s h i f t i n g  c o a l i t i o n s  of i n t e r e s t s .  For in s tan ce ,  in s p i t e  
of th e  powers of s t r a t e g i c  dec i s io n  t h a t  the  Board was supposed to  have, 
as embodied in the  LNDC Act,  in a c t u a l i t y  i t  became c l e a r  t h a t  not a l l  
s t r a t e g i c  changes were n e g o t i a b le ,  some were government d i r e c t i v e s  and 
non-nego t iab le :
. Appointment and changes of CEOs 
. Deciding who buys d iv e s ted  companies 
. Appointment and change of company managers 
. Choice of p a r tn e r  on s t r a t e g i c  p ro j e c t s  
. Investment in s t r a t e g i c  p r o j e c t s .
The arrows in d ic a te  the  dynamic na tu re  of th e  p rocess .  There i s  a parade 
of i s sues  of d i f f e r e n t  magnitude,  h i g h - p r i o r i t y  and urgency sponsored 
by var ious  a c to r s ;  some a re  reso lved  and q u i e t l y  pass from focus ,  and 
a re  fo r g o t t en  as a c to r s  tu rn  t h e i r  a t t e n t i o n  to  the  next s e t  of i s sues  
in th e  parade .  The i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p  among the  c e l l s  is  very f l u i d ,  
and th e  con tex ts  o f ten  d i f f e r e n t ,  some is sues  have been enduring,  
dominant and have occupied management and o th e r  a c t o r s '  focus over  the  
y e a r s .  Some fade away a t  one level only to  emerge as c r i t i c a l  in the  
next l e v e l ,  what were 'minor s ide  involvements ’ may become 'major 
invo lvements ' .  The f i n a n c i a l  autonomy, d i v e s t i t u r e ,  and d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  
of funding opt ions  a re  some of th e  changes t h a t  have incrementa l ly  
su s ta ined  t h e i r  high p r o f i l e  f o r  n eg o t i a t io n  as management a t tempts  
to  break away from government c o n t r o l .  I t  i s  a l so  c l e a r  from th e  model 
t h a t  diagonal n e g o t i a t io n s  are  p o s s ib l e ,  c e l l s  1 and 4, in which 
management of a powerful s u b s id ia ry  can in f luence  and manipula te  the
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b e hav iou r  of  i t s  p a r e n t  company to  ind e p en d en t ly  n e g o t i a t e  s t r a t e g i c  
changes  t h a t  a f f e c t  i t s  s p e c i f i c  m a rke t .  That  was t h e  ca se  in 1985/86 
when Lesotho Brewing n e g o t i a t e d  with  government f o r  t h e  r e p e a l  of  
a n t i - s h e b e e n  l e g i s l a t i o n  and t h e  r e l o c a t i o n  o f  t h e  b e e r  levy c o l l e c t i o n ,  
in o r d e r  t o  s t a b i l i z e  b e e r  p r i c e s  between Lesotho and SA, and expand 
i t s  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e l s .  Unlike most LNDC s u b s i d i a r i e s ,  i t  b o a s t s  
o f  a competent  team of  management (management agreement w ith  South 
A f r i c a n  B re w e r ie s ) ,  and was h ig h l y  p r o f i t a b l e ,  d e c l a r i n g  a d iv idend  
o f  R2.7 m i l l i o n  in 1986, o f  which LNDC's s h a re  was R1.39 m i l l i o n .
Thus i t  confi rms  th e  view he ld  by many, (A haroni ,  1981, 1986) t h a t  
pe rformance  of  th e  s u b s i d i a r y  can a f f e c t  i t s  autonomy.
What t h e  t w o - t i e r  typo logy  im p l ie s  i s  t h a t  s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  
d i s s i m i l a r ,  have d i f f e r e n t  degree  o f  s a l i e n c y  t o  d i f f e r e n t  a c t o r s  with 
unequal  power, and r e q u i r e  a c t o r s  t o  r e a d j u s t  t h e i r  n e g o t i a t i o n  s t r a t -  
egern as s i t u a t i o n s  and a c t o r s '  needs change ,  and new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  
of  r e a l i t y  r e c o n s t r u c t e d .  The r a t i o n a l  and consensua l  n a t u r e  of 
s t r a t e g i c  change o f t e n  p o r t r a y e d  in some change l i t e r a t u r e ,  was l e s s  
v i s i b l e .  'Zones of  d i s s e n t  t y p i c a l l y  e x i s t ,  l e a d in g  t o  compromise 
and accommodation as mechanisms of  change d e c i s i o n '  - Narayanan and 
Fahey (1982 p . 2 3 1 ) .  Some s i t u a t i o n s  have endur ing  and p r e d i c t a b l e  
p a t t e r n s  t h a t  f a l l  w i th i n  a g e n e r a l l y  known k i t  of  s o l u t i o n s ,  o t h e r s  
a r e  novel and p ro b lem a t i c  and r e q u i r e  g r e a t e r  awareness  t o  a n t i c i p a t e  
p o t e n t i a l  i n f l u e n c e s ,  a l l i e s  and r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  s t r u c t u r a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  
t o  d e s i r e d  change.  While t h e  model p ro v id e s  us w i th  a handle  on ' l e a d i n g  
t e n d e n c i e s '  o f  s t r a t e g i c  change and a map t o  fo l lo w  n e g o t i a t i v e  i s s u e s  
and t h e i r  i n t e r a c t i v e  n a t u r e  a t  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  o f  c o r p o r a t e  h i e r a r c h y ,  
as  w i th  any model,  i t  has some l i m i t a t i o n s .  F i r s t l y ,  i t  can on ly  con­
s i d e r  t h o s e  e x p l i c i t l y  n e g o t i a b l e  and n o n - n e g o t i a b l e  s t r a t e g i c  changes 
and te n d s  t o  presume t h e  i m p l i c i t  and t a c i t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  t h a t  were
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o f t e n  a p re lu d e  to  t h e  v i s i b l e  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  Secondly ,  t h e  e x t e r n a l  
s t a k e h o l d e r s  a re  bundled up as i f  they  were a homogeneous group wi th 
t h e  same i n t e r e s t s .  The te rms and a r rangements  o f  t h e i r  s t a k e s  have 
c l e a r l y  shown t h a t  w h i le  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  was a common denominato r ,  the y  
d i f f e r e d  in many r e s p e c t s  on how t h e i r  funds should be dep loyed .
The r e a l i t y  of  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  p rocess  in Lesotho was very complex,  
in v o lv in g  p loys  and behind t h e  scenes  d e a l s  (av/ay from t h e  Cabine t  
a rena )  t h a t  could only be imputed from t h e  r e s u l t a n t  p o l i t i c i a n s '  
b e h av io u r ,  p a r t  o f  t h e  s h i f t i n g  power and p o l i t i c a l  games t h a t  we 
d i s c u s s  in t h e  nex t  s e c t i o n .  Thus,  a c t o r s  were no t  involved  in 
e x p l i c i t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  a l l  t h e  t ime  s t r a t e g i c  change had t o  be imple­
mented.  Sometimes t h e  c o n t e x t  of  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  was such t h a t  q u i e t  
and s u b t l e  rea d ju s tm e n t  o f  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n a l  a r rangements  a r e  made to  
r e f l e c t  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  p o l i t i c a l  mood and a t t i t u d e s ,  while  in o t h e r  
c a s e s  th e y  may be open ly  d i s c u s s e d  and b a rg a in e d ,  as was t h e  case  with 
Inves tm en t Promotion s t r a t e g y .  However, by s p e c i f y i n g  t h e  wide range 
of  n e g o t i a t i v e  and n o n - n e g o t i a t i v e  s t r a t e g i c  i s s u e s  and t h e  d i f f e r e n t  
a c t o r s  and c o a l i t i o n s ,  t o g e t h e r  with t h e i r  n e g o t i a t i o n  and b a rg a i n in g  
s t r a t e g e m ,  t h e  complex n a t u r e  of  n e g o t i a t e d  s t r a t e g y  p roces s  becomes 
c l e a r .
Because t h e  s t a t e d  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  were so broad and 
lo o s e ly  d e f in e d  ( s e e  appendix I) and u n s t a b l e ,  t h e  r o l e s  and boundar ie s  
on how f a r  each o f  t h e  key s t a k e h o l d e r s  could  in t e r v e n e  on c o r p o r a t e  
dec i s ion -m ak ing  were vague and p a r t l y  compounded by t h e  o v e ra rch in g  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  I t  was t h e r e f o r e  
im por tan t  t o  have some deg ree  of  o r d e r  w i th in  t h i s  complex r e l a t i o n s h i p  
and p r e d i c t a b i l i t y  in d e c i s i o n  making t h a t  could inform and a l e r t  
management t o  th e  e x t e n t  of  p o t e n t i a l  succes s  o r  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e i r  
in tended cou rse  of  a c t i o n .  The n e g o t i a t e d  change p e r s p e c t i v e  i l l u m i n a t e s
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I
some o f  th e  change s t r a t e g e m  and n e g o t i a t i o n  t h a t  s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n  
makers in LNDC were u s in g :
F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  i t  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  change t h r e s h o l d  may be m a in ta ined  by 
i n c r e a s i n g  t e n s i o n  over  t h e  s t a t u s  quo, bu t  pos tpone  change n e g o t i a t i o n  
u n t i l  t h e r e  i s  an oppor tune  moment f o r  i t .  This  w i l l ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  
depend on t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  p e r c e iv e d  importance  and t h e  urgency of  
t h e  s i t u a t i o n  (eg a c r i s i s ) ,  f o r c e s  behind t h e  change,  and a v a i l a b i l i t y  
o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  The e v en tu a l  f l o t a t i o n  o f  LNDC e q u i t y  t o  DGE, d e s p i t e  
government r e l u c t a n c e ,  would seem to  have come about  th rough  a m ix tu re  
o f  r e v e r s a l s ,  pos tponements and r e a c t i v a t i o n s  o f  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  when 
t h e  c l i m a t e  was f e l t  conduc ive w i th i n  government.  The World Bank has 
e q u a l l y  ta ken  t h e  oppor tune  moment o f  r e n e g o t i a t i o n  of  g r a n t s  renewal 
t o  demand f u l f i l m e n t  o f  s p e c i f i c  changes from LNDC as a c o n d i t i o n  o f  
t h e  g r a n t ,  o r  t o  w i thho ld  a c r e d i t  a n d /o r  demand compliance with  t h e  
te rm s  o f  c r e d i t  ag reement.  Thus,  t im ing  of  change ,  t i e d  t o  th e  
c r i t i c a l  n a t u r e  of  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  may be a l u b r i c a n t .
Secondly ,  th rough  a ' p reem p t ive  s t r a t e g y ' ,  management may dec ide  t o  
t a k e  t h e  plunge and implement s t r a t e g i c  changes and l e g i t i m i z e  t h e i r  
a c t i o n  a f t e rw a rd  f o r  r a t i f i c a t i o n .  This  i s  both  r i s k y  and c o s t l y  as 
l a s t  minute r e b u f f  may r e s u l t  in s u b s t a n t i a l  sunk c o s t s  and damage t o  
t h e  image of  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n .  However, i f  s u c c e s s f u l ,  i t  t e n d s  t o  pu t  
p r e s s u r e  f o r  r a t i f i c a t i o n  on th o s e  who must a u t h o r i s e  i t .  'Why oppose 
a s u c c e s s f u l  o p e r a t i o n '  -  t e n d s  t o  p r e v a i l .  The r e o r g a n i z a t i o n  of  New 
I n d u s t r i e s  D iv i s io n  -  NID, c a r r i e d  o u t  by Mar t in in 1983, was l a r g e l y  
' c o n t a i n e d '  w i th in  th e  d i v i s i o n s  and p r e s e n te d  to  Execu tive  Committee 
and t h e  Board,  mainly as a p ro g re s s  r e p o r t .  John Bow used t o  pe rsuade  
t h e  PM by showing him ar rangements  a l r e a d y  e n t e r e d  i n t o  w ith  SA i n v e s t o r s ,  
ready  t o  i n v e s t  in LNDC, and i t  became d i f f i c u l t  t o  t u r n  down such 
p ro p o s a l s .
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T h i r d l y ,  t h e  s a l i e n c y  of  t h e  proposed changes may be played  down by 
r e s t r i c t i n g  in fo rm at ion  o r  th rough  in fo rm a t io n - o v e r l e a d  t o  mask t h e  
i s s u e s  from f o c u s .  Inves tm ent Committee would seem to  o p e r a t e  on t h i s  
b a s i s ,  th rough  c a r e f u l  c o n t ro l  o f  t h e  in fo rm a t io n  and a b i l i t y  to  
s chedu le  th e  Committee meet ings  and s e t  agenda.  Thus, t h e  investment 
p ro p o s a l s  p r e s e n te d  t o  t h e  Committee were o f t e n  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  a p l o t  
s tag ed  and de term ined  b a c k - s t a g e  by d i v i s i o n a l  d i r e c t o r s  advoca t ing  
t h e  change.  Most s t r a t e g i c  changes seem t o  have passed smoothly through 
t h e  Board only  t o  be opposed dur ing  im plementa t ion  e i t h e r  because most 
d i r e c t o r s  could  no t  fo l lo w  what was going on, o r  had no t ime and hence 
s h o r t  c i r c u i t e d  th e  a n a l y t i c a l  r i g o r ,  a c c e p t i n g  as p l a u s i b l e  management 
p r o p o s a l s  unaware of  t h e  r a m i f i c a t i o n s  and p o l i t i c a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s .  To 
quo te  Hall  (1972) ' p o s s e s s i o n  (o f  i n fo rm a t io n )  g ive s  r i s e  t o  c o n t ro l  
e i t h e r  because o t h e r s  a re  kep t  in t h e  dark about  t h e  dangerous  d i s c o n -  
f i r m i n g ,  d i s c r e p a n t  in fo rm a t io n  because  the y  have l i m i t e d  access  . . .  
o r  because t h e  a c t i o n s  of  o t h e r s  can be a n t i c i p a t e d  and t h e r e f o r e  
c o n t r o l l e d ' .
These change s t r a t e g i e s  a re  not  m u tua l ly  e x c l u s i v e ,  they  o v e r la p  and 
may a l l  be p r e s e n t  in any one s t r a t e g i c  change p r o c e s s ,  some may be 
e f f e c t i v e  a t  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  o f  t h e  p r o c e s s .  By t h e  same token ,  
s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  d i f f e r e n t i a l l y  im p o r tan t ,  and may be based 
on d i f f e r e n t  p ro c e s s e s  invo lv ing  a new s e t  o f  a c t o r s  who may d e f in e  
t h e i r  s i t u a t i o n  and response  t o  i t  d i f f e r e n t l y .  When in d i v i d u a l s  a re  
aware of  t h e  p u n i t i v e  s a n c t i o n s  t h a t  may fo l lo w  t h e i r  a c t i o n s ,  and 
y e t  have an im por tan t  need t h a t  must be s a t i s f i e d ,  they  a re  s e v e re ly  
c o n s t r a i n e d  by t h e  wishes  of  t h o s e  who can s a t i s f y  i t ,  (F ine  1984 
p . 251) .
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Power and P o l i t i c s  of  Resource  Dependence
To t h i s  p o i n t  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  has  d e a l t  w i th  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  p ro c e s s  
invo lved  in t h e  ' t r a d i t i o n - b r e a k i n g  change '  and how a c t o r s  m ob i l iz ed  
power t o  r a l l y  behind t h e i r  demand t o  pursue  outcomes congruen t  with  
t h e i r  p e r c e iv e d  i n t e r e s t s .  Emerging from t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  i s  a c r i t i c a l  
r o l e  o f  c o a l i t i o n s ,  and mainly e x t e r n a l  a c t o r s  as r e s p e c t e d  and i n f l u ­
e n t i a l  power b r o k e r s ,  as s u p p l i e r s  and c o n t r o l l e r s  of  e s s e n t i a l  r e s o u r c e s ;  
u s ing  a m ix tu re  o f  o v e r t  and u n o b t r u s iv e  power t o  d e f i n e  c o l l e c t i v e  
s i t u a t i o n  o f  s t r a t e g i c  change ,  f o s t e r  t h e i r  p e r s p e c t i v e  of  r e a l i t y  t o  
e n s u re  compl iance with  t h e i r  o b j e c t i v e s  and s upp re s s  o r  exc lude  c o n f l i c t i n g  
i s s u e s  from t h e  agendas.  The p ro ces s  has g iven  us some f l a s h e s  of 
p o l i t i c a l  games i n d i v i d u a l s  p lay  in m a n i f e s t i n g  t h e i r  p r e f e r e n c e s  f o r  
one a l t e r n a t i v e  over  a n o t h e r  and t h e  c ho ice s  of  p ro p o s a l s  of  change t o  
advance s t r a t e g i e s  c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t s .  The s t r a t e g i c  
d e c i s i o n s  from t h i s  p r o c e s s ,  Mazzolini  a rg u e s ,  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  no t  o u t ­
comes o f :
"a r a t i o n a l e  shared  by a l l  p l a y e r s .  Ra the r ,  they  r e s u l t  from p o l i t i c s  
among i n d i v i d u a l s  who see d i f f e r e n t  f a c e s  of  th e  i s s u e  and who d i s a g r e e  
abou t  t h e  o p t i o n s  they  f a v o u r " ,  (1979 p . 268) .
His views f i t  wel l  w i th  P f e f f e r ' s  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s  
(which w i l l  be adopted) as ' t h o s e  a c t i v i t i e s  taken  w i th i n  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  
t o  a c q u i r e ,  deve lop ,  and use power and o t h e r  r e s o u r c e s  t o  o b t a i n  o n e ' s  
p r e f e r r e d  outcomes in a s i t u a t i o n  in which t h e r e  i s  u n c e r t a i n t y  o r  
d i s s e n s u s  about  c h o i c e s ' ,  (1981 p . 7 ) .  I f  p o l i t i c s  i s  t h e  s tudy  of  
power in a c t i o n  as P f e f f e r  s u g g e s t s ,  we look a t  t h e  p o l i t i c s  of  
r e s o u r c e  dependence and c o n t r o l  t h a t  were a p p a re n t  th ro u g h o u t  t h e  s tudy 
p e r io d  in LNDC.
* Resources r e f e r  t o  any p r o f e s s i o n ,  va lued a c t i v i t y ,  bu t  mainly 
f i n a n c i a l  and t e c h n i c a l  r e s o u r c e s .
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S t r u c t u r a l  Con t ro l s
The e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of  a SOE i s  in e s sence  a p o l i t i c a l  d e c i s i o n ,  a s t a t e  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  s t r a t e g y  o f t e n  r e f l e c t i n g  t h e  government o f  t h e  d a y ' s  
p e r c e p t io n s  and id e o lo g ic a l  b e l i e f s  about  t h e  management o f  n a t i o n a l  
economy. The c l e a r  examples from t h e  Western economies (which o f t e n  
p rov ide  cues t o  LDCs) a re  t h e  c o n t r a s t s  between C onse rva t ive  governments 
in B r i t a i n  and France and Labour and S o c i a l i s t s  government r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
The former  m a in ta in  t h a t  t h e  ' b u s i n e s s  o f  government i s  no t  t h e  govern ­
ment o f  b u s i n e s s ' * ,  hence p r i v a t i z e  most o f  SOEs, whereas t h e  l a t t e r  
p e rc e iv e  t h e  s t a t e  p lay ing  an im por tan t  r o l e  th rough  c o n t r o l  of  some 
'commanding h e i g h t s '  o f  t h e  economy. The r e s u l t a n t  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  
s t r u c t u r e  and communication may r e f l e c t  t h e s e  b e l i e f s  and p e r c e p t i o n s .  
The s t a t e  in most c a s e s ,  as  i t  was wi th  LNDC, p ro v id es  a l l  t h e  c r i t i c a l  
r e s o u r c e s ,  from e q u i ty  f i n a n c i n g ,  t h e  c a p i t a l  and o p e r a t i o n a l  expend­
i t u r e s .  But i t  i s  t h e  c o n t ro l  o f  a c c e s s i b i l i t y  t o  t h e  s c a r c e  r e s o u r c e s  
t h a t  i s  a major o b s t a c l e  t o  s t r a t e g i c  d i s c r e t i o n  of  a SOE. As p o in ted  
o u t ,  t h e  CEO of  LNDC, o f f i c i a l l y ,  has no d i r e c t  l i n k  with  t h e  C ab in e t ,  
h i s  proposed s t r a t e g i c  changes,  annual  budget  p r o p o s a l s ,  g r a n t s  and 
subven t ion ,  a r e  supposed t o  be r o u t e d ,  and must be endorsed by t h e  
s u p e rv i s in g  M in i s t ry  of  Trade .  Compl ica t ing  t h e  p rocess  a re  two o t h e r  
M i n i s t r i e s  involved  in th e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  with  LNDC t h a t  a re  l i k e l y  t o  
have s t ro n g  in f l u e n c e  on t h e  s t r a t e g i c  c o n t e n t  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n .
Thei r  p e r s p e c t i v e  of  i s s u e s  may no t  be co n g ru e n t ,  and t h e  most powerful  
of  t h e  l o t  - p rov id ing  c r i t i c a l  r e s o u r c e ,  f i n a n c e ,  may have t h e  l a s t  
say .  This  p rocedure  i s  no t  j u s t  a r a t i o n a l  d e s ign  t o  accomplish 
c o r p o r a t e  g o a l s ,  enhance performance and improve i n t e r a c t i o n  between 
th e  s t a t e  and SOE. I t  i s  so des igned  t o  s e rv e  a purpose because  ' i t
* C hance l lo r  of  Exchequer -  Nigel Lawson, P r i v a t i s a t i o n  Survey,  A 
Spec ia l  Repor t .  The O bserver ,  25th October  1987.
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i s  in someone 's ,  o r  some g r o u p ' s  i n t e r e s t  t o  have i t  be as i t  i s ' ,  
Mangham (1979 p . 132).  P f e f f e r  (1978) has e x p l i c i t l y  argued t h a t  t h e  
e x p l a n a t i o n s  o f  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  must go beyond t h e  economic 
e f f i c i e n c y  and manager ia l  a s p e c t s ,  and c o n s id e r  t h e  un d e r ly in g  p o l i t i c s  
of  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e :
“S t r u c t u r e ,  i t  would appea r ,  i s  no t  j u s t  t h e  outcome of  a m anager ia l  
p ro c e s s  in which d e s ig n s  a r e  s e l e c t e d  t o  ensu re  h ig h e r  p r o f i t s .
S t r u c t u r e ,  r a t h e r  i s  i t s e l f  t h e  outcome o f  a p rocess  in which 
c o n f l i c t i n g  i n t e r e s t s  a r e  media ted  so t h a t  d e c i s i o n s  emerge as 
t o  what c r i t e r i a  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  w i l l  seek t o  s a t i s f y .  Organ­
i z a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e s  can be viewed as t h e  outcome of  a c o n t e s t  
f o r  c o n t r o l  and in f l u e n c e  o c c u r r i n g  w i th i n  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  Organ­
i z a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r a l  ar rangem ent a re  as l i k e l y  t o  be t h e  outcomes 
o f  p o l i t i c a l  p ro c e s s e s  as a r e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  r e s o u rc e  a l l o c a t i o n  
d e c i s i o n s " ,  p . 36.
This a b i l i t y  (however l i g i t i m a t e )  t o  c o n t r o l  supp ly  and a cc ess  t o  
e s s e n t i a l  r e s o u r c e s  bestows enormous power upon t h e  government and 
c r e a t e s  a dependency r e l a t i o n s h i p  t h a t  e n s u re s  t h a t  i t  can e x e r t  power 
over  LNDC t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  LNDC has no d i s c r e t i o n a r y  a l t e r n a t i v e  
means o f  f i n a n c e .  The c o n t r o l  p rocess  has o t h e r  im por tan t  p o l i t i c a l  
p a y - o f f s  f o r  t h e  government:
1. I t  can i n f l u e n c e  s t r a t e g i c  behav iour  o f  a SOE th rough w i thho ld ing  
o f  g r a n t s ,  c u t s  in budge ta ry  a l l o c a t i o n ,  ve to  p ro c e s s in g  of  p ro p o s a l s  
f o r  e x t e r n a l  f i n a n c e s ,  and as was o f t e n  t h e  c a s e ,  change CEOs.
For i n s t a n c e ,  in 1980/81 government d id  no t  advance LNDC wi th  
Inves tment Promotion budget  and t h a t  s e r i o u s l y  c u r t a i l e d  inves tment
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campaigns of  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n .  This  knowledge of  p o t e n t i a l  and 
a c t u a l  use of  p u n i t i v e  s a n c t i o n s ,  a c t s  as a spur  t o  SOE t o  e i t h e r  
t o e  t h e  government l i n e  o r  r e a d j u s t  i t s  s t r a t e g i e s  in o r d e r  t o  
accommodate p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s .  The same i n f l u e n c e s  were 
i d e n t i f i e d  i n t e r n a l l y ,  between management and i t s  wholly-owned 
s u b s i d i a r i e s .  The rede f inem en t  o f  t h e  f o r e i g n  inves tment  s t r a t e g y  
in 1985/86 t o  focus  on lo c a l  promotion as w e l l ,  may be seen in 
t h i s  c o n t e x t  t o  pre-em pt  f i n a n c i a l  squeeze  due t o  government 
p r e s s u r e  f o r  import  s u b s t i t u t i o n  i n v e s tm e n t s .
2 .  Through t h e  r e f e r r a l  o r  approva l  system, i e  where some s t r a t e g i c  
changes have t o  g e t  Cab ine t  b l e s s i n g  p r i o r  t o  im plem en ta t ion ,  
u n o b t r u s iv e  power i s  be ing  e x e r c i s e d ,  and i m p l i c i t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
and compromises made in t h a t  c e r t a i n  i s s u e s  a r e  e i t h e r  ' s t y m i e d '  
o r  o m i t te d  from recommendations i f  the y  pose a r i s k  o f  government 
r e j e c t i o n ;  thus  s e l f - s c r e e n i n g  and r e s t r a i n t  t a k e s  p l a c e .
However, power i s  r e l a t i v e ,  i t  i s  no t  a s t a b l e  and permanent  p r o p e r t y ;  
i t  i s  unevenly  d i f f u s e d  among a c t o r s  and t h e  i n f l u e n c e s  they  can 
a c t u a l l y  e x e r t  vary from one s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n  t o  an o th e r  and s h i f t  
w i th  t im e .  This  was a p p a re n t  in Van Gen and B e t c h t e l ' s  p e r i o d s .  The 
d i f f e r e n c e s  in t h e  degree  o f  s t r a t e g i c  autonomy between t h a t  p e r io d  
and t h e  p o s t - l o c a l i s a t i o n  seem t o  lend su p p o r t  t o  t h i s  v ie w p o in t .
There a r e  a l s o  c l e a r  i n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  Lesotho government was f u l l y  
aware o f  some o f  th e  f a c t o r s  t h a t  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  s t r a t e g i e s  
o f  Van Gen ( see  c h a p t e r  6 f o r  comments o f  LNDC chairman about  t h e s e  
f a c t o r s ) .  The q u e s t i o n ( s )  t h a t  might  be r a i s e d  i s  why was i t  t h a t  in 
t h e  pos t-Van Gen e ra  - t h e  in d ig e n iz e d  p e r i o d ,  t h e  government has  moved 
in t o  c o n t r o l  t h o s e  same d i s c r e t i o n a r y  f a c t o r s  t h a t  were p e r c e iv e d  to  
have b rough t  about  p r o f i t a b l e  r e s u l t s ?  How p l a u s i b l e  a re  t h e  e x p l a n a t i o n s  
t h a t  e x t e r n a l  r e s o u rc e s  a r e  in  d i r e  demand from a l l  s e c t o r s  of  t h e
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economy and r e q u i r e  government i n t e r v e n t i o n  f o r  d i s t r i b u t i v e  j u s t i c e ?
To be c e r t a i n ,  t h e r e  a r e  no ready and s imple  answers t o  t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s ,  
bu t  I submit t h a t  f a r  from be ing  a r a t i o n a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  w e a l t h ,  
c o n t r o l  of  r e s o u r c e s  i s  a p o l i t i c a l  manoeuvre t o  recoup and m a in ta in  
b a s i s  o f  i n f l u e n c e  and power f o r  t h e  advancement of  th o s e  in power 
and t h e i r  c o n s t i t u e n t s .  Such s p h e re s  o f  i n f l u e n c e  in p r e s t i g e o u s  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  such as LNDC, may be r e l i e d  upon t o  f u l f i l l  an im por tan t  
r o l e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  pa t ro n a g e  and r e c i p r o c a l  p a y - o f f s  t o  c o l l e a g u e s ,  
p a r t y  l o y a l i s t s  and members of  t h e  r u l i n g  c l i q u e .  In some c a s e s  SOEs 
have become conven ien t  ‘c o o l in g  o f f '  l o c a t i o n s  where i n d i v i d u a l s  may 
be appo in ted  in r e a d i n e s s  f o r  more s e n i o r  m i n i s t e r i a l  appoin tmen t as 
happened t o  LNDC in 1986 when t h e  CEO, h a rd ly  two y e a r s  in t h a t  p o s t ,  
was promoted t o  a m i n i s t e r i a l  p o s t .
I t  i s  in t h i s  rega rd  t h a t  I have argued t h a t  appointment and changes  
o f  most CEOs was a p o l i t i c a l  d e c i s i o n  w i th o u t  s i g n i f i c a n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
w i th  t h e i r  expec ted  performance ( i f  e v e r  government had one) in LNDC.
The demotion of  Senna in 1984 t o  a d i r e c t o r  of  th e  Legal D i v i s i o n ,  which 
had t o  be c r e a t e d  because  he had no jo b  t o  do,  demonst ra ted  t h a t  economic 
e f f i c i e n c y  may be secondary  t o  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s ,  as  a new CEO, a 
former  s e n i o r  c i v i l  s e r v a n t ,  was a p p o in te d .  I r o n i c a l l y  t h a t  was a y e a r  
when LNDC performance  was beg inn ing  t o  improved.  Fur thermore ,  o u t s i d e  
p o l i t i c a l  appoin tments  a r e  a t h r e a t  t o  c a r e e r  p ro s p e c t s  of  t h e  d i v i s i o n a l  
d i r e c t o r s  who have come up th rough  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  t r a i n i n g  and d e v e l ­
opment system with an eye on l e a d e r s h i p  promot ion ,  and a cause  o f  s e l f ­
doubt  and e r o s i o n  of  c o n f id e n ce  on t h e i r  pe rformance  s in c e  t h e r e  i s  
no th ing  h ig h e r  t o  aim f o r ,  l e ad in g  t o  some r e s i g n a t i o n s .  Commenting 
on t h i s  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r f e r e n c e ,  t h e  former  CEO of  LNDC, John Bow, w ro te :
" R e l a t i v e l y  low s a l a r i e s  and o t h e r  b e n e f i t s ,  coup led with  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  in many c a ses  i n i t i a t i v e ,  in n o v a t io n  and m e r i t  a r e  no t  always 
rewarded with  promotions  and s a l a r y  i n c r e a s e s ,  have tended  t o  dampen 
t h e  morale and t h e  p r o d u c t i v i t y  o f  p a r a s t a t a l  w orkers .
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Some o f  th e  p rocedures  govern ing  t h e i r  o p e r a t i o n s  te nd  t o  d i s c o u r a g e  
th e  management teams from ta k in g  r i s k s .  The managers want t o  r e t a i n  
t h e i r  j o b s  by p la y in g  i t  s a f e .  They avoid r i s k y  v e n t u r e s ,  whose 
f a i l u r e  may lead  t o  t h e i r  d i s m i s s a l  w h i le  s ucces s  may no t  be a d e q u a te ly  
rewarded o r  even a p p r e c i a t e d " . *
The ex p re s s e d  concerns  about  c o r p o r a t e  per formance were im por tan t  f o r  
p o l i t i c a l  expediency  and t o  s a t i s f y  o u t s i d e  i n v e s t o r s  in o r d e r  t o  
m a in ta in  LNDC v i a b i l i t y  t o  a t t r a c t  f o r e i g n  in v e s tm e n t s ,  p rov ide  j o b s  
which t h e  M i n i s t e r  r e s p o n s i b l e  can t a k e  c r e d i t  f o r .  This  i n h e r e n t  
c o n f l i c t  h i g h l i g h t s  t h e  dilemma o f  a SOE in deve lop ing  n a t i o n s ,  t h a t  
they  a r e  e v a l u a t e d  on economic p r o f i t a b i l i t y  c r i t e r i a  w h i le  t h o s e  who 
have t o  manage them, CEOs, a r e  appo in ted  and a p p r a i s e d  on p o l i t i c a l  
grounds .  No wonder most LNDC CEOs have tu rn e d  o u t  t o  be ' symbol ic  
h e a d s ' ,  w i th  t h e  l e a s t  comprehension of  what was happening,  in v/hich 
d i r e c t i o n  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  should  be go ing ,  and e f f e c t i v e l y  c r e a t i n g  
l e a d e r s h i p  vacuum t h a t  has o f t e n  been f i l l e d  by t h e  I r i s h  d i v i s i o n a l  
d i r e c t o r s .  In o t h e r  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  Aharoni (1986) observes  ' t h e  
m i n i s t e r  i s  o f t e n  t h e  r e a l  CEO of t h e  f i r m ,  and t h e  o f f i c i a l l y  nominated 
CEO may be no more than  a p l a n t  manager,  c a r r y i n g  o u t  o r d e r s  on how 
th e  f i rm  should  be managed and who i n t e r e s t s  a r e  t o  be g u a r a n t e e d ' ,
( p . 286) .
S uccess fu l  SOEs can p lay  an im por tan t  r o l e  in t h e  economy o f  a c o u n t ry ,  
p rov id ing  jo b  o p p o r t u n i t i e s ,  deve lop ing  dep re s sed  a r e a s  and c o n t r i b u t e  
revenues  t o  t h e  t r e a s u r y .  The s u p e r v i s i n g  m i n i s t e r  t a k e s  t h e  c r e d i t  
f o r  t h e s e  ach ievem ents ,  and he o f f i c i a t e s  o r  i n v i t e s  t h e  head o f  
s t a t e  t o  t h e  in a u g u ra t io n  of  new p l a n t s .  These a c t i v i t i e s  c a r r y  
p o l i t i c a l  w eigh t  of  f a r  g r e a t e r  importance t o  t h e  power p r o f i l e  o f  t h e  
CEO and t h e  M in i s t e r  w i th in  t h e  C ab in e t ,  which may s e rv e  t o  s o l i d i f y  
o r  a l t e r  h i s  o r  he r  p u b l i c  s t a n d i n g  and endear  him o r  he r  t o  t h e  
Prime M i n i s t e r .  But power i s  no t  i n f i n i t e l y  a v a i l a b l e  t o  a l l ,  t h e
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powerful  and i n f l u e n t i a l  a c t o r s  a r e  o f t e n  a s e l e c t  few, and such 
endearment would lead t o  o t h e r s  lo s in g  t h e i r  power p o s i t i o n  and a c c e s s  
t o  t h e  e a r  o f  PM, u n le a sh in g  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r n e c i n e  among o t h e r  m i n i s t r i e s  
by suspending  t h e i r  f a c i l i t a t i n g  s e r v i c e s  o r  c o - o p e r a t i o n  t h a t  c o n t r i b u t e s  
t o  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  ach ievem ents ,  in o r d e r  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  pe rc e iv e d  o r  
a c t u a l  s l i d e  o f  t h e i r  power b ase .  These ' p o l i t i c a l  games' were 
i d e n t i f i a b l e  among t h e  t h r e e  m i n i s t e r s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  LNDC. Suddenly 
a new d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e i r  r o l e  on th e  Board emerged -  they  were t o  be 
' o r d i n a r y '  members w hi le  on t h e  Board and ' M i n i s t e r s '  o u t s i d e  t h e  
Boardroom. With t h e s e  two h a t s  on one p e r s o n ,  t h e  M in i s t e r  of  F inance 
would promise  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of  funds  t o  s u ppor t  a s p e c i f i c  p r o j e c t  in 
t h e  Boardroom, and l a t e r  when t h e  M i n i s t e r  of  Trade makes a r rangements  
f o r  funds  t r a n s f e r  he would be t o l d  t h e r e  were no fu n d s ,  t h e  M i n i s t e r  
was t a l k i n g  a t  a pe r sona l  l e v e l .  The M i n i s t e r  of  Trade was e a s i l y  
i d e n t i f i a b l e  with  t h e  achievem ents  o f  LNDC as t h e  chai rman ,  and t a k in g  
c r e d i t  from t h e  b u s in e s s  community and p u b l i c  a t  l a r g e  f o r  h i s  d e v e lo p ­
ment s t r a t e g i e s .  But t h o s e  who prov ided  t h e  f i n a n c i n g  and c o - o r d i n a t e d  
e x t e r n a l  s ou rces  o f  r e s o u r c e  f e l t  th e y  were be ing s i d e l i n e d  and f l e x e d  
t h e i r  power by s t a l l i n g  in p ro c e s s in g  t h e  c h a i rm a n ' s  p r o p o s a l s ' i n  o r d e r  
t o  g e t  him t o  a c t  in a d e s i r e d  manner. E s s e n t i a l l y ,  t h e  i s s u e  b o i l e d  
down t o  t h e  co m p e t i t io n  t o  i n f l u e n c e  change p ro c e s s  and t h e  M in i s t r y  
c o n t r o l l i n g  c r i t i c a l  r e s o u r c e  e x t o r t i n g  c o n c e ss io n s  and compromises 
from o t h e r s  t o  r e c o g n i s e  i t s  i n d i s p e n s a b i l i t y  t o  t h e i r  o p e r a t i o n s  and 
i m p l i c i t l y  demanding a v i s i b l e  r o l e  t o  p l a y .  Thus,  t h e  s u b t l e  p o l i t i c a l  
jockey ing  between M i n i s t e r s  d e c id in g  whose s c r i p t s  w i l l  be p layed o u t ,  
who w i l l  be t h e  h e r o ( e s )  o f  change t o  t a k e  c e n t r e  s t a g e  and r e c e i v e  
t h e  ac c o la d e s  o f  job  c r e a t i o n ,  tu rn e d  o u t  t o  be im por tan t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  
in t h e  p roces s  o f  f a c i l i t a t i n g  s t r a t e g i c  change as each a c t o r  wanted t o  
make a d i s t i n c t i v e  im press ion  t h a t  w i l l  be r eco g n i se d  t o  h i s  c r e d i t .
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A c c e s s i b i l i t y  t o  t h e  PM, as a l r e a d y  i n d i c a t e d ,  was t h e  most c e n t r a l  
and e f f e c t i v e  power base a c t o r s  could  r e l y  upon t o  e f f e c t  s t r a t e g i c  
change ,  and t h e  powerful  CEOs l i k e  John Bow, who had t h a t  o p p o r t u n i t y ,  
were a b l e  t o  o v e r r i d e  t h e  r e s o u r c e  c o n t r o l s  and c i rcumvent o r  even 
undermind b u r e a u c r a t i c  p rocedures  by o b t a i n i n g  approval  o f  t h e  PM.
But in t h e  p o l i t i c a l  world o f  a SOE, acc ess  i s  no t  g u a ra n t e e d ,  i t  
changes w i th  people  and i s s u e s  t h a t  a r e  dominant  a t  t h e  t im e ;  however, 
i t s  p o s s e s s o r s  w i l l  not  r e l i n q u i s h  i t  e a s i l y ,  th e y  o f t e n  have enough 
s u p p o r t  and i n f l u e n c e  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s .  The s t a b i l i t y  and 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  CEO in  LNDC, depended no t  e x c l u s i v e l y  on t h e  
c l o s e r  l i n k s  wi th  t h e  ' r e a l  p o l i t i c a l  power ' in government bu t  t o  some 
e x t e n t  on h i s  i n f l u e n c e  and p o l i t i c a l  p r o f i l e  w i th i n  t h e  C a b in e t ,  in 
p a r t i c u l a r  t h e  s u p e r v i s in g  m i n i s t r i e s .  The c o n c e n t r a t i o n  of  i n f l u e n c e  
and a l l i a n c e  with  head of  government a lo n e ,  t h r e a t e n e d  Cabine t  M i n i s t e r s '  
power and led t o  b lock ing  t h e  acc e s s  o r  in some extreme c a s e s ,  a Cabine t  
r e s h u f f l e  b rought  in new 'm in d -g u a rd s '  d i v e r t i n g  t h e  PM's a t t e n t i o n  t o  
o t h e r  p r i o r i t i e s .  These changes have had a t e l l i n g  e f f e c t  on th o s e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  t h a t  r e l i e d  mainly  on t h a t  power base t o  e f f e c t  s t r a t e g i c  
change .  John Bow's comments as he t e n d e re d  h i s  r e s i g n a t i o n  in 1982, 
s u g g e s t  t h a t  he r e a l i z e d  t h a t  i n a b i l i t y  t o  m a in ta in  d i r e c t  a c c e s s  and 
communication t o  head of  government,  meant he no longe r  had power t o  
i n f l u e n c e  d e c i s i o n s  w i th in  government,  hence h i s  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  in LNDC 
was f i n i s h e d .  Thus,  t h o s e  with  power t o  e r e c t  b a r r i e r s  and m ed ia te  
t h e  a c c e s s i b i l i t y ,  were a b l e  t o  c o n t r o l  in fo rm a t io n  f low as w ell  as 
de te rm in e  who should  be al lowed a c c e s s .  Mutual dependence was c r e a t e d  
and t h e  PM's power t o  i n f l u e n c e  d ec i s ion -m ak ing  in LNDC somewhat 
reduced because he depended on t h e  new i n t e r m e d i a r i e s  who had t h e i r  
own c la ims  t o  s t a k e  ou t  and p e r c e p t i o n s  on what he should  focus  on.
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The Capt ive  Board
C orpo ra te  Boards u s u a l l y  p la y  an im por tan t  r o l e  in t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  of  
t h e i r  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  e s p e c i a l l y  as s t r o n g  advoca tes  of  change and a 
b u f f e r  between management and e x t e r n a l  i n t e r f e r e n c e .  In t h i s  l e v e l  
o f  c o r p o r a t e  gu idance ,  competence and c e r t a i n  b re a d th  o f  v i s i o n  about  
t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ’s b u s in e s s  a r e  e s s e n t i a l .  The board a l s o  se rved  as 
a prime channel  of  i n f l u e n c e  by e x t e r n a l  s t a k e h o l d e r s .  Through review 
r e p o r t s ,  c o n d i t i o n s  of  c r e d i t  agreem en ts ,  t h r e a t s  of  withdrawal  of  
g r a n t s ,  c a l l s  f o r  c l e a r  s t r a t e g i c  d i r e c t i o n  from t h e s e  a c t o r s ,  manage­
ment was a b l e  t o  persuade  p o l i t i c a l  d i r e c t o r s  t o  m arsha l l  s u p p o r t  w i th in  
government.  However, t h e  s i t u a t i o n  in SOEs i s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t ,  
t h e y  lack  d i r e c t o r s  who can d i r e c t ,  as  opposed t o  mere ly  com pl ian t  and 
nominal ru b b e r - s t a m p s ,  and t h i s  seems t o  be due t o  t h e  mode o f  a p p o i n t ­
ment used in t h e s e  e n t e r p r i s e s .  The appoin tment of  d i r e c t o r s  o f  LNDC 
i s  made by t h e  head of  government on t h e  ' a d v i c e  of  management ' .  The 
adv ice  b a s i c a l l y  r e f e r s  t o  non-Cabine t  d i r e c t o r s  who a re  appo in ted  on 
t h e  b a s i s  of  t h e i r  competence in c o r p o r a t e  management and a c c e p t a b i l i t y  
t o  government.  These p r o f e s s i o n a l s ,  i t  was a rgued ,  would be f r e e  of  
i n f l u e n c e s  from w i th i n  and o u t s i d e  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  and would m a in ta in  
o b j e c t i v e  views of  i s s u e s  and a c t  as  a d v i s e r s  f o r  t h e  smooth runn ing  
o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n .  The appoin tment may be j u s t i f i e d  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  
in t h a t  t h e  s t a t e  i s  t h e  s o l e  s h a r e h o l d e r  in t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n .  Commenting 
on t h e  appoin tment o f  d i r e c t o r s ,  Sexty  (1580) has c o r r e c t l y  observed  t h a t :
"A s tu te  managers may nominate persons  who a r e  p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y  a c c e p t ­
a b l e  t o  them in te rms o f  a t t i t u d e  towards  b u s in e s s  and a r e  p o l i t i c a l l y  
a c c e p t a b l e  t o  t h e  government.  In t h i s  way, government g e t s  t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  appoin tment bu t  management g e t s  a d i r e c t o r  i t  f e e l s  i s  
a c c e p t a b l e . "
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What Sexty has over looked i s  t h a t  th e  system of  appointment i t s e l f ,  
t h e  p re s en ce  of  t h e  PM as t h e  chairman ( l a t e r  P r e s i d e n t )  who appo in ted  
them, and Cabine t  M i n i s t e r s ,  i s  an i m p l i c i t  c o n t r o l  and imposes s e l f ­
c e n s o r s h ip  on how f a r  t h e  o u t s i d e r s  may openly  p rov ide  a c o n s t r u c t i v e  
c r i t i c i s m  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  on m a t t e r s  t h a t  a f f e c t  
government i n t e r e s t s .  The comments of  one e x t e r n a l  d i r e c t o r  in  c h a p t e r  
7, abou t  t h i s  c a p t i v e  s t a t u s  no t  t o  r o c k - t h e - b o a t ,  a r e  i n s t r u c t i v e .
As p o in t e d  o u t  e a r l i e r ,  u n l i k e  in t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  where t h e  board 
t e nds  t o  be t h e  a r b i t o r  o f  s t r a t e g i c  changes ,  t h e  board o f  LNDC i s  but  
one of  t h e  to p  dec i s ion -m ak ing  f o r a  w i th o u t  d e f i n i t i v e  power in most 
s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n s .  The Act s t i p u l a t e s  t h a t  i t  may a p p o in t  t h e  CEO, 
bu t  in p r a c t i c e  i t  i s  only t h e  government t h a t  a p p o in t s  and changes  
t h e  e x e c u t i v e s .  However, i t  i s  no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  t h e  M i n i s t e r ( s )  in 
charge  of  LNDC t h a t  can make t h e  changes ,  they  may o r i g i n a t e  anywhere 
w i th in  t h e  Cabine t  depending on t h e  power o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  o r  c o a l i t i o n  
behind t h e  change o f  a p p o in te e  be ing c o n s id e r e d .  Likewise t h e  chairman 
has l i m i t e d  power over  t h e  CEO, h i s  (CEO) a l l e g i a n c e  i s  w ith  h i s  power 
base in government of  which th e  chairman may be one.  These f i n d i n g s  
a r e  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  of  Fubara (1984 p . 68) in t h e  s tudy  o f  performance 
of  p u b l i c  e n t e r p r i s e s  in N i g e r i a ,  he observed t h a t  appoin tmen t o f  
board members was th rough  some ' t e c h n i q u e  o f  connec t ion ism  w i th  t h o s e  
in p o w e r ' ,  w h i le  Aharoni (1986 p . 386) p o i n t s  ou t  t h a t  in Zambia, 'between 
1971 and 1978, ZIMCO's board of  d i r e c t o r s  inc luded  a l l  t h e  key m i n i s t e r s ,  
with  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  h im se l f  as  t h e  c h a i r m a n ' .  He conc luded t h a t :
"appointment o f  managers on p o l i t i c a l  c r i t e r i o n  makes them v u l n e r a b l e  
and s e n s i t i v e  t o  p o l i t i c a l  wishes  and i s  an ex t rem ely  e f f e c t i v e  c o n t r o l  
mechanism".
334
I t  i s  worth n o t ing  t h a t  s i m i l a r  c o n t r o l  s t r u c t u r e s ,  w ith  one e x c e p t io n ,  
were be ing used by t h e  HQ on i t s  s u b s i d i a r i e s .  I t  has two r e p r e s e n t ­
a t i v e s  on t h e  boards  of  i t s  s u b s i d i a r e s ,  coming from t h e  s u p e r v i s i n g  
d i v i s i o n  -  O p e ra t i o n s .  The board members were mainly appo in ted  by th e  
HQ, and t h e  s t r a t e g i c  change i s s u e s  l i k e  expans ion ,  c a p i t a l  g e a r i n g  may 
be d i s c u s s e d  by t h e  company board and recommend t o  HQ o r  t h e i r  r e p r e s ­
e n t a t i v e s  g iv e  a go-ahead t o  t h e  g e n e ra l  manager.  Thus t h e  same degree  
o f  r u b b e r - s tam p in g ,  apathy  and lack  of  i n f l u e n c e  expe r i enced  a t  HQ, and 
d e s i r e  f o r  more independent  board with  f u l l  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  powers was 
r e p o r t e d  in s i x  o f  t h e  e i g h t  s u b s i d i a r i e s .  S u b s id i a r y  managers were 
in  most c a s e s  more s e n i o r  than  d i v i s i o n a l  d i r e c t o r s  -  s t a t u s - w i s e .
They earned  h ig h e r  s a l a r i e s  and enjoyed  o t h e r  l u c r a c t i v e  packs t h a t  
were n o t  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e i r  d i v i s i o n a l  c h i e f s ,  and f e l t  they  had a 
b e t t e r  knowledge of  t h e i r  i n d u s t r y  than  t h e  de tached  HQ s t a f f .  However, 
because  o f  t h e  power t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  f i n a n c e s ,  impose l i m i t s  o f  expend­
i t u r e  b u d g e t s ,  h i r e  and f i r e  management, e v a l u a t e  managers '  per fo rmance  
a n n u a l ly  t o  de te rmine  s a l a r y  i n c r e a s e s ,  and r e f e r r a l  of  s t r a t e g i c  
d e c i s i o n s  t o  HQ, meant t h a t  HQ p e r s p e c t i v e s  o f  change and performance  
p r e v a i l e d  most of  t h e  t im e .
The resou rce -dependence  p o l i t i c s  has t o  be i n t e r p r e t e d  c a r e f u l l y .  I t  
i s  no t  sugges ted  t h a t  power and p o l i t i c a l  games were con f ined  to  
government-management i n t e r a c t i o n  because  o f  s t r u c t u r a l  c o n t r o l s ,  even 
though th e y  seem t o  have been c o n t r i b u t o r y ,  o r  t o  c o n t r o l  o f  f i n a n c i a l  
r e s o u r c e s .  I n t e r n a l l y ,  as  a l r e a d y  d e s c r i b e d ,  t h e r e  were d i v i s i o n a l  
p o l i t i c s ,  t h e  d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  e x p e r t  power o f  IDA, c o n t r o l  and em iss ion  
of  c r i t i c a l  s t r a t e g i c  i n f o r m a t io n ,  t h e  in formal boundary spanning 
i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  were e f f e c t i v e l y  u t i l i z e d  t o  r e s t r u c t u r e  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  
d i v i s i o n s  and s u b s i d i a r i e s ,  p e r sonne l  p o l i c i e s ,  l o c a l i z a t i o n  and 
performance c r i t e r i a  t o  r e f l e c t  t h e  p e r s p e c t i v e  of  t h e  e x p e r t s  as well
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as t h e  s t a k e h o l d e r s  a c c e p t i n g  t h a t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  
Environmental  f a c t o r s  e q u a l l y  played a f a c i l i t a t i v e  r o l e  t o  f o s t e r  
a c c ep tan c e  of  one d e f i n i t i o n  o ve r  o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e s ;  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  
t h e  c l o s u r e  o f  b o rd e r s  between Lesotho and South A f r i c a ,  made t h e  
proposed  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  s t r a t e g i e s  more v i a b l e  and imminent.  From 
t h i s  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  may be seen as a n e g o t i a t e d  p o l i t i c a l  
a rena  c o n t e s t e d  by d i f f e r e n t  a c t o r s  and c o a l i t i o n s  f o r  sphe res  o f  
i n f l u e n c e  and c o n t r o l ,  t h e r e  may be winners  and l o s e r s  among t h e  
i n t e r a c t a n t s  as  t h e  more powerful  impose t h e i r  w i l l ,  bu t  in t h e  main,  
a c t o r s  b a rg a in  and compromise and s t r a t e g i c  changes emerge from t h i s  
p o l i t i c a l  p r o c e s s .  I t  i s  a dynamic p rocess  which r e q u i r e s  a c t o r s  t o  
keep working a t  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  m a in ta in  t h e i r  power p o s i t i o n s  
which may s h i f t ,  d im in ish  o r  be enhanced.  Things do no t  j u s t  happen,  
th e y  a r e  e n ac ted  and r e c o n s t r u c t e d  by s o c i a l  a c t o r s  d i f f e r e n t i a l l y  
d e f i n i n g  t h e i r  r e a l i t y  w i th  s e l f  i n t e r e s t .  This  p e r s p e c t i v e  f i t s  
well  i n t o  t h e  c o n ce p t io n  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p rocess  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f f e r e d  by 
Mazzolin i  (1979) .  Quoting A l l i s o n  (1971) ,  he p o i n t s  ou t  t h a t :
"In  t h i s  p r o c e s s s ,  sometimes one group committed t o  a co u r s e  o f  a c t i o n  
t r ium phs  ove r  o t h e r  groups  f i g h t i n g  f o r  o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  Equa l ly  
o f t e n ,  however, d i f f e r e n t  groups p u l l i n g  in d i f f e r e n t  d i r e c t i o n s  
produce a r e s u l t  . . .  a m ix tu re  of  c o n f l i c t i n g  p r e f e r e n c e s  and unequal  
power o f  v a r io u s  i n d i v i d u a l s  -  d i s t i n c t  from what any person  o r  group 
in t e n d e d .  In both  c a s e s ,  what moves t h e  chess  p i e c e s  i s  no t  s imply 
t h e  r ea s o n s  t h a t  s u p p o r t  a c o u r s e  o f  a c t i o n ,  o r  t h e  r o u t i n e s  o f  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  t h a t  e n a c t  an a l t e r n a t i v e ,  bu t  t h e  power and s k i l l  o f  
p roponen ts  and opponents  o f  t h e  a c t i o n  in q u e s t i o n " ,  p . 251.
C re a t in g  Options
I t  i s  in  l i g h t  o f  t h i s  a p p a re n t  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t  t h a t  we need t o  
re -examine  t h e  n e g o t i a t e d  changes  f o r  r e s o u rc e  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  as a 
means o f  t r a n s f o r m i n g  t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  c o n t r o l  mechanisms. The focus  
of  t h e s e  s t r a t e g i c  changes has been t o  g e n e r a t e  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  revenues
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from i n t e r n a l  sou rces  and n e g o t i a t e  f o r  e x t e r n a l  funds as a l t e r n a t i v e s  
t o  an asymmetrical  dependence on s t a t e  s o u r c e s .  Such s t r a t e g i e s  were 
o f  g r e a t  appea l  t o  t h e  government,  p r i m a r i l y ,  as  a l t e r n a t i v e  funds  t o  
annual  s u b v e n t i o n s .  However, a v a i l a b i l i t y  of  a l t e r n a t i v e  s o u r c e s ,  as 
we have s een ,  in c re a s e d  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  r e l a t i v e  power and autonomy 
by broaden ing  t h e  cho ice  and reduc ing  r e l i a n c e  on one s o u rc e .  These 
s t r a t e g i e s  were e v i d e n t  in LNDC s in c e  1977 when World Bank opened a 
l i n e  o f  c r e d i t  which was r e n e g o t i a t e d  and in c re a s e d  t o  R4.5m in 1981, 
t o  be fo l low ed  by a s e r i e s  o f  o t h e r  s i m i l a r  a r rangements  with  o t h e r  
e x t e r n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  as d i s c u s s e d  in c h a p t e r  9.  The d i s in v e s t m e n t  
s t r a t e g y  t o  c u t  c o s t l y  o p e r a t i o n s ,  inves tm en ts  in p r o f i t a b l e  v e n tu re s  
( b e e r  and l i q u o r  company),  l o c a l i s a t i o n  schemes t o  develop  i n t e r n a l  
e x p e r t i s e ,  and use of  'Task F o rce '  in O pe ra t ions  D iv i s io n  t o  p rov ide  
c o n s u l t a n c y  s e r v i c e  t o  t h e  s u b s i d i a r i e s  f o r  a management f e e ,  may be 
seen as co n t in u ed  management a t t e m p t  t o  sway power pendulum t h e i r
way, and m a in ta in  autonomy t o  pursue  ' c o r p o r a t e  o b j e c t i v e s '  with
minimum e x t e r n a l  i n t r u s i o n .  R e l in q u i s h in g  power has no t  been easy 
and has r e s u l t e d  in some o f  t h e  p r o t r a c t e d  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  The n e g o t i a t i o n  
w i th  D6E, begun in 1982 t o  f l o a t  25 pe r  c e n t  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  e q u i t y ,  
dem ons t ra ted  t h a t  ownership  was in tended  government s t r a n g l e h o l d  o f  
c o n t r o l  o f  s t r a t e g i c  b eh a v io u r ,  and t h e i r  compromise t o  o f f e r  only 
p r e f e r e n c e  s h a re s  r a t h e r  th a n  common s h a r e s ,  sugges ted  th e y  f e l t  t h r e a t ­
ened and v u ln e r a b l e  t o  t h e  p e r c e iv e d  d i l u t i o n  o f  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s .  This
was s i g n i f i c a n t  in t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  t h e  o f f e r  which gave DGE a s e a t  
on t h e  Board, appo in ted  C o rp o ra te  P la n n e r ,  and t h e  government r e t a i n e d  
f i r s t  o p t i o n  t o  r ep u rch as e  t h e  s h a re  should  DGE d e c id e  t o  s e l l  them.
The i n f e r e n c e  we may draw from t h i s  i s  t h a t ,  t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  SOE's 
dependence and c o n t r o l  by t h e  s t a t e ,  t h e  g r e a t e r  w i l l  be t h e  use o f  
c o u n t e r a c t i n g  in f l u e n c e  s t r a t e g i e s  and n e g o t i a t i o n s  t o  ba lance  o r  
change power r e l a t i o n s h i p  and c o n t r o l  by o t h e r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .
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The n e t  e f f e c t  of  a l l  t h e s e  seemingly d i s j o i n t e d  manager ia l  a c t i o n s  
has been t o  d r a s t i c a l l y  reduce  power c o n c e n t r a t i o n  in one a c t o r  o r  
c o a l i t i o n  and t o  d i f f u s e  i t  among d i f f e r e n t  a c t o r s  o r  c r e a t e  d i f f e r e n t  
power c e n t r e s .  Consequent ly  a co m p e t i t io n  in some s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n s  
has emerged in which a c l o s e r  i n t e r a c t i o n  with  s t a k e h o l d e r s ,  i n d i v i d u a l s  
o r  c o a l i t i o n s ,  and n e g o t i a t i o n s  f o r  use o f  some r e s o u r c e s  i s  f o s t e r e d  by 
t h e  deg ree  t o  which management d e r i v e s  more b e n e f i t s  ou t  o f  t h a t  p a r t i c ­
u l a r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  than  with  government o r  o t h e r s .  The p o i n t  in c a s e  
being a c l o s e r  and dominant  r e l a t i o n s h i p  with  t h e  W8 which t a k e s  a more 
a c t i v e  r o l e  than  o t h e r  s t a k e h o l d e r s  in t h e  s u p e r v i s i o n  of  i t s  funded 
inves tm en ts  and p ro v id es  d e t a i l e d  b iannua l  rev iews of  LNDC a c t i v i t i e s ,  
wi th  s p e c i f i c  recommendations f o r  a c t i o n .  Management accep ted  t h e  Bank 's  
comprehensive m oni to r ing  r eq u i re m en ts  as a n e c e s s a ry  n u i s a n c e ,  p ro v id in g  
a v a l u a b le  p r o f e s s i o n a l  t r a i n i n g  f o r  t h e i r  s t a f f .
However, t h e  f i n d i n g s  of  t h i s  r e s e a r c h  tend  t o  s u p p o r t  Cook's  (1979) 
o b s e r v a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  o f  r e s o u r c e s  means t h a t  t h e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  may a c t u a l l y  lo s e  some measure o f  autonomy in t h e  sense  
t h a t  i t  becomes more dependent  upon o t h e r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  t h a t  have 
prov ided  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  r e s o u r c e s  and e x e r c i s e  c o n t r o l  t o  m on i to r  
and r e p r e s e n t  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s .  The d e t a i l e d  r e p o r t i n g  systems and 
annual  review m is s io n s ,  t h e  'dos  and d o n ' t  d o s '  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t u a l  
a r rangem en ts ,  have more o r  l e s s  r e l e g a t e d  LNDC t o  a s u b s i d i a r y  o f  t h e  
WB, o p e r a t i n g  and being managed along WB g u i d e l i n e s  and q u a r t e r l y  
p rov id ing  p ro g re s s  r e p o r t s  of  i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  and per formance in 
compliance wi th  s p e c i f i c  recommendations ( o f t e n  mandatory) from t h e  
Bank. I n t e r e s t i n g l y ,  t h e r e  were s i m i l a r  r e p o r t i n g  a r rangements  between 
LNDC HQ and t h e  s u b s i d i a r i e s .  LNDC seems t o  be caught  up in t h i s  
doub le -b ind  r e l a t i o n s h i p  whereby management p e r c e p t i o n s  of  what 
should happen and what changes should  t a k e  p l a c e  have e i t h e r  t o  be 
n e g o t i a t e d  wi th  government,  o t h e r  s t a k e h o l d e r s ,  o r  in most c a s e s ,  b o th .
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This m u l t i -dependence  n e c e s s i t a t e s  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  and n e g o t i a t i o n s  which
though the y  have proven f a c i l i t a t i v e  in b r in g i n g  d i f f e r e n t  powerful
c o a l i t i o n s  t o  i n f l u e n c e  s t r a t e g i c  changes ,  have in g en e ra l  t ended  t o
r e s t r i c t  and l i m i t  t h e  s w i f t  r e s p o n s iv e n e s s  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  t o
emerging t h r e a t s  and o p p o r t u n i t i e s  from i t s  env ironment and c r e a t e
ch o ic e  c o n d i t i o n s  in which c e r t a i n  p a t t e r n s  of  s t r a t e g i c  change emerge
t h a t  a r e  pe rce iv ed  by p o l i t i c i a n s  as impervious  t o  s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l
r e a l i t i e s .  The d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  p o l i c y  of  1982 by South A f r i c a  t o
deve lop  t h e  homelands c r e a t e d  a s t ro n g  c o m p e t i t io n  by o f f e r i n g  s u p e r i o r
i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  what had h i t h e r t o  been LNDC's u n r i v a l l e d  market  n ic h e  -
r
i e  a t t r a c t i v e  inves tment i n c e n t i v e  package .  Management r e a c t i v e  
s t r a t e g y  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e i r  marke t  s h a re  th rough  sugges ted  changes  in 
t a x  s t r u c t u r e  and ' p i o n e e r  i n d u s t r i e s  a c t '  r e s u l t e d  in p r o t r a c t e d  
p e r s u a s io n s  and a p p ea ls  suppor ted  by market  s t u d i e s  t o  pu t  p r e s s u r e  
f o r  improved i n c e n t i v e  package which was f i n a l l y  r e s o lv e d  in 1985/86 
when t a x  h o l id a y  was ex tended  from 6 y e a r s  t o  10: almost  f o u r  y e a r s  
l a t e r .
Thus,  t h e  e s t a b l i s h e d  s t r u c t u r a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  and c o n t r o l s  on t h e  
s t r a t e g i c  behav iour  of  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  have c r e a t e d  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  t o  r e l a x  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  which has been 
a b ro a d e r  s t r u c t u r e  with  f l e x i b l e  and d i v e r s e  n e g o t i a b l e  a r rangem en ts .
I
In o t h e r  words, t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  o p t i o n s  has c r e a t e d  r e l a t i v e  
s t r a t e g i c  d i s c r e t i o n ,  reduced power imbalance and r e s o u rc e  dependence 
from one a c t o r ,  bu t  t h e  o v e r a l l  n e g o t i a t e d  s t r u c t u r e  s t i l l  pu ts  
s t r a t e g i c  power eq u a t io n  in f av o u r  o f  ' p l u r a l i t y  o f  e x t e r n a l s '  who 
e x p l i c i t l y  o r  i m p l i c i t l y  d e c id e  which i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o r  p e r s p e c t i v e  
o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  w i l l  be a c c e p te d .
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The IDA Connect ion and Local Anchorage of  S t r a t e g i c  Change
In t h e  resou rce -dependence  r e l a t i o n s h i p  we h i g h l i g h t e d  t h e  two c r i t i c a l  
r e s o u r c e s  c e n t r a l  t o  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  and p o in t ed  o u t  t h a t  a p a r t  from 
f i n a n c e ,  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  has r e l i e d  on e x t e r n a l  m anager ia l  e x p e r t i s e ,  
t h e  most v i s i b l e  of  which were p rov ided  by t h e  I r i s h  Development 
A u t h o r i t y ,  a development f i n a n c e  c o r p o r a t i o n  from Dublin ,  on a two y e a r  
s h o r t - t e r m  a r rangem ent .  We examine t h e i r  r o l e  as change c a t a l y s t s  and 
c o n s u l t a n t s ,  some s t r a t e g i c  changes  the y  i n s t i g a t e d ,  and t h e  i n t e r n a l  
lo c a l  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  implement and s u s t a i n  t h e s e  changes as t h e  IDA 
s t a f f  changed.  I r e f e r  t o  t h i s  lo c a l  s k i l l  and c a p a b i l i t y  t o  m a in ta i n  
and fo l lo w  th rough  t h e  im plementa t ion  of  t h e  change as ' l o c a l  a n c h o r a g e ' .  
The u n d e r ly in g  assumption he re  i s  t h a t ,  g iven  t h a t  t h e  IDA e x p e r t s  were 
on a s h o r t - t e r m  c o n t r a c t ,  t h e r e  had t o  be an i n t e r n a l  manager ia l  
c a p a c i t y  and c a p a b i l i t y  w i th i n  LNDC t o  c a r r y  over  t h e  s t r a t e g i c  p ro c e s s  
and be a b l e  t o  i n t e r n a l i z e  i t  once th e  e x p e r t s  were gone.  In o t h e r  
words,  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of  a pool o f  top  and middle management co re  
s u f f i c i e n t l y  exper i enced  and competent  t o  accompl ish  t h e  s t a t e d  
o b j e c t i v e s  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n .  This  lo c a l  anchorage was a l s o  n e c e s s a ry  
t o  en s u re  c o n t i n u i t y  and t o  smoothe t h e  d i s r u p t i v e  changes occa s io n ed  
by high tu r n o v e r  of  CEOs.
The IDA team of  t h r e e  e x p e r t s  in F inance ,  O pe ra t ions  and New I n d u s t r i e s  
d i v i s i o n s ,  changed every  two y e a r s  as t h e  c o n t r a c t s  were r e n e g o t i a t e d  
and ex tended ,  b r in g in g  in d i f f e r e n t  g roups ,  each wi th  i t s  own agenda 
o f  changes f o r  t h i e r  r e s p e c t i v e  d i v i s i o n  which had t o  be implemented 
w i th in  t h e i r  c o n t r a c t  p e r i o d .  Some of  t h e  s t r a t e g i c  changes were o f  
l a rg e  s c a l e  and r e q u i r e d  t ime f o r  new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  
t o  be unders tood  and i n t e r n a l i z e d ,  a t t i t u d e s  changed and p o t e n t i a l  
change p a y - o f f s  c r y s t a l i z e .  S t r a t e g i c  changes -  t h o s e  o r c h e s t r a t e d  
i n t e r n a l l y  w i thou t  e x t e r n a l  involvement ,  were rushed  th ro u g h ,  i t  may
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be argued because of  t ime p r e s s u r e  on t h e  e x p e r t s ,  w i thou t  much t r a i n i n g  
and s k i l l  development f o r  t h o s e  expec ted  t o  e x ec u te  them. Thus, th e  
change ideas  and r a t i o n a l e  f o r  d e f i n i n g  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  as they  d i d ,  came 
in and l e f t  w ith  t h e  e x p e r t s .  They owned and dominated t h e  change p r o ­
c e s s  w i th i n  t h e  d i v i s i o n s ,  which o f t e n  r e f l e c t e d  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  s t r a t e g y .  
D es p i te  coming from th e  same o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  IDA, t h e r e  was l i t t l e  s ign  
of  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  of  s t r a t e g i e s  among t h e  e x p e r t s  and from LNDC l e a d e r ­
s h ip  t o  focus  on c o r p o r a t e  purpose  and c o n s o l i d a t e  p rev ious  s t r a t e g i e s ,  
( s ee  NID r e o r g a n i z a t i o n  in c h a p t e r  8) o r  any documenta t ion of  what 
o t h e r s  had been doing as a b a s i s  f o r  f u t u r e  changes .  The e f f e c t  has 
been h a l f - h e a r t e d  implemented changes ,  f l u c t u a t i n g  g o a l s  pursued a c c ­
o rd ing  t o  d i f f e r e n t  p r e s s u r e s ,  abandoned changes and r e g r e s s i o n  to  
p rev io u s  and accustomed ways o f  doing t h i n g s .  When Pat  O'Connor 
r e s t r u c t u r e d  O pera t ions  D iv i s io n  and spruced  up t h e  s u b s i d i a r i e s '  
f i n a n c i a l  r e c o rd  through t i g h t  c o n t r o l ,  i t  was g e n e r a l l y  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  
t h e  s t a g e  was s e t  f o r  LMDC re c o v e ry .  When O'Connor l e f t ,  t h a t  t i g h t  
regime g r a d u a l l y  c o l l a p s e d ,  t h e  lo c a l  c o u n t e r p a r t s  could  not  s u s t a i n  
i t ,  and a n o th e r  I r i s h  e x p e r t  had t o  come t o  i n s t i g a t e  y e t  a no the r  
wave of  r e o r g a n i z a t i o n  in 1984/85 which led t o  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  'Task 
Force '  a t  HQ t o  a c t  as  a t r o u b l e - s h o o t e r  and development u n i t  m on i to r ­
ing performance  of  s u b s i d i a r i e s .
There were a l s o  some i n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  lack  of  competence and commitment 
t o  'own s t r a t e g i c  changes '  v/ere coupled with  o p p o s i t i o n  from th e  
ves ted  i n t e r e s t s  w i th in  t h e  d i v i s i o n s  v/ho had e x c e l l e d  and enjoyed  
p e r q u i s i t e s  under  t h e  p re v io u s  s t r a t e g y .  IDA e x p e r t i s e  was in v i t e d  
in 1978, p r e c i s e l y  to  come and implement t h e  f o r e i g n  inves tment p ro ­
motion s t r a t e g y  which was r ega rded  as t h e i r  s p e c i a l i t y ,  however each 
of  t h e  new e x p e r t s  had h i s  own d i f f e r e n t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  and f i n e -  
tu n ing  t o  make. The e x t e n t  of  t h i s  ' b i a n n u a l  c l e a n  sweep'  by new 
e x p e r t s  was d r a m a t i c a l l y  b rought  o u t  in  t h e  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  of  New
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I n d u s t r i e s  D iv i s io n  t h a t  led t o  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a Market P lanning  Uni t .  
The i n t e g r a t i o n  of Inves tm ent Promotion ( IP )  department i n t o  t h e  
P r o j e c t  depa r tm en t ,  t h e  cho ice  and upgrading  o f  p r o j e c t  managers t o  
assume t h e  promotion r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  in 1983, and t h e  t r a n s f e r  of  
inves tment  promotion s t a f f  t o  a newly c r e a t e d  Market P lann ing ,  brought  
a new focus  t o  t h e  IP s t r a t e g y  and a high p r o f i l e  s t a t u s  t o  t h e  P r o j e c t  
Managers a t  t h e  c o s t  of  IP depa r tm en t .  The s h i f t  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  
and new r o l e s  t r i g g e r e d  f e e l i n g s  of  u n c e r t a i n t y  t o  t h e  IP s t a f f .  They 
had developed  s p e c i a l i z e d  s k i l l s  and planned t h e i r  c a r e e r s  around 
Inves tm ent Promotion s t r a t e g y  then  p e rc e iv e d  as th e  f u t u r e  of  LNDC.
The i n t e g r a t i o n  s t r a t e g y ,  and c r e a t i o n  o f  Market Planning Unit  with  
com ple te ly  new t a s k s ,  meant:
"The r o l e s  t h a t  were l e a rn ed  to  r e l y  on w i l l  now be i n a p p r o p r i a t e  - 
wrong. They had to  be e r a s e d ,  and t h a t  was no t  ea s y .  The o ld  dog 
had t r o u b l e  with  new t r i c k s  p a r t l y  because he had t o  u n le a rn  h i s  
o ld  h a b i t s " ,  Newman (1985) .
But most i m p o r t a n t ly ,  t h e  r e o r g a n i z a t i o n  meant lo s s  of  s t a t u s ,  high 
power v i s i b i l i t y  of  c l o s e  i n t e r a c t i o n  with  t h e  CEO and in n e r  c i r c l e s  
of s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s ,  which t h e  IP had enjoyed f o r  y e a r s .  I t  
came as no s u r p r i s e  t h a t  be ing  denuded of  r e a l  power, the y  could no t  
come t o  terms with  t h e  low p r o f i l e  ' r e c e p t i o n 1 s t a t u s  of  i n t e r f a c i n g  
with  o u t s i d e  s t a k e h o l d e r s ,  t h a t  t h r e e  s e n i o r  e x e c u t iv e s  t r a n s f e r r e d  
t o  Market P lanning  e v e n t u a l l y  l e f t  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n .  The r o l e  of  
Market P lanning  was never  c l e a r l y  unders tood  w i th in  and th roughou t  
th e  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  nor was t h e  focus  of  th e  r e o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  bu t  as I 
po in ted  o u t ,  t h e  changes were s u c c e s s f u l l y  managed th rough a s t ro n g  
e x e c u t iv e  c o a l i t i o n  of  d i v i s i o n a l  d i r e c t o r s  which comprised a l l  t h e  
dec i s ion -m ak ing  commit tees up t o  t h e  Board l e v e l ,  and o p p o s i t i o n  
ha rd ly  s u r f a c e d  o u t s i d e  th e  d i v i s i o n s .
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The i m p l i c a t i o n s  of  t h i s  argument a r e  tw o - f o ld :
F i r s t  of  a l l ,  they  s u g g e s t  t h a t  power and p o l i t i c s  in a SOE should  
no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  be seen as a f e a t u r e  o f  management and government 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  o r  o t h e r  o u t s i d e r s  bu t  r a t h e r  i t  i s  a phenomenon p r e v a l e n t  
and even endemic t o  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  t h e  s t a k e s  a r e  e q u a l ly  h igh f o r  
d i v i s i o n a l  c h i e f s  t o  show good r e s u l t s  and r e t a i n  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s ,  i f  
no t  t o  move even h ig h e r  e l sew h e re ,  the y  p l o t  and r e s t r u c t u r e  t h e i r  
d i v i s i o n s  t o  r e a l i g n  in a l l i a n c e s  in such a manner than  l ike -minded  
a c t o r s  move i n t o  in n e r  c i r c l e s  of  i n f l u e n c e .  From t h i s  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  
t h e  I r i s h  team which was being e v a l u a t e d  a t  t h e  end of  t h e i r  c o n t r a c t  
by IDA, i t  was e s s e n t i a l  t o  come up with  s t r a t e g i c  changes and d e f i n e  
per formance  c r i t e r i a  t h a t  would show r e s u l t s  w i th i n  a s h o r t  te rm ,  with  
minimum o p p o s i t i o n  t h a t  might  p o s s i b l y  t h r e a t e n  t h e i r  a p p r a i s a l  and 
c a r e e r  m o b i l i t y  in IDA. The I r i s h  s t a f f  from t h e s e  two d i v i s i o n s  -  
NID and OD, l e f t  in 1986 and t h e  new CEO, a ppo in ted  in th e  same y e a r ,  
i n t ro d u c e d  a com ple te ly  new d i v i s i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e .
Secondly and most im p o r ta n t ,  i t  i s  no t  t h e  s t r a t e g i c  change p rocess  
pe r  se t h a t  we should De concerned ab o u t ,  bu t  t h e  f requency  of  t h e  
changes ,  o f t e n  r e s u l t i n g  from t h e  high tu r n o v e r  o f  t h e  e x p e r t s  and 
CEOs, o f f e r  an o th e r  im por tan t  e x p l a n a to r y  dimens ion  t o  our  comprehension 
of  t h e  changes in LNDC. This l i n e  of  argument a l s o  su g g es t s  t h a t  
s t r a t e g i c  change r e q u i r e s  r e s o u r c e s  - t e c h n i c a l  and f i n a n c i a l ,  commit­
ment and a b l e  l e a d e r s h i p  gu idance  t o  bind t o g e t h e r  d i s p a r a t e  demands 
in o r d e r  t o  implement changes .  That some changes were h a l f  implemented 
o r  g r a d u a l l y  abandoned seem t o  be r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  s h o r t - t e r m  n a t u r e  of  
t h e  e x p e r t s '  c o n t r a c t u a l  agreements ,  and manager ia l  s k i l l  d e f i c i e n c y  
w i th in  t h e  c o r p o r a t io n  upon which t o  absorb  and anchor t h e  e x p e r t  
i n s t i g a t e d  changes.  Because o f  t h e  s k i l l  d e f i c i e n c y ,  t h e  change movers
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got so immersea in d e c i s i o n  making and l e a d e r s h i p  p r o c e s s ,  in a r t i c u l a t i n g  
t h e  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  s t r a t e g i c  change ,  i n f u s in g  i n t e r e s t  and l e g i t i m i z i n g  
t h e i r  new p e r c e p t i o n s ,  t h a t  th e y  h a rd ly  had t ime t o  adequa te ly  coach 
t h e i r  u n d e r s t u d i e s  and p r e p a re  them f o r  smooth s u c c e s s io n ,  t h u s  c r e a t i n g  
p e rp e t u a l  r e l i a n c e  on o u t s i d e  e x p e r t i s e  f o r  c r i t i c a l  manager ia l  f u n c t i o n s .  
The form er PS o f  P lanning  and CEO of  LNDC exp res sed  h i s  concern  about  
t h i s  a p p a re n t  lack  of  lo c a l  s k i l l s  t o  top  and i n t e r n a l i z e  t h e  f o r e i g n  
e x p e r t i s e .  'The e x p l o i t a t i o n  o f  t h i s  e x p e r t i s e  by our  people  t o  channel  
i t  in accordance  with  ou t  own needs and requ i re m en ts  has been weak, in 
f a c t  n o n - e x i s t e n t ' ,  he obse rved .
Does Per formance Rea l ly  Count?
Mintzberg (1987) has observed t h a t  t h e  concep t  of  s t r a t e g y  i s  ' r o o t e d  
in s t a b i l i t y ,  not  change,  and t h a t  most o r g a n i z a t i o n s  f avou r  p e r io d s  
of  s t a b i l i t y  so t h a t  they  may e x p l o i t  t h e  success  they  have D u i l t ' .  
However, t h e i r  envi ronments  c o n t in u e  t o  change im p e rc e p t ib ly  u n t i l  
such t i n e  t h a t  an o r g a n i z a t i o n  may f i n d  i t s e l f  ou t  of  k i l t e r  w ith  i t s  
market ,  and has t o  change and leap  t o  a new s t a b i l i t y .  S t r a t e g i c  
change,  Mintzberg s u g g e s t s ,  does no t  come about  f o r  t h e  sake o f  change,  
t h e r e  a re  pe rce iv ed  o r  a c t u a l  p a y - o f f s ,  performance e x p e c t a t i o n s  which 
t h e  dec id in g  a c t o r s  w i l l  d e r i v e  from t h e  new s t a b i l i t y ,  they  may be 
h ighe r  p r o f i t  marg ins ,  r e d u c t i o n  of  t h e  l o s s e s ,  p e n e t r a t i n g  new marke t ,  
growth and employment c r e a t i o n .  S t a b i l i t y  t h e r e f o r e  in t h e  changed 
s i t u a t i o n  u n d e rg i rd s  s t r a t e g i c  change .  The q u e s t i o n  of  focus  in t h i s  
s e c t i o n  i s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  what impact t h e  s t r a t e g i c  changes had on th e  
c o r p o r a t e  per fo rmance .  Were th e y  t a r g e t e d  t o  any performance e x p e c t ­
a t i o n s ,  what were t h e  d r i v i n g  mot ives  behind t h e  changes,  could  th ey  
be d ivorced  from t h e  a c t o r s '  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s ?
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Determining s t r a t e g i c  change impact on per formance o f  a SOE can be a 
t a u n t i n g  and complex p roces s  g iven  t h e  h e t e r o g e n e i t y  of  a c t o r s  and 
m u l t i p l e  c o n f l i c t i n g  g oa l s  they  a re  expec ted  t o  a c h ie v e .  Aharoni 
(1986 p . 162) however p o i n t s  ou t  t h a t  t h e  am biguity caused by t h e  
p l e t h o r a  o f  g o a l s  and t h e  p l u r a l  p r i n c i p a l s  c r e a t e s  room f o r  manoeuvre 
by e x t e r n a l  c o n t r o l l e r s  and managers t o  c o n s t r u e  and pursue o b j e c t i v e s  
th e y  see  as  im p o r ta n t ,  and make i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  judge  with  c e r t a i n t y  
t h e  per fo rm ance .  Performance as used here  r e f e r s  t o  any of  t h e  observed 
s t a n d a rd  measures of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  h e a l t h  which may inc lude  p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  
number o f  jo b s  c r e a t e d ,  s u c c e s s f u l  companies e s t a b l i s h e d  o r  t a x  c o n t r i ­
b u t i o n .  Thus i t  i s  a m u l t id im en s io n a l  and v a l u e - l a d e n  concep t  which 
i s  c l o s e l y  bouno up with t h e  p e r c e p t i o n s  and p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  of  
t h e  a c t o r s  who de te rm ine  and en fo rc e  performance  c r i t e r i a  expec ted  from 
an o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  and t h e i r  view of a SOE. The e x e c u t iv e s  of  th e  HQ 
of  LNDC, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  te n d  t o  e v a l u a t e  t h e  impact  of  t h e i r  s t r a t e g i c  
d e c i s i o n s  in t h e  s u b s i d i a r i e s ,  p r i m a r i l y  on t h e  f i n a n c i a l  performance  
o f  each company. The managers whose companies were c o n s i s t e n t l y  
per fo rming  poo r ly  have been sacked .  The improvement of  s a l a r i e s  f o r  
company managers ,  s e l e c t i v e  r e c r u i t m e n t  of  ex p e r i en ced  and competent  
g r a d u a te  managers and t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  p e r f o r m a n c e - r e l a t e d  b iannua l  
a p p r a i s a l s ,  t h a t  s t r a t e g y  was g e n e r a l l y  a t t r i b u t e d  with  t h e  g radua l  
p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  companies.  The cho ice  o f  inves tment p r o j e c t s  
a l s o  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  th o s e  p r o j e c t s  with  t h e  h i g h e s t  employment c a p a c i t y  
had b e t t e r  p ro s p e c t s  o f  approval  than  o t h e r s ;  a c r i t e r i o n  o f  g r e a t  
appea l  t o  f i n a n c i e r s  and p o l i t i c i a n s .  For t h e  fo rm er ,  i t  i s  im por tan t  
as  a v i s i b l e  i n d i c a t o r  of  t h e i r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  c o u n t ry ,  f o r  t h e  
l a t t e r  i t  i s  a vo te  winning measure o f  w ea l th  c r e a t i o n  by t h e  government 
in power. When th e  government blocked t h e  s a l e  of  loss-making Limefford  
t o  a lo c a l  consor t ium of businessmen,  w h i le  t h e  company c on t inued  t o  
make lo s s e s  and s u b s i d iz e d  by LNDC, t h e  q u e s t i o n  of  economic v i a b i l i t y
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and performance  e x p e c t a t i o n s  r e s u r f a c e d .  I t  d id  no t  seem t o  make sense 
t o  ve to  d i v e s t i t u r e  o f  a company and c o n t in u e  t o  m a in ta in  i t  th rough  
t a x p a y e r s '  money. Thus,  w h i le  some s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n s  such as t h i s  
may be c a s t i g a t e d  as p o l i t i c a l  and d e t r i m e n t a l  t o  t h e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  
of  an o r g a n i z a t i o n  from management p o i n t  of  view, what i s  a p p a r e n t ly  
c l e a r  from t h i s  r e s e a r c h  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no ' o b j e c t i v e '  economic 
o r  i n s t ru m e n ta l  per formance ou t  t h e r e ,  which t h e  government or  manage­
ment w i l l  s t r i v e  t o  ach ieve  in t h e  b e s t  i n t e r e s t s  of  th e  c o r p o r a t i o n .  
What we have a r e  a c t o r s '  p e r c e p t i o n s ,  b e l i e f s  and p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  
m a n i f e s t e d  in v a r io u s  c r i t e r i a  they  choose t o  i n t e r p r e t  t h e  outcomes 
o f  t h e i r  d e c i s i o n s .  A c o s t l y  and uneconomic inves tment in a M i n i s t e r ’ s 
c o n s t i t u e n c y ,  w i l l  be j u s t i f i e d  and e v a l u a t e d  on th e  b a s i s  o f  e q u i t a b l e  
w ea l th  d i s t r i b u t i o n  by government,  a pe rformance  c r i t e r i o n  which l e g i t ­
imizes  what may have been a s e l f - s e r v i n g  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t .
We have a l r e a d y  d i s c u s s e d  many s t r a t e g i c  changes in c lu d in g  ap p o in t in g  
and changing of  CEOs, which r e f l e c t e d  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  of 
i n d i v i d u a l s  and c o a l i t i o n s  w ie ld in g  g r e a t e r  power w i th in  LNDC. From 
a p o l i t i c a l  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  t h e  e f f e c t  of  t h e s e  s t r a t e g i e s  could  be 
d e f in e d  as e i t h e r  e n t r e n c h in g  government c o n t r o l  of t h e  SOE o r  cementing 
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  t i e s  th rough  a r e c i p r o c a l  l a r g e s s e  t o  a p a r ty  c o l l e a g u e  
ana so on.  I agree  with  Thompson and S t r i c k l a n d  I I I  (1986) t h a t  we 
should  no t  i n f e r  from t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  t h a t  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s  
i s  n e c e s s a r i l y  d y s f u n c t i o n a l  and should  be e l im i n a t e d  o r  t h a t  a SOE is  a
" p o l i t i c a l  j u n g l e  with  a pr imary  emphasis  on p o l i t i c a l  manoeuvring 
and t h i n k i n g  up new power p l a y s .  But (as  t h i s  r e s e a r c h  a t t e s t s )  
p o l i t i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  abound and ' r a t i o n a l  c h o i c e s '  o f t e n  g ive  
way t o  p o l i t i c s  of  n e g o t i a t i o n  and compromise".
While t h e r e  i s  no c o n c l u s i v e  ev idence  from t h e  d a t a ,  t h e  e v o l u t i o n  of  
LNDC performance c r i t e r i a  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  i t  r e f l e c t e d  t h e  power c o n f i g -
u r a t i o n  in th e  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  t h a t  i s  pe rformance  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f t e n  
c a r r i e d  t h e  view o f  t h o s e  who c o n t r o l l e d  s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n s .  In t h e  
e a r l y  lS70s ,  f i n a n c i a l  per formance  was t h e  main c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  manage­
ment c o n t r o l l e d  much of  s l a c k  r e s o u r c e s  -  mining r o y a l t i e s  and levy 
from SA sugar  so ld  in Lesotho ,  which made i t  l e s s  dependent  on govern­
ment.  As t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  go t  deepe r  i n t o  m anager ia l  and f i n a n c i a l  
t r o u b l e s  and government had t o  b a i l  i t  o u t ,  t h e  performance  measurement 
te n d ed  t o  focus  on jo b  c r e a t i o n  and main tenance  and macro-economic 
i s s u e s  such as l o c a l i s i n g  pu rchas ing  power. F i n a n c i a l l y ,  t h a t  was a 
p e r io d  of  heavy l o s s e s ,  s u b s i d i z a t i o n  and c l o s u r e s  of some companies.  
A c q u i s i t i o n s  of  v a r io u s  u n r e l a t e d  b u s i n e s s e s  were made t o  g r a n t  th e  
s t a t e  s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  economy. But,  with  t h e  i n c r e a s e  of  
o t h e r  s t a k e h o l d e r s  i n v e s t i n g  in LNDC, t h e  p redom inan t ly  government 
d e f i n i t i o n  of  per formance had t o  be n e g o t i a t e d  and o r g a n i z a t i o n s  such 
as t h e  World Bank, DGE, have r e s u s c i t a t e d  management c r i t e r i a  and i n s i s t  
on f i n a n c i a l  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  and d iv id en d  payment.  Thus,  compromises 
had t o  be made, each o f  t h e  i n t e r e s t e d  a c t o r s  has some but  no t  a l l  t h e i r  
p r i o r i t y  outcomes,  t h e  r e s u l t  i s  a n e g o t i a t e d  performance  c r i t e r i a  
which r e f l e c t  t h e  cu r ren cy  o f  power among c o r p o r a t e  s t a k e h o l d e r s  on 
s p e c i f i c  s t r a t e g i c  changes over  t h e  y e a r s .
To sum up t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n ,  we have i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  c o r p o r a t e  performance 
i s  ex t rem ely  im por tan t  t o  a l l  s t a k e h o l d e r s ,  t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  f a c t o r s  may 
impact  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  performance b e s id e s  changes in s t r a t e g y ,  however 
t h e  c r i t e r i a  used t o  de te rm ine  t h e  impact o f  a s t r a t e g i c  change seem 
t o  be an i n t e g r a l  a s p e c t  of  power and p o l i t i c s  o f  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  c o n t r o l .  
The powerful  i n d i v i d u a l s  who a r e  a b l e  t o  choose a c r i t e r i o n  have a 
chance  t o  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  o t h e r s  t o  a c c e p t  t h e i r  i n t e r ­
p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  outcome. N egative  r e s u l t s  a r e  suppressed  i f  they  
w i l l  damage o r  t h r e a t e n  a c t o r s '  power p o s i t i o n s ,  poor f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s
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may be ex p la in e d  away as temporary  and l e g i t i m i z e d  f o r  t h e  need t o  
m a in ta in  j o b s .  There i s  l e s s  p u b l i c i t y  about  companies c l o s i n g  down 
w i th in  a y e a r ,  with heavy l o s s e s ,  than  t h e r e  i s  f o r  new ones opening 
up with h igh employment p o t e n t i a l ,  as  a r e s u l t  o f ,  say ,  improvement 
o f  inves tment  i n c e n t i v e s .  There i s  t h e r e f o r e  a tendency  f o r  convergence  
o f  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  of  powerful  a c t o r s  and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  
per fo rmance .  As we e v a l u a t e  t h e  performance o f  SOE, a g r e a t e r  under ­
s t a n d in g  may be enhanced i f  we took i n t o  account  d i f f e r e n t  demands, 
e x p e c t a t i o n s  and compromises t h a t  were n e g o t i a t e d  to  e f f e c t  a p a r t i c u l a r  
s t r a t e g i c  change .  All  t h i s  led Aharoni (1986 p . 188) t o  conclude t h a t :
"The major  reason  f o r  l o s s e s ,  however,  i s  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  m i l i e u  in 
which SOE o p e r a t e .  Quoting Ghai he p o in t e d  o u t  t h a t  SOEs in A f r i c a  
a r e  f r e q u e n t l y  used as a means of  pa t ro n a g e  and a source  of  wea l th  
and power f o r  p o l i t i c a l  and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  l e a d e r s " .
The economic models t h a t  a r e  based upon s i n g l e  and u n i v e r s a l l y  
ap p l i e d  c r i t e r i a  and p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  t h e  market  t o  t h e  changes ,  would 
need t o  r e c o g n iz e  t h a t  in t h e  r e a l  world o f  SOEs in most deve lop ing  
n a t i o n s ,  s t r a t e g i e s  a r e  no t  o f t e n  i n s t i g a t e d  t o  ‘c r e a t e  s h a r e h o l d e r s ' 
w e a l t h ' ,  and w hi le  f i n a n c i a l  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  i s  a rguab ly  r ecogn ized  as 
im p o r tan t ,  t h e  r e a l i t y  i s  o f t e n  d i f f e r e n t  and overshadowed by p o l i t i c a l  
i n t e r e s t s .
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Chapter  11
Summary and Conclus ions
The a n a l y s i s  and c o n c lu s io n s  shown in t h e  p rece d ing  d e s c r i p t i v e  and 
a n a l y t i c a l  c h a p t e r s ,  have prov ided  a range  of  i n s i g h t s  i n t o  t h e  p rocess  
of  s t r a t e g i c  change and i t s  impact  on t h e  performance  of  LNDC. I t  i s  
t h e  purpose  of  t h i s  c h a p t e r  t o  draw t o g e t h e r  t h i s  in fo rm a t ion  and 
conclude  what t h e  s tudy  im pl ie s  f o r  our  u n d e r s tan d in g  of  s t r a t e g i c  
change p rocess  in o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  The c h a p t e r  i s  d iv id ed  i n t o  t h r e e  
s e c t i o n s ;  t h e  f i r s t  s e c t i o n  p ro v id es  t h e  summary o f  t h e  t h e s i s  and 
t h e  main i s s u e s  r a i s e d  in th e  s tu d y ,  t h e  second draws th e  c o n c l u s i o n s  
de r iv e d  from th e  a n a l y s i s  of  th e  s t r a t e g i c  change p rocess  in a SOE, 
and th e  l a s t  s e c t i o n  c o n s i d e r s  th e  w ider i m p l i c a t i o n s  of  t h e  r e s e a r c h  
in r e l a t i o n  to  p r a c t i t i o n e r s  involved  in t h e  management of  SuEs, p o l i c y  
makers concerned wi th SOE a f f a i r s ,  and t h e  im p l i c a t i o n s  of  t h e  s tudy  
f o r  r e s e a r c h .
Overview of S t r a t e g i c  Change in a SOE
The r e s e a r c h  was concerned  about  how s t r a t e g i c  changes v/ere made by 
management of  a s ta te -ow ned  e n t e r p r i s e  in a deve lop ing  c o u n t r y .  An 
a u x i l i a r y  purpose was t o  e s t a b l i s h  how s t r a t e g i c  changes a f f e c t e d  th e  
e n t e r p r i s e ' s  per fo rmance .  In c h a p t e r  one we in t ro d u ced  t h e  s u b j e c t  
by showing how th e  s tudy  deve loped ,  and t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a g e n e ra l  p a u c i t y ,  
i f  not  lack  of  r e s e a r c h  on s t r a t e g i c  change in SOEs in d eve lop ing  
n a t io n s  as wel l  as in t h e  developed  c o u n t r i e s .  The r a t i o n a l e  f o r  t h e  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of  s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s ,  t y p e s  of  SOEs, and t h e i r  expec ted  
r o l e s  from t h e i r  s ta k e h o ld e r s -g o v e rn m e n t s ,  were h i g h l i g h t e d .  These 
e n t e r p r i s e s ,  i t  was obse rved ,  have become im por tan t  economic a c t o r s  
in t h e i r  c o u n t r i e s ,  commanding enormous r e s o u r c e s  t h a t  have a t  t im es
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c r e a t e d  d eb t  f in a n c in g  problems in most LDCs, and y e t  l i t t l e  i s  known 
about  how they  manage t h e i r  s t r a t e g i c  change .
In c h a p t e r  two,  we reviewed t h e o r i e s  and models o f  s t r a t e g i c  change .
But,  because  of  l i m i t e d  r e s e a r c h  in t h i s  a re a  on SOEs, t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  
rev iew was a b lend of  change models from t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  and r e l e ­
van t  e m p i r i c a l  ex p e r i e n c e s  drawn from SOEs. The p ro ces s  and p o l i t i c a l  
models o f  change embraced some a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  s t r a t e g i c  changes b u t ,  
s e v e r a l l y  and c o l l e c t i v e l y ,  cou ld  n o t  ad eq u a te ly  c a p t u r e  t h e  complex 
phenomena of  change in SOE, and t h a t  led t o  t h e  adop t ion  of  N ego t ia ted  
Order p e r s p e c t i v e  as a t h e o r e t i c a l  framework t h a t  o f f e r e d  a b e t t e r  
comprehensive and in -d e p th  a n a l y t i c a l  c l a r i t y  t o  t h e  p rocess  o f  change 
in a SOE.
Chap te rs  t h r e e  and f o u r ,  o u t l i n e d  t h e  r e s e a r c h  d es ign  t h a t  was fo l lowed  
t o  c o l l e c t  t h e  d a ta  and t h e  i n t e r a c t i v e  p ro c e s s  invo lved  in i t s  a n a l y s i s .  
Given t h e  e x p l o r a t o r y  n a t u r e  of  t h e  s tu d y ,  t h e  r e s e a r c h  approach was 
p redom inan t ly  q u a l i t a t i v e ,  f o l l o w in g  ' a  h i s t o r i c a l  in -d e p th  i n t e r v i e w 1 
in o r d e r  t o  g e t  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of  t h e  change p ro ces s  from t h o s e  
i n d i v i d u a l s  who were d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y  invo lved  in s t r a t e g i c  changes.  
The in t e r v i e w s  were suppor ted  by v a r io u s  documenta t ion  o f  secondary  d a t a .
in c h a p t e r  f i v e ,  an e s s e n t i a l  background in fo rm a t io n  about  Lesotho and 
t h e  b ro a d e r  envi ronment  -  t h e  soc io -economic  and p o l i t i c a l  env ironment 
and i t s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  with i t s  econom ica l ly  powerful  neighbour  South 
A f r i c a  a r e  d e s c r i b e d .  The c h a p t e r  a t t e m p t s  t o  s i t u a t e  t h e  change 
p rocess  in LNDC w i th in  th e  b ro a d e r  s t r u c t u r a l  c o n t e x t  and o r i e n t a t e s  
t h e  r e a d e r  t o  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  p e r s p e c t i v e  n e c e s s a ry  t o  a p p r e c i a t e  and 
unde rs tand  t h e  changes t a k i n g  p l a c e  in LNDC in t h e  1980s.  (A r e a d e r  
f a m i l i a r  with  t h e  Southern  A f r i c a n  s i t u a t i o n ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  economic 
and p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  among t h e  s t a t e s  in th e  r e g i o n ,  should  be
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a b l e  t o  fo l low  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n s  w i th o u t  r ead in g  t h i s  c h a p t e r ) .
The d e s c r i p t i v e  accounts  o f  t h e  r e s e a r c h  a r e  covered in c h a p t e r s  s i x ,  
seven and e i g h t .  The p r e s e n t a t i o n  has fo l lowed  a h i s t o r i c a l  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  
and shows how t h e  c o r p o r a t e  s t r a t e g y  evolved  in an e x p l o r a t o r y  and 
o p p o r t u n i s t i c  n a t u r e ,  r e v o lv in g  around t h e  v i s i o n  and p e r c e p t i o n  of  
t h e  CEO who had enormous c o n t r o l  and power ove r  s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n s  
and how t h a t  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  power and i n f l u e n c e  have s h i f t e d  among 
d i f f e r e n t  CEOs over t h e  p e r io d  o f  t h e  s tu d y .  The i n t e r p l a y  of  m anager ia l  
a c t i o n s ,  government i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  and env i ronmenta l  f a c t o r s  t h a t  were 
p e r c e iv e d  t o  have c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  l e a d e r s h i p  tu r b u l e n c e  and f i n a n c i a l  
c r i s i s  a re  d e s c r i b e d ,  with  su p p o r t  o f  d i r e c t  q u o t a t i o n s  from t h e  
i n t e r v i e w s  ana secondary  s o u rces  t o  i l l u m i n a t e  t h e  p rocess  of  s t r a t e g i c  
change as i t  happened in LNDC from 1967 t o  1968. The a b ru p t  l e a d e r s h i p  
changes ,  t h e  s h i f t  o f  c o r p o r a t e  ' i n v e s tm e n t  p a ra d ig m ' ,  i n f l u e n c e  and 
r o l e  o f  e x t e r n a l  a c t o r s ,  and t h e  r e - o r g a n i z a t i o n  p rocess  in t h e  HQ as 
wel l  as  in t h e  companies,  and t h e  c o n t e x t s  w i th in  which t h e s e  changes 
took p l a c e ,  p rov ide  a t h i c k  and comprehensive account  of  s t r a t e g i c  
changes in LNDC from d i f f e r e n t  p e r s p e c t i v e s .
Making sense  o f  t h e  d e s c r i p t i v e  accoun ts  and a n a ly s in g  t h e  n e g o t i a t e d  
change p roces s  were t h e  s u b j e c t s  of  c h a p t e r s  n ine  and t e n .  The 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  in c h a p t e r  n in e  showed t h a t  s t r a t e g i c  change p ro ces s  in 
LNDC d i s p l a y e d  s i m i l a r  p a t t e r n s  of  change as t h o s e  by o t h e r  r e s e a r c h e r s  
reviewed in c h a p t e r  two.  Inc rem en ta l  changes were i d e n t i f i e d  which 
seemed t o  r e s u l t  from t h e  pro longed  c o n s u l t a t i o n  p rocess  among t h e  
d i v e r s e  a c t o r s  with  i n t e r e s t  in LNDC. They were f r e q u e n t l y  i n t e r s p e r s e d  
by a b ru p t  and sudden d i s c o n t in u o u s  changes ,  e s p e c i a l l y  of  t h e  l e a d e r s h i p  
k in d .  S t r a t e g i c  changes d id  n o t  stem from a con t inuous  l o g i c a l  i n c r e ­
mental  ism, r a t h e r ,  they  were t h e  outcome o f  b a rg a in in g  and p o l i t i c a l  
games among key a c t o r s  i n s i d e  and o u t s i d e  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  w i th  i n f l u e n c e
351
on s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n s .  These a c t o r s  c o n t r o l  im por tan t  and c r i t i c a l  
r e s o u r c e s  which th ey  use e f f e c t i v e l y  t o  i n f l u e n c e  c o r p o r a t e  s t r a t e g y  
when t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  a re  a f f e c t e d .  In LNDC, t h i s  p o l i t i c a l  p ro c e s s  
was p a r t i c u l a r l y  e v i d e n t  when t h e  e s t a b l i s h e d  and almost  t a k e n - f o r -  
g r a n t e d  inves tment s t r a t e g y  was changed ,  u p s e t t i n g  and d i s m i s s i n g  t h e  
b e l i e f s  and assumptions  t h a t  had guided t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  over  t h e  y e a r s .  
In c h a p t e r  t e n ,  t h e  an a ly se s  show how j o i n t  a c t i o n  was ach ieved  from 
t h e  he te rogenous  group of a c t o r s  with  d i f f e r e n t  s h i f t i n g  i n t e r e s t s .  
Through a t w o - t i e r  typo logy  of  n e g o t i a t i o n ,  we re v e a l  how key a c t o r s  
s t a k e  t h e i r  c l a im s ,  g a r n e r  suppor t  and b u i l d  a l l i a n c e s  f o r  t h e i r  
p r e f e r r e d  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  a c q u i r e  and use power t o  pursue o r  p r o t e c t  
t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s .  Thus power and p o l i t i c s  seem to  be t h e  m a ins tay  of  
s t r a t e g i c  change n e g o t i a t i o n  and t h o s e  a c t o r s  who wie ld  power and can 
s u s t a i n  i t ,  o f t e n  had t h e i r  s o l u t i o n  o r  d e f i n i t i o n  of  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  
imposed over  t h e  l e s s  pow er fu l ,  and t h e  c o r p o r a t e  s t r a t e g i c  b eh av io u r  
fo l l o w s  from t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n s .  The r e s u l t  was no t  o f t e n  a win- 
lo se  s i t u a t i o n ,  a c t o r s  p r i m a r i l y  engaged in d i s c u s s i o n s ,  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
and compromises to  s e t t l e  f o r  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  s o l u t i o n  r a t h e r  than  
t h e i r  p r e f e r r e d  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  Within t h i s  m i l i e u  of  power and p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i v i t y ,  we have q u es t ioned  v a l i d i t y  of  some of th e  o r th o d o x ie s  of 
change which assume t h a t  th e  aim o f  s t r a t e g i c  change i s  t o  improve 
c o r p o r a t e  performance  and shown t h a t  per formance  was i n s e p a r a b l e  from 
th e  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  of  a c t o r s  who d e f i n e  i t .
T h e o r e t i c a l  I m p l i c a t io n s
The p ro ces s  o f  s t r a t e g i c  change as ana ly sed  in t h i s  s tudy  has i n d i c a t e d  
t h a t  a SOE i s  no t  a m o n o l i th i c  e n t i t y  with  a u n i t a r y  v o ic e ,  purpose  and 
co nsensua l  o b j e c t i v e s .  R a the r ,  i t  r e p r e s e n t s  a c o a l i t i o n  of  d i s p a r a t e  
a c t o r s ,  a p o l i t i c a l  c o l l e c t i v i t y  of  d i v e r s e  i n t e r e s t s  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by 
s h i f t i n g  and o f t e n  c r o s s - p u rp o s e  d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  i t s  g o a l s .  I t s
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s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n s  emanate from a p l u r a l i t y  o f  c o n f l i c t i n g  and f r a g ­
mented i n t e r e s t s  of  s t a t e ' s  macro s o c i a l  o b j e c t i v e s ,  th e  management, 
and o t h e r  s t a k e h o l d e r s '  micro economic o b j e c t i v e s ;  consensus  i s  r a r e  
w i th in  t h i s  t r i a d i c  r e l a t i o n s h i p  on change p r i o r i t i e s  and t h e  l i n e s  
of  a c t i o n  t h a t  th e  c o r p o r a t i o n  should  f o l l o w .  Given t h i s  f r a g m e n ta t io n  
of  i n t e r e s t s  and a u t h o r i t y  t o  i n f l u e n c e  s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n s ,  t h e  
fo rm u l a t io n  and implementa t ion  o f  s t r a t e g i c  change i s  a complex p rocess  
of  b a r g a i n i n g ,  n e g o t i a t i o n ,  and accommodation among t h e  c o n s t e l l a t i o n  
of  i n t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l  c o n s t i t u e n t  s t a k e h o l d e r s ,  each t r y i n g  t o  f o s t e r  
enac tment  of  a change o r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  a s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  would secu re  
t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s .  Rarely  a re  t h e r e  c l e a r ,  c r i s p ,  consensua l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  
of  th e  c o r p o r a t e  s t r a t e g y  in which a l l  t h e  a f f e c t e d  a c t o r s  a g r e e ,  
d i s s e n s u s  i s  r i f e ,  and t o  c r e a t e  s t r a t e g i c  change and accompli sh  c o r ­
p o r a t e  o b j e c t i v e s ,  i n d i v i d u a l s  n e g o t i a t e  with  each o t h e r  t o  s t r i k e  
q u a s i - r e s o l u t i o n s ,  o r  t h e  more powerful  a c t o r s  may impose t h e i r  d e f i n i t i o n  
of  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  and th rough s u b t l e  m a n ip u la t io n  o r  e x p l i c i t  c o n t r o l ,  
c a j o l e  o t h e r s  t o  ac c e p t  t h e i r  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  a s i t u a t i o n .  This  p roces s  
i s  a major d e p a r t u r e  from t h e  p r e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  t h e  planned r a t i o n a l  
deba tes  in s t r a t e g i c  l i t e r a t u r e  which p e r c e iv e  outcomes of  s t r a t e g i c  
d e c i s i o n s  as d e r iv e d  p red o m in an t ly ,  i f  not  s i n g u l a r l y  from to p  management 
and r ega rd  a c t o r s  as  c o n s i d e r i n g  known and c o n s i s t e n t  p r e f e r e n c e s  based 
on o r d e r l y  and l o g i c a l  env i ronm en ta l  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n .
Such a concep t ion  of  s t r a t e g i c  change was found c l e a r l y  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  
f o r  a SOE, where d i s s e n s u s  about  g o a l s  and a l t e r n a t i v e s  abound and 
compromises may have t o  be made, r e i n f o r c i n g  f i n d i n g s  from r e s e a r c h  in 
o t h e r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  t h a t  ' i t  may be a fundamenta l  e r r o r  t o  assume t h a t  
s t r a t e g i c  changes can come about  as  a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  a n a l y s i s  and 
e v a l u a t i o n  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  s t r a t e g i c  management ' ,  Johnson 
(1907 p . 274) .  S t r a t e g i c  change can no longe r  be c o l l a p s e d  i n t o  a top  
management a c t i v i t y  o r  be r eg a rd ed  as a dyadic p rocess  t h a t  has t o  be 
n e g o t i a t e d  between management and t h e  s t a t e .  Such loaded c o n c e p t u a l -
i z a t i o n s ,  we found,  m i s r e p r e s e n t  t h e  d i v e r s i t y  of  i n t e r e s t s  and in f l u e n c e s  
t h a t  comprise a SOE. S t r a t e g i c  change may be conce ived  as a dynamic,  
m u l t i - l a y e r e d  and n e g o t i a t e d  p r o c e s s ,  f ragmented  amongst v a r io u s  
changing p r i n c i p a l s  i n s i d e  and o u t s i d e  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  w ith  d i f f e r e n t i a l  
power b a s i s ,  and r e p r e s e n t i n g  d i v e r s e  s h i f t i n g  i n t e r e s t s .  Economic 
r a t i o n a l i t y  o f t e n  p lays  a suDord ina te  r o l e  t o  a c t o r s '  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s .
P a t t e r n s  of  inc rem en ta l  change were i d e n t i f i a b l e  from a s e r i e s  of 
s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n s  t h a t  were made over  t h e  s tudy  p e r i o d ,  which sugges t  
t h a t  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  l e a rn  and may adap t  t h e i r  s t r a t e g y  f o rm u la t io n  t o  
t h e  im p e r c e p t ib l e  changes in t h e i r  r e l e v a n t  env i ronm ent .  However the  
p ro ces s  o f  l o g i c a l  inc rementa l  ism, as m a n i fe s ted  in t h i s  s tu d y ,  sugges t s  
t h a t  t h e  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  t h e  p ro ces s  might  l i e  e l sew here  r a t h e r  than  in 
a d e l i b e r a t e  manager ia l  s t r a t e g y  to  implement changes as proposed by 
Quinn (1980) .  Because of  th e  need to  c o n s u l t  and b a rg a in  with  th e  
' p l u r a l i t y  of  p r i n c i p a l s '  who own and c o n t r o l  a SOE, t h e  a t t e n d a n t  
m o d i f i c a t i o n s  and r e v e r s a l s  t o  change p r o p o s a l s ,  t h e  tendency  t o  h ive  
o f f  s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n s  from management purview i n t o  government c o n t r o l ,  
p u r s u a s io n s  and p o l i t i c k i n g  t o  i n f l u e n c e  s t r a t e g i c  changes and th e  
s t r u c t u r a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  imposed by t h e . n e g o t i a t i o n  c o n t e x t ,  i e  who has 
a u t h o r i t y  t o  s a n c t i o n  s p e c i f i c  s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n s ,  and who can 
n e g o t i a t e  w ith  whom f o r  what,  i t  may be concluded  t h a t  th e  very n a t u r e  
of  n e g o t i a t e d  s t r a t e g i c  change p ro ces s  in a SOE i s  i n c re m e n ta l .
The bulk of  our  f i n d i n g s  though,  p o i n t  t o  t h e  f requency  of  i n t e r r u p t i o n s  
t h a t  i n t e r s p e r s e d  th e  in c rem en ta l  changes as d i f f e r e n t  d e c i s i o n  makers 
came in wi th  d i f f e r e n t  agendas,  t h e  sudden and d i s c o n t in u o u s  changes 
t h a t  f u e l l e d  t h e  pace ,  b u i l d i n g  towards  a f i n a n c i a l  c r i s i s  and paradigm 
s h i f t .  In LKDC, t h e s e  d i s c o n t in u o u s  changes f i rm ed  around key l e a d e r s h i p  
p o s i t i o n s  of  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n :  t h e  f r e q u e n t  and a b ru p t  changes of  CEOs ,
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t h e  board of  d i r e c t o r s  as  Cab ine t  r e s h u f f l e s  were made as well  as  
changes in government and t h e  major  p o l i t i c a l  and economic upheava ls  
w i th i n  i t s  env i ronment,  and t h e  s h o r t - t e r m  c o n t r a c t u a l  a r rangem ents  
o f  e x p e r t  co re  in t h e  d i v i s i o n s  on whom t h e  s t r a t e g y  f o r m u l a t io n  
and im plementa t ion  so c l e a r l y  depended.
Within t h i s  d i v e r s i t y  of  i n t e r e s t s ,  t h e r e  a r e  no homogeneous s e t  of  
i d e o l o g i c a l  b e l i e f s ,  assumptions  and e x p e c t a t i o n s  about  t h e  SOE 
m is s io n ;  the y  r e s i d e  in segmented d e c i s i o n  groups and a re  i n t e r p r e t e d  
d i f f e r e n t l y ,  which make a 'paradigm s h i f t '  t h e  more d i f f i c u l t  t o  ach iev e ,  
block  a c t o r s '  l i n e s  of  a c t i o n ,  and t r i g g e r  s t r o n g e r  p o l i t i c a l  o p p o s i t i o n .  
A s h i f t  o f  paradigm poses a p o l i t i c a l  t h r e a t  to  t h e  dominat ing id e o lo g ­
i c a l  b e l i e f s ,  t o  modus v ivend i  of  t h e  a c t o r s  and t h e i r  power c o n f i g u r a ­
t i o n  r e s u l t i n g  in h ig h e r  o c cu r ren c e  of  p r o t r a c t e d  n e g o t i a t i o n s  and 
p o l i t i c a l  b a rg a in s  among t h e  a f f e c t e d  a c t o r s ,  t r y i n g  to  r e a d j u s t  t h e i r  
va lue  p o s i t i o n s .  Our f i n d i n g s  s u g g es t  t h a t  f i n a n c i a l  c r i s i s ,  a r r i v a l  
of  new CEO, and o u t s i d e  e x p e r t s  with  d i f f e r e n t  p e r s p e c t i v e s ,  uncontam­
in a te d  by i n t e r n a l  p o l i t i c s ,  were im por tan t  l u b r i c a t o r s  i n t e n s i f y i n g  
t h e  t e n s i o n  f o r  paradigm change ,  y e t  i n s u f f i c i e n t  by themse lves  t o  
lead  t o  t h e  change im plem enta t ion ,  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r v e n t i o n  was t h e  
u l t i m a t e  s o l u t i o n .
These change p a t t e r n s  f u r t h e r  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  s t r a t e g i c  changes t h a t  were 
s u c c e s s f u l l y  implemented and endured  were t h o s e  a s s o c i a t e d  with  p e r io d s  
o f  r e l a t i v e l y  c o n s i s t e n t  and s t a b l e  t e n u r e  of  CEOs. The longe r  th e  
t e n u r e  of  t h e  CEO, t h e  more f o c a l  and i n s p i r a t i o n a l  r o l e  he p layed  in 
managing s t r a t e g i c  change p r o c e s s ,  b u i l d i n g  t h e  i n t e r n a l  a l l i a n c e  
c o h es io n ,  and i n t e r f a c i n g  c l o s e l y  wi th  t h e  e x t e r n a l  s t a k e h o l d e r s .  There 
were two such s t a b l e  p e r io d s  in LNDC, from 1967 t o  1973, under l e a d e r s h i p  
of  Van Gen, and between 1977 t o  1982 under John Dow. The in t e r v e n i n g  
p e r io d s  have seen h ig h e r  t u r n o v e r  of  CEOs, av e ra g in g  t o  changes every
365
two y e a r s  o r  l e s s .  The s h o r t e r  t h e  t e n u r e ,  t h e  l e s s  u n i t e d  was t h e  
i n t e r n a l  management a l l i a n c e ,  t h e  more f r e q u e n t  were cum ula t ive  s p u r t s  
of  d i s c o n t i n u i t y  of  s t r a t e g i c  change.  Thus,  c o n s i s t e n t ,  p u r s u a s iv e  
and competent  l e a d e r s h i p  would seem t o  be c r u c i a l  f o r  c r e a t i n g  and 
s t a b i l i z i n g  s t r a t e g i c  changes ,  y e t  t h e s e  q u a l i t i e s  were c o n s p icu o u s ly  
d e f i c i e n t  in t h e  p o l i t i c a l l y  appo in ted  CEOs. Without t h e  i n t e r n a l  
competent  and s t a b l e  l e a d e r s h i p  to p rov ide  v i s i o n  of  what t h e  c o r p o r ­
a t i o n  can and should become, and in f u s e  purpose and meaning t o  c o r p o r a t e  
s t r a t e g y ,  w i th o u t  s k i l l e d  e x e c u t iv e  co re  t o  implement and s t a b i l i z e  
th e  change p r o c e s s ,  t h e r e  v/as a tendency f o r  i n d i v i d u a l s  faced  with  
a novel  unknowable s i t u a t i o n  t o  r e v e r t  t o  t h e i r  o ld  r e l i a b l e  s k i l l s  
which may be i r r e l e v a n t ,  o r  t o  i n t e r p r e t  t h e  new r e a l i t y  w i th i n  th e  
c o n t e x t  of  t h e i r  e s t a b l i s h e d  paradigm.  In t h e  mids t  of  t h i s  l e a d e r s h i p  
i n s t a b i l i t y ,  s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n  making has s h i f t e d  t o  t h e  e x t e r n a l  
e x p e r t s ,  with  t h e  r e s u l t a n t  r i s k  t h a t  they  pursue  s t r a t e g i e s  th e y  
p r e f e r  and no t  what t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  needs most as p e rce iv ed  by t h e  
s t a t e ,  a f a c t o r  which may lead  t o  f u r t h e r  change of  c h i e f  e x e c u t i v e  t o  
b r in g  in a p o l i t i c a l l y - m i n d e d  CEO who w i l l  f o s t e r  and p r o t e c t  s t a t e  
i n t e r e s t s .  Hence a s e r i e s  o f  s t r a t e g i c  changes t n a t  were launched 
bu t  could not  s t i c k  o r  make th e  in tended  impact  when e x p e r t s  l e f t ,  
because they  lacked i n t e r n a l  anchorage  and ownersh ip .  In LNDC, t h i s  
r e g r e s s i o n  in s t r a t e g i c  changes  seem t o  have been due mainly t o :
1. e x c e s s iv e  r e l i a n c e  on e x t e r n a l  e x p e r t s  who were change i n s t i g a t o r s  
and e x e c u to r s ,  c o n t r o l l e d  t h e  c r i t i c a l  in fo rm a t io n  about  t h e  
b u s in e s s  o f  th e  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  and could  d e f i n e  and i n f l u e n c e  t h e  
param ete rs  of  s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n s .  T he i r  e x p e r t i s e  has proven 
in d i s p e n s a b le  t o  e f f e c t i v e  management of  LNDC, and t h e i r  
s u b s t i t u t i o n  c o s t l y .  They were more d i r e c t l y  involved  in c o r p o r a t e  
management, and t h e  s t r a t e g i c  change p ro ces s  in p a r t i c u l a r ,  a s  our  
typo logy  of  n e g o t i a t i o n s  i n d i c a t e d ,  than  i s  normal ly  assumed in
co n v e n t io n a l  a n a l y s i s  t h a t  subsume them under government o r  as 
p a r t  o f  a g e n e ra l  envi ronment of  a SOE. Through t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  
p e r s p e c t i v e ,  we a r e  a b l e  t o  pu t  i n t o  sharp  focus  t h e i r  r o l e  in th e  
change p r o c e s s ,  and i l l u m i n a t e  t h e  t u r b u l e n t  u n d e r c u r r e n t s  o f  
c o r p o r a t e  p o l i t i c s  m a n i f e s t  in t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n s  among t h e  v a r io u s  
c o n s t a n t l y  s h i f t i n g  c o a l i t i o n s  i n s i d e  and o u t s i d e  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  
as th e y  endeavour  t o  s t a k e  t h e i r  c l a im s  and i n f l u e n c e  s t r a t e g i c  
d e c i s i o n s .
2.  Abrupt p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r v e n t i o n  in t h e  appoin tmen t and change of  
c h i e f  e x e c u t i v e s ,  o f t e n  la ck ing  m anager ia l  s k i l l s  t o  p ro v id e  t h e  
sense  o f  d i r e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  e s p e c i a l l y  du r ing  u n s e t t l i n g  
p e r io d s  of  change .
Those f i n d i n g s  a re  d i f f e r e n t  from Ramamurti (1986) who found t h a t  t h e  
Boards o f  g o v e rn m e n t - c o n t ro l l e d  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  in t h e  United S t a t e s ,  
were composed o f  e x p e r i e n c e d  d i r e c t o r s  from t h e  b u s in e s s  s e c t o r .
As t h i s  s tudy  shows, t h e r e  was a high deg ree  o f  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
in t h e  management o f  LNDC w i th  s c a n t  r e g a rd  f o r  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  t h e  
Board of  d i r e c t o r s .
Based on a view of a SOE as a loose  c o a l i t i o n  of  i n t e r l i n k a g e s  and 
he te rogeneous  groups c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by unequal  power r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  
e x p e r i e n c e s ,  i d e o l o g i c a l  d i v e r s i t y ,  and v a ry in g  p e r c e p t io n s  of  t h e  
c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  o b j e c t i v e s ,  ou r  f i n d i n g s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  power and p o l i t i c a l  
jockey ing  a r e  e s s e n t i a l  e x p l a n a t o r y  components of  t h e  n e g o t i a t e d  
s t r a t e g i c  change p r o c e s s .  They p ro v id e  us with  t h e  v e h i c l e  f o r  a n a ly s in g  
t h e  p ro c e s s e s  by which s t r a t e g i c  changes a r e  made, and f o r  u nde r ­
s ta n d in g  t h e  r e s u l t s  of  t h i s  n e g o t i a t e d  i n t e r a c t i o n ,  Hall (1972 p . 4 6 ) .
The p o l i t i c a l  p e r s p e c t i v e  adds some c r i t i c a l  i n s i g h t s  as t o  why some
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s t r a t e g i c  changes were n e g o t i a t e d ,  by whom, o r  n o n - n e g o t i a b l e ,  why 
c e r t a i n  change p ro p o s a l s  were supp res sed  o r  d e f l e c t e d ,  why i n d i v i d u a l s  
took  p a r t i c u l a r  s t a n c e s  on some i s s u e s  as a g a i n s t  o t h e r s ,  who a re  
t h e  a c t o r s  whose views c a r r y  g r e a t e r  w eigh t  on s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n s ,  
and how a c t o r s  p e r c e iv in g  t h e i r  pow er less  p o s i t i o n  may r e a l i g n  and 
mus te r  su p p o r t  t o  b o l s t e r  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  in pursuance  of  t h e i r  p r e f e r r e d  
l i n e  of  a c t i o n  and d e f e a t  t h e  o p p o s i t i o n .  Thus,  i t  a t t e m p t s  t o  account  
f o r  t h e  c on fus ion  and f o u l - u p s  ( g lo s s e d  over  by r a t i o n a l  models)  which 
a l s o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  f i n a l  c o r p o r a t e  s t r a t e g i c  c h o i c e ,  Mazzolini  
(1979 p . 272) .  I t  r e v e a l s  t h a t  w i th i n  t h e  t r i a d i c  i n t e r a c t i o n  of  t h e  
s t a t e ,  management, and t h e  o u t s i d e  s t a k e h o l d e r s ,  t h e r e  was power 
asymmetry,  l a r g e l y  in f av o u r  o f  o u t s i d e  a c t o r s ,  t h a t  changed wi th  i s s u e s ,  
i n d i v i d u a l s  ano t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s ,  and t ime as a c t o r s  r e a p p r a i s e d  t h e i r  
i n t e r e s t s ,  and reviewed t h e i r  c o n t r a c t u a l  a r rangem ents  in t h e  l i g h t  
of  changes in th e  s i t u a t i o n .  This  shows t h e  cu r ren cy  of  power,  w h i le  
i t  may c o n f in e  th e  o c cu r ren c e  as wel l  as t h e  outcome o f  n e g o t i a t i o n ,  
n e v e r t h e l e s s  i t  i s  no t  a f i x e d  p r o p e r t y  o f  a c t o r s ,  i t  i s  r e l a t i v e  and 
s h i f t s  with  i s s u e s ,  t h e i r  c e n t r a l i t y  o r  c r i t i c a l  n a t u r e  t o  i n d i v i d u a l s  
a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  t im e ,  and t h e i r  s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y .  I t  i s  a f u n c t i o n  
of  dependence in t h a t  t h o s e  who c o n t r o l  c r i t i c a l  r e s o u r c e s ,  c o n t r o l  
a cc es s  t o  a l t e r n a t i v e  r e s o u r c e s  and s o u rces  o f  p o l i t i c a l  power,  c o n t ro l  
v i t a l  in fo rm a t io n  and can d e f i n e  pa ram e te r s  o f  change n e g o t i a t i o n ,  have 
a b i l i t y  t o  r e f u s e  r e s o u r c e s ,  a l s o  have power t o  advance t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  
i n t e r e s t .
In LNDC, government c o n t r o l  o f  f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s ,  t h e  appoin tmen t of  
CEOs and board of  d i r e c t o r s ,  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  f a i l u r e  t o  g e n e r a t e  
s u f f i c i e n t  i n t e r n a l  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  r e v e n u e s ,  and l i m i t a t i o n s  on access  
t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  m a rk e ts ,  has c r e a t e d  a resou rce -dependence  
r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  g iv ing  government power t o  e n s u re  compliance and in f l u e n c e
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s t r a t e g i c  behav iour  of  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  and pursue  i t s  own p o l i t i c a l  
i n t e r e s t s .  Such p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s ,  t h i s  s tudy  shows, a r e  o f t e n  
l e a s t  concerned with  t h e  l o g i c a l  and economic per formance t h a t  t h e  
r a t i o n a l  change t h e o r i s t s  would e x p e c t ,  r a t h e r  a SOE i s  p e r c e iv e d  as 
an economic in s t ru m en t  th rough  which t o  pursue  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  
f o r  t h e  sake o f  p o l i t i c s .  ' C o n f l i c t s  a r e  i n e v i t a b l e ,  f r i c t i o n s  a r e  
p a r t  o f  l i f e ,  and harmony has proven t o  be an im poss ib le  dream. Trade­
o f f s  between e f f i c i e n c y  and e q u i t y ,  o r  between p o l i t i c a l  demands and 
economic r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  a r e  no t  e a s i l y  f o u n d ' ,  concluded Aharoni (1986 
p . 411 ) .  The c h o ice  o f  a s t r a t e g y  r e s t s  no t  so much on a n a l y t i c a l  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  f i n a n c i a l  pe r fo rmance ,  o r  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  reasons  i n d i ­
c a t i n g  why a p a r t i c u l a r  s t r a t e g y  w i l l  enhance c o r p o r a t e  per fo rmance ,  
p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  t end  t o  o v e r r i d e  economic outcomes.  However, our  
f i n d i n g s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  SOE management a r e  no t  com pl ian t  r e a c t o r s  
in f l u e n c e d  and y i e l d i n g  p a s s i v e l y  t o  d i c t a t e s  o f  e x t e r n a l  c o n t r o l l e r s ,  
th e y  a r e  a c t i n g  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  w i th  t h e i r  ov/n c a r e e r s  ana s e l f - i n t e r e s t s  
t o  promote.  They eschew government i n t e r v e n t i o n  ana i n s t i g a t e  s t r a t e g i e s  
t h a t  c i rcum ven t  t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  c o n t r o l s  t o  advance t h e i r  s t r a t e g i c  
autonomy th rough  c r e a t i o n  o f  boundary spanning channe ls  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  
and i n f l u e n c e  c o n t e x t  o f  n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  c o - o p t a t i o n  o f  powerful e x t e r n a l  
a c t o r s  t o  t i l t  power in t h e i r  f a v o u r ,  and th rough  c o n t r o l  of  v i t a l  
in fo rm a t io n  t o  s e l e c t i v e l y  i n f l u e n c e  t h e i r  p r e f e r r e d  a l t e r n a t i v e s .
F i n a l l y ,  w i th i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  c o n t e x t  of  t h e  n e g o t i a t e d  changes was 
a powerful  and i n v i s i b l e  a c t o r  ( t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  South A f r i c a )  no t  
e x p l i c i t l y  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  in t h e  change n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  bu t  seemingly 
f u l l y  aware o f  t h e  p roces s  and a b le  t o  change t h e  d i r e c t i o n ,  c o n t e x t  
and subsequen t  n e g o t i a t e d  s t r a t e g i e s  th rough  i t s  powerful  i n f l u e n c e  
on th e  economic and p o l i t i c a l  env ironment on which LNDC s t r a t e g i e s  
were t a r g e t e d .  The unequal  economic power became an e f f e c t i v e  c o n t r o l
mechanism used to  g e n e r a t e  p r e s s u r e  and c o n s t r a i n  s t r a t e g i c  changes 
t h a t  seemed t o  t h r e a t e n  t h e  e s t a b l i s h e d  economic c o - o p e r a t i o n  and 
dependence .  To quo te  Benson (1977 p . 8 ) :
' t h ro u g h  t h e  e x e r c i s e  of  power a paradigm i s  en fo rced  (eg economic 
b lockade  which a rguab ly  led to  change of  government in 1986) a c t i o n  
p remises  a r e  e s t a b l i s h e d ,  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between components a r e  
a r r a n g e d ,  and env i ronmenta l  in t e r c h a n g e s  a r e  n e g o t i a t e d . '
These f i n d i n g s  seem t o  lend s u p p o r t  t o  t h e  view t h a t  envi ronmenta l  
d i s t u r b a n c e s  and c r i s i s  may a c t  as i n s t i g a t o r s  o r  f a c i l i t a t o r s  of  
s t r a t e g i c  change ,  P e t t i g r e w  (1985) ,  Johnson (1987) .  In LNDC, d i v e r s ­
i f i c a t i o n  i n t o  o v e r s eas  inves tm en t  marke ts  ( c h o ic e  o f  a d i f f e r e n t  
inves tm en t  c o n t e x t ) ,  and emphasis  on impor t  s u b s t i t u t i o n  p r o j e c t s  
seem t o  have fo l lowed  c l o s u r e  o f  t h e  b o rd e r  w i th  South A f r i c a  and 
change o f  government in 1986. Thus,  changes  in o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  e n v i r o n ­
ment would seem t o  have f a c i l i t a t e d  t h e  p ro c e s s  of  s t r a t e g i c  change 
ana r e d e f i n i t i o n  of  t h e  domain w i th i n  which LNDC has t o  e x i s t  in t h e  
1980s.
The i m p l i c a t i o n s  of  t h e  p e r c e iv e d  in f l u e n c e  of  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  e n v i ro n ­
ment s u gges t  a r e a s  t h a t  need t o  be focused  on and analyzed  in con junc­
t i o n  wi th  examining t n e  p ro c e s s  of  n e g o t i a t e d  s t r a t e g i c  change .  Without 
looking  a t  t h e  r e l a t e d  s t r u c t u r a l  and n e g o t i a t i o n  c o n t e x t s  w i th in  which 
t h e  embedded change r e a l i t y  was produced and t h e  d i s c o n t in u o u s  change 
t h a t  SOEs face*! w i thou t  a t t e n t i o n  and a p p r e c i a t i o n  of  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  
h i s t o r i c a l  p r o c e s s e s ,  t o  t h e  p a s t  s t r a t e g i e s  t h a t  in f lu e n c e d  o r  ou t  
of  which th e  p r e s e n t  a r rangements  have been e n g i n e e re d ,  w i th o u t  a 
c l e a r  comprehension o f  t h e  dynamics o f  power and p o l i t i c s  t h a t  seem 
t o  u nde rg i rd  t h e  p rocess  of  s t r a t e g i c  change in SOEs, t h e  key a c t o r s  
involved  and t h e i r  s t r a t e g i e s  of  a l l i a n c e s  in d i f f e r e n t  change s i t u a t i o n s ,
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we may be advancing e x p l a n a t i o n s  t h a t  do no t  improve our  u n d e r s t a n d in g  
of  how and why a p a r t i c u l a r  s t r a t e g i c  change was n e g o t i a t e d  and s u s t a i n e d  
as i t  d i d .  The n e g o t i a t i o n  p e r s p e c t i v e  has a t tem pted  t o  b r ing  t h e s e  
o u tc ro p p in g s  of  change in t o  sharp  f o c u s ,  by t r a c i n g  and grounding  them 
in t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  p ro c e s s e s  and c o n t e x t s  ou t  of  which s t r a t e g i c  
changes emerged.  I t  r e c o g n iz e s  t h a t  t h e  p ro ces s  of  change in a SOE i s  
based in t h e  main,  on t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n ,  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  power t o  change 
parad igms,  t o  impose i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of  th e  s i t u a t i o n  and e n fo rce  com­
p l i a n c e  with  p rocedures  t h a t  p r o t e c t  a c t o r s '  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  o r  
c o n s t r a i n  t h e  a c t i o n s  of  o t h e r s  as a means of  ach iev ing  t h e i r  own 
i n t e r e s t s .
Somasundram (1985) has a p t l y  remarked about  s c a r c i t y  o f  r e s e a r c h  on th e  
management o f  d i s c o n t in u o u s  change in SOEs. He observed :  " the  l i t e r a t u r e  
is  r e p l e t e  with  recommendations of  how to  manage smooth, con t inuous  and 
q u a n t i t a t i v e  change,  but  r a t h e r  s i l e n t  about  a b r u p t ,  d i s c o n t in u o u s ,  
q u a l i t a t i v e  change.  P ub l ic  e n t e r p r i s e s  l i v e  in t h i s  world . . .  i f  p u b l i c  
e n t e r p r i s e s  a re  t o  be in a dynamic e q u i l i b r i u m  with t h e i r  env i ronm ent,  
a c e n t r a l  p o s i t i o n  should g ive  c o n s t a n t  a t t e n t i o n  t o  change,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
a b r u p t ,  d i s c o n t i n u o u s ,  q u a l i t a t i v e  change ."  p . 46.  This r e s e a r c h  i s  
t h e r e f o r e  p a r t  of  t h e  s o l u t i o n  towards  f i l l i n g  t h i s  t h e o r e t i c a l  gap 
and p u t t i n g  t h e  p rocess  of  s t r a t e g i c  change in SOEs on t h e  r e s e a r c h  
agenda f o r  fo c u s .
Im p l i c a t io n s  f o r  Research
The purpose o f  t h i s  r e s e a r c h  was t o  e x p lo re  how s t r a t e g i c  changes were 
c r e a t e d  in a s ta te -owned  e n t e r p r i s e  in a deve lop ing  n a t i o n .  The r e s u l t a n t  
f i n d i n g s ,  based on S t r a u s s  (1978) N e g o t i a t io n  concep tua l  framework,  
i n d i c a t e  t h a t  s t r a t e g i c  changes d e v i a t e  from t h e  comprehensive r a t i o n a l
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model,  they  a re  not  i s o l a t e d  ep i so d es  d iv o rc e e  from t h e i r  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  
c o n t e x t ;  r a t h e r ,  they  a re  outcomes of  power and p o l i t i c s  in t h e  p roces s  
of  n e g o t i a t i o n  among the  d i f f e r e n c e  of  i n t e r e s t s  t h a t  comprise  a SOE. 
P a t t e r n s  o f  change have emerged t h a t  t end  t o  rev ea l  high p r o p e n s i t y  
towards  d i s c o n t in u o u s  changes;  s t r u c t u r a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  on management 
s t r a t e g i c  d i s c r e t i o n  were i d e n t i f i e d ,  and sugges ted  t h a t  no t  every  
s t r a t e g i c  change was n e g o t i a b l e ,  some could  be imposed by powerful  
a c t o r s .  Thus,  power and p o l i t i c s  would seem t o  be t h e  motor d r i v i n g  
o r  c o n s t r a i n i n g  t h e  p roces s  of s t r a t e g i c  change .
There a r e  im por tan t  r e s e a r c h  i m p l i c a t i o n s  t h a t  emerge from t h i s  
n e g o t i a t e d  change p e r s p e c t i v e .  Our f i n d i n g s  s u g g es t  t h a t  management 
o r c h e s t r a t e d  s t r a t e g i e s  (w i th o u t  e x t e r n a l  i n t e r v e n t i o n  and n e g o t i a t i o n )  
were d i s c u s s e d  and implemented smoothly ,  took  s h o r t e r  g e s t a t i o n  p e r i o d ,  
were t a r g e t e d  to  a p e rce iv ed  problem o r  o p p o r t u n i t y ,  and i n t e r n a l  d i s s e n t  
was e a s i l y  s u p p re s se d ,  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  s t r u c t u r e d  approach where 
s t r a t e g i e s  were n e g o t i a t e d  with  e x t e r n a l  a c t o r s .  A r e s e a r c h  on t h e  
r e l a t i v e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of  th e  two approaches  and manager ia l  a c t i o n  in 
each might  be of  i n t e r e s t  t o  p r a c t i t i o n e r s  and r e s e a r c h e r s .  G re a t e r  
un d e r s tan d in g  on managing s t r a t e g i c  change may be ga ined  on why t h e r e  
appeared  t o  be more consensus  around management i n s t i g a t e d  s t r a t e g i c  
d e c i s i o n s  than  on n e g o t i a t e d  s t r a t e g i e s .  The s tudy  might  r e v ea l  th e  
o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t s  o f  a c t o r s '  p o l i t i c a l  jo c k e y in g  and j o s t l i n g  in th e  
p rocess  of  prolonged  n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  t h a t  could  s e rv e  t o  m i t i g a t e  t h e  
f requency  of  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r v e n t i o n  of  s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n s  in t h e  f u t u r e .
I t  i s  e q u a l ly  im por tan t  t o  ga in  a b e t t e r  u n d e r s t a n d in g  of  how management 
a l l i a n c e s  a re  formed.  What type  o f  s t r a t e g i c  changes f o s t e r  management 
t o  form a l l i a n c e s  t o  e x e r t  i n f l u e n c e  in s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n ?  SOEs 
a re  managed by p o l i t i c a l l y  a ppo in ted  e x e c u t i v e s  who seem t o  lack
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manager ia l  s k i l l s  and p o l i t i c a l  power t o  i n f l u e n c e  s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n s  
as d e s i r e d  by th e  s t a t e .  Fu tu re  r e s e a r c h  may examine whether  a l l i a n c e s  
a r e  more e f f e c t i v e  in change n e g o t i a t i o n  than  th e  p o l i t i c a l  e x e c u t i v e s .  
Research i s  e s s e n t i a l  t o  d e f i n e  more c l e a r l y  t h e  n a t u r e  of  e x e c u t iv e  
s k i l l s  and p r o f i c i e n c y  r e q u i r e d  f o r  e x e c u t iv e s  of  SOEs. P o l i t i c a l  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n  a lone  i s  inadequa te  in t h e  management of  modern complex 
SOEs.
Our f i n d i n g s  sugges t  t h a t  th e  more p r o f i t a b l e  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  and l e s s  
dependent  i t  i s  on s i n g l e  source  of  funds ,  t h e  more d i s c r e t i o n a r y  power 
i t  has on s t r a t e g i c  changes ,  and t h e  b roade r  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  a c t i v i t y .  
Fu tu re  r e s e a r c h  should examine t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between th e  d i r e c t i o n  
of  change and t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  p r o c e s s .  Are t h e r e  more change n e g o t i a t i o n s  
when t h e  SOE i s  in f i n a n c i a l  c r i s i s  and depends on s t a t e  funding than 
when i t  i s  f i n a n c i a l l y  p r o f i t a b l e ?  We would expec t  t h a t  with  g r e a t e r  
f i n a n c i a l  autonomy t o  pursue t h e i r  o b j e c t i v e s ,  t h e r e  would be con t inued  
p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r v e n t i o n  and i n t e n s i v e  n e g o t i a t i o n  as management r e n e g ­
o t i a t e s  and r e d e f i n e s  t h e  c o n t r o l  s t r u c t u r e s ,  w hile  t h e  s t a t e ' s  s t a k e s  
would be high f o r  r e l i n q u i s h i n g  c o n t r o l .
F i n a l l y ,  s t r a t e g i c  change i s  p ro c e s s u a l  and may r e q u i r e  l o n g i t u d i n a l  
i n v e s t i g a t i v e  approach ,  as  r e s e a r c h  by P e t t i g r e w  (1986) ,  Quinn (1080) 
and Johnson (1987) have shown, and such a p ro c e s s  could  not  be f u l l y  
c ap tu re d  w i th in  th e  t ime c o n s t r a i n t s  of  t h i s  s tu d y .  Fu tu re  r e s e a r c h ,  
us ing n e g o t i a t i v e  p e r s p e c t i v e  as a method o f  i n q u i r y ,  could  develop 
our  f i n d i n g s  to  e n r i c h  our  u n d e r s t a n d in g  of  t h e  p r o c e s s .  Such a 
r e s e a r c h  could  focus  on how a c t o r s  in a SOE dec ide  which s t r a t e g i c  
changes a r e  n e g o t i a b l e ,  o r  n o n - n e g o t i a b l e .  What a r e  t h e  common f e a t u r e s  
of  th e  n e g o t i a b l e / n o n - n e g o t i a b l e  s t r a t e g i e s .  These a re  bu t  some o f  th e  
r e s e a r c h  p o i n t e r s  t h a t  may be fo l lowed  from t h i s  s tu d y .
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Im p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  Management
For management, t h e  t a s k  i s  one of  r e a l i z i n g  and a p p r e c i a t i n g  t h a t  SOEs 
f u n c t i o n  in a m i l i e u  of  c o n f l i c t f u l  e x p e c t a t i o n s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  a c t o r s  
and in a dynamic p o l i t i c o - e c o n o m i c  envi ronment where managers o f t e n  
have no d i s c r e t i o n  ana c o n t r o l  over  t h e i r  s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n s .  There 
i s  a need f o r  r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  t h e  r o l e  of  SOE management, t h e i r  
p e r c e p t i o n  of  a SOE as an economic o r  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t ru m e n t ,  and t h e i r  
i n t e r a c t i o n  s t r a t e g i e s  with  t h e  e x t e r n a l  s t a k e h o l d e r s .  I t  i s  no lo nger  
s u f f i c i e n t  t o  bemoan s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n s  on s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n s ,  nor  
complain about  ambiguous o b j e c t i v e s  of  a SOE which r e n d e r  s t r a t e g i c  
change p rocess  p rob lem a t ic  t o  n e g o t i a t e .  These f a c t o r s  a re  composi te  
components of  a t u r b u l e n t  envi ronment of  t h e s e  e n t e r p r i s e s ,  the y  have 
become a norm r a t h e r  than  an e x c e p t i o n ,  and t o  a r e s o u r c e f u l  manager,  
th e y  a r e  p a r t  o f  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  and c o n s t r a i n t s  t h a t  have t o  be s o lv e d .  
To be e f f e c t i v e ,  an i n t e g r a t i v e  approach i s  r e q u i r e d  where t h e  conce rns  
of  t h e  d i v e r s e  i n t e r e s t s  -  s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  and techno-economic ,  t h a t  
impact on t h e i r  s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n s  may be c o - o r d i n a t e d ,  n e g o t i a t e d ,  
and q u a s i - r e s o l u t i o n s  made. This  im p l ie s :
1. R e a l i z a t i o n  Dy SOE managers t h a t  t h e  c o n t e n t  o f  s t r a t e g i c  change 
as wel l  as i t s  c o n t e x t  needs t o  be managed. They need to  be 
aware of  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  and management p ro c e s s e s  through which 
s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n s  a re  made and i n f l u e n c e d ,  t h e  key i n f l u e n t i a l  
a c t o r s  in t h e  p rocess  and t h e i r  power b a s e ,  when and how th e y  may 
g a r n e r  suppo r t  f o r  what ty p e  o f  s t r a t e g i e s .  I t  im pl ie s  management 
o f  t h e  boundary-spanning p ro ces s  t o  e n s u re  t h a t  s t r a t e g i e s  a r e  
i d e n t i f i e d ,  changing s i t u a t i o n s  r e d e f i n e d  and r e l e v a n t  in fo rm a t io n  
g a th e re d  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n  making and reduce  
u n c e r t a i n t y  f a c in g  th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  As t h i s  s tudy  has shown, t h i s
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a D i l i t y  t o  d e f i n e  th e  p remises  of  t h e  change c o n te x t  remained 
management 's  most p o t e n t  b a r g a i n in g  s t r a t e g y .  The e s t a b l i s h m e n t  
of  Market P lann ing as a boundary-scann ing  u n i t  t o  c o - o r d i n a t e  
t h e  demands of  e x t e r n a l  s t a k e h o l d e r s ,  mon i to r  changes in t h e  
i n d u s t r y  and be an i n t e r n a l  change agent  f o r  LNDC, seem t o  have 
been an a t t em p t  t o  ga in  b e t t e r  u n d e r s tan d in g  of  t h e  c o n t e x t  of  
t h e  change p rocess  and improve s t r a t e g y  fo r m u l a t io n .
2.  P o l i t i c a l  s e n s i t i v i t y .  S t r a t e g i c  change p r o c e s s ,  as t h i s  s tudy  
has  dem ons t ra ted ,  r e q u i r e s  p o l i t i c a l  s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  m u l t i p l e  
i n t e r e s t s  of  d i f f e r e n t  c o n s t i t u e n t s ,  some more powerful  than  o t h e r s .  
I t  invo lves  r e s o l v i n g  competing p o l i t i c a l  demands and r e q u i r e s  a 
s k i l l e d  t a c t i c i a n  who can no t  only  pe r su ad e ,  n e g o t i a t e ,  and improvise  
s o l u t i o n s ,  bu t  can a l s o  m a rsha l l  suppo r t  and form a l l i a n c e s  with  
o t h e r  a c t o r s  t o  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  change p r o c e s s .  A r e c o g n i t i o n  of  
p o l i t i c a l  games played  in s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n s  p rov ides  an o p p o r tu n i ty  
t o  a n t i c i p a t e  o p p o s i t i o n ,  c o n f l i c t s ,  and r e a l i g n  i n t e r n a l  and 
e x t e r n a l  pov/er c o n f i g u r a t i o n  t o  s u ppor t  t im e ly  s t r a t e g i c  change 
n e g o t i a t i o n .
3. T ra in in g  of  SUE e x e c u t i v e .  To manage e f f e c t i v e l y  and be a b l e  to  
unde rs tand  the  complex p ro c e s s e s  and c o n t e x t s  of  s t r a t e g i c  change 
as we sugges ted  above,  a SOE e x e c u t iv e  needs a c e r t a i n  deg ree  of  
v i s i o n  and m anager ia l  s k i l l s  t o  g ra sp  complex a n a l y t i c a l  prob lems ,  
f a r  g r e a t e r  than merely be ing  a p o l i t i c a l  crony of  a r u l i n g  p a r t y  
o r  a m i n i s t e r .  Berg (1985) recogn ized  t h i s  v/hen he observed  t h a t  
' a t  t h e  base of  any s t r a t e g i c  change p ro ces s  t h e r e  must be a c l e a r  
co n ce p t io n  of  what th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  i s  in r e l a t i o n  t o  i t s  w ider  
c o n t e x t  ( i t s  m iss ion )  and what i t  i s  aiming a t  ( i t s  v i s i o n ) '  p . 299.  
SOE e x e c u t iv e s  a r e  drawn from e x p e r i e n c e s  t h a t  have no t  a d e q u a te ly  
p repa red  them f o r  t h e i r  manager ia l  t a s k s ,  and t h e r e f o r e  need t o  be 
t r a i n e d  in manager ia l  s k i l l s  and a t t i t u d e s  to  equip  them f o r  t h e i r
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r o l e .  A case  in p o i n t  from t h i s  s tu d y ,  was John Bow. For two 
y e a r s  he was a deputy d i r e c t o r  o f  LNDC 1975-77,  and th en  s e n t  f o r  
e x e c u t i v e  development c o u r s e  b e f o r e  be ing promoted t o  CEO in 1978.
He was a rguab ly  rega rded  as t h e  b e s t  lo c a l  e x e c u t i v e  LNDC has ev e r  
produced .
In summary, t h e  SUE management needs a broadened awareness of  i n t e r n a l  
ana e x t e r n a l  p ro c e s s e s  and c o n t e x t  t h a t  i n f l u e n c e  s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n s ,  
and an und e r s tan d in g  t h a t  power and p o l i t i c s  a r e  a s p e c t s  of  t h e  change 
p r o c e s s  t h a t  need t o  be managed as s e r i o u s  as t h e  market  of  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n .
P o l i c y  I m p l i c a t i o n s
To f u n c t i o n  e f f e c t i v e l y ,  we have sugges ted  t h a t  SOE e x e c u t iv e s  a l s o  
have t o  accommodate p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  of  t h e  s t a t e .  However, our  
f i n d i n g s  show t h a t  w hile  management may n e g o t i a t e  and i n f l u e n c e  th e  
e x t e r n a l  p o l i t i c a l  p roces s  and i n t e r n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  p ro c e s s ,  i t  
has  l i m i t e d  c o n t r o l  over  t h e  s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n .
The government ap p o in t s  CEOs, may impose some changes o r  c o n s t r a i n  
them and g e n e r a l l y  has t o  be c o n s u l t e d  on s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n s  t h a t  
a r e  p e rc e iv e d  to  be of  i n t e r e s t  t o  i t .
Government r e l i e s  on management t o  i d e n t i f y ,  d e f i n e  and fo rm u la te  
s t r a t e g i e s ,  t h e r e  a re  no comparable s k i l l s  w i th in  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  to  
u n d e r t a k e  t h i s  t a s k ,  t o  e v a l u a t e  t h e  v a l i d i t y  of  management a n a l y s i s  
o r  m on i to r  s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n  p r o c e s s e s .  I t  has tended  to  i n t e r v e n e  
th rough  im pos i t ion  of  s t r u c t u r a l  c o n t r o l .  Rather  than  in t e rv e n e  
th rough  t h e  appointment  of  CEOs t o  i n f l u e n c e  s t r a t e g i c  behav iour  of  
t n e  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  i t  may g iv e  more d i s c r e t i o n a r y  power t o  management 
on s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n s ,  bu t  r e s t r u c t u r e  t h e  c o n t e x t  in which s t r a t e g i c  
d e c i s i o n s  a re  made, th rough  a reward system t h a t  l i n k s  manager ia l
i n c e n t i v e s  t o  f u l f i l m e n t  of  s p e c i f i c  o b j e c t i v e s .  This  i s  a l r e a d y  
s u c c e s s f u l l y  o p e r a t i n g  among LNDC s u b s i d i a r i e s  such as Maseru Motors 
and t h e  Asparagus Cannery.  With t r e n d s  underway f o r  more e q u i t y  f l o t a t i o n ,  
commerc ia l ly  o r i e n t e d  i n v e s t o r s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  demand high r e t u r n s  from 
t h e i r  inves tm en ts  and make management more ac c o u n ta b l e  f o r  c o r p o r a t e  
per fo rm ance ,  a r e l a t i o n s h i p  which was l e s s  v i s i b l e .
Government p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r v e n t i o n s  invo lve  c o s t s  t o  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  
which need t o  be f l a s h e d  ou t  so t h a t  p o l i c y  makers a r e  aware o f  t h e  
consequences  of  t h e i r  a c t i o n s .  F i r s t  of  a l l ,  f r e q u e n t  changes of 
CEOs may f u e l  t h e  r a t e  of  change and lead to  g r e a t e r  i n s t a b i l i t y  o r  a 
c r i s i s .  I t  c r e a t e s  u n c e r t a i n t y  and l e a d e r s h i p  t u r b u l e n c e  as th e  
c o r p o r a t i o n  d r i f t s  from one l e a d e r s h i p  s t y l e  t o  a n o t h e r .  This  i s  
h a rd ly  a conduc ive s i t u a t i o n  f o r  an o r g a n i z a t i o n  e s t a b l i s h e d  t o  champion 
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n ,  i n s t i l  c o n f id e n c e  t o  i n v e s t o r s  and be an exemplar  of  
e f f i c i e n t  management. Secondly ,  p o l i t i c a l l y  appo in ted  CEOs a r e  p laced  
in a d i f f i c u l t  s i t u a t i o n  where th e y  need t o  win t h e  suppo r t  of  t h e i r  
s t a f f  by dem ons t ra t ing  t h a t  th e y  a r e  independent  of  t h e  government 
w i th o u t  i t  r e a l i s i n g ,  w h i le  s t i l l  expec ted  to  g e t  r e s u l t s  f o r  t h e  
c o r p o r a t i o n  th rough  t h e i r  i n f l u e n c e  on p o l i t i c a l  c o n n e c t io n s .  Main­
t a i n i n g  t h a t  c r e d i b i l i t y  between t h e  two s i d e s  has n o t  been s u c c e s s f u l ,  
and has led t o  f u r t h e r  changes as t h e  government r e a s s e r t e d  i t s  c o n t r o l .  
Fur therm ore ,  t h i s  s o r t  of  i n t e r v e n t i o n  has c r e a t e d  dependence whereby 
CEO looks a t  t h e  government f o r  d i r e c t i o n ,  he becomes r i s k  a v e r s e  and 
does no t  want t o  rock t h e  boa t  and s t a t u s  quo i s  m a in ta ined  u n t i l  
f o r e i g n  s t a k e h o l d e r s  p r e s s u r e  f o r  change.
There i s  a need f o r  r e d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  r o l e  o f  e x t e r n a l  e x p e r t s  in 
t h e  management of LNDC. They have b rought v a l u a b le  m anager ia l  e x p e r i e n c e  
and p e r s p e c t i v e  t o  th e  management o f  s t r a t e g i c  change which LNDC
c o n t i n u e s  t o  r e l y  upon. There i s  however a problem t h a t  con t inued  
r e l i a n c e  on th e s e  e x p e r t s  w i th o u t  a c l e a r l y  d e f in e d  r o l e ,  in t h e  
c o n t e x t  of  f r e q u e n t  l e a d e r s h i p  changes ,  an no a p p r o p r i a t e  lo c a l  e x p e r t i s e ,  
th e y  have te nded  t o  c r e a t e  s t r a t e g i e s  t h a t  appeal  t o  them and lack  
ind igenous  e x e c u t iv e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g .  The r e s u l t  has been ha l f - im plem en ted  
changes  which cease  th e  moment e x p e r t s  l e a v e .  Our f i n d i n g s  s u g g es t  
t h a t  c o n s i s t e n t  l e a d e r s h i p  i s  c r u c i a l  t o  t h e  management of  s t r a t e g i c  
change ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  as t h e  e x t e r n a l  e x p e r t  co re  were on s h o r t - t e r m  
c o n t r a c t s .  I t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  e s s e n t i a l  t o  r e c o n s i d e r  how such e x p e r t i s e  
cou ld  be deployed more e f f i c i e n t l y .  F i n a l l y ,  given a high p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of  t h r e e  Cabine t  m i n i s t e r s  in c lu d in g  th e  chai rman ,  t h e  
Board would seem t o  be in a powerful  p o s i t i o n  t o  consummate a l l  s t r a t e g i c  
d e c i s i o n s  w i th o u t  r e f e r e n c e  t o  government.  This would enhance t h e  s t a t u s  
o f  t h e  Board in i t s  gu idance  r o l e ,  c r e a t e  f l e x i b l e  r e a c t i o n  t o  inves tment 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  by management by reduc ing  t h e  t o r t u o u s  n e g o t i a t i o n  p r o c e s s ,  
and would make e f f i c i e n t  use of  t h e  p o l i t i c i a n s '  t im e .  They would not  
have t o  go over  LNDC b u s in e s s  aga in  in C ab ine t .
In summary, th e n ,  th o s e  who a r e  involved  in t h e  po li cy-making  of  SOEs, 
t h i s  r e s e a r c h  p rov ides  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  r e f l e c t i o n  and rev ie w,  and i n d i c a t e s  
t h a t  th e y  have much to  ga in  from u n d e r s t a n d in g  im p l i c a t io n s  of  t h e i r  
p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n s  on th e  s t r a t e g i c  change management in SOEs, an 
awareness  which i t  i s  hoped w i l l  lead t o  f u r t h e r  r e s e a r c h  from th e  
government-SOE s t r a t e g y  management p e r s p e c t i v e .
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Appendix I
Lesotho Nationa l  Development C orpo ra t ion  Act ,  1567 
Purpose ,  Power and R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s :
The purpose o f  th e  c o r p o r a t i o n  i s  t o  i n i t i a t e ,  promote and f a c i l i t a t e  
t h e  development of  m anufac tu r ing  and p ro c e s s in g  i n d u s t r i e s ,  mining and 
commerce in a manner c a l c u l a t e d  t o  r a i s e  t h e  le ve l  of  income and employ­
ment in Lesotho .
In c a r r y i n g  ou t  t h i s  pu rpose ,  t h e  government of  Lesotho may, a f t e r  
c o n s u l t a t i o n  v/ith t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  g iv e  i t  gene ra l  d i r e c t i o n s  as t o  
t h e  p o l i c y  t o  be a p p l i e d  in c a r r y i n g  ou t  t h e  purposes  and t h e  c o r p o r ­
a t i o n  s h a l l  g ive  e f f e c t  t o  t h o s e  d i r e c t i o n s .  Every d e c i s i o n  made in 
accordance  wi th  such d i r e c t i o n s  s h a l l  be deemed t o  be a d e c i s i o n  of 
t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n .
The c o r p o r a t i o n  and th e  m i n i s t r i e s ,  depar tm en ts  and o t h e r  ag en c ie s  
o f  th e  government s h a l l  in c o n s u l t a t i o n ,  from t ime t o  t ime d e v i s e  
uniform programs and p rocedu res  f o r  e f f e c t i v e  c o l l a b o r a t i o n  in p u r ­
suance o f  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  of  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  and t h e  Prime M i n i s t e r  
r e s e r v e s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  a f f i r m  th o s e  p rocedu res  with  o r  w i th o u t  v a r i a t i o n .
The c o r p o r a t i o n  i s  empowered t o  c a r r y  ou t  i t s  purpose as s p e c i f i e d  
above,  e i t h e r  by i t s e l f  o r  in a s s o c i a t i o n  with  o t h e r  b o d ie s ,  p e r s o n s ,  
o r  as managing ag en t ,  in o r d e r  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e ,  f o r m u l a t e ,  i n i t i a t e  
and c a r r y  out  p r o j e c t s ,  u n d e r t a k in g s  and e n t e r p r i s e s  f o r  t h e  promotion 
o r  expans ion  of  new o r  e x i s t i n g  e n t e r p r i s e s  in o rd e r  t o  deve lop Lesotho 
econom ica l ly  in m a nufa c tu r ing ,  a g r i c u l t u r e  and commercial s e c t o r s .
To c o n s t r u c t ,  e s t a b l i s h ,  a c q u i r e ,  m a in t a i n ,  manage o r  o p e r a t e  any 
p r o j e c t  o r  b u s in e s s  e n t e r p r i s e .
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To apply  f o r  and a c q u i r e  m ine ra l  t i t l e s ,  p r o s p e c t  o r  mine f o r  any 
m i n e r a l s .
G enra l ly  t o  do any th ing  t h a t  i s  n e c e s s a ry  o r  conducive t o  a t t a i n m e n t  
of  t h e  purpose  of  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  even though t h a t  t h i n g  i s  no t  
e x p r e s s l y  inc luded  among t h e  t h i n g s  t h a t  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  has been 
mandated t o  do.
(This  c a t c h - a l l  p r o v i s i o n  has  been t h e  source  o f  ambiguous and o f t e n  
c o n f l i c t i n g  p o l i c y  d i r e c t i o n s  from t h e  government because i t  can 
su ppor t  every  whimsical  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  t h a t  p o l i t i c i a n s  and o t h e r  
a f f e c t e d  c o a l i t i o n s  argue  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  ought  t o  be d o i n g ) . -*
To r a i s e ,  l end ,  o r  borrow money, o r  make advances t o  any company or  
person ;  in p a r t i c u l a r  t o  lend o r  advance money t o  companies owing or  
engaged in any b u s in e s s  c o n s i s t e n t  with  t h e  purpose of  th e  c o r p o r a t i o n  
and to  a c t  as  a g u a ra n t e e  f o r  repayments o r  performance  by any such 
companies.
I f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  deemed i t  e s s e n t i a l  f o r  s a feg u a rd in g  i t s  in v e s tm en t ,  
i t  may De involved  in an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r o l e ,  as a d i r e c t o r ,  manager 
o r  t r u s t e e  of  any b u s in e s s  where i t  has in v e s tm en t s .
Board o f  D i r e c t o r s
The a f f a i r s  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  a r e  managed and c o n t r o l l e d  by a board 
of  d i r e c t o r s  who may e x e r c i s e  a l l  t h e  powers.  The d i r e c t o r s  c o n s i s t
* Comment s u p p l i e d .
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of  t h e  PM, who was t h e  Chairman o r  such o t h e r  m i n i s t e r  of  t h e  government 
as t h e  PM may d e s ig n a t e  Chairman o f  t h e  board ,  t h e  M i n i s t e r s  o f  F inance ,  
C e n t ra l  P lan n in g ,  and Trade ,  and no l e s s  than  two o r  more than  f o u r  
o t h e r  pe rsons  appoin ted  by PM, one o f  whom may be t h e  CEO of  t h e  c o r p o r ­
a t i o n .
The board may a p po in t  one o f  t h e  d i r e c t o r s  t o  be CEO, bu t  i s  no t  bound 
t o  make such an appoin tm ent .  (This  was meant t o  f a c i l i t a t e  a c t i n g  
a p p o in tm e n t s ) . *
F i n a n c i a l  Management
The sha re  c a p i t a l  of  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  i s  a sum of  money de te rmined  by 
t h e  boa rd ,  which sum i s  d iv id e d  i n t o  o r d in a r y  s h a re s  o f  one rand each .  
(A u tho r i sed  sha re  c a p i t a l  i s  10 ,000,000  rand d iv id e d  i n t o  10 ,000,000 
o r d in a r y  s h a re s  of one rand each -  as  amended subsequen t  t o  W8 
n e g o t i a t i o n s ) .*
The funds ,  a s s e t s  and r e s o u rc e s  o f  th e  c o r p o r a t i o n  comprised o f  a l l  
t h e  monies and p ro p e r ty  t h a t  was dona ted ,  l e n t  o r  g r a n te d  t o  t h e  
c o r p o r a t i o n  by th e  government,  m i n i s t r y  o r  o t h e r  government a g e n c i e s ,  
c r  by a n o t h e r  government o r  by an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n .
The c o r p o r a t i o n  may in v e s t  a l l  o r  any of  i t s  money in t h e  pu rchase  
of  any s e c u r i t i e s  approved g e n e r a l l y  o r  s p e c i f i c a l l y  by t h e  M i n i s t e r  
of  F inance .
* Comments s u p p l i e d .
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The c o r p o r a t i o n  s h a l l  manage i t s  a f f a i r s  such t n a t  i t s  g e n e ra te d  
revenues  s h a l l  cover  i t s  e x p e n d i t u r e s .  (This  i s  worth n o t in g  because  
i t  was l a t e r  superceded  by and s u b o rd in a t e d  t o  job  c r e a t i o n  and main­
t e n an ce  in s p i t e  o f  u n p r o f i t a b l e  o p e r a t i o n s  t h a t  were being s u b s i d i z e d ) .
All  income, p r o p e r t y ,  and p r o f i t s  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  from w hateve r  
s o u r c e s ,  s h a l l  be ploughed back and a p p l i e d  e x c l u s i v e l y  t o  t h e  promotion 
o f  t h e  purpose of  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  and no d iv idends  a re  pa id  t o  t h e  
s h a r e h o l d e r .
The income and p r o f i t s  of  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  a re  no t  l i a b l e  t o  t a x a t i o n .
The c o r p o r a t i o n  s h a l l  no t  oe l i q u i d a t e d  exce p t  by o r  under t h e  a u t h o r i t y  
of  an a c t  of  p a r l i a m e n t .
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Appendix II
S t a t u s  o f  Compliance with Covenants  
For 2nd Line o f  C r e d i t
Covenant S t a t u s
Loans t o  inves tment  e n t e r p r i s e s  would In compliance
be made a t  an i n t e r e s t  r a t e  of  no t  l e s s
th a n  11% p . a . ,  w ith  an a d d i t i o n a l  1% p . a . ,
f e e  pa id  t o  he lp  cover  f o r e i g n  exchange
r a t e  t i s k .
Rental  cha rge s  f o r  f a c t o r y  b u i l d i n g s  w i l l  In compliance 
no t  be l e s s  than  15% per  annum of  t h e  c o s t  
of  s a id  b u i l d i n g  s u b j e c t  t o  p r i c e  
e s c a l a t i o n  p r o v i s i o n s .
LNDC s n a i l  f u r n i s h  W3 with  q u a r t e r l y  in compliance
r e p o r t s  on i t s  o p e r a t i o n s ,  f i n a n c i a l  
c o n d i t i o n  and r e s o u rc e  p o s i t i o n .
Within s i x  months fo l low ing  th e  l a s t  WB t o  f u r n i s h  LNDC with
withdrawal from C r e d i t  Line,  LNDC s h a l l  o u t l i n e  and s ugges ted
p re p a re  a r e p o r t  f o r  WB re g a rd i n g  t a b l e s  f o r  such r e p o r t ,
t h e  e x e c u t io n  and o p e r a t i o n  of  i n v e s t ­
ment p r o j e c t s .
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LNDC s h a l l  f u r n i s h  t o  WB no more than 
f o u r  months a f t e r  t h e  end of  i t s  f i s c a l  
y e a r  t h e  a u d i t e d  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  
and a u d i t o r s  r e p o r t .
In compliance,  
d e b t :  e q u i t y .
0 . 9 : 1 .
LNDC s h a l l  t a k e  such s t e p s  s a t i s f a c t o r y  
t o  WB t o  p r o t e c t  i t s e l f  a g a i n s t  f o r e i g n  
exchange r i s k .
LNDC s h a l l  f u r n i s h  d e t a i l s  of  any changes 
in th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e .
LN'DC w i l l  p rov ide  d e t a i l s  of  i n t e r n a l  
management commit tees ,  t h e i r  f u n c t i o n ,  
membership and f requency o f  m e e t in g s .
Prov ide  in fo rm a t ion  on changes,  i f  any,  
in t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  of  LNDC 
d e p a r tm e n t s ,  d i v i s i o n s  a n d /o r  s e c t i o n s .
P rov ide  WB with  a no te  on a c t i v i t i e s  of  
Inves tm ent Promotion program and t h e  
fund ing  of  inves tment program.
F urn ish  WB with  s t a t em en t  of  LNDC's medium 
te rm (3-5  y e a r s )  development s t r a t e g y .
LNDC w i l l  m a in ta in  a d e b t :  e q u i t y  r a t i o  
of  no more th an  3 :1 .
C u r re n t  
R a t io  i s
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Appendix I I I
S t r a t e g i c  Change P rocess :  The Company Focus
In t h i s  s e c t i o n  company s p e c i f i c  change d e c i s i o n s  a r e  d e s c r i b e d ;  
companies have been c l a s s i f i e d  i n t o  t h r e e  c a t e g o r i e s  ( see  f i g u r e  8 .4 )  
acco rd ing  t o  t h e  degree  of  i n t e r a c t i o n  with  t h e  h e a d q u a r t e r  -  OD, and 
t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n s  a re  dec ided  by th e  h e a d q u a r t e r .
The f i r s t  c a t e g o ry  comprises  of  companies t h a t  a re  wholly-owned by 
LNDC, in c lu d in g  ' s t r a t e g i c  co m p a n ie s ' .  There i s  c l o s e r  c o n t a c t  and 
m on i to r in g  by OD as a l r e a d y  a l l u d e d  t o ,  and OD i n v a r i a b l y  d e te rm in e s  
and d e c i d e s  with  o r  w i th o u t  company c o n s u l t a t i o n .  As most of  t h e i r  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  with  t h e i r  head o f f i c e  has been d i s c u s s e d ,  only  a b r i e f  
d e s c r i p t i o n  of  s p e c i f i c  s t r a t e g i c  changes in each of  them w i l l  be 
p r e s e n t e d .
The second c a teg o ry  of m a jo r i t y -o w n e r s h ip  involved  th o s e  companies 
where s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n s  were a s u b j e c t  of  e x p l i c i t  a n d /o r  i m p l i c i t  
c o n s u l t a t i o n s  with  company managers ,  m in o r i ty  s h a r e h o l d e r s ,  and th e  
f r a n c h i s e r s .  Again t h e s e  have been touched  upon and only s p e c i f i c  
changes w i l l  be h i g h l i g h t e d .
L a s t l y ,  t h e  r e s t  of  t h e  s e c t i o n  w i l l  be devo ted t o  t h e  change p ro c e s s  
in t h e  Lesotho Brewing Company, a ma jo r i ty-owned s u b s i d i a r y  managed 
under a 'management agreement* .  The focus  i s  e s s e n t i a l  because  o f  
i t s  un iq u e ly  high degree  of  autonomy in s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n  making and 
seemingly  no r e l a t i o n s h i p  with  head o f f i c e ;  i t  i s  a l s o  a m oney-sp inne r ,  
g e n e r a t i n g  s i n g u l a r l y  huge d iv i d e n d s  t o  LNDC, and i s  one company which 
can n e g o t i a t e  d i r e c t l y  on i t s  b e h a l f  with  t h e  government.
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F igure  8 .4
SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES Degree o f  ownership  & Management S t a t u s
Basotho Canners ) 
)
C l i f f o r d  Trading  ) 
)
Loti  Br ick  )
)
S e c u r i t y  Lesotho )
Lesotho Brewing Co
N at iona l  Motors ) 
)
Pionee r  Motors )
Loti  Br ick
Wholly-owned
Management c o n t r a c t  
Majori ty-owned
I t  was e s t a b l i s h e d  in 1980 th rough  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  of  
K r e a i t a n s t a l t  f u r t h  Weiceraufbau-KFW, a German o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  w i th  th e  
c a p i t a l  o f  DM2.5 m i l l i o n .  I t  i s  a wholly-owned LNDC s t r a t e g i c  p r o j e c t  
ie  an impor t  s u D s t i t u t i o n  p r o j e c t  t h a t  m anufac tu res  and s e l l  b r i c k s ,  
us ing  lo c a l  m a t e r i a l s .  I t  s u p p l i e d  about  70% of t h e  loc a l  market  and 
30% was made up of  SA towns b o rd e r in g  Maseru -  C a p i ta l  of  Lesotho .
Since  e s t a b l i s h m e n t ,  one of  i t s  p e r s i s t e n t  problems has been changes 
in management, from 1980 to  1983 i t  had been managed by two d i f f e r e n t  
c o n s u l t a n t  groups from South A f r i c a ,  and an i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  r e c r u i t e d  
General  Manager.  A major management change took  p l a c e  in 1983 when 
t h e  p o s i t i o n  of  General Manager was l o c a l i s e d ,  and was immediate ly  
fo l lowed  by t h e  a r r i v a l  of  a German t e c h n i c a l  a d v i s e r  - Works Manager. 
Ex tens ive  p l a n t  m odern iza t ion  was u nder ta ken  by t h e  Works Manager and 
modern d r y e r  and k i l n  were pu rchased ,  which was q u i t e  an improvement
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on th e  'open a i r '  d ry ing  system which was in u se .  By 1984, t h e  
p ro d u c t io n  had almost  doubled from a low o f  35 ,000-40 ,000  b r i c k s  p e r  
day t o  75 ,000-80 ,000  p e r  day,  and f i n a n c i a l  per formance  had s t e a d i l y  
improved as Table 8 .2  shows.
Year U ni ts  Produced 
(mi 11 ions)
P r o f i t  (Li
1981 3 .6 -
1982 6 .3 (138,000)
1983 6 .0 (251,000)
1984 9 .3 (54 ,000)
1985 9 .3 (53 ,000)
1986 11.8 52,000
P a r t i a l Sanc t ion  E f f e c t
Following t h e  1985/86 b o rd e r  c l o s u r e ,  t h e  company l o s t  i t s  SA market  
s h a r e ,  and one of  i t s  b i g g e s t  cus tomer  -  Niarosi C o n s t ru c t io n  w i th  a 
two y e a r  c o n t r a c t  of  240,000 b r i c k s  pe r  month.  That  led t o  t h e  
changes in t h e  company's pu rch as in g  p o l i c y  in 1986. Because t h e r e  
were fewer  lo c a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  -  a p a r t  from t h e  government,  who cou ld  
make l a rg e  o rd e r s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  SA cu s to m ers ,  t h e  new p o l i c y  emphasized 
' sm a l l  u n i t s  with  high t u r n o v e r ' .  The m a rke t ing  s t r a t e g y  ( th rough  word- 
of-mouth promot ion) emphasized high q u a l i t y  b r i c k s ,  given  th e  company's  
modern equipment ,  and t h e  p roduc t  range was a l s o  in c re a s e d  in o r d e r  t o  
compete b road ly  in t h e  home m arke t ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  c o n c r e t e  b r i c k s  
in t h e  l a rg e  lower income marke t .
As th e  company had made c u m u la t iv e  l o s s e s  s i n c e  i t  was e s t a b l i s h e d ,  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  were underway between t h e  government and LNDC in 1986 
t h a t  management should  be al lowed  t o  r e s t r u c t u r e  i t s  c a p i t a l  base  by
c a p i t a l i z i n g  t h e  ' l o a n  c a p i t a l '  and w r i t e  o f f  th e  l o s s e s . *  That 
r e l i e f  i t  was hoped would f r e e  t h e  company from deb t  s e r v i c i n g ,  and 
a l low  i t  t o  compete e f f e c t i v e l y  in o r d e r  t o  r e - e n t e r  t h e  l u c r a t i v e  
SA m arke t .  Fol lowing t h e  1986 coup,  t h e  g e n e ra l  manager was changed 
r a t h e r  s t r a n g e l y  by government t o  a n o th e r  SOE, and t h e  p ro d u c t io n  
manager a c ted  as g e n e ra l  manager when t h i s  r e s e a r c h  was c a r r i e d  o u t .
8FV Canners
O r i g i n ,  b u s i n e s s ,  development
The company was e s t a b l i s h e d  by M in i s t ry  of  A g r i c u l t u r e ,  th rough  t h e  
a s s i s t a n c e  o f  FAO e x p e r t ,  as  a s t r a t e g i c  cash crop p i l o t  p r o j e c t  
producing  and cann ing a spa ragus  and beans .  I t  has very c l o s e  l i n k s  
with  t h e  fa rming community who supply  i t  w ith  a l l  i t s  raw m a t e r i a l s .
I t  was t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  LNDC in 1960 in o r d e r  t o  go f u l l y - f l e t c h e d  
commercial in t h e  e x p o r t  o f  a s p a ra g u s ,  and i t s  management was immediately 
l o c a l i s e d  even though FAO has co n t in u ed  t o  p rov ide  f i n a n c i a l  and t e c h n i c a l  
e x p e r t i s e .
S e a s o n a l i t y  Smoothing
Asparagus i s  t h e  ma ins tay  p ro d u c t  of  t h e  company, and i s  c u r r e n t l y  
in high demand in u n s a t i a b l e  West Germany marke t  where i t s  q u a l i t y  
i s  r ank ing  h i g h e r .  Canned asparagus  e x p o r t s  in 1985 have been 295 
to n s  and touched  350 to n s  in 1986. But t h e  o t h e r  p roduc t  -  beans ,  
has had f i e r c e  c o m p e t i t io n  in baked beans  market  from t h e  well  en t ra nched  
South A fr ican  b ran d s ,  and th e  company has been lo s in g  money in t h i s  
p ro d u c t .  Asparagus i s  a s ea s o n a l  p roduc t  which comes once a y e a r
* S ince  e x t e r n a l  lo a n s ,  g r a n t s ,  i e  KFW, t o  LNDC a re  n e g o t i a t e d  by 
government,  which i s  t h e  g u a r a n t o r ,  government pe rm is s ion  i s  r e q u i r e d  
b e fo re  they  can be c a p i t a l i z e d  o r  w r i t t e n  o f f  as l o s s e s .
* LNDC S u b s id ia ry  Company R ep o r t s ,  1986.
beg inn ing  from September t o  December, a f t e r  which t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  
y e a r  was devo ted  t o  baking and canning  beans ,  mainly t o  cover  t h e  
ov e rh ea d s ,  keep peop le  in employment and t o  keep t h e  company l a b e l  
on t h e  s h e l v e s .  But t h a t  a f f e c t e d  t h e  a sp a rag u s  p r o f i t s ,  and 
management major t a s k  was t o  d e c id e  on:
1. Mow th e y  could  i n c r e a s e  t h e  p ro d u c t io n  of  t h e  p r o f i t a b l e  
a spa ragus  th ro u g h o u t  t h e  y e a r  such t h a t  baked beans would only  
be s h o r t - t e r m  supp lem en ta ry .  The problem a s s o c i a t e d  with  t h a t  
p ro p o s a l  was t h a t ,  be ing a s e a s o n a l  p r o d u c t ,  a sparagus  cou ld  
n o t  be expanded any f u r t h e r ,  a t  l e a s t  in  t h e  s h o r t - t e r m .  To 
change t h a t  and i n c r e a s e  t h e  volume was a long- te rm  p rocess  
t h a t  would t a k e  t h r e e  y e a r s  t o  t h e  h a r v e s t .
2.  Search f o r  a l t e r n a t i v e  p r o f i t a b l e  c rops  in o r d e r  t o  smooth t h e  
s e a s o n a l i t y  of  t h e  a sp a rag u s  and c o n t in u e  p ro d u c t io n  th ro u g h o u t
t h e  y e a r .
The l a t t e r  o p t io n  was adopted and sea rch  was resumed by v a r io u s  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s :  UJDC commissioned s t u d i e s  t o  look f o r  a l t e r n a t i v e  p ro d u c t s ,  
M in i s t ry  o f  A g r i c u l t u r e  r e s e a r c h e d  p ro d u c t s  t h a t  could  s u r v iv e  t h e  
d i f f i c u l t  c l i m a t i c  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  Lesotho - and be grown dur ing  t h e  
a sparagus  o f f - s e a s o n ,  and came up with  peaches  which come on from 
January  t o  March. But t h e  marke t  in t h a t  p roduc t  was s t i l l  h ig h ly  
c o m p e t i t i v e  in SA where t h e  company impor ted  most o f  i t s  peaches ,  
and in t h e  EEC, t h e  t a r g e t e d  e x p o r t  m arke t .  To p e n e t r a t e  t h a t  marke t ,  
p roduc t  q u a l i t y  was emphasized and i t  was p o s i t i o n e d  in t h e  market  
a t  t h e  to p  with  a premium p r i c e ;  i t  was well  r e c e iv e d  and by 1983 f u l l  
p ro d u c t io n  was resumed.
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The search  process  f o r  o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  products  con t inued ,  and in 
1984 green  beans were in t roduced  f o r  expor t  market .  S tud ie s  commissioned 
by FAO had shown t h a t  t h e r e  was a market  f o r  ' e x t r a - f i n e  f rench  b e a n s ' .
The French and Belgians  were found to  be the  b ig g e s t  consumers of  green 
beans.  Working in con junc t ion  with th e  Belgian company, th e  beans were 
grown in Lesotho while  th e  market ing  was done by th e  Be lg ian .  The 
process  has cont inued  and by 1986 more products  were being t e s t e d  inc lud ing  
th e  ' n a t u r a l  food'  market us ing  ro s e - h ip s  t h a t  grow wild in Leso tho,  
a l s o  r e a l i z i n g  t h a t  t h e r e  was a market  f o r  most p ro d u c ts ,  th e  emphasis 
had s h i f t e d  t o  growing them. As th e  diagram 8 .6  below show, th e  
s e a s o n a l i t y  problem has d r a s t i c a l l y  been changed.
Figure  8 .5
Production  Cycle A f te r  S t r a t e g i c  Search
/
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S t r u c t u r a l  Changes
As th e  incremental  produc t  l i n e s  b u i l t  up to  so lve  th e  s e a s o n a l i t y  
problem, i t  became apparen t  t h a t  the  company s t r u c t u r e  and the
3b0
p ro d u c t i o n  f a c i l i t i e s  were ou t  o f  k i l t e r  with  t h e  emerging changes 
and had t o  be reviewed t o  accommodate t h e  changes .  F i r s t ,  because 
t h e  company had a c q u i red  farms f o r  i t s  p r o d u c t s ,  f u n c t i o n a l  d i v i s i o n s  
were c r e a t e d ,  one t o  focus  on t h e  p ro d u c t io n  s i d e  o f  t h e  cannery ,  
w h i le  t h e  o t h e r  would focus  on t h e  farms in o r d e r  t o  s e c u re  raw m a t e r i a l s  
f o r  t h e  canne ry .  Perhaps more im p o r tan t  were t h e  changes in t h e  farming 
approach ,  from owning farms t o  m on i to r in g  and a s s i s t i n g  fa rmers  grow 
t h e  c o n t r a c t e d  c ro p s .  I t  was im por tan t  t h a t  t h e  fa rm ers  p ick  t h e  beans 
q u i t e  e a r l y  in t h e  morning w h i le  the y  were s t i l l  f r e s h  and s o f t ;  t h a t  
was what  cus tomers  wanted in e x t r a - f i n e  green  b e a n s . But because  
t h e  f a rm e rs  knew t h a t  t h e  Cannery would s t i l l  absorb  a l l  t h e  unwanted 
beans ,  t h e i r  e a r l y  morning p r o d u c t i v i t y  was low, l e ad in g  t o  l o s s e s .
Hence t h a t  backward i n t e g r a t i o n  approach was changed and t h e  management 
dec ided  t o  he lp  them t o  grow t h e i r  c rops  and buy from them. The 
p r e s s u r e  has been tu rn e d  on t h e  fa rm ers  t o  produce  and s e l l  what t h e  
company wants o r  bea r  t h e  lo s s  of  u n s u i t a b l e  s t o c k .  Secondly ,  t h e  
p h y s i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  had become ina dequa te  t o  hand le  t h e  growth,  and a 
p roposa l  f o r  a g r a n t  t o  b u i l d  a new p lan  was made t o  EEC th rough  t h e  
normal channe ls  i e  from t h e  Cannery —  LNDC —  Min. of  Trade —
Min. o f  P lann ing  —  EEC —  LNDC. As so o f t e n  was t h e  ca se  from 
in form al i n q u i r y  and sound-up,  EEC had i n d i c a t e d  t o  LNDC t h a t  money 
would be made a v a i l a b l e .  (The a b s u r d i t y  o f  t h i s  p ro ces s  was t h a t  
LNDC s h a re s  t h e  same o f f i c e  b u i l d i n g  and a r e  in t h e  same f l o o r  with  
EEC r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ,  but  cou ld  no t  go t o  them d i r e c t l y ) .  The new 
modern p lan  was completed in 1985 with  a c a p a c i t y  o f  2250 t o n s .
D i v e r s i f i c a t i o n
The majo r a spa ragus  marke t ,  and u n t i l  l a t e l y  t h e  on ly  market  of th e  
CAnnery, was West Germany, bu t  t h a t  i s  so a l s o  f o r  most l a r g e - s c a l e  
p ro d u c e r s .  So around 1985, management dec ided  t o  d i v e r s i f y  t h e  market
and s e l l  t o  Sweden and t h e  Benelux c o u n t r i e s ,  w hi le  s t i l l  e x p o r t i n g  
t o  Germany. These markets  a r e  small  bu t  l u c r a t i v e  and growing.  The 
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  has a l s o  led  t o  t h e  mass ive expans ion  of  t h e  fa rming  
a r e a s  in d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  o f  t h e  c o u n t ry ,  and i n c re a s e d  p ro d u c t i o n  of  
a s p a r a g u s ,  eg 60 h e c t r e s  eve ry  y e a r  from 1986 t o  1992. These changes ,  
were env isaged  would lead t o  s t e a d y  i n c r e a s e s  in s a l e s  volume t o  meet 
t h e  demand of t h e  newly e s t a b l i s h e d  m a rk e t s .  Thus,  t h e  a t t e m p t  t o  
so lv e  t h e  tv/o p roduc t  base p ro d u c t io n  p r o c e s s ,  t o  a m u l t i p l e  p r o d u c t s ,  
has been a slow, t r i a l  and e r r o r ,  e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n ,  s tudy  t o u r s ,  
commissioned market  s t u d i e s ,  t h a t  has spurned t h e  p e r io d  from 1980 
and s t i l l  con t inued  in 1986. The p ro ces s  v/as well  summed up by th e  
General  Manager when he d e s c r i b e d  how he went about  i t .
Vie have been r o l l i n g  along  based on our market  success  o f  t h e  
p r o d u c t s  we t r i e d .  We never  s a t  down and s a id  now we have g o t  
t o  develop  our p roduc t  s t r a t e g y .  You f i n d  y o u r s e l f  doing c e r t a i n  
t h i n g s ,  and you w i l l  f i n d  t h a t  t h e r e  was seldom a consc ious  e f f o r t  
t o  s i t  down and develop  t h a t  as a s t r a t e g y .  In o t h e r  words you 
p ic k  t h e  p ie c e s  from what you have been doing and say oh: t h i s  
i s  ou r  d i r e c t i o n .  As long as what you a re  doing i s  good you 
c o n t i n u e .  I r e p o r t  t o  00 about  what I have been doing and how 
I in t e n d  t o  c o n t in u e  o r  change t h a t  d i r e c t i o n .  Ask me where 
t h e  s t r a t e g y  i s  . . .  I d o n ' t  have t h e  f i l e  f o r  t h a t .
Limefford Trading
O r ig in  and b u s in e s s  of  t h e  Company
Limefford  was o r i g i n a l l y  owned by a South A f r ican  businessman who in 
h i s  o ld  age ,  s o ld  i t  t o  LNDC in 1975. I t  was acq u i red  as p a r t  o f  t h e  
s t r a t e g y  o f  s h i f t i n g  pu rch as in g  power in t o  Lesotho .  I t s  main b u s in e s s
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was t h e  supp ly  of  b u i l d i n g  m a t e r i a l s  and hardware and had d i v e r s i f i e d  
i n t o  many o t h e r  r e t a i l i n g  s e r v i c e s  with  branches  e s t a b l i s h e d  th ro u g h o u t  
t h e  c o u n t r y .
R a t i o n a l i z a t i o n
As a l r e a d y  p o in t ed  ou t  e l sew here  ( s e e  c h a p t e r  6 ) ,  t h e  1970s were a 
p e r io d  o f  h igh manager ia l  t u r n o v e r  th ro u g h o u t  LNDC and Limefford had 
a f a i r  s h a r e  of  t h o s e  t u r b u l e n t  t im es  r e s u l t i n g  in poor f i n a n c i a l  
pe r fo rmance ;  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i t  had c o n s t a n t  R0.5 m i l l i o n  o v e r d r a f t  which 
i t  s t r u g g l e d  t o  d e f r a y .  By 1980/81 OD moved in t o  r a t i o n a l i z e  th e  
b u s i n e s s ,  and a l l  t h e  branches  t h a t  had mushroomed th ro u g h o u t  t h e  
co u n t ry  were c l o s e d  down in c lu d in g  a l o t  of  o t h e r  depar tm en ts  a t  th e  
company head o f f i c e  and th e  vaca ted  o f f i c e s  were l e t  ou t  f o r  r e n t i n g .  
Following th e  r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  p r o c e s s ,  LNDC decided  t o  s e l l  t h e  company 
t o  t h e  l o c a l  b u s in e s s  g roup ,  as p a r t  o f  i t s  d i v e s t i t u r e  s t r a t e g y ,  bu t  
t h e  c a b i n e t  d i sapproved  th e  s a l e  and so th e  problems c o n t in u e d .
More changes were i n s t i g a t e d  by OD in 1984, when t h e  General  Manager 
was changed and former  O pera t ions  D iv i s io n  acc o u n ta n t  who used to  
moni to r  t h e  same company took over  as t h e  General  Manager. F a m i l i a r i t y  
with  t h e  company problems was h i s  main a s s e t .  He immediate ly  changed 
t h e  p u rc h a s in g  p o l i c y  of  t h e  company which was locked in th e  one 
s u p p l i e r ,  and broadened t h e  supply  s o u rc e .  Given t h e  r e c e s s i o n  in 
t h i s  i n d u s t r y  in SA - t h e  only  s u p p l i e r  of  t h e s e  p r o d u c t s ,  t h e  changes 
in p u rch as in g  p o l i c y  proved a success  as s u p p l i e r s  competed f o r  b e t t e r  
c r e d i t  te rm s  in t h e  squeez ing  i n d u s t r y .
The company he ld  some m i n o r i ty  s h a re s  in Lesotho S t e e l ,  a h ig h ly  
p r o f i t a b l e  s t e e l  company. In an e f f o r t  t o  boos t  h i s  cash f low ,  t h e
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General  Manager wanted t o  s e l l  them (bought s i x  y e a r s  ago a t  R12,500,  
the y  were valued  a t  approx im ate ly  R120,000).  The company board had 
agreed  bu t  r e f e r r e d  t h e  f i n a l  d e c i s i o n  t o  LNDC, and a f t e r  a y e a r  of  
c o n s t a n t  p r e s s u r e  from t h e  manager,  OD f i n a l l y  approved t h e  s a l e .
As t h e  General  Manager e x p l a i n e d ,  t h e r e  were two competing b u y e r s ,  
one w i th  a h ig h e r  b id  and recommended by t h e  company Board,  and th e  
o t h e r  w i th  a lower b id  and recommended by t h e  HQ. The l a t t e r  g o t  t h e  
HQ approva l  on what was d e s c r i b e d  as a p o l i t i c a l  d e c i s i o n ,  l e a d in g  t o  
some Board members r e s i g n i n g .  By 1985/86 t h e  performance of  t h e  
company had d r a s t i c a l l y  changed t o  R290,000 p r o f i t  in 1986 from R130,000 
in  1985 and t h e  d iv idend  payout o f  R70,000.  I t  i s  worth n o t in g  t h a t  
t h i s  i s  one of  t h e  companies t h a t  LNDC would p r e f e r  t o  s e l l ,  i t  no 
lo n g e r  s e rv e s  th e  purpose i t  was in tended  f o r ,  bu t  because of  p o l i t i c a l  
u n c e r t a i n t y  of  whe ther  th e  s a l e  w i l l  meet government a p p ro v a l ,  t h e y  
a r e  s tu c k  wi th i t  w h i le  c o n t in u in g  t o  r a i s e  t n e  need f o r  d i v e s t i t u r e  
t o  C a b in e t .  But th e  more p r o f i t a b l e  t h e  company becomes,  t h e  l e s s o r  
t h e  p r e s s u r e  f o r  d i v e s t i t u r e ,  and t h e  more p o l i t i c a l l y  s e n s i t i v e  t h e  
s a l e  becomes as th e  Cabine t  would c l o s e l y  s c r u t i n i z e  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  
b u y e r s .
S e c u r i t y  Lesotho Ltd 
O r ig in ,  S e r v i c e s ,  Development
The idea  of  p ro v id in g  i n d u s t r i a l  s e c u r i t y  s e r v i c e s  was s t a r t e d  as f a r  
back as du r ing  Van Gen 's  p e r i o d ,  bu t  no f i rm  a c t i o n  was taken  u n t i l  
l a t e  in 1982 when LNDC e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  company th rough  a management 
agreement with  S e c u r i t a s  o f  South A f r i c a :  t o  p rov ide  a guard s e r v i c e  
t o  i n d u s t r i a l  and p r i v a t e  c l i e n t s ,  and o t h e r  s p e c i a l  s e c u r i t y  s e r v i c e s .
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Management was t o  be provided  by S e c u r i t a s ,  one of  South A f r i c a ' s  
le a d in g  s e c u r i t y  e x p e r t s ;  however, th ey  s e n t  j u n i o r  in e x p e r ie n c e d  s t a f f  
t o  LNDC, an u n a c c e p ta b l e  d e c i s i o n  f o r  LNDC which had hoped t o  g e t  s e a s ­
oned s e n i o r  s t a f f .
Between 1983 and 1985, t h e  company had changed t h r e e  managers,  a l l  
p rov ided  by S e c u r i t a s  w i thou t  much improvement in t h e  per formance ,  
p r o f i t a b i l i t y  w is e .  LNDC made an o f f e r  in 1985 of  50% s h a re s  in t h e  
company t o  i n c r e a s e  commitment by S e c u r i t a s  t o  g e n e r a t e  p r o f i t s .  That 
o f f e r  was s u r p r i s i n g l y  d e c l in e d  on t h e  b a s i s  t h a t  i t  would be d i f f i c u l t  
t o  manage t h e  company competent ly  from Johannesburg -  SA. S ubsequen t ly ,  
i t  was m u tua l ly  agreed  by t h e  two p a r t i e s  t h a t  S e c u r i t a s  should  withdraw 
i t s  s e r v i c e s ,  and a lo c a l  General  Manager and fo rmer  d i r e c t o r  o f  t h e  
company was a p p o i n t e d .  A f t e r  th e  t e r m i n a t i o n  of  t h e  Management c o n t r a c t ,  
t h e  company name was changed t o  S e c u r i t y  Lesotho.
F in a n c i a l  R e s t r u c t u r i n g
S e c u r i t y  Lesotho had been o p e r a t in g  a t  a l o s s  s in c e  i t  was e s t a b l i s h e d ,  a 
r a t h e r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f e a t u r e  of  most LNDC s u b s i d i a r i e s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  
t h e  company was d e c l a r e d  t e c h n i c a l l y  i n s o l v e n t  in 1986, wi th accumulated 
l o s s e s  of  R277,000.  The 'Task Force '  moved in t o  l i t e r a l l y  manage th e  
company a f t e r  i t  was l o c a l i s e d .  A s i x  months b u s in e s s  p lan  was p repared  
and implemented by t h e  ' f o r c e '  team. I t  recommended t h a t :
1. LNDC loans  -  amounting t o  R3Ci0,000, be c a p i t a l i z e d  and conve r ted  
i n t o  a 5% cum ula t ive  redeemable p r e f e r e n c e  s h a re s  in o r d e r  t o  
r e l i e v e  t h e  i n t e r e s t  burden and launch t h e  company on a f r e s h  
f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n .
2.  F u r t h e r  in ves tm en t  - R132,000,  be i n j e c t e d  t o  c l e a r  a l l  t h e  bank 
o v e r d r a f t s  in o r d e r  to  p rov ide  a p o s i t i v e  working c a p i t a l .
The c a p i t a l  i n j e c t i o n  was fo l lowed  by changes in personne l  p o l i c i e s .  
Pens ions  schemes, medica l  a id  and compulsory sav ings  were in t roduced  
t o  combat t h e  c o s t l y  high tu r n o v e r  of  g u a rd s .  Improving t h e  image 
of  t h e  company was a l s o  im por tan t  f o r  i t s  c l i e n t s  as  well  as making 
i t  a v i a b l e  c a r e e r .  S t r o n g e r  l i n k s  with  Lesotho P o l i c e  Force and t h e  
rank ing  of  guards  in s i m i l a r  p o l i c e  f a s h i o n ,  g r a d u a l l y  improved t h e  
q u a l i t y  of  r e c r u i t s .  The s t ro n g  t i e s  w ith  t h e  p o l i c e  f o r c e  were 
f o s t e r e d  by t h e  new g e n e ra l  manager; a fo rmer  p o l i c e  s u p e r i n t e n d e n t ,  
he emphasized t h a t  ' q u a l i t y  s e r v i c e '  was h i s  main c o m p e t i t iv e  weapon 
based upon t h i s  ph i lo sophy  t h a t  s e c u r i t y  s e r v i c e s  a re  a f u n c t i o n  of  
' q u i c k  a c t i o n ,  f o l l o w - u p ,  and f e e d b a c k ' .  Judged by i t s  f i n a n c i a l  
per formance and t h e  employment c r e a t e d ,  t h e r e  was a s i g n i f i c a n t  
change in perform ance  r e s u l t i n g  in R48,000 n e t  p r o f i t  (u n au d i t ed )  in 
t h e  1986/87 f i n a n c i a l  y e a r ,  and a r i s e  in t h e  number of  guards  from 
70 in 1S85 t o  164 in 1986*. The i n d u s t r i a l  s e c u r i t y  market  i s  a l s o  
expanding as t h e  c o u n t ry  d e v e lo p s ,  t h e r e  i s  more con f idence  in t h e  
company's competence and t h e  upward t r e n d  of  cr ime in Maseru.
The Motor V eh ic le  F r a n c h i s e
The two motor v e h i c l e  companies -  Maseru Motors and P ionee r  Motors, 
were t h e  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  t a k e - o v e r  by LNDC and Lesotho Bank of  SA d e a l s  
in t h e  e a r l y  1970s, as  p a r t  o f  LNDC s t r a t e g y  t o  g e n e r a t e  economic a c t ­
i v i t y  and l o c a l i s e  e x p e n d i tu r e  in t h e  c o u n t ry .  LNDC holds  51% e q u i ty  
in each of  them w h i le  Lesotho Bank ho lds  49%. While o p e r a t i n g  under 
d i f f e r e n t  f r a n c h i s e  ag reem en ts ,  the y  b a s i c a l l y  p rov ide  t h e  same s e r v i c e s ,  
ie  marke ting  new v e h i c l e s  and p ro v id in g  garage  s e r v i c e s .
* This needs t o  be i n t e r p r e t e d  in t h e  c o n t e x t  of  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
r e s t r u c t u r i n g  which e f f e c t i v e l y  c l e a r e d  a l l  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  o b s t a c l e s  
f o r  t h e  new manager.
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Maseru Motors Ltd
A f t e r  t h e  t a k e - o v e r  in 1973, Maseru Motors had remained under i t s  former  
SA management u n t i l  1977 when a lo c a l  g e n e ra l  manager was a p p o i n t e d .
Apar t  from t h e  g e n e r a l  manager ia l  upheaval  t h a t  engu l fed  LNDC in t h e  
1970s, t h e  company i s  perhaps  t h e  only  one t h a t  has r e t a i n e d  i t s  l e a d e r ­
s h ip  ev e r  s i n c e  i t  was l o c a l i s e d ,  and en joys  r e l a t i v e  autonomy on i t s  
d e c i s i o n  making.
In t h e  t e c h n i c a l  i n d u s t r y  such as t h i s ,  t h e r e  was lack  of  lo c a l  t e c h n i c i a n s  
a f t e r  SA management p u l l e d  o u t ,  and th rough  b i l a t e r a l  agreement betv/een 
LNDC, government and t h e  government o f  West Germany, a team of  German 
t e c h n i c i a n s  were seconded t o  Maseru Motors t o  s u p e r v i s e  and t r a i n  t h e  
lo c a l  s t a f f  w h i l e  some went f o r  ex tended s t u d i e s  in West Germany, fo l lowed  
by p lacement in t h e  VW and Mercedes Benz f a c t o r i e s  with  whom t h e  company 
ho lds  f r a n c h i s e  in SA.
The Market o f  t h e  Company
Under t h e  f r a n c h i s e  agreement by both t h e  Mercedes Benz and VW, t h e  
company i s  co n f in e d  e x c l u s i v e l y  t o  market  t h e  p ro d u c t s ,  i e  new v e h i c l e s  
and p a r t s ,  o f  t h e  two f r a n c h i s e r s  who a l s o  do t h e  promotion of  t h e  
p ro d u c t  and t h e  a a v e r t i s i n g .  A f t e r  p r o t r a c t e d  n e g o t i a t i o n s  wi th  t h e  
f r a n c h i s e r s  i t  was f i n a l l y  agreed t h a t  th e  two p ro d u c ts  and p a r t s  could  
be marketed under  t h e  same p rem is es .  Because of  t h a t  j o i n t - f r a n c h i s e  
s t r a t e g y ,  Maseru Motors was a b l e  t o  segment i t s  p ro d u c t  o f f e r  a c r o s s  
t h e  w ider  spec trum of  t h e  market  with  Mercedes on t h e  to p  luxury  m arke t ,  
and VW competed in t h e  midd le  and lower segments o f  t h e  market  w i th  
t h e  market  l e a d e r  - Toyota SA.
The s t r a t e g y  was f u r t h e r  boos ted  by t h e  government ' p o l i c y '  in 1979/80
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whereby a l l  m i n i s t e r s  were g iven  ' f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e '  t o  buy s p e c ­
i f i c a l l y  Mercedes c a r s .  That en t re n ch ed  t h e  company's  marke t  s h a re  
in t h e  e x e c u t i v e  segment in Leso tho .  O vera l l  t h e  government has been 
t h e  b i g g e s t  cash  cus tomer ;  e s p e c i a l l y  because  a p a r t  from t h e  government 
m i n i s t r i e s  p u rc h a s e s ,  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  cou ld  only  buy from t h e  lo c a l  
d e a l e r s  under t h e  government ' c a r  advance '  scheme.
Following t h e  1986 Coup, t h e  new government c o a l i t i o n  has swi tched  t o  
Toyota,  and a l l  government depar tm en t s  have fo l lowed  s u i t .  That  sudden 
change o f  a long e s t a b l i s h e d  major  cash cus tomer  took  p l a c e  in t h e  
m ids t  of  management concern about  o t h e r  macro c o m p e t i t i v e  changes ;
1. Because t h e r e  i s  only one h i r e  pu rchase  f a c i l i t y  in t h e  whole 
co u n t ry  (owned by Lesotho Bank which i n s i s t  on people  buying l o c a l )  
most SA HP companies have r e c e n t l y  opened up t h e i r  c r e d i t  f a c i l i t i e s  
with  a t t r a c t i v e  te rm s ,  t o  Lesotho c i t i z e n s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e  a c a r  loan 
from Lesotho HP was payab le  w i th i n  24 months,  w h i le  in SA was
42 months.
2.  Local banks and t h e  HP company do not  f i n a n c e  second-hand v e h i c l e s ,  
nor would Maseru Motors a c c e p t  a ' t r a d e - i n '  as p a r t  o f  p u rc h a s e .
I t  cannot  even g e t  i n t o  second-hand market  because  t h e  f r a n c h i s e  
exc ludes  i t .  Hence i t  c anno t  compete.
3. There has been u n s u c c e s s fu l  'buy Leso tho '  d r i v e  by LNDC in an e f f o r t  
t o  pe rsuade  cus tomers  t o  s u p p o r t  lo c a l  i n d u s t r i e s .  There would 
seem t o  be some cus tomer  a t t i t u d e s  and b i a i s e s  in f a v o u r  of  SA 
p ro d u c ts  and s e r v i c e s  t h a t  were b e l i e v e d  t o  be of  h ig h e r  q u a l i t y  
th an  lo c a l  ones .  Such peop le  buy e x c l u s i v e l y  in SA.
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The r e s u l t  has been a g radua l  s h i f t  of  an a l r e a d y  small  market  of  
Lesotho cus tomers  t o  SA, b e n e f i t i n g  from HP f a c i l i t i e s  t o  buy both 
new and second hand v e h i c l e s  t h e r e ,  and merely s e r v i c e  them with  Maseru 
Motors.  These changes have r e s u s c i t a t e d  t h e  d i v e s t i t u r e  d i s c u s s i o n s  
which as e a r l i e r  p o in t e d  o u t  tended  t o  l a p se  whenever t h e  companies 
were p r o f i t a b l e  as Maseru Motors was.
Table 8 .3  
O pera t ing  P r o f i t
1982 1983 1984 1985 1985
R160.000 139,000 130,000 72,000 109,000
P ionee r  Motors Ltd
P io n ee r  Motors ho lds  a f r a n c h i s e  d e a l e r s h i p  with  Toyota SA which s u p p l i e s  
i t  w ith  a wide range of  Toyota models l i k e  Toyota C o r o l l a ,  C re s s id a  and 
Hi lux in c lu d in g  p a r t s .  I t  i s  t h e  market  l e a d e r  in Lesotho in t h e  middle 
amd lower segments of  t h e  market  where i t  ho lds  65% s h a re  of t h e  m arke t ,  
mainly due t o  i t s  lower p r i c e s  compared t o  i t s  c o m p e t i t o r s  VW, Mercedes,  
Mazda and Ford .  Because t h e  consumer i n f l u e n c e s  and changes in l i f e  
s t y l e s  in SA te n d  t o  c a r r y  over  i n t o  Lesotho,  t h e  p ro d u c t ,  promot ion ,  
a d v e r t i s i n g  and t e c h n i c a l  t r a i n i n g  were p rov ided  by t h e  f r a n c h i s o r  
under t h e  ' poo l  arrangement* whereby t h e  d e a l e r s  c o n t r i b u t e d  some f ix e d  
amount p e r  y e a r .
Market Changes: R e i n t e r p r e t i n g  t h e  F ra n c h i s e
The change o f  government in 1986 and i t s  immediate swi tch  t o  Toyota 
v e h i c l e s  t r i g g e r e d  g r e a t e r  e x p e c t a t i o n s  o f  i n c re a s e d  s a l e s  volume f o r  
P io n e e r .  However, i n s t e a d  o f  p u rchas ing  from P ionee r  Motors,  t h e
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government made a s p e c i a l  bulk o r d e r  d i r e c t  t o  Toyota in SA. That  
immediate ly  sparked  o f f  a row between Toyota and P io n e e r ,  no t  t o  mention 
LNDC's embarrassment  a t  t h e  government a c t i o n .  P ionee r  management had 
c o n t e s t e d  t h a t  t h e i r  f r a n c h i s o r  was i n t e r f e r i n g  in t h e i r  'T rade  Area '  
b u s i n e s s .  Under t h e  f r a n c h i s e  agreement,  Toyota had t h e  s o l e  r i g h t  
t o  make s a l e s  o f  i t s  p ro d u c ts  f o r  use in t h e  Trade Area,  t o  government 
of  Republic o f  South A f r i c a ,  p r o v i n c i a l  c o u n c i l s  o r  any d e p a r tm e n t s ,  
l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  w i th o u t  paying any commission t o  t h e  d e a l e r  on such 
s a l e s .  But as  p o in t e d  o u t ,  government i s  t h e  b i g g e s t  cus tomer  in 
Lesotho ,  and t h e  agreement was based on c o n d i t i o n s  in SA which d id  no t  
p r e v a i l  in Leso tho .  That led t o  t h e  changes in t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  
ag reement.  Toyota co n t in u ed  t o  supply  t h e  government d i r e c t l y  bu t  
ag reed  to  pay P io n e e r  commission f o r  every  u n i t  so ld  in Lesotho Trade 
Area.
P io n ee r  could  be d e s c r ib e d  as t y p i c a l  LNDC p ro b le m a t i c  company. One 
c o n s t a n t  change phenomenon with  i t  was th e  high t u r n o v e r  of  managers ,  
i t  had no l e s s  th a n  8 d i f f e r e n t  managers from 1972 to  1986, e x c lu d in g  
o cca s io n s  when i t  had t o  be managed by OD s t a f f .  I t  was lo s in g  money 
(accumulated l o s s e s  from 1979-83 amounted t o  R155,000) t h e r e  was high 
r a t e  of  c a r  t h e f t  and cus tomer  co n f id e n ce  was low, which led t o  most 
o f  i t s  cus tomers  t a k i n g  t h e i r  b u s in e s s  a c ro s s  t h e  bo rde r  t o  SA.
Given t h e  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  of  t h e  s e r v i c e s ,  Toyota had th r e a t e n e d  to  
withdraw t h e  f r a n c h i s e  l i c e n s e ,  a p r e s s u r e  which seemed t o  have s p u r red  
LNDC i n t o  a c t i o n .  In 1984 a major r e s t r u c t u r i n g  was launched by OD, 
beg inn ing  with  t h e  change o f  General  Manager. For t h e  f i r s t  t im e ,
OD in c o n s u l t a t i o n  with  Lesotho Bank, succeeded t o  a t t r a c t  an e x p e r ­
ienced and s k i l l e d  General  Manager who immediately in t roduced  sweeping 
changes,  such as  d i s m i s s a l  of  h a l f  t h e  workshop s t a f f ,  in an e f f o r t  
t o  improve t h e  image of  th e  company. Communication w i th in  t h e  v a r io u s  
s e c t i o n s  o f  t h e  company was improved,  management team e s t a b l i s h e d
compromised of  t h e  GM and h i s  l i n e  managers,  who began t o  t a k e  a c t i v e  
r o l e  in o p e r a t i o n a l  d e c i s i o n s ,  a r a t h e r  new and app rehe ns ive  e x p e r i e n c e  
f o r  most of  them as t h e  GM e x p l a in e d :
I s t a r t e d  by having  r e g u l a r  b r i e f i n g  meetings  wi th  them. But t o  
my s u r p r i s e  I found t h a t  they  were looking  a t  me with  s t e r n  f a c e s  - 
somewhat f r o z e n .  They w o u ld n ' t  say a t h i n g ,  j u s t  l i s t e n  and go.
The c r u c i a l  m is take  t h a t  used t o  happen he re  was t h a t  t h e  manager 
used t o  t a k e  p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n s  with  t h e  h e a d q u a r t e r s  w i th o u t  any 
d i s c u s s i o n  with  t h e  l i n e  managers .  They were always t o l d  what 
t o  do.  They d i d n ' t  c o n s i d e r  them se lves  involved  in t h e  running  
o f  t h i s  company, o r  as p a r t  o f  management. They were merely 
r e c i p i e n t s  o f  d e c i s i o n s  de te rmined  by t h e i r  manager and HQ, and 
f i n a l l y  dumped on them. Some o f  them were a t  a complete lo s s  
in t h e  mee tings  when I asked t h e i r  views on what they  th o u g h t  
t h e  company should  do.  But w i th  t i m e ,  they  s t a r t e d  t o  u n f r e e z e ,  
and t a l k  about  i s s u e s  in t h e i r  s e c t i o n s .
More c a p i t a l  e x p e n d i tu r e  was a u t h o r i z e d  t o  modernize t h e  v/orkshop and 
a new showroom was opened in 1985, a l l  o f  which met t h e  f r a n c h i s e  te rms 
t h a t  adequa te  in v e n to ry  and f a c i l i t i e s  were of  prime impor tance in th e  
s u c c e s s f u l  p r e s e n t a t i o n  of  Toyota p ro d u c t s  in t h e  Trade Area.
While by 1986 n e t  income was high -  R104,000 and d iv idend  was pa id  out  
t o  LNDC and Lesotho Bank, l i k e  Maseru Motors and Limefford T rad ing ,  
P ionee r  remains  high on t h e  d i v e s t i t u r e  l i s t  and o f f e r s  have been 
made, but  t h a t  d e c i s i o n  i s  t h e  p r e s e r v e  o f  t h e  government which i s  
even more complex now under  t h e  new government s t r u c t u r e .  The King 
i s  ve s ted  w i th  e x e c u t iv e  and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  powers,  he i s  a s s i s t e d  in 
t h e  e x e c u t io n  o f  h i s  d u t i e s  by t h e  M i l i t a r y  Council  and t h e  Council
of  M i n i s t e r s .  With t h i s  d i s p e r s i o n  of  a u t h o r i t y  i t  i s  not  c l e a r  where 
t h e  a c t u a l  s e a t  of  power i s ,  and d i r e c t i v e s  t end  t o  f low from a l l  
t h r e e  a l l i a n c e s  in d i f f e r e n t  d i r e c t i o n s .
Lesotho  Brewing Co
O r i g i n ,  B us iness  and O rg a n iz a t io n
Trading  as Maluti  Mountain Brewer ie s  -  MMB, i t  was e s t a b l i s h e d  by LNDC 
in 1982 as p a r t  of  i t s  s t r a t e g y  to  i n v e s t  in revenue  g e n e r a t i n g  p r o j e c t s  
t h a t  would c r e a t e  i n t e r n a l  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  r e s o u rc e s  and reduce  dependence 
on u n r e l i a b l e  government loans  and s u b v e n t io n s .  I t  manufac tu res  and 
im por ts  b e e r  under f r a n c h i s e  l i c e n c e  from South AFrican Brewer ie s  - 
SAB, and v a r io u s  s o f t  d r in k s  from Coca-Cola and S p a r l e t t a  in SA.
LNDC holds  51% of  t h e  e q u i t y ,  39% by Gerbe (which owns SAB) and 10% 
by t h e  Commonwealth Development C o rp o ra t io n ,  and th e s e  s h a r e h o ld e r s  
a p p o in t  t h e  board of  d i r e c t o r s ,  no t  O pera t ion  D iv i s io n s  in LNDC as 
was t h e  c a s e  w i th  th e  r e s t  o f  t h e  s u b s i d i a r i e s .
Because o f  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  and manager ia l  e x p e r t i s e  t h a t  SAB has in th e  
b e e r  b u s in e s s  and due t o  lack  of  lo c a l  competence in t h i s  type  of  
b u s i n e s s ,  LNDC e n t e r e d  in t o  'Management C o n t r a c t '  w ith  SAB t o  p rov ide  
t h e  e x p e r t i s e  and manage t h e  company.
Growth and Expansion
P r i o r  t o  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  MMB t h e  s o le  im por te r  and d i s t r i b u t o r  
•of b e e r  was Liquor Commission, a government run agency;  and with  t h e  
launch ing  o f  MM3, bee r  was s t i l l  so ld  through Liquor Commission - LC. 
Thus MMB's e n t i r e  manufac tu red  s to c k  of  bee r  was so ld  t o  LC a t  
' f a c t o r y  p r i c e '  which in t u r n  s o ld  i t  t o  a l l  t h e  l i c e n s e d  d e a l e r s
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th ro u g h o u t  t h e  c oun t ry  and c o l l e c t e d  t h e  levy f o r  t h e  t r e a s u r y .  At 
t h i s  s t a g e  t h e  company was more p ro d u c t io n  o r i e n t e d ,  p u t t i n g  l e s s  
emphasis on q u a l i t y  t o  cope up wi th  t h e  high demand o f  t h e  monopoly 
o f  being t h e  on ly  b e e r  m a n u fa c tu re r  in t h e  whole c o u n t ry .  The e s t a b l i s h ­
ment o f  LC was fo l low ed  by laws which p r o h i b i t e d  im p o r ta t io n  o f  any 
be e r  i n t o  t h e  c o u n t ry .  But Liquor Commission d id  not  l a s t  long under 
government t u t e l a g e ,  i t  was r i d d l e d  with  c o r r u p t i o n  and mismanagement 
and t h e  government c lo se d  i t  down and t r a n s f e r r e d  i t s  o p e r a t i o n s  t o  
MMB in c lu d in g  t h e  c o l l e c t i o n  of  l evy .
That  unexpec ted  a d d i t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  led t o  th e  
c r e a t i o n  o f  Liquor  D i s t r i b u t o r s  - LD, a wholly-owned s u b s i d i a r y  of  MMB, 
bu t  o p e r a t i n g  e s s e n t i a l l y  as a d i v i s i o n  w i th i n  MMB, t o  r e p l a c e  Liquor 
Commission. As t h e  government t h r u s t  t h e s e  new r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  MMB 
had j u s t  i n c re a s e d  i t s  p roduc t  range by both  wines and s p i r i t s  - a 
r e s u l t  o f  hard n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i th  government s e n s i t i v e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
r a m i f i c a t i o n s  o f  l i q u o r  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  in a c o u n t ry  where r e l i g i o u s  
>groups a r e  very  i n f l u e n t i a l .  So, i n i t i a l l y  LD focused  on improving 
t h e i r  s k i l l s  on t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e s e  two p ro d u c t s  as th e y  were 
a new b u s in e s s  t o  th e  company. The Group General  Manager d e s c r ib e d  
Ihow he coped wi th  t h a t  sudden change:
G ra d u a l ly ,  ove r  a pe r io d  o f  a y e a r ,  we moved t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
f o r  s e l l i n g  and d i s t r i b u t i n g  b e e r  o u t  o f  t h e  Brewing Company 
(MMB) t o  them (LD), then  we moved in s o f t  d r i n k s  s a l e s  and 
d i s t r i b u t i o n .  We v/anted t o  g e t  a l l  t h e  p r o d u c t s ,  t h e  supply  
s i d e  i n t o  LD. But as v/e went along v/e became aware o f  o t h e r  
t h i n g s  t h a t  needed t o  be improved.
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So a f t e r  t h i s  g radua l  b u i l d - u p  of  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  MMB became p u r e ly  
a m a n u fa c tu r e r  and LD a warehousing  and d i s t r i b u t i o n  o p e r a t i o n  f o r  a l l  
p r o d u c t s .
MMB1s o r i g i n a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  s t r a t e g y  was on t h e  c a l l - a n d - c o l l e c t  b a s i s ,  
t h e  cus tomers  from a l l  over  t h e  coun t ry  had t o  come t o  t h e  brewery t o  
g e t  t h e i r  s u p p l i e s ,  bu t  fo l l o w in g  t h e  c r e a t i o n  of  LD in 1984, d i s t r i b ­
u t i o n  depo t s  were developed in v a r io u s  p a r t s  of  th e  c o u n t ry ,  s t i l l  
o p e r a t i n g  on t h e  c a l 1 - a n d - c o l l e c t ,  however on a much more a c c e s s i b l e  
b a s i s .  This  was a p e r io d  o f  growth in s a l e s  volume as w e l l ,  and t h e  
f i r s t  y e a r  o f  d iv id e n d s  p a y -o u t .  See Taole 8 .4  below.
Turnover  ( 1 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0 ) Net P r o f i t  (L o s s ) Dividend Paid
1982 1.4 (137 ,000)
1983 9 .7  (1 ,200 ,000)
1984 17.6  964,000
1985 19.1 2 ,234 ,000  1,000,000
1986 24 .2  3 ,903 ,000  2 ,730 ,000
S ource :  LNDC: S u b s i d i a r y  F in a n c i a l  Records
The o ld  s t r u c t u r e  which was based on o v e r s ee in g  th e  o p e r a t i o n s  of  MMB 
co u ld  no lo n g e r  cope with t h e  expans ions  and s t r u c t u r a l  s egm en ta t ion  
was u nde r ta ken  in 1985. Within each o f  t h e  two d i v i s i o n s  MM3 and LD, 
s p e c i a l i s e d  semi-autonomous management teams were c r e a t e d .  The brewery 
had a General  Manager and h i s  s t a f f  of  P roduc t ion  Manager, Finance 
Manager,  Personne l  and Marketing Managers,  w hile  LD had i t s  General  
Manager, t h e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  Manager, P e r s o n n e l ,  F inance and S a le s  Manager; 
a t  t h e  same t im e  a head o f f i c e  s t r u c t u r e  headed by t h e  Group General  
Manager was c r e a t e d .
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MMB1s marke t ing  ph i lo sophy  draws h e a v i l y ,  i f  no t  a c t u a l l y  based on 
SAB's t o  'p r o v id e  t h e  cus tom er  wi th  t h e  wide range  o f  q u a l i t y  b ee r  
and t h e  b e s t  p r i c e 1. Having i n t e g r a t e d  i t s  p ro d u c t io n  and d i s t r i b u t i o n  
systems v e r t i c a l l y  and h o r i z o n t a l l y  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  became 
nex t  im por tan t  f a c t o r .  Two major f a c t o r s  led t o  t h e  immediate focus  
on t h e  q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l .
1. Beer brand p r e f e r e n c e s  in SA te nded  t o  s p i l l o v e r  in t o  Lesotho,
SAB d id  a l o t  of  brand a d v e r t i s i n g  and t h a t  had an enormous i n f l u e n c e  
on what happened t o  MMB in te rms of  le ve l  and q u a l i t y  o f f e r e d  t o  
match t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n s .
2.  The 150,000 + miners  v/ho d r in k  on t h a t  s i d e  of  t h e  bo rde r  tended  
t o  look f o r  t h e  same brands  when th e y  came home on weekends, and 
were comparing t h e  q u a l i t y .  Thus o f f e r i n g  t h e  b e s t  s e l l i n g  brands  
o f  t h e  same q u a l i t y  as in SA was c r u c i a l ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  dur ing  t h e  
e a r l y  y e a r s  of  i t s  o p e r a t i o n s  when t h e r e  was g en e ra l  c r i t i c i s m
of  MMB b ee r  to  a p o i n t  where i t  was p r e s e n te d  as SAB.
Q u a l i ty  c o n t r o l  changes were fo l low ed  by changes in t h e  p roduc t  
p ackag ing ,  from cans t o  750 ml r e t u r n a b l e  b o t t l e s  which reduced th e  
p r i c e s  d r a m a t i c a l l y  t o  t h e  cus tom er .  By 1S84 and 1985, i t  won t h e  
awards f o r  t h e  b e s t  q u a l i t y  b e e r  from SAB, and with  t h e  con f ide nce  
b o l s t e r e d ,  t h e  p roduc ts  were g r a d u a l l y  marketed as MMB, and made 
in Leso tho .
Management was however b o th e re d  t h a t  t h e  c l o s e  c o l l a b o r a t i o n  between 
MMB and SAB and o t h e r  b o t t l i n g  companies in SA, had c r e a t e d  an image 
of  be ing  a f o r e i g n  company t o  t h e  l o c a l  community. That  p e r c e p t io n  
had t o  be changed and i t  led  t o  an a g g r e s s i v e  promotion t o  g e n e ra te
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h ig h e r  awareness o f  i t s  a c t i v i t i e s ,  and h i g h l i g h t i n g  i t s  l o c a l i s a t i o n  
and employment r e c o rd  which was t h e  h i g h e s t  in t h e  coun t ry  o u t s i d e  
government.  S po r t s  s p o n s o r s h ip ,  brewery t o u r s  and community p r o j e c t s  
were a l l  launched t o  b u i l d  t h a t  lo c a l  image and acc ep tanc e  as th e  
Lesotho company.
Competi t ion  and L e g i s l a t i v e  Hurdles
The marke t ing  mix changes  d id  no t  a ch i e v e  t h e  s a l e s  volume t h a t  management 
had e x p e c te d ,  much as t h e  t r e n d  was s t i l l  up, because  of  l e g i s l a t i v e  
problems t h a t  management had been n e g o t i a t i n g  u n s u c c e s s f u l l y  with  
government.  The government cha rge s  4% levy on bee r  and l i q u o r  so ld  
t o  t h e  h o t e l s ,  which i s  c o l l e c t e d  a t  t h e  p o in t  o f  purchase  by t h e  brewery .  
The Group g en e ra l  manager had been n e g o t i a t i n g  with  t h e  M i n i s t e r s  of  
Trade and Finance  t o  have t h e  levy t r a n s f e r r e d  e l sew here  w i th in  govern ­
ment a g e n c i e s ,  mainly  Decause t h a t  had made MMB1s c o s t  of  b ee r  48% more 
expens ive  than  i t  was in SA; bu t  d u r in g  th e  p rocess  a new government 
came t o  power and t h e  i s s u e  seemed t o  have taken  back s e a t .  Given 
th e  f r e e  f low of  goods between Lesotho and SA, bee r  snuggl ing  in t o  
Lesotho had r i s e n  as d e a l e r s  could  g e t  i t  chea pe r  from SA and s e l l  
p r o f i t a b l y  in Lesotho ,  th u s  u n d e r c u t t i n g  MMB's market  s h a r e .
There were l e g i s l a t i v e  problems as wel l  on t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n .  There 
were laws en fo rced  th rough  l i c e n s i n g ,  which s t i p u l a t e d  which o r g a n i z ­
a t i o n s ,  groups  e t c .  cou ld  p u rchase  d i r e c t l y  from t h e  brewery ,  t h e  r e s t  
of  th e  p u b l i c  bought t h e i r  s u p p l i e s  from t h e  b o t t l e  s t o r e s  -  ' o f f -  
s a l e s '  owned by h o t e l i e r s .  But most o f  th e  ' o f f - s a l e s '  were c o n c e n t r a ­
te d  in t h e  c i t y  and i n a c c e s s i b l e  t o  m a j o r i t y  o f  people in r u r a l  a r e a s .  
Shebeens,  o s t e n s i b l y  i l l e g a l ,  had deve loped t o  f i l l  in t h a t  demand 
and prov ided  a s o c i a l  o u t l e t  f o r  t h e  su rbu rban ,  r u r a l  communit ies ,  
and had e n t e r e d  t h e  urban market  as  w e l l ,  c r i p p l i n g  t h e  market  o f  t h e
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h o t e l s  who were bulk volume cus tomers  of  t h e  brewery .  The i s s u e  t h a t  
bo th e re d  both management and h o t e l i e r s  was where d id  t h e  ‘ shebeens '  
g e t  t h e i r  supply  t h a t  made them so p o p u la r  and c o m p e t i t iv e ?  Manage­
ment had proposed t o  government Shebeens be l e g a l i s e d  so t h a t  the y  
could  be s u p p l i e d  by t h e  brewery  hence be l e v i e d  and c o n t r o l l e d .  But 
as  e a r l i e r  i n d i c a t e d ,  such a p roposa l  touched  on s e n s i t i v e  p o l i t i c a l  
and s o c i a l  i s s u e s  v/hich t h e  government has handled  by complete i n a c t i o n .
By 1985 more s i g n i f i c a n t  changes v/ere made, perhaps  t o  f u r t h e r  p r o j e c t  
t h a t  lo c a l  image, when a p o s i t i o n  o f  deputy  Group General Manager was 
c r e a t e d  and l o c a l i s e d  th ro u g h  a promotion of  one of  t h e  s e c t i o n  managers 
and a coup le  o t h e r  s e n i o r  appo in tm en ts  were l o c a l i s e d .  By 1986 more 
focus  was on t r a i n i n g  and c o n s o l i d a t i o n  t o  develop  n e c e ss a ry  e x p e r i e n c e  
f o r  t h e  newly a p p o in te d .  This  was how t h e  MMB ge n e ra l  manager c e s c r i b e d  
t h a t  p e r i o d :
We have grown very q u i c k l y ,  I c a n ' t  see  us growing as f a s t .  We 
w i l l  s e t t l e  down, have r e a s o n a b l e  s t e a d y  grov/th,  . . .  g e t  ou t  of  
t h e  h i l l  v/e have been c l im b in g  . . .  v/e go t  a l o t  of  in e x p e r ien ce d  
peop le  in p o s i t i o n s ,  t h e y  need c l o s e  a t t e n t i o n  t o  make s u re  t h a t  
th e y  g e t  t h i n g s  r i g h t .
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